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The Perception of Investment Analysts on the 
Corporate Governance of Nigerian Banks  
Folajimi Ashiru 
 
Abstract 
This study is the first (to the best of this researcher's knowledge) to provide a ranking 
on features of good corporate governance drivers and how these features influence 
investment decision making. The study was conducted in a developing country 
(Nigeria) context with the aim to espouse more relevant empirical and theoretical 
underpinnings (stakeholder-agency, signaling, and social cognition theories) different 
from the ubiquitous agency theory Anglo/Saxon corporate governance model. In 
developing countries, due to the weak institutions, all stakeholders are exposed, even 
those with contracts. Moreover, developing countries' businesses environment has a 
prevalence of strong dominant individual or family shareholders presence in firms. 
Therefore, this study focused on external constituents and differs significantly from 
the internal focus (on firm performance and organizational power and politics) of 
prior corporate governance research, and extends the understanding of the features of 
good corporate governance drivers. The research adopted a mixed method approach. 
The quantitative models were tested using data obtained from 141 investment analysts 
who make investment decisions in Nigeria. The quantitative models were assessed 
using an ordered logit regression analysis approach. 
Further, the research employed the semi-structured interview technique to examine 
the psychological reasoning of investment analysts (27 interviews) when firms project 
good corporate governance drivers' features. The interviews were analyzed using a 
thematic analysis approach. The study provided conclusive evidences, and the 
findings were divided into three governance mechanisms; 1. Board structure and 
composition mechanism, 2. External Ownership Mechanism drivers, 3. 
Accountability mechanism drivers. 
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Chapter One: Introduction 
 
“Shareholders are stupid and impertinent. Stupid because they give their money to 
somebody else without any effective control over what this person is doing with it, 
and impertinent because they ask for a dividend as a reward for their stupidity” Carl 
Furstenberg, German Banker (Rajan & Zingales, 2003). 
Nevertheless, regardless of opinions held about investors, investors must continue to 
invest hence corporate governance presents mechanisms to make investments less 
"stupid" and expectations for returns less "impertinent." 
 
1.1 Background and Motivation 
Corporate governance is a broad concept whose goals operate through a number of 
mechanisms. The stakeholder – agentic (Hill & Jones, 1992) framework suggests that 
drivers of good corporate governance can protect stakeholders' interests and maximize 
the firm's earning potential (Shleifer & Vishny, 1997). These drivers1 as identified 
and collated by numerous studies (e.g., Lim et al., 2007; Filatotchev et al., 2007; 
Adegbite, 2015) are grouped into internal and external governance mechanisms.  The 
varying conceptualization of governance mechanism as practiced by firms has 
necessitated researchers (e.g. Domadenik et al., 2017; Hou et al.,  2017; Miletkov et 
al., 2015; Adegbite, 2015) to devote extensive attention to corporate governance of 
firms usually with the aim of linking the governance practices with financial 
performance measures (Nag et al., 2007).  Furthermore, researchers (e.g., Boyd & 
Solarino, 2016; Lim et al., 2007) have drawn attention to the role of particular 
governance mechanisms in helping firms achieve optimal decision making. This is 
because the adoption of corporate governance mechanisms is seen as positive for 
firms, capital markets and national economies (La Porta et al., 2000). Therefore, for 
firms to be optimally beneficial to stakeholders, the corporate governance 
mechanisms and drivers must be appreciable to all stakeholders. 
                                                          
1 The drivers are board independence, board heterogeneity, board reputation, foreign (institutional) 
investors, effective shareholder activism, voluntary disclosure, independent audit committee, pay for 
performance and board evaluation. 
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Consequently, one of the ways firms project their going concern nature is through 
self-projected governance, which is often directed by regulation. Corporate 
governance regulation is designed to ensure that an effective framework exists to 
underpin the relationship between an organization and those who hold future financial 
claims against that organization (Zingales, 1998). Holders of such claims may include 
shareholders, commercial lenders, investment analysts who represent investors and 
other stakeholders all of whom are important from a public policy perspective. All of 
these groups rely on the good stewardship of executives and managers in the 
organization to meet these claims when they arise (Jensen & Meckling, 1976).  
 
Therefore, the governance drivers projected by firms can help resolve the agency 
conflict. However, there are two types of agency conflicts, depending on ownership 
setting. Type 1 agency conflict typically assumes that conflict exists between mana-
gement as agent and shareholders as principal (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). This 
conflict happens in situations where the firm owners or shareholders as capital 
providers are separate from management who have been employed to manage the firm 
on behalf of the shareholders. Type 11 agency conflict, on the other hand, occurs 
between majority and minority shareholders because of concentrated ownership 
setting. This kind of agency problem prevails in a country or company, where the 
ownership is concentrated in the hands of few persons or with the family owners, then 
the minority shareholders find it difficult to protect their interests or wealth (Demsetz 
& Lehn, 1985). 
 
However, in spite of the different types of agency conflicts,  most corporate 
governance (especially of specialised industries) is usually researched from an inside-
out perspective with studies (e.g., Mark, 2017; Hsin-Yu et al., 2016; Warren & 
Wayne, 2016) considering firms compliance or otherwise with codes of corporate 
governance as set by a country's relevant institutional bodies. For these specialized 
industries, corporate governance seems to gain more prominence among stakeholders 
especially during times of market failures or crisis (Barth et al., 2012; Chan-Lau, 
2010; Levine, 2010; Merrouche & Erland, 2010). In order to achieve acceptability, 
   
3 
 
members of specialized industries must abide by rules which govern and sets their 
category apart. Subsequently, upon achieving a high level of legitimacy, categories 
become forms (Hannan et al., 2007) which makes stakeholders perceive firms in a 
particular industry as having similar qualities. Hence, abiding by industry rules brings 
a level of homogeneity (Di Maggio & Powell, 1983). Firms that fail to abide by the 
codes will lose legitimacy and will not appeal to the target audience (King & Whetten, 
2008; Zuckerman, 1999). This occurs because audience members find it difficult to 
evaluate the offerings of deviant firms (Leung & Sharkey, 2009), or they view such 
firms as unattractive (Leung, 2010). However, despite this obvious requirement to 
abide by the codes of their categories, firms must still differentiate themselves from 
other members of the category (Deephouse, 1999; Navis & Glynn, 2010; King & 
Whetten, 2008; Zuckerman, 1999; 2004).  
For example, to help prevent periodic crisis or failure and to enable stakeholders to 
have enlightened relationships, the financial sector of most countries have a specific 
industry code of corporate governance to which producers in the financial sector must 
abide by. To this end, all financial institutions are expected to meet minimum 
regulatory standards as dictated by the regulatory code of corporate conduct. 
Therefore, there is some homogeneity (Di Maggio & Powell, 1983) forced upon banks 
in most countries as the banks have been presented with a uniformed code of corporate 
governance to follow at a minimum.  The abidance to the uniform governance codes 
might mean stakeholders in the banking sector assume corporate governance practice 
of the banks are superficial (Adegbite, 2012, Osemeke & Adegbite, 2016; Di Maggio 
& Powell, 1983). This phenomenon becomes even more pertinent if banks operate in 
weak institutional contexts where the “rules of the game” (North, 1990, p. 3) are 
significantly different from what is obtainable in developed countries. Such 
homogenous phenomenon means the corporate governance of banks is important to 
different stakeholders for different reasons. As firms’ existence and continuity are 
related to stakeholders support and acceptance (Gray et al., 1995), firms should 
provide tools and mechanisms to address the needs of different stakeholders and their 
different concerns (Rowley, 1997). Moreover, according to Donaldson & Preston 
(1995) and Schneper & Guillen (2004) what is perceived as good corporate 
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governance by some stakeholders might not necessarily be what is understood by 
another stakeholder. What then is good corporate governance? 
Good corporate governance requires a sincere effort at self-evaluation and 
improvement on a regular basis. Zingales (1998, p. 499) described the governance 
system as "the complex set of constraints that shape the ex-post bargaining over the 
quasi-rents generated by the firm." This governance system definition by Zingales 
(1998) encompasses a wide net of stakeholders including shareholders, investors, 
creditors, employee and as well as the environment and community. This supposes a 
firm’s governance structures are designed to help the firm maximize its earning 
potential to the benefit of not only shareholders but also all stakeholders (Claessens 
& Yurtoglu, 2013). 
For specialized sectors such as the banking sector, a group of important stakeholders 
are the investors since they control the majority of stocks of publicly traded companies 
(Zorn et al., 2004). Investors can be retail or institutional. While retail investors are 
numerous in their numbers, institutional investors are custodians of large reserves of 
funds. Therefore, institutional investors represent a critical stakeholder of the 
financial sector as they provide access to essential capital required by financial sector 
players for financing activities (Zorn et al., 2004). Indeed, the capital provided by 
institutional investors is more readily available than capital provided by shareholders 
as institutional investors take an objective view of firms with the intent to make a 
profit from their investments. Inestment analysts make investments on behalf of 
institutional (and indeed retail) investors. 
Investment analysts are security specialists who analyze the performance and future 
prospects of a company by gathering and processing information about the firm from 
published reports as well as directly from management through quarterly earnings, 
conference calls and intermittent meetings (Brauer & Wiersema, 2018). Investment 
analysts can be of two types. First, there are investment analysts who only analyse 
and share their expert opinions about a firm with the investment community through 
their research reports and recommendations of the firm’s stock (strong buy, buy, hold, 
under-perform, and sell) (Pollock & Rindova, 2003). Second, there are investment 
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analysts who not only analyse, but also make investment decisions typically on behalf 
of their employers or investors, who might prefer to rely on experts for their 
investment decisions. Investment analysts of concern in this research are those that 
make actual investments in Nigeria on behalf of clients. Hence, investment analysts 
are considered prominent information intermediaries in the financial markets (Jensen 
& Meckling, 1976) and their recommendations have significant impact on investment 
decisions (Frankel et al., 2006). The importance of investment analysts makes them 
to be stakeholders that firms will want to pay attention to (Wiersema & Zhang, 2011). 
For specialized sectors such as the banking sector, investment analysts are particularly 
important, since investors, especially institutional investors, whom they represent 
control majority of stocks of publicly traded companies (Zorn et al., 2004). Given the 
importance of investment analysts, producers in the financial sector seek to project 
their firms positively to investment analysts, in the hope that investment analysts have 
a positive perception of the producer firms. Hence, especially in less developed 
countries where institutions are weak, corporate governance can act as an alternative 
institutional mechanism (Anderson & Reeb, 2004). Therefore, the projection of good 
corporate governance represents one avenue for producers in the financial sector to 
attract investments from investment analysts. 
Investment analysts regularly make investment decisions. These investment decisions 
are almost inevitably complex, and thus create significant challenges for investment 
analysts. Like many high-level strategic choices, investment decisions may involve 
large amounts of ambiguous data (Coff, 2003; Jemison & Sitkin, 1986), which causes 
information overload. This information must often be evaluated under considerable 
time pressure because of concerns regarding secrecy and competitive bidding 
(Jemison & Sitkin, 1986). Therefore, investment decisions require sophisticated, 
strategic thinking about how unfolding events may change the value of the target firm 
(Capron, 1999; Capron et al., 1998). The decision-making complexity means 
investment analysts must be able to effectively recognize good corporate governance 
drivers that will influence their investment decision making. The importance of 
identifying relevant drivers of good corporate governance cannot be underestimated 
as investment analysts are more concerned about protecting themselves (and their 
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firms) from being exploited rather than disciplining management (Claessens & 
Yurtoglu, 2013).  
This need for self-protection or awareness is even more pertinent in developing 
countries, where the principal-agent problem (type 1) is not the most prevalent, but 
rather the principal – principal agency challenge (type 11) (Adegbite, 2015). In such 
weak institutional environments, good corporate governance reduces risks and 
encourages minority shareholders and creditors to provide more financing to firms 
(Claessens & Yurtoglu, 2013). According to OECD principles of corporate 
governance, the corporate governance framework should ensure the strategic 
guidance of the company, the effective monitoring of management by the board and 
the board’s accountability to the company and the shareholders (OECD, 2004).  
Unsurprisingly, Chen et al., (2009; 2011) find that firm-level corporate governance 
significantly lowers the cost of capital in developing countries with the effect more 
pronounced in countries with particularly poor legal system. Similarly, according to 
Gugler (1999), in situations where banks implement governance systems that 
facilitate the efficient mobilization and allocation of funds, it will lower the capital 
cost, boosts the capital information, and, consequently, stimulates productive growth 
within the firm.  Thus, one can infer that to lower costs of capital or loans in 
developing markets, investment analysts can use firm-level corporate governance as 
a form of a substitute to the legal protection afforded stakeholders (Anderson & Reeb, 
2004). 
Consequently, as posited by Claessens & Yurtoglu (2013 p. 19), "the question then 
arises, why firms, markets, and countries do not adjust and adopt voluntarily better 
corporate governance measures. The answer is that firms, markets, and countries do 
adjust to some extent, work only imperfectly and involve considerable cost". In any 
case, Schneider & Scherer (2015) advocated that the dominant approach to corporate 
governance which concentrates on the primacy of shareholder (Daily et al., 2003, 
Judge, 2009) does not properly consider the risk accruing from changing economic 
and political conditions of business firms operating in a global environment nor the 
resulting legitimacy problems of business firms. Especially as major factors that shape 
firms governance structure are the overall country’s development, institutional 
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environment (Nakpodia & Adegbite, 2018) and in developing countries especially, 
the individual firm’s ownership structure (Claessens & Yurtoglu, 2013). 
Therefore, for corporate governance to help investors make better decision, 
researchers need to focus on corporate governance practices, the firm-level analysis 
positions that allocate power, looking beyond conventional approaches in law and 
financial economics that position corporate governance as good enough panacea to 
the problems of agency costs inherent in firms (Fama & Jensen, 1983; Jensen & 
Meckling, 1976). It is pertinent to move away from the inside out perspective 
narratives and also consider the external perspective narrative. This external 
stakeholder perspective narrative will consider governance practices of firms from the 
viewpoint of the audience rather than industry actors.  Especially considering that for 
specialized industries, drivers of corporate governance might mean different things to 
different stakeholders (Donaldson & Preston, 1995; Schneper & Guillen, 2004).  
Interestingly, the delicate nature of specialized sectors such as banking means that 
regulators are always primed to minimize crisis. This leads the regulators to introduce 
code of corporate governance which are supposed to be means or mechanisms which 
reduce agency conflicts and help the alignment of interests (Goranova et al., 2017). 
However, recent research has begun to document that some firms' actual practices do 
not always acquiesce to codes as introduced by the regulators (Bednar et al., 2015; 
Chizema et al., 2015). This might not be unconnected to the fact that many codes of 
corporate governances are merely an adoption of the ubiquitous Anglo/Saxon models 
of corporate governance (Adegbite et al., 2013). 
Furthermore, the homogeneity presented by the corporate governance practices of 
banks in developing countries might prevent differentiation, hindering the ability of 
investment analysts to make informed decisions. The homogenous characteristic of 
banks results from the fact that they are heavily regulated. This heavy regulation is 
necessitated due to the critical part that banking institutions are required to play in 
economic development, the opacity of their activities and assets, and the readily-
available source of revenue from public depositors and the need to protect depositors 
(Adegbite, 2012; Alenazi, 2016). For these reasons, governments (of different 
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countries) through their respective regulatory agencies have laid down regulations 
governing banks. Indeed, the strict regulation of the commercial bank industry is a 
practice emphasized by most countries around the world. 
Further, the international standards set up by the International Monetary Fund (IMF), 
Bank for International Settlement (BIS) and World Bank have placed pressure on 
governments to ensure their heavy involvement in the banking sector. However, the 
government regulations introduced have been noted to distort bankers' behavior, and 
inhibit the implementation of individual processes of corporate governance (Alenazi, 
2016). In the light of this enforced homogeneity, what corporate governance drivers 
matter to investors? The lack of differentiation by banks necessarily means 
stakeholders might hold contrasting opinions on what constitutes good corporate 
governance. Especially in highly regulated industries such as the banking sector, 
stakeholders might have differing opinions on what represents good corporate 
governance and on the level of importance of the drivers of good corporate 
governance.  
Thus, in an attempt to extend existing literature on the drivers of good corporate 
governance, (Adegbite, 2015; Okike, 2007; Filatotchev et al., 2007) this research 
identifies drivers of good corporate governance that lead to decision making from the 
perspective of investment analysts. Furthermore, the governance literature does not 
provide a comprehensive assessment of the validity of individual features of drivers 
of corporate governance in a systematic way (Black et al., 2017; Filatotchev et al., 
2007).  This research, which relies on stakeholder-agency, signaling and social 
cognition theories, takes a psychological approach to corporate governance by 
investigating investment analysts' perspective to what represents good corporate 
governance drivers, using the Nigerian banking sector for context. (Nigeria is a 
developing country with a significantly developed financial sector).    
1.2 Contextual Study Site 
This research has chosen Nigeria as a contextual study site and Nigerian Banks as 
firms of interest for many important reasons. Nigeria, located in West Africa is the 
most populous country in Africa with an estimated population of about 190.87million 
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(UN, 2018), composed of 250 tribes, and could be the world’s third largest population 
by 2050 (IMF, 2018). The country has a GDP of USD376.3bn (IMF, 2018) making it 
Africa’s largest economy (IMF, 2018). The Nigerian economy grew by an average of 
6.5% from 2005- 2015 (World Bank, 2015)2. Oil and gas sector constitutes only 11% 
of the country's GDP but accounts for 95% foreign exchange earnings making the 
country largely a mono-export economy. Hence, fluctuations in prices of oil affect the 
revenue generation capacity of the country. Service sector constitutes about 50% of 
the GDP while agriculture has a 23% share. (CBN, 2016). The country is also largely 
a consumer nation importing its needs from different parts of the world. Being the 
27th largest economy in the world (IMF, 2018), her importance in Africa and indeed 
the world cannot be overemphasized. Enjoying a stable democratic government since 
1999 (Yusuf et al., 2018), the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
(UNCTAD) (2014) reports that Nigeria has remained a major attraction in Africa for 
Foreign Direct Investments (FDI) over recent years. Its ability to continually attract 
these foreign investments could be weakened by the state of its corporate governance. 
However, investors are willing to pay a premium for better-governed firms in less-
developed markets (Khanna & Zyla, 2012). 
In developed countries, the general value system of the people has more implications 
for corporate governance than political networks (Hollingsworth & Lindberg, 1985). 
This value system might not necessarily be present in developing countries. Hence, 
characterized by weak institutions (Adegbite, 2015) and pockets of powerful business 
and political elites (Nakpodia & Adegbite, 2018), Nigeria presents a peculiar 
challenge for potential investors and indeed all stakeholders that should normally be 
interested in tapping into the country's vast potentials. Instructively, Nigeria has a 
relatively developed financial sector (Alade, 2012) regulated in line with world 
standards (Levine, 2012). However, the financial sector is not immune from the weak 
institutions prevalent in the environment, hence, despite the regulations, the 
challenges faced by stakeholders in the financial sector are well documented (see 
Adegbite, 2012).   
                                                          
2 Nigeria recently exited a recession, and its GDP is projected by the IMF to grow at a rate of 2.1% for 2018 and 
2.3% for 2019 
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Nevertheless, Nigeria is a leading light in corporate governance research in Africa 
and indeed developing countries (Ahunwan, 2002; Okike, 2007; Amao & Amaeshi, 
2008; Amaeshi &  Amao, 2009; Adegbite et al., 2013; Nakpodia et al., 2016). The 
distinctiveness of Nigeria's corporate governance system can provide different 
dynamics to the ubiquitous agency problem frequently researched from the Anglo-
American perspectives (La Porta et al., 1999).  This distinctiveness lends itself to the 
Nigerian banking sector. As stated earlier, corporate governance in Nigeria banking 
sector is characterized by homogeneity by banks due to the mandatory requirement 
of the Central bank of Nigeria (CBN) for all banks to meet a specified code of 
corporate governance. Despite this mandatory governance requirement, stakeholders 
still have to contend with weak institutional environments. Characteristic of 
environments with weak institutions (and largely informal environment) are dominant 
shareholders and elites (Nakpodia & Adegbite, 2018). These elites or dominant 
shareholders are often associated with autocratic behavior (Carl et al., 2004). 
Subsequently, this informal institutional environment impacts governance framework 
(Globerman & Shapiro, 2003; Strange et al., 2009). In developing countries, the more 
power vested in top management relative to other stakeholders (Hofstede 2001), the 
more decisions are dominated by a few. For example, directors on boards of banks 
are supposed to be independent of management and make their own decisions on 
issues, but in Nigeria the CEO or the Chairman is typically overbearing (Adegbite, 
2015).  Hence, trust in compliance with governance regulations is vested in external 
organizations rather than internal structure. The perception of external stakeholders 
will be that bureaucratic processes internally might blur firms operations and 
reporting, seemingly in a bid to protect the organization and the dominant 
shareholders to the detriment of other stakeholders (Hofstede, 2001).  
The importance of investment analysts makes them to be stakeholders that firms want 
to pay attention to (Wiersema & Zhang, 2011). For specialized sectors such as the 
banking sector, investment analysts are particularly important, since investors, 
especially institutional investors, whom they represent, control majority of stocks of 
publicly traded companies (Zorn et al., 2004). Consequently, this present research 
recognizes that formal and informal institutional structures determine 
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consumer/audience choices (North, 1990). In situations whereby formal institutions 
are weak, informal institutions; such as norms governing interpersonal relationships, 
must be escalated by firms and individuals for strategic and performance decision-
making processes (Peng & Heath, 1996). As a result, investment analysts have to 
address the various challenges of their investment decisions, as they cannot rely upon 
the regulatory environment in countries with weak institutions. These developments 
challenge the dominant approach to corporate governance that regards shareholders 
as the only stakeholder group in need of special protection due to risks not covered 
by contracts and legal institutions (Schneider & Scherer, 2015). 
Furthermore, the banking sector in Nigeria presents moderate representativeness of 
developed corporations in sub-Saharan Africa (Lewane, 2012). The development of 
the financial sector makes the banking sector closest to corporate governance 
scholarly representations of the agentic issue. Moreover, the banking sector in Nigeria 
is highly regulated and follows the international financial reporting standards (IFRS) 
(Abdulkadir, 2012). In addition, the financial sector in Nigeria is the most organized 
sector in the country and is quite transparent, which enables it to attract many 
investors' (local and international) interests (Lewane, 2012). In particular, the bedrock 
of any country's development lies with its financial sector (Millineux, 2006) hence, it 
is not surprising that the banking industry is by far one of the most scrutinized sectors 
in any country and is characterized by intense regulation (Mechelli et al., 2017). 
Yet, while previous studies might have documented the weaknesses in the governance 
and regulatory practices in Nigeria (ROSC 2004; Okike, 2007; Okike & Adegbite, 
2012; Osemeke & Adegbite, 2016), most of the studies have mainly stopped at 
highlighting some of these corporate governance regulatory challenges, without 
providing fundamentally new perspectives for stakeholders to make important 
decisions such as investments. To the best of the researcher’s knowledge, the 
literature on corporate governance in developing countries does not provide a 
comprehensive assessment of the validity of individual governance driver features in 
a systematic way. Nor does it provide a ranking of individual driver features in terms 
of their relevant importance vis-à-vis other features in the same “family” of the ‘good’ 
governance benchmarks (Filatotchev et al., 2007). There is a need to identify these 
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important drivers and features that describe them, especially in a weak institutional 
context, where there is a need for reliance on corporate governance indicators 
(Anderson & Reeb, 2004). Especially as there are different corporate governance 
practices for different countries and among different sectors (Khanna et al., 2006).  
 
1.3 Research Gaps 
It is evident many corporate governance studies are focused on one or two core areas 
while neglecting other important drivers of corporate governance (Filatotchev et al., 
2007). The effectiveness of this individual driver analysis is questioned especially 
when contradictory or ambiguous results are obtained for similar drivers (Li et al., 
2010; Bear et al., 2010; Barnea & Rubin, 2010). The presence of other corporate 
governance elements further complicates the results of such isolated empirical 
corporate governance studies. Moreover, for individual firms, a different set of 
practices might produce more appropriate corporate governance structure (Agrawal 
& Knoweber, 1996). Hence rather than seeing corporate governance drivers in 
isolation, they may be better understood in terms of a complete combination (Li et al., 
2010; Bear et al., 2010; Barnea & Rubin, 2010, Filatotchev et al., 2007). Indeed, some 
prior studies (e.g., Ryan & Wiggins, 2002; Cheng, 2004; Wu & Tu, 2007; Coles et 
al., 2008) have supported the view that firm-level governance factors have potential 
to solve agency problem. As a result, researchers build corporate governance indices 
and test whether they predict firm value or performances even though these indices 
are imperfect (Black et al., 2017).  The unreliability of these indices led Black et al., 
(2017) to suggest caution in relying on research using corporate governance indices 
as a basis for firm-level governance changes or country level legal (regulatory) 
reforms. Consequently, Adegbite (2015) reported nine firm level antecedents, which 
determine good corporate governance practices in Nigeria a developing country. 
However, Adegbite's research took views of board members and industry experts on 
what constitutes drivers of good corporate governance and did not provide for the 
views of expert stakeholders who might hold divergent views on signals emanating 
from the producer firms. Indeed different drivers can substitute or compliment 
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themselves (Dalton et al., 2003; Hoskisson et al., 2002) permitting various 
interpretations by stakeholders. This current study will test nine antecedents of good 
corporate governance in a weak institutional setting in a particular category of 
producers (Nigerian banks) from the viewpoint of investment analysts with the aim 
to determine what particular corporate governance features lead to investment 
decision making.  
Also, Schneider & Scherer (2015 p.318) hold that a "democratization of corporate 
governance required by law or soft law might be a way to indirectly tackle governance 
gaps." Just as Schneider & Scherer (2015) propose that further research is necessary 
to find ways to process and balance compliance claims of an organization and its 
efficiency. Gomez & Korin (2008) show that corporate governance practices of firms 
are necessary to signal trustworthiness and establish confidence such that investors 
are willing to invest in the firm and that other stakeholders' consent to the activities 
of the firm.   Therefore, corporate governance, which plays a central role in securing 
corporate accountability, has to adapt to the changing economic and political 
operations conditions of corporations if it is to remain capable of filling this objective. 
Hence, instead of corporate governance being centered on the protection of corporate 
shareholders, it needs to secure corporate accountability to all those affected by 
corporate action, even indirectly (Schneider & Scherer, 2015; Brauer & Wiersema, 
2018). This research will provide empirical evidence revealing what corporate 
governance drivers signal to investment analysts.  
Furthermore, different industries might have different corporate governance drivers 
(Khaana et al., 2006). Indeed, contingencies of industries may also differ depending 
on contextual environment making generalization quite difficult. Therefore, industry 
focus research might be critical and important for policymaking or public 
understanding (Filatotchev et al., 2007). Jizi (2013) underscores the fact that there is 
a dearth of studies, which have considered the importance of examining the impact of 
banks internal corporate governance mechanism and reconciling its consequences on 
banks value. Therefore, further research is needed on why particular governance 
drivers as projected by banks might not mean the same thing to the external 
stakeholders such as investment analysts. Especially in a weak institutional 
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environment where there is evidence that firms through selective compliance to a 
multiplicity of codes (Osemeke & Adegbite, 2016) can signal effective or ineffective 
corporate governance. This study will present the psychological underpinnings to 
what the features of drivers of good corporate governance drivers in the banking 
sector of Nigeria mean to investment analysts. 
 
1.3 Research Questions 
Expectedly, investment analysts who invest in the banking sector rely on regulatory 
induced governance practices for their decision-making.  However, the undesirable 
effects of a weak institutional environment (Adegbite et al., 2013), escalates the 
importance of corporate governance drivers and perception of these drivers. Hence, 
while codes of corporate governance have been variously introduced, and are 
mandatory for the banking sector in Nigeria, the impact of these codes on corporate 
governance practices cannot be deemed satisfactory (Okpara, 2011). Similarly, the 
homogeneity and convergence prospects of corporate governance regulations and 
codes have been subjected to constant scrutiny (Khanna & Palepu, 2004; Yoshikawa 
& Rasheed, 2009; Osemeke & Adegbite, 2016). 
Therefore, what do important stakeholders such as investment analysts perceive when 
banks project governance drivers? The corporate governance literature on governance 
mechanisms in developing countries leaves the following questions unanswered; 1a. 
Which board structure and composition governance drivers’ features matter to 
investment analysts for investment making decisions and why? 1b. Which external 
ownership governance drivers’ features matter to investment analysts for investment 
decision making and why? 1c. Which accountability mechanism governance drivers’ 
features matter to investment analysts for investment decision making and why? This 
research focuses on these questions. 
As a result, taking into account Nigeria’s investment climate on the one hand, and 
grounding in prior literature as well as established regulatory codes on the other hand, 
this study examines the perception of investment analysts on nine firm-level 
antecedents of good corporate governance in Nigeria (Adegbite, 2015; Filatotchev et 
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al., 2007). These drivers are also represented in the code of corporate governance for 
banks by the Central Bank of Nigeria. 
 
1.4 Research Methodology 
This study employs a mixed methodology.  Mixed methods research integrates both 
quantitative and qualitative data (Boyd et al., 2012; Johl et al., 2012). The mixed 
method approach helps to overcome the deficiencies in studies that engage either a 
quantitative technique or a qualitative approach (Creswell, 2013). For example, 
quantitative research is less likely to answer ‘why' a phenomenon (shareholder 
behaviour) occurs (Creswell & Clark, 2011), providing an opportunity to apply 
important elements of one approach to research that engages another approach. Thus, 
this approach enables us to unpack the various rationalisations that inform the 
response of investment analysts to the features of good corporate governance drivers. 
Survey method 
Following the work of researchers such as Filatotchev et al. (2007), Adegbite (2015), 
McCahery et al. (2016), the identified features of good corporate governance were 
used to develop a survey questionnaire, and the respondents were invited to score each 
classification on a 5-point Likert scale, with 1 = strongly agree and 5 = strongly 
disagree. This was appropriate given that the item inter-correlations were strong 
(Guadagnoli & Velicer, 1988). A comprehensive database of investment analysts who 
purchase equities or fixed income transactions in Nigeria was compiled. The database 
contained detailed information (emails, phone numbers) of 1, 250 investment 
analysts. Questionnaires were circulated to them all and 161 responses were received, 
141 of which were useable in the survey.  115 (8.2%)3 of the useable questionnaires 
were completely filled. This response rate is acceptable and comparable to similar 
surveys (e.g., 5.3% in Brav et al. (2008a), 4.3% in Dichev et al. (2013), and 5.4% in 
McCahery et al. (2016)). The survey was administered anonymously to mitigate 
                                                          
3 The low response rate is primarily the result of the mass emailing using the obtained comprehensive 
investment analysts’ database. If one excludes the mass emailing, the response rate is substantially higher at 
40.2% 
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concerns of untruthful or strategic answers. It was also emphasized that individual 
responses would be treated as confidential4. The survey questionnaire (full detail of 
the questionnaire items is provided in Appendix 1) was distributed and collated using 
Qualtrics, a web-based survey tool.  The survey questions were modifications from 
previous studies and were pre-tested to ensure their validity, reliability and contextual 
relevance (Adegbite, 2015; Bryman & Bell, 2015). 
This methodology was aimed at achieving two objectives. First, a relatively high score 
across the population of respondents would indicate the high importance of specific 
features in a family of drivers of good corporate governance. Second, following 
McCahery et al. (2016), ordered logit regressions was used to show the relationship 
between the feature of a driver and decision making. Ordered logit regression allows 
the interpretation of all regression coefficients as suggestive evidence with respect to 
the underlying theoretical arguments but not as tests of causality.  
 
Interview Method 
Consistent with previous research on corporate governance in Nigeria (e.g., Uche et 
al., 2016; Amao & Amaeshi, 2008; Adegbite et al., 2013; Nakpodia & Adegbite, 
2018), the quantitative data was complemented with semi-structured interviews to 
further validate the theoretical framework, triangulate the results, and flesh out the 
findings with illustrative quotes. Semi-structured interviews were conducted between 
December 2017 and January 2018. Participants were drawn from senior investment 
analysts who are experienced and understand the Nigerian business environment. 
They include managing directors, chief investment officers, senior asset managers 
and fund managers. All these executives were familiar with drivers of good corporate 
governance. The experience of the participants enabled this research to benefit from 
their knowledge of the topic thereby improving the objectivity and reliability of the 
research design. Also, this enriched data prevented similitude and served as a control 
                                                          
4 Furthermore, discussions with a number of the respondents indicated that they were quite passionate about the 
topic and would not have spent time filling the questionnaire if they intended to answer untruthfully. 
   
17 
 
mechanism upon which different views were assessed and compared with one another 
(see Adegbite, 2015). 
The interview data collected for this study were analysed using the NVivo 11 
application package which allows for the subjective interpretation of the content of 
text data through a systematic classification process of coding and identifying themes 
or patterns (Hsieh & Shannon, 2005).  
 
1.5 Contribution 
This study contributes to the body of knowledge in the following ways; Firstly, 
whereas, Adegbite (2015 p.319) answered the pertinent question of "how firms can, 
by themselves, promote good corporate governance in weak institutional settings" , 
the research did not reveal what investment analysts interpret the drivers of corporate 
governance as projected by these firms in developing countries to mean. Projected 
corporate governance drivers by firms might not necessarily be viewed in the same 
manner by investment analysts.  Therefore, it is necessary to reveal what investment 
analysts perceive when they are presented with the corporate governance mechanism 
drivers of Nigerian banks. This is important for many reasons not least because it will 
enable both local and international business firms operating in developing countries 
to position themselves for favorable investment decisions. In providing insights to 
this lacuna, this research inquiry employs a sectoral study in Nigeria in order to 
investigate what particular features of governance mechanism drivers matter to 
investment analysts in a weak (corrupt) institutional environment.  Using the banking 
sector also enables the stakeholder-agentic challenge to be appropriately appreciated 
as investment analysts might be latent or active principals.  
Secondly, the discussions herein are about the perceptions of investment analysts on 
the governance drivers.  Using already established constructs, this study developed a 
survey for quantifiable measurement in direct response to the call by Adegbite (2015) 
for test on the governance drivers (and propositions) that project good corporate 
governance practices. As a result, this study developed testable hypotheses on the 
significance or otherwise of each driver features on investment decision making. This 
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is done in an attempt to reveal which specific features adequately describe each 
governance drivers. Subsequently, the opinions of some of the top executive 
investment analysts were obtained to understand the "why" behind the choices. 
Thirdly, the institutional theoretical account has been variously used to supplement 
some of the limitations of agency theory (Adegbite & Nakajima, 2011; Nakpodia, 
2015) in corporate governance research, especially in Nigeria. However, neo-
institutionalism may not fully capture the dynamics of corporate governance as the 
theory does not contemplate the contingencies that promote institutional change 
(Buck & Shahrim, 2005). This study in response to a call for management scholars to 
engage more with psychological research in the business field (Connelly et al., 2011) 
relied on less investigated social cognition theory to provide investment analysts 
insights applicable in weak governance environments.  Potentially, this research 
provides coherent theoretical generalization that can go beyond the Nigerian case and 
help in providing generalizations for developing countries with weak institutional 
environments. Discussions in this study also help to overcome the criticism that the 
social cognitive theory is too broad, as this research obtained opinions of a specific 
group of experts on corporate governance drivers.  
Further, this study offers a stakeholder-agentic approach to understanding corporate 
governance drivers. The rise of institutional theory (Davis, 2009a; Davis, 2011) and 
advent of agency theory, (Dobbin & Jung, 2010; Shapiro, 2005) have perhaps made 
the shareholder-value oriented corporate governance more popular. Dobbin & Jung 
(2010) however criticized this approach as they argued it leads to short-termism in 
corporate policy. This study obtained the perspective of important economic agents 
using a stakeholder-agentic approach to understand if features of governance drivers 
signals projected by actors in a sector were similarly received by the audience 
especially investment analysts. We also extend the signaling theory by focusing on 
investors' perception of features of corporate governance drivers as signaled by actors 
in the banking sector. 
Empirically, this research further adds to the budding literature on corporate 
governance in African countries (Briston, 1978; Abor, 2007; Kyereboah-Coleman, 
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2007; Mangena & Chamisa, 2008; Sanda et al., 2010; Bokpin, 2011; Mahadeo et al., 
2012; Mangena et al., 2012; Ntim et al., 2012; Ntim & Soobaroyen, 2013; Adegbite, 
2015; Nakpodia & Adegbite 2018). Nigeria is an African giant with ambitions to be 
one of the top 20 economies in the world by the year 2020, by being able to maintain 
its economic leadership role in Africa. Very much on the way to meeting this target, 
the need for Nigeria to institute an effective corporate governance framework that 
recognizes the increasingly important role of investors/investment analysts cannot be 
overstated. 
Finally, whereas the cavernous lacuna in literature on corporate governance in Nigeria 
is receiving increasing scholarly attention (Okike, 2007; Adegbite & Nakajima, 
2011a, Adegbite, 2015, Nakpodia et al., 2016; Nakpodia & Adegbite, 2018), authors 
have predominantly focussed on the environmental determinants of corporate 
governance in the country. This study extends the micro-level descriptions of the 
growing empirical literature by presenting perspectives of investment analysts on 
identified firm-level drivers of good corporate governance in Nigerian banks. The 
discussions in this study are not only useful to the Sub-Saharan African business 
scholarship but also provides pointers to bank executives on which drivers of good 
corporate governance signals that can help them attract much-needed investment. 
1.6 Thesis Structure 
After this introduction, chapter two is the theoretical framework of the entire thesis. 
The different theories of relevance in corporate governance are discussed. Following 
which the stakeholder-agency (main theory), signaling and social cognition theories 
(supporting theories) of this research are elaborated.  
Chapter three is a comprehensive literature review which discusses corporate 
governance in developed countries, developing countries, Nigeria, Nigerian banking 
sector and code of corporate governance in Nigeria. This part also provides a review 
of mechanisms of good corporate governance in developing countries context, 
investment analysts and investment decision making. 
Chapter four combines the theoretical underpinnings and the literature review to 
develop the research hypotheses. In all 33 hypotheses were developed. Undertaking 
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a research activity requires a rigorous methodological procedure to enhance its 
success (Bryman, 2015). To this end, chapter five represents the research 
methodology of the thesis. The study examines the perspectives of investment 
analysts as it regards corporate governance drivers projected by Nigerian banks. To 
do this, a mixed method was adopted. Firstly, the compatibility of the selected 
research design with the research objectives and questions is discussed. The chapter 
also addresses the challenges in using a mixed-methods research design. Secondly, 
the chapter discusses the quantitative research design, methodology, statistical 
analysis of data used in this study, and the justification of the chosen data and research 
design. Thirdly, the theoretical framework that underlies the qualitative research 
method, the design of the semi-structured interviews and the process of data collection 
and data analysis using a thematic analysis approach.  
Chapter Six presents the investment analysts’ perspective on board structure and 
composition drivers features and how these features impact investment decision 
making. For easy following, the chapter is divided into three parts (a. board 
independence driver features, b. board heterogeneity driver features, and c. board 
reputation driver features). Each part presents the statistical summaries of the features 
of the mechanism drivers and the control variables used in the developed models for 
the mechanism drivers. The quantitative and qualitative findings of the investment 
analysts' perspectives of drivers are then integrated. Following which a conclusion is 
presented. 
Chapter Seven presents the investment analysts' perception of external ownership 
mechanism drivers’ features and their impact on investment decision making. For 
easy following, the chapter is divided into two parts (a.foreign institutional investors 
driver features and b. effective shareholder activism driver features). Each part of the 
chapter presents the statistical summaries of the features of the external mechanism 
driver and the control variables used in the developed models for the mechanism 
driver. The quantitative and qualitative findings of the investment analysts' 
perspectives of drivers are then integrated. Following which a conclusion is presented. 
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Chapter Eight presents the investment analysts' perception of accountability 
mechanism drivers features. Again, for easy following, the chapter is divided into four 
parts (a. voluntary disclosure driver features, b. independent audit committee driver 
features, c pay for performance driver features and d. board evaluation features). Each 
part of the chapter presents the statistical summaries of the features of the 
accountability mechanism driver and the control variables used in the developed 
models for the mechanism driver. The quantitative and qualitative findings of the 
investment analysts' perspectives of drivers are then integrated. Following which a 
conclusion is presented. 
Chapter Nine is the thesis conclusion showing the results and findings of the thesis. 
The chapter also reveals the implication for theory, developing countries, and 
investors. Finally, limitations and future research direction are provided. 
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Chapter Two: Theoretical Framework  
 
2.1 Introduction 
The theoretical framework of this study focuses on how investors perceive the signals 
of corporate governance drivers and to what extent these drivers influence decision 
making. Theory is important as it helps us to describe and understand how events 
occur; phenomenon is arrived at, and reasoning is developed. Theories do not 
necessarily mean we will not get unexpected relationships or occurrences as a theory 
will not necessarily tell us "what to do, but it will tell us what is possible to do and 
what is not possible to do" (Iskander, 2008, p. 109). Theory helps us eliminate a 
number of situations when we have to choose among alternatives (Champers, 1996).  
Corporate governance studies have been served with many theories. These include 
agency, stakeholder, stewardship, signalling, behaviorial and institutional theories. 
The introductory part of this chapter will highlight agency, stakeholder, stewardship 
and institutional theories none of which will be relied on solely or primarily by this 
research. It will also explain why these theories do not particularly address the 
questions of this present study. Subsequently, the research theories (stakeholder-
agency, signaling, and social cognition) will be discussed in the light of their 
appropriateness to developing country context. 
2.2. Theories not utilised in this study 
i. The agency theory assumes that the ability of a firm to maximize its wealth is 
advanced by minimizing possible conflicts between its main actors (Fama & Jensen, 
1983). This possible conflict is usually referred to as the agency problem (Jensen & 
Meckling, 1976). While agency theory has provided scholars with the dominant 
theoretical inspiration for understanding corporate governance, it has also been 
criticized in favor of more accommodating theoretical views (Eisenhardt, 1989; 
Hillman & Dalziel, 2003; Judge Jr. & Zeithaml, 1992). Researchers increasingly 
realize that there is not a single agency model that adequately depicts corporate 
governance in all national contexts (La Porta et al., 1997, 1998; Lubatkin et al., 
2005a). The agency theory satisfactorily explains situations where 
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executives/managers (agents) can have economic self-interest, which will naturally 
affect firm performance and the subsequent payoff to the shareholders, it misses 
essential bases of human behavior, upon which cooperation and collective action are 
possible. The weak institutional environment prevalent in developing countries such 
as Nigeria, and the stakeholders of interest in this research (investment analysts) 
weakens agency theory as a theory to use in isolation for research focused on 
investment analysts' perspective on governance drivers. See more on agency theory 
in appendix 4a. 
ii. Stewardship theory, rooted in sociology and psychology, is usually presented as 
the alternative theory to agency theory (Davis et al., 1997).  This is because 
stewardship theory rather than assume a divergence of principal and agent interests 
defines human relationships around a more robust behavioral model. In spite of 
suggestions that executives/stewards in “loosely coupled, heterogeneous 
organizations with competing stakeholders and competing shareholder objectives are 
motivated to make decisions that they perceive are in the best interests of the group”, 
(Davis et al., 1997, p. 25),  this study is not concerned with the motives of managers 
to perform or serve. This present study concerns itself with the perspective of 
investment analysts on which features of good corporate governance drivers are 
important for investment decision-making purposes and why. As a result, the 
stewardship theory is not appropriate for this study especially as it accounts mainly 
for managers as stakeholders and not investors or investment analysts. See more on 
stewardship theory in appendix 4b. 
iii. Stakeholder perspective can be traced to 1930's depression era when used by 
General Electric Company to engineer its survival (Preston & Sapienza, 1990). The 
theoretical concept here is that the general society expects firms to behave properly 
in a manner that guarantees their going concern and in manners that befits their social 
and economic roles. Freeman, (1984) defines a stakeholder of a firm as those who can 
affect or are affected directly or indirectly by the firm's success or otherwise. They 
can also exercise some form of power or discretion over the firm or its activities 
(Donaldson & Preston, 1995). Stakeholders are classified into two groups: primary 
stakeholders (e.g employees, management, investors, regulators, etc.), whose 
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participation is essential for the survival of the firm, and secondary stakeholders (e.g 
analysts, NGOs, regulators, etc), who are not essential to the survival of the 
corporation although their actions and response can significantly damage or benefit 
the corporation (Freeman, 1984; Clarkson, 1995). However, the broad nature of the 
stakeholder theory makes it only partially suited for this present study. Although the 
stakeholder theory supports a concept where non-financial measures are designed to 
investigate firm activities (Logsdon & Lewellyn, 1998), it fails to recognize the 
agency challenges that exists between managers and investment analysts who make 
investment decisions on behalf of their clients. See more on stakeholder theory in 
appendix 4c. 
iv. Institutional theory is a well-developed theory in management studies that 
presupposes that firms are not just concerned or affected by internal environment but 
also by its external regulatory, normative and cognitive institutional environment 
(Scott, 1995). Institutionalism assumes that organizations conform to accepted 
standards of behavior in an effort to enhance their survivability by gaining legitimacy 
with other external organizations. Leading from this, the institutional theory is based 
upon the idea that much of what shapes organizational structures and behaviors are a 
reflection of patterns that have evolved from doing things over a period. As a result, 
the prediction of organizational practices and their explanations can be arrived at by 
examining industry traditions and patterns (Eisenhardt, 1988; Judge & Zeithaml, 
1992). Thus, from an institutional theory perspective, in order to gain competitive 
advantage, firms in particular concentrated industries adopt similar strategies 
(DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Meyer & Rowan, 1977; Scott, 1995) which leads to some 
form of homogeneity (D’Aveni, 1994). This action makes some firm activities 
fashionable (Sharma & Vredenburg, 1998).   
This current study concerns itself not with the conformity or otherwise of banks with 
mandatory regulations which produces the isomorphism. Instead, the study focuses 
on perspectives of investment analysts and how features of drivers of good corporate 
governance can influence their decision-making. The study is not primarily concerned 
with Nigerian banks' legitimacy or compliance with codes of corporate governance. 
Therefore, while the institutional theory has some relevance to this current research, 
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it does not provide enough impetus to answer the research questions, which are 
concerned about perspectives of investment analysts on features of good corporate 
governance drivers that leads to decision making. Theories that explain the agentic 
relationship between external stakeholders and firm and psychological reasoning for 
actions these external stakeholders engage in are more relevant to this research. See 
more on institutional theory in appendix 4d. 
2.3 Core Theoretical Framework. Stakeholder-Agency Theory  
Review of existing governance literature reveals that agency theory (Jensen & 
Meckling, 1976) and stakeholder theory (Freeman, 1984) are the two dominant5 
perspectives used to explain corporate governance relationships. Hence, by 
combining the agency and stakeholder theories, Hill & Jones (1992) conceptualized 
the stakeholder-agency theory. This theory proposes a paradigm that helps explain 
certain aspects of a firm's strategic behaviour, the structure of management‐
stakeholder contracts, the form taken by the institutional structures that monitor and 
enforce contracts between managers and other stakeholders and the evolutionary 
process that shapes both management‐stakeholder contracts and the institutional 
structures that police those contracts (Hill & Jones, 1992). The theory as 
conceptualized by Hill & Jones (1992) is particularly suited to this research due to 
individual limitations of both agency and stakeholder theories.  
For example, agency theory explains the conflicting relationship between managers 
and stakeholders assuming the presence of information asymmetry, the opportunistic 
behavior of agents, and conflicts of interests between the principal (shareholder) and 
agent (manager). Therefore, it is desirable to monitor the agents closely in order to 
align the principal–agent goals, reduce conflicts, and maximize the wealth of 
stockholders (Halme & Huse 1997). Agency theory contends that effective corporate 
governance improves a firm's capability to deal with emerging challenges and reduce 
agency conflicts (Haniffa & Cooke 2002). Additionally, it maintains that the internal 
governance mechanism must act effectively to hold the agents accountable for their 
                                                          
5 There is a recent thrust in the use of institutional theories in corporate governance research in Nigeria by some 
researchers (e.g., Adegbite et al., 2013; Nakpodia, 2015; Adegbite, 2015; Nakpodia et al., 2016). 
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actions (Li et al., 2008). The agency literature in this vein suggests that effective 
corporate governance enhances a firm’s legitimacy (Michelon & Parbonetti, 2012) 
and improves financial performance (Jo & Harjoto, 2011). Also, keeping in view the 
stakeholders' demand for sustainable corporate development, Gul & Leung (2004) 
argue that the agency theory better explains the role of governance in stakeholders' 
management. Similarly, Haniffa & Cooke (2002) maintain that effective board 
performance is vital in order to curb managers' opportunism. Other proponents of 
agency theory such as Kolk (2008), Ienciu et al. (2012), and Buniamin et al. (2011) 
argue that effective governance can reduce the agency problems by holding managers 
accountable to the wide variety of stakeholders. However, although researchers have 
used the agency theory framework to explain the corporate governance mechanisms, 
this framework seems unable to cover all the aspects of relationships that might exist 
between agents and principals or principals and principals or agents and investment 
analysts who represent their principals. 
The findings of recent research show that companies all over the world are facing 
increased stakeholder pressure to be sustainable (Chen & Wang, 2011). The 
stakeholders’ need for information about ongoing operations has increased 
remarkably in the last couple of decades (Haniffa & Cooke, 2005; Fernandez-Feijoo 
et al., 2012). Stakeholders expect companies to disclose not only financial but also 
non-financial information (Fernandez-Feijoo et al., 2012). This led Jensen & 
Meckling (1976) and Hill & Jones (1992) to argue that the board of directors is the 
supreme stakeholder of business firms and its duty is to align the goals of management 
with those of the wider variety of stakeholders. As a result, under stakeholder theory, 
Michelon & Parbonetti (2012) argue that good corporate governance enhances firm-
stakeholder relationships by fostering corporate sustainability.  Further, Barako & 
Brown (2008) divide the stakeholder theory into two branches—managerial and 
ethical. Following Deegan (2000) and O’Dwyer (2002) who named managerial as a 
positive and ethical as a normative branch of stakeholder theory, Donaldson & 
Preston (1995, p. 6) argue that all the branches of stakeholder theory are ‘mutually 
supportive’ and advocate the conflict-free management–stakeholder relationship. 
   
27 
 
However, the stakeholder-agency theory as applied in this research differs from the 
agency theory, as its underlying market assumptions are not the same as those used 
in the agency theory (Hill & Jones, 1992). The agency model predominately concerns 
itself with implicit contractual relationships, (Giudice et al., 2013; Miletkov et al., 
2014). For example, the agency theory assumes a single dyadic type of relationship 
between investors and banks in an efficient market. Agency theory, therefore, 
assumes that the primary purpose of corporate governance systems is to provide 
shareholders with some level of assurance that their interests will be protected by 
managers who are trying to achieve outcomes that are consistent with the 
shareholders' objectives (Shliefer & Vishny, 1997). However, investment analysts 
(who act on behalf of their principals) are vast with some already holding some form 
of equity in firms while others might not hold equity for any given length of time or 
indeed hold any equity at all.  Thus, while agency theory is useful in providing an 
understanding of how the self-interested economic motivations of managers can 
impact firm performance and the subsequent payoff to the shareholders, it misses 
essential stakeholders such as investment analysts who are external to the firm and 
who rely on signals from the investee firms for their decision making processes. 
Consequently, although the agency theory has provided scholars with the dominant 
theoretical inspiration for understanding corporate governance, it has also fostered 
critics who have argued for a more nuanced approach to understanding corporate 
governance through a pluralistic theoretical view (Eisenhardt, 1989; Hillman & 
Dalziel, 2003; Judge Jr. & Zeithaml, 1992). The agency theory also suffers from 
another significant limitation in international business governance research. The 
theory presupposes the operation of an efficient and competitive market environment, 
where corporate ownership is dispersed, information asymmetries are minimal and 
competitive pressures are maximal (Udayasankar et al., 2005). In many developing 
market economies, however, these agency theory presumptions are predominantly 
invalid (La Porta et al., 1999; Adegbite, 2015). Other scholars such as Perrow (1986) 
claimed that agency theory addresses no evident problems, and Hirsch & Friedman 
(1986) called it excessively narrow, focusing only on stock price.   
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Similarly, the stakeholder-agency theory differs from the stakeholder theory. 
Freeman's (1984) main argument is that executives are responsible for managing and 
coordinating the constellation of competitive and cooperative interests of various 
stakeholders. The instrumental approach of stakeholder theory (Donaldson & Preston, 
1995; Jones, 1995) calls for the formulation and implementation of processes that 
meet the requirements of stakeholders because they control vital resources. It also 
suggests that stakeholder satisfaction will ensure the long-term survival and success 
of the firm (Freeman, 1984; Waddock & Graves, 1997). In such situations and to 
fulfill their different claims, stakeholders that own resources pertinent to a firm's 
success will be willing to provide their resources. This can improve financial 
objectives (Jones, 1995; Hillman & Klein, 2001). However, the strategic value 
obtained from stakeholder relationships have been criticized. Sternberg (1997) posit 
that stakeholder theory undermines private property and accountability, as it transfers 
to all stakeholders the right to determine how firms' owners' assets are used. 
Moreover, the stakeholder framework stipulates that the owner's assets should be used 
not for the benefit of shareholders only, rather for all stakeholders. Consequently, 
stakeholder orientation cannot provide better corporate governance, managerial 
conduct or corporate financial performance. Drawing on agency theory, Williamson's 
(1993), explains the doubtful positive link between a stakeholder orientation and firm 
performance. According to Williamson (1993), agency problems between owners and 
managers are aggravated when managers act on behalf of non-shareholder 
stakeholders. 
The question then still arises; who really counts as important stakeholders for firms 
(Freeman, 1984)? Indeed, most studies still rightly treat shareholders as the main 
stakeholders of a firm although there are many other relevant stakeholders (Selznick, 
1996). However, what is certain is that stakeholders such as investment analysts are 
becoming more and more critical to firms fitting in with the stakeholder-agency 
perspective when they hold some form of agentic relationship with the firm. Hence, 
even though the stakeholder theory's underlying philosophy is much broader than the 
agency theory, and accommodates external and internal perspectives of anyone with 
connections to the firm (Conyon & He, 2016; Haβ et al., 2016), it cannot fully explain 
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investment analysts relationship with firms nor can it explain how investment analysts 
perceive features of drivers of good corporate governance which can lead to 
investment decision making.  
In this regard, agency and stakeholder theories complement each other by advocating 
the alignment of existing stockholders' (majority and minority), interests or latent 
stock stakeholder, and management goals (Hill & Jones, 1992).  Both frameworks 
discourage the opportunistic behavior of management (Michelon & Parbonetti 2012). 
Walls et al. (2012) contend that one theory independent of the other is unable to 
explain why and/or how social targets should be included in corporate strategic goals. 
It is also evident from the literature review chapter 3 that many researchers use 
different theories to hypothesize or conceptualize governance relationships in 
developing countries (Nakpodia & Adegbite, 2018; Adegbite, 2015; Okike, 2007). 
This study acknowledges the lacuna of a single theoretical framework (Walls et al., 
2012) and provides support for adopting different theories to study the different 
drivers of corporate governance and the impact of these drivers' features on 
investment decision making. Hence, we rely on the complementarities of both agency 
and stakeholder theories as propositioned by Hill & Jones (1992). This lack of a 
singular theoretical governance perspective provides the rationale of combining both 
agency and stakeholder theories to explain the perspective of investment analysts to 
good governance drivers signaled by banks. Therefore, following  Hill & Jones 
(1992); Iskander (2008) and Hussain et al.'s (2018) theoretical framework and 
considering investment analysts as an important stakeholder group, the study uses the 
stakeholder-agency theory for hypothesizing on the relationships between good 
governance features and investment decision making relationships.  
Moreover, the scrutiny of managerial actions has intensified as a result of increased 
pressure from customers and unions, more governmental regulations and 
advancement in media communications (Hussain et al., 2018). Hence, as more 
stakeholders are engaged in monitoring and disciplining managers, a stakeholder-
agency approach (Hill & Jones, 1992) is an appropriate framework to connect drivers 
of good corporate governance and investment decision making. This approach frees 
management from the constraints of a single objective function, should make resource 
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allocation more flexible, and importantly, effective for the pursuit of a broader array 
of stakeholder ends. This process will involve a trade-off between simplicity, on the 
one hand, and flexibility and complexity, on the other (Mitchell et al., 2016). The 
presence of this potential trade-off is positive, in that the outcomes of the intra-
corporate invisible hand are open to the possibility of contributing to a wider array of 
social goods; as the simplicity of single-objective management can be balanced 
against the complexity of trying to satisfy multiple objectives (Mitchell et al., 2016). 
However, this trade-off must be considered in light of Jensen's (2001) argument that 
simplicity is necessary not just for the sake of it, instead, for the sake of making 
managerial decisions sharper and possibly avoiding agency losses (that reduce 
shareholder wealth). This concern also arises in a stakeholder-agentic corporation 
(i.e., for stakeholder agency losses) because there is a unique role for management, as 
"the only group of stakeholders who enter into a contractual relationship with all other 
stakeholders" and as "the only group of stakeholders with direct control over the 
decision-making apparatus of the firm" (Hill & Jones, 1992, p. 134). 
Therefore, the way to lure stakeholders is by satisfying their interests and 
implementing policies aimed at improving a firm's image. The problem, as Sternberg 
(1997) has already pointed out, is that the implementation of such policies may be 
incompatible with all legitimate business objectives and undermines basic property 
rights. The stakeholder-agency theory provides a lens for understanding the 
perspective of investment analysts (who make investment decisions on behalf of 
investors in Nigeria) as it regards what corporate governance drivers of firms' signals 
in developing countries and if the signals of the drivers lead to investment decision 
making. Hill & Jones' (1992) conception of a "nexus of contracts," stakeholder-
focused corporation suggests that corporations can be viewed as quasi-markets within 
which various stakeholders, along with (and mediated by) management, engage in 
invisible hand–style transactions through which they pursue some bundle of 
objectives (Mitchell et al., 2016). In this research, the line of research hypothesizing 
that features of drivers of good corporate governance may or may not be connected 
with positive investment decision making is developed. This study develops 
arguments for this research grounded on stakeholder theory and agency framework, 
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the two theories that stakeholder-agency theory relies on, to justify the existence of 
an association between features of drivers of good corporate governance and 
investment decision making. The arguments provided explain the relationship 
between investment analysts decision making based on their perspective of Nigerian 
banks' 1) board structure and composition governance drivers' features, 2) external 
ownership governance drivers' features and 3) accountability governance drivers' 
features. 
In developing countries especially, the negligence of regulatory institutions (Osemeke 
& Adegbite, 2016; Yakassai, 2001) escalates the importance of good corporate 
governance. A Mckinsey report of 2002, suggests that over 82 percent of investors 
rely on corporate governance practices of firms in developing countries to make 
investment decisions.  In these developing countries, the primary assumption of 
efficient markets is breached, as the environment is replete with weak institutions (La 
Porta et al., 1999; Perrow, 1986: Putterman, 1984; Okike, 2007; Adegbite, 2015). The 
weak institutional environment prevalent in developing countries makes the principal 
–principal agency problem more pertinent thereby leaving stakeholders such as 
investment analysts (who act on behalf of their principals) exposed. However, despite 
the weak institutional environment, investment analysts must still make investment 
decisions relying on their perception of firms' adherence or otherwise to good 
corporate governance practices and the trustworthiness of the firms' financial 
statements. Stakeholder-agency theory adequately deals with all investors as some 
investors invest/divest depending on market indices or their specific needs and might 
not be involved with the firm in a principal-agent/principal relationship but instead 
are "latent stakeholders." Hence, this study links the agency and stakeholder theories 
to explain the implicit and explicit relationships important stakeholders might hold 
with a firm (Hill & Jones, 1992). 
Finally, the stakeholder-agency theory can be applied when investigating a 
phenomenon which generates mutual interests between different stakeholders, not 
focusing on only trade-offs (Moriarty, 2014). These interests can involve investment 
analysts who are interested in making effective investment decisions for specialized 
sectors such as the banking industry. This present study uses the stakeholder-agency 
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theory (Hill & Jones, 1992) to explain how investment analysts perceive banks' 
corporate governance behavior in the society. The theory explains the process that 
shapes relationships between management of firms and investment analysts who rely 
on drivers of good corporate governance cues signaled by firms in weak institutional 
environments. The relationships hypothesised in this study, will metamorphize as 
agentic relationship due to the economic interest of investment analysts. The 
stakeholder- agency theory is particularly suited for this present study as it supports a 
concept where non-financial measures are designed to investigate firm activities 
(Logsdon & Lewellyn, 1998) especially as the main stakeholders of concern are 
investment analysts whose primary interest is profit making on behalf of their 
clients/firms. 
2.4 Theoretical Support Framework. Signaling Theory  
Signaling theory is centered on communication between individuals, companies and 
regulatory agencies (Kabbach de Castro, 2009). Spence (2002) posits that the 
signaling theory is concerned mainly with bridging information asymmetry that might 
exist between parties (Spence, 2002). Basically, what information is the sender 
signaling and what is the receiver interpreting? Stiglitz (2002) highlights two broad 
types of information where information asymmetry is important. 1. Information about 
quality and 2. Information about intent. Information about quality is important when 
one party is not fully aware of the characteristics of another party while information 
about intent can help accentuate behavior characteristics of another party (Elitzur & 
Gavious, 2003). The signaling theory suggests that firms with superior information 
transparency signal better corporate governance and better performance (Rotchschild 
& Stiglitz, 1976) to stakeholders.  
Management scholars have also utilized signaling theory to explain the influence of 
information asymmetry in an array of research contexts. Stiglitz (2002) postulated 
that when people know things differently or know different things, then information 
asymmetry may occur. Typically, in countries with weak institutions as typified by 
many developing countries including Nigeria, information asymmetry seems to be the 
norm. Inadvertently, when information asymmetry exists, signaling theory provides a 
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means to describe the behavior and characteristics of the parties involved. 
Furthermore, markets have imperfection information, even though some researchers 
expect such imperfect markets to behave perfectly (Stiglitz, 2008). Corporate 
governance signaling by firms can be used to provide relevant firm-specific 
information, which will help eliminate information asymmetry and position firms 
favorably (Lee et al., 1983) to its stakeholders. In order to signal successfully, banks 
will use credible corporate governance signals (Eccles et al., 2001). Banks in Nigeria 
signal the practice of good corporate governance through certain drivers. 
Theoretically, investors react to news or available information (Merton, 1987) and the 
level of revealed information assists in reducing information asymmetry. We can infer 
thus that signaling theory helps in bringing to fore the cost of information acquisition. 
For example, a recent study of corporate governance shows how management signal 
the unobservable quality of their companies to potential investors using the 
observable quality of their financial statements (Zhang & Wiersema, 2009). Another 
example is when diversity researchers use signaling theory to explain how firms use 
diverse boards to signal adherence to social values to a range of organizational 
stakeholders (Miller & Triana, 2009). 
Furthermore, firms signal certain behavior by the information they provide publicly. 
For example, Chahine & Filatotchev (2008) in their study carried out in France found 
that more disclosure by firms is positively associated with better IPO pricing. Also, 
Certo (2003) and Filatotchev & Bishop (2002) posit that a new firm floating an IPO 
will have directors from different fields in a bid to signal ‘legitimacy' to potential 
investors. Therefore, with a lower level of information asymmetry and fewer agency 
problems, a firm's value is likely to be improved, helping the firm achieve better 
shareholders value (Diamond & Verrechia, 1991; Watson et al., 2002; Kothari et al., 
2009). Moreover, companies are prepared to anticipate and match stakeholder 
expectations in the absence of mandatory guidance on corporate governance matters 
and raise the issues of transparency, accountability, and opportunism in reporting 
(Osemeke & Adegbite, 2016). 
It must be noted that research on industry signals is an under-researched aspect of 
signaling theory. For example, in specialized industries such as the banking sector, 
   
34 
 
stakeholders might be influenced differently based on the institutional, task 
environment or the industry competitive environment signals (Sanders & Boivie, 
2004). As a result, some management scholars, e.g., Zhang & Wiersema (2009), Certo 
(2003) and Osemeke & Adegbite (2016) have used signaling theory to explain 
information asymmetry in corporate governance. This current study focuses on the 
perception of investment as it regards the corporate governance practices of Nigerian 
commercial banks. The study will reveal which of the corporate governance drivers 
features signaled by banks lead investment analysts to make investment decisions. 
The signaling theory supports the core theoretical framework as it provides a 
mechanism by which banking sector actors signal non-financial cues to investment 
analysts. 
2.5 Theoretical Support Framework. Social Cognitive Theory  
One of the more important theories of human behavior is the social cognitive theory 
(Bandura, 1986) as the theory focuses not only on the individual's behavior but also 
on social cognitive factors (environment and personal). This current study relies on 
social cognitive theory (Bandura, 1989) in relation to investment analysts' perception 
of features of drivers of good corporate governance in Nigerian Banks. This theory is 
especially relevant to this present study as it looks at interactive human psychosocial 
functioning in terms of behavior, cognition, trust, other personal factors and 
environmental events (Wood & Bandura, 1989). The theory "accords a central role to 
cognitive, vicarious, self-regulatory and self-reflective processes" (Wood & Bandura, 
1989, p. 362).  Decisions of individuals are influenced by internal cognitive processes 
and external social situations (Cooper & Lu, 2016). This is because the environment 
of people predicts their behavior (Bandura, 1989). This environment includes social 
norms, access within the community, peer influence and values (Bandura, 1991).  
Social environment can be said to include virtual and real world (Narayan, 2013). 
Further, social cognition can be traced to research on individual perception (Asch, 
1946; Cantor & Mischel, 1979a; Schneider et al., 1979), cognitive schemata (Alba & 
Hasher, 1983; Anderson, 1982; Reder & Anderson, 1980), categorization (Rosch et 
al., 1976) and decision making which enables individuals achieve their set objectives 
(Kotter, 1982; Mintzberg, 1973; Stewart, 1967). Investment analysts create their 
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decision support systems and selectively process the information generated by their 
environment (George, 1980). This research leans on social cognition theory to 
understand and predict investment analysts' decision-making based on their 
perception of features of good corporate governance drivers signaled by Nigerian 
banks.  
Furthermore, financial knowledge may be categorized as objective and subjective 
knowledge (Friestad & Wright, 1995). Objective knowledge is tangible, unbiased and 
measurable, while subjective knowledge is about one's belief and perceptions of 
knowledge. Ultimately, the decision of the investment analysts to invest is subjective. 
An investment analyst's decision depends on the expected costs, his knowledge of 
financial techniques and his risk perception. The risk perception is entirely a 
subjective factor. For a good investment decision, the investment analyst needs to 
understand the possible opportunities using both objective and subjective knowledge. 
A wrong investment decision can lead to investors losing their investments. 
Therefore, in developing countries, it is essential for investment analysts to 
understand the drivers of good corporate governance to obtain the maximum value 
from their investment appraisal process. In investment evaluation, the corporate 
governance drivers projected by firms must match the information held by the 
decision maker (Avram et al., 2009); in this case the investment analyst's views. 
Corporate governance drivers as projected by banks will mean different things to 
different stakeholders but are critical for attracting investors. Newell et al. (1958) 
proposed that decision makers (develop heuristics, or shortcuts to aid them in 
decisions in which risks are highly uncertain (see Barnard, 1938; Prietula & Simon, 
1989). Banks' projection of good corporate governance practices represents an avenue 
for the banks to position themselves to investment analysts who want to make 
investments even though most investors base their decisions on market and financial 
data (Tyebjee & Bruno, 1984; MacMillan et al., 1987; Robinson, 1987; Zacharakis & 
Meyer, 1998). However, under more extreme uncertainty, investment analysts 
especially early-stage investment analysts also rely on other less-explicit social 
factors for decision-making. These social factors include high-status affiliations 
(Burton et al., 2002), familiarity with other members of syndicates (Kelly & Hay, 
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2003), the quality of the management (MacMillan et al., 1986), the way the firm is 
projected (Martens et al., 2007), all of which facilitates investment analysts' sense-
making about the investment opportunity (Navis & Glynn, 2011). These social factors 
(high-status affiliations, firm projection, quality of management, etc.) fit with features 
of corporate governance divers being investigated in this present research. 
The social cognitive theory is very adaptive and dynamic (Kock, 2004) and has been 
employed in many fields. For example, it has been used in organizational management 
(Wood & Bandura, 1989), e-government system (Loo et al., 2009; Rana & Dwivedi, 
2015), internet banking adoption – consumer behaviour (Boateng et al., 2016), 
technological innovation adoption (Compeau et al., 1999; Ratten & Ratten, 2007), 
tourism sustainability (Font et al., 2016) and accounting fraud (Shi et al., 2017).  In 
addition, the study by Domino et al. (2015) relied on social cognition theory to 
examine the antecedents of individual corporate accountant's perceptions of fit 
between the individual accounts and their organizations' ethical climate.   However, 
to the best of this researcher's knowledge, this theory has never been used to study the 
perception of investment analysts when considering the importance of features of 
drivers of good corporate governance in decision-making. The social cognition theory 
can be used to support reasons why individuals make certain individual decisions or 
behaviors (Bandura, 1986). The theory touches on aspects such as social environment, 
cognition, and beliefs about capabilities, which are relevant to explain sections of this 
present study. 
This theory will also help provide a theoretical underpinning for potential decision 
making of investment analysts based on their perception of drivers of good corporate 
governance that banks signal. Based on this theory, features of drivers of good 
corporate governance investment analysts perceive to be important to their decision-
making processes will be identified. These features are taken as the external social 
environmental factors that influence the schemas of the individual audience. 
Following from this, this present study will argue that an investment analyst's 
decision-making process can be influenced based on cognition and beliefs on the 
perception of features of drivers of good corporate governance. According to 
Bandura's theory, humans learn to satisfy their needs, wishes, and desires by 
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observing the outcomes of behaviors and events, where the observations lead to 
expectations about what will happen in the future and about one's ability to perform 
behaviors and to express emotions. Individuals compare their behaviors with those of 
others and make value judgments about their own and others' behaviors. In this way, 
according to social cognitive theory, it is not simply the external conditions alone that 
determine behavior (as extreme behaviorists might claim), but it is also the decisions 
one makes based on one's cognitions ("knowledge") about the conditions. Hence, 
social cognition theory can function as a cognitive map rather than a limited capacity 
model when based on the decision-making processes of highly experienced 
individuals (Davis, 1992). Mishina et al. (2012 p.460), suggests "that individual 
members of a stakeholder group notice similar types of cues, react in a similar manner 
toward those cues, and hence arrive at a similar conclusion." For this particular study, 
perspectives of highly experienced investment analysts are sampled. We survey and 
interview investment analysts as a stakeholder group. Some strategy researchers have 
argued that a given stakeholder group consider different firm attributes which the 
stakeholders might hold important to designated interests (see (Agle et al., 1999; 
Carter & Deephouse, 1999; Dukerich & Carter, 2000; Lange et al., 2011; Love & 
Kraatz, 2009; Mahon, 2002; Pfarrer et al., 2010; Rindova & Fombrun, 1999; Rindova 
et al., 2006; Wartick, 2002).  
Other behavioral theories such as implicit personality theory and stereotyping are 
limited in their ability to explain social cognitive processes mainly due to their 
respective restrictiveness. Implicit personality theory looks at personality traits while 
stereotyping signals demographic cues. Social cognition theory on the other offers a 
more general framework for explaining and predicting selection decisions (Davis, 
1992). The theory strives to reduce information-processing complexity allowing a 
broad content base (Davis, 1992). 
The next section provides a conclusion to the chapter. 
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2.6 Conclusion 
This chapter has reviewed the limitations of the dominant corporate governance 
theories (agency and stakeholder) in addressing the research questions. Similarly, the 
researcher discussed the limitations of institutional theory in addressing the research 
questions despite the contextual nature of the study. This is because the main concern 
of the research is the opinions of investment analysts who are economic agents mainly 
concerned with profits and not necessarily conformity of firms to society.  
Consequently, the chapter explained the rationale behind adopting the Hill & Jones’ 
(1992) conceptualization of the stakeholder-agency theory as the core theoretical 
underpinning for this study. To address the social-environmental context and the 
reasoning of the investment analysts, the researcher employed signalling and social 
cognition theories as support theoretical frameworks. 
The next chapter provides a comprehensive review of the literature covering corporate 
governance definitions, practice in developed and developing countries, codes of 
corporate governance in Nigeria as well as corporate governance mechanism. Also, a 
review of investment analysts and their operations in Nigeria is discussed.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
39 
 
Chapter Three: Literature Review 
3.1 Introduction 
In chapter two, the research theories of this study were presented. However, in 
addressing the study research questions, it is necessary to build upon credible 
evidence, drawing from a review of previous relevant research. This is the focus of 
this chapter. The review will cover corporate governance definitions, relevant issues 
in corporate governance across the globe and developing countries. Subsequently, it 
will focus on corporate governance in Nigeria and further narrow down to the 
corporate governance in the banking sector. Corporate governance mechanisms, 
drivers and features prevalent in Nigerian banking sector are discussed. Finally, 
investment analyst and investment decision making process are discussed. Issues 
emerging from the reviews above provided the basis for identifying gaps in the 
literature. This thesis seeks to address these gaps in conjunction with the study 
research questions.  
3.2 Corporate governance definitions 
Corporate governance ensures that the boards of directors do their jobs properly 
(Nwanji & Howell, 2004). Governance also protects shareholders' rights, enhances 
disclosure and transparency, provides an effective legal and regulatory enforcement 
framework, and facilitates the effective functioning of the board. The main objective, 
as the ‘traditional' disclosure studies argue, is to fulfil the needs of stakeholders in 
terms of improving transparency, satisfying the decision needs of interested parties 
(Meek et al., 1995), reducing agency costs (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Poshakwale & 
Courtis, 2005) and reducing information cost in stock markets (Cormier & Gordon, 
2001; Verrecchia, 2001). 
However, for a recent practice, corporate governance has transcended most 
companies worldwide. These companies subject themselves to some form of 
corporate scrutiny to gain public trust, which ensures their going concern status. 
Moreover, governance practices go hand in hand with common law practices (La 
Porta et al., 1999). Therefore, particularly in developed countries, where dispersed 
share ownership is common, corporate governance permits the shareholders to have 
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more influence over firms and the dispersed shareholders are also able to apply 
pressure for compliance (Bebchuk & Weisbach, 2010; Shleifer & Vishny, 1986).  
The Organisation for Economic Corporation and Development (OECD) defines 
corporate governance as the arrangement of relationships and analogous 
responsibilities among a core group consisting of shareholders, board members and 
managers designed to best foster the competitive performance required to achieve a 
firm’s primary objective as well as act accountably and responsibly (OECD, 2004). 
Consequently, corporate governance could be seen as the mechanism of managing the 
internal and external network of relationships of firms which helps them achieve their 
primary objectives (Aguilera et al., 2006; Money & Schepers, 2007).  
Governance would usually have been directed by shareholders who naturally seek to 
protect their investments as firms are usually run by agents (managers) on behalf of 
shareholders. However, other stakeholder's interests also need to be protected, and 
corporate governance provides a means by which this objective can be seen to have 
been met. Specifically, corporate governance involves defining goals of an 
organization, how the firm is monitored internally and externally, who the 
management are and its succession plans, how discipline and professionalism are 
maintained (including rewards and sanctions) and performance indicators (Nwagbara 
& Ugwoji, 2015). Essentially, it includes shareholders and management of a 
corporation as key actors; in a wider context, it involves all players (stakeholders) 
within and outside a firm, who partake in the mission and vision of a firm as dictated 
by shareholders (Nwagbara & Ugwoji, 2015). Therefore, corporate governance is also 
defined as “a set of control mechanism that is specially designed to monitor and ratify 
managerial decisions and to ensure efficient operation of a firm on behalf of its 
stakeholders” (Donnelly & Mulcahy, 2008, p. 416). 
The corporate governance definitions described thus far have focused mainly on 
developed countries where firm ownership is not concentrated in individuals or 
families but instead is quite dispersed among different shareholders who appoint a 
functional board of directors' who in turn act as a good external control to 
management. However, in developing countries where institutions are weak, the 
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common beliefs of dispersed ownership and a "pronounced separation of ownership 
and control" are not realities. Distributed ownership is an "exception rather than the 
rule" as most organizations are controlled either by families or dominant/concentrated 
ownership. (La Porta et al., 1999; Adegbite, 2012; 2015).  
Furthermore, societal culture influences corporate governance (Mackenzi, 2007) as 
well as political and legal legislations. Hence, from a sociological perspective, Davis 
(2005, p. 143) posits that corporate governance "describes the structures, processes, 
and institutions within and around organizations that allocate power and resource 
control among participants." Similarly, from the psychological aspects of governance, 
corporate governance refers to the set of institutions and structures that allocate 
power, rights, and responsibilities among a corporation's various stakeholders, 
especially shareholders and managers (Benton, 2014). Stakeholders such as 
investment analysts who operate in developing countries require the corporate 
governance practices of firms for investment decision-making purposes. Therefore, 
following Benton (2014), one can say, corporate governance in developing countries 
with weak institutions, is the way a firm (through its management) projects itself to 
its environment as pursuing its shareholders' vision and mission while being 
accountable to all stakeholders.   
In any event, meanings of good corporate governance are rooted in evidence coming 
from various streams of social sciences including economics, finance, law, political 
science, sociology, and management studies. Good corporate governance is seen as 
involving both the reduction of risks to shareholders or other stakeholders as well as 
enabling managers to engage in business activities, which will benefit all (Keasey et 
al., 1997). Table 2.1 below provides sample definitions of corporate governance in 
different disciplines.  
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Table 3. 1 Corporate governance definitions from different fields 
 
Sample Definition (s) of Corporate Governance Author Journal/Source 
Accounting  "Corporate governance deals with the ways in which suppliers of finance 
to corporations assure themselves of getting a return on their 
investment." 
Shleifer & Vishny 
(1997, p.737) 
Shleifer, A., and Vishny, R. (1997). A survey of 
corporate governance. Journal of Finance, 52(2), 
737-783. 
Economics "The complex set of constraints that shape the ex-post bargaining over 
the quasi-rents generated by the firm." 
Zingales, (1998, p. 
499) 
The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics and the 
Law. London: Macmillan. 
"A framework within which the integrity of a transaction is decided." Williamson, (1979, p. 
235) 
Williamson, O. (1979). Transaction-cost 
economics: The governance of contractual relations. 
Journal of Law & Economics, 22(2), 233-261. 
Management  "Corporate governance is the system by which companies are directed 
and controlled."  
Cadbury Committee 
(1992) 
Sir Adrian Cadbury Committee Report 1992 
"Corporate governance involves a set of relationships between a 
company’s management, its board, its shareholders and other 
stakeholders. Corporate governance also provides the structure through 
which the objectives of the company are set, and the means of attaining 
those objectives and monitoring performance are determined." 
OECD (2004 p. 11) OECD (2004). Organization for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD). 2004. OECD 
Principles of Corporate Governance 
Comparative corporate governance is the study of relationships between 
parties with a stake in the firm and how their influence on strategic 
corporate decision making is shaped by institutions in different countries 
Aguilera & Jackson. 
(2010) 
Aguilera, R. & Jackson, G. (2010). Comparative 
and International Corporate Governance. The 
Academy of Management Annals, 4(1), 485-556. 
Refers to who controls the capitalist firm, especially the modern joint 
stock, public limited, giant corporation, as well as what for, how and to 
what effect. 
Pitelis (2004) 
 
Pitelis, C. (2004).  (Corporate) Governance, 
(Shareholder) Value and (Sustainable) Economic 
Performance. Corporate Governance: An 
International Review, 12(2), 210-223. 
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Legal "The whole set of legal, cultural and institutional arrangements that 
determine what publicly traded corporations can do, who controls them, 
how control is exercised, and how the risk and returns from the activities 
they undertake are allocated." 
Blair (1995, p.3) Blair, M. (1995). Ownership and control: 
Rethinking corporate governance for the twenty-
first century. Washington, DC: Brookings Institute 
the principles and legal and contractual frameworks that define and 
regulate the sharing of power in a corporation 
Page, (2005) Corporate governance and value creation. The 
Research Foundation of CFA Institute 
Sociology "The structures, processes, and institutions within and around 
organizations that allocate power and resource control among 
participants." 
Davis, (2005, p.143) Davis, (2005). New directions in corporate 
governance. Annual Review Of Sociology, 31, 143-
162. 
Politics The system that not only promotes growth and protects investors but also 
generates employment and fosters equality of opportunities 
Gourevitch & Shinn 
(2005) 
Gourevitch & Shinn (2005. Political power and 
corporate control: The new global politics of 
corporate governance. Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press. 
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3.3 Corporate Governance across the World 
Corporate governance as a regulatory induced practice is a relatively new phenomenon 
(Rezael, 2008), which gained traction worldwide mainly as a result of corporate scandals.  
Even in developed countries, regulatory induced corporate governance is less than 
30years old (Tricker, 2015). In the UK, the Sir Adrian Cadbury report, which was 
published in 1992, can be said to be the bedrock upon which corporate governance codes 
were set for UK companies.  This Cadbury report developed a “set of principles of good 
corporate governance which were enacted into a code of best practice and incorporated 
into list rules of London stock exchange” (Filatotchev et al., 2007, p. 7). Subsequently, 
other reports such as Rutterman internal control report of 1995, Greenbury’s report on 
directors pay, Myners review on the role of investors/institutional investors and 
companies, etc. have emerged to make a more robust code of corporate governance in the 
UK.  
Similarly, in the USA, strong regulatory enforced corporate governance can be said to 
have taken off fully in the 2000s especially after the Enron and WorldCom crises of 2001 
with the enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. Although the U.S model is usually 
taken as a benchmark for shareholder-oriented corporate governance and sometimes 
equated with a "model" for good corporate governance, the system of corporate 
governance in the United States is a moving target. However, the US governance model 
continuously undergoes changes which international audiences fail to appreciate.  The 
"one size fits all" system of U.S. law led to discussions on the benefits of mandatory rules 
compared to more flexible sets of principles based rules (Anand, 2006). In the past, 
corporate boards were mainly made up of directors, chosen from firm executives and 
former executives, or friends of the CEO (Mace, 1971). These inside directors had a 
predominately advisory role, and would rarely mount a major challenge to CEO 
decisions. 
On the other hand, the Communitarian model appears as the leading model in continental 
European countries, especially in countries such as Germany and France. This model, 
often characterized by a high concentration of ownership equity with dominant family 
shareholdings (Tricker, 2015), focuses on addressing the expectations of a wider spectrum 
of interests; hence Aguilera (2005) described it as a stakeholder-oriented system. 
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Japanese governance represents another interesting case.  Japanese firms traditionally had 
a system dominated by lifetime employment, cross-shareholdings, and an important 
governance role being played by banks (Nakajima, 1999; Adegbite, 2010). Jackson 
(2004) posited these values are being eroded due to innovations and legal reforms in 
corporate governance, even if they have not fully disappeared. Indeed, Japanese corporate 
governance model is similar to the stakeholder oriented model practiced in Germany. 
However, the Japanese classical model places emphasis on companies interrelation 
through cross-holdings and interlocking directors (known as Keiretsu) rather than 
antagonism (Mallin, 2006) and makes the governance model arguably different from 
other stakeholder oriented models such as practiced in Germany. Although there are many 
young firms that are family controlled and some that are foreign controlled, control and 
ownership is mostly separated in the majority of the firms.  Hence, basically, Japanese 
firms owned through a cross-holding of shares held by lenders (principally banks) and 
business partners as a symbol of altruism and commitment (Adegbite, 2010). 
Overall, the 1990s had an inconsistent effect on corporate governance. The governance 
mechanisms shifted managerial interests away from the long-term development of the 
firm and linked their interests with shareholder value (Gordon, 2007). The system seemed 
successful and thus put corporate governance on the reform agenda worldwide, 
culminating in the OECD guidelines in 1997 that were mainly modeled upon a stylized 
version of current U.S. practices. However, for a recent practice, corporate governance 
has transcended most companies worldwide. These companies subject themselves to 
some form of corporate scrutiny to gain public trust, which ensures their going concern 
status. Ultimately, governance practices go hand in hand with common law practices, 
therefore, in developed countries, dispersed share ownership is common (La Porta et al., 
1999). This permits the shareholders to have more influence over firms, and the dispersed 
shareholders are also able to apply pressure for compliance (Bebchuk & Weisbach, 2010; 
Shleifer & Vishny, 1986). Expectedly, developed countries generally adopted corporate 
governance earlier than developing countries (Sahin, 2015).  
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3.4 Corporate Governance in Developing Countries 
Corporate governance research, which is typically underpinned by the transaction 
cost/agency theory, has focused mainly on developed countries where organization 
ownership is quite dispersed and board of director's act as a good external control to 
management. While convergence theorists (Coffee Jr, 1999; Guillén, 2000) have 
examined the possibilities and implications of corporate governance convergence, factors 
such as political forces (Roe, 2003) and institutional elements (Aguilera & Jackson, 2003) 
continue to result in diversity in corporate governance approaches. Developing countries, 
according to Judge et al. (2008), are relatively poor economies some who have shown 
rapid development potential, such as China. Judge et al. (2008) demonstrate a correlation 
between economic development and governance systems, as 21 countries, whose stage of 
economic development was classed as ‘emerging,’ all embrace the emerging corporate 
governance model (Nakpodia, 2015).  
Considering the economic challenges in developing countries, an efficient governance 
system is critical to economic survival. Claessens & Yurtoglu (2013) suggest that a good 
corporate governance structure benefit firms in developing countries and can facilitate 
greater access to financing, lowering the cost of capital, equitable treatment of all 
stakeholders and better performance.  However, given the challenges in these economies, 
the development and practice of corporate governance has been weakened. For instance, 
the regulatory mechanism for implementing corporate governance in these countries are 
unconvincing, with some countries practicing a mix of both the principles-based and the 
rules-based mechanism (see Berglof & von Thadden, 1999). The level of economic 
development has also meant that the engagement of corporate governance to deal with 
infractions has remained unpopular (Nakpodia, 2015). The lack of good institutional 
framework, has further limited governance in these countries. Klapper & Love (2004) in 
their study involving 14 emerging countries, noted that firm-level governance is lower in 
countries with weak legal institutions thereby hindering governance ideals.  
Hence, in developing countries, trust in compliance with governance regulations will be 
seen to be vested in external organizations rather than internal structure. The perception 
will be that bureaucratic processes internally might blur firms operations and reporting 
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seemingly in a bid to protect the organization (Hofstede, 2001). Recent research in 
developing economies suggest main conflicts are principal-principal conflicts between 
majority shareholders (family, state or concentrated ownership) and minority 
shareholders (Young et al., 2008; Chang, 2006; Jiang, 2006). Characteristics of 
environments with weak institutions (and largely informal environment) are dominant 
shareholders and influential leaders (Nakpodia & Adegbite, 2018). In developing 
countries, the more power vested in top management relative to the employees (Hofstede, 
2001) the more decisions are dominated by a few. These leaders are often associated with 
autocratic behavior (Carl et al., 2004). Therefore, if the stakeholders do not understand 
the institutional situation or challenges of principal-principal conflicts governing the firm 
in developing economies, then corporate governance reform policies might be 
inconsequential, and this might produce unplanned for results (Peng et al., 2008). 
Especially since in most developing economies, the control function of the board of 
directors is mainly seen as window dressing. Thus, the informal institutional environment 
impacts governance framework (Globerman & Shapiro, 2003; Strange et al., 2009).  
Building on "rules of the game" metaphor, North (1990, p.3) defines institutions as the 
humanly devised constraints that structure human interaction. Similarly, Scott (1995, 
p.33) defines institutions as “regulative, normative and cognitive structures and activities 
that provide stability and meaning to social behaviour.” Therefore, institutions can be 
classified broadly as formal and informal ones. According to Peng et al., (2008), 
institutions govern societal transactions in the area of politics (e.g., corruption, 
transparency, etc.), Law (e.g., economic liberalization and regulatory regime) and society 
(e.g., ethical norms, attitudes towards entrepreneurship). Despite the institutional 
environment importance, scholars have rarely studied further than the environment or task 
situations to investigate the interaction among institutions, organizations and strategic 
choices (Teegen et al., 2004; Narayanan & Fahey, 2005), though recently this is changing 
as more and more researchers understand the need to contemplate contextual situations.  
This has meant laws and regulations (formal institutions), and norms and cognitions 
(informal institutions) have been assumed away as "background" conditions. (Peng et al., 
2008). Many researchers suggest that handling or treating institutions as "background" 
will not enable us to understand fully relationships among firms, its environment, its 
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audiences and indeed the firms' performance (Ingram & Silverman, 2002; Lewin & Kim, 
2004; Oliver, 1997). 
Hence, when considering developing economies, the normal treatment of institutions 
becomes even more glaring as inappropriate (Narayanan & Fahey, 2005). Contextual 
studies of institutional environment (such as Nakpodia & Adegbite, 2018; Nakpodia et 
al., 2016; Adegbite, 2015; Kogut, 2003; Leung et al, 2005; Peng, 2002; 2003; 2006; 
Redding, 2005; Teegen et al, 2004) dealing with the firm’s relationship with its broader; 
environment, will find it almost impossible to apply typical mainstream theories in 
developing countries, hence new reasoning and major modification are necessitated 
(Kiggundu et al., 1983). Adegbite & Nakajima (2011b) showed two classes of 
institutional effects on corporate governance: those external (macro) and those internal 
(micro) to the firm. They provided empirical evidence to suggest that the external 
institutional environments, which profile a firm's corporate governance, consist of the 
country's social, economic, political, and legal environments, whereas those internal to 
the firm consist of the firm's/industry's values, culture, history, and ethics. They noted 
that this model represents an encompassing framework that provides illumination on 
certain institutional effects and relationships, thereby encapsulating the complex 
dynamics and realities of governance in modern-day corporations. Such research has, 
however, fallen short in developing a psychological understanding of why and how actors 
in weak institutional environments react to firm-specific cues. 
Hence, whereas this present research recognizes that formal and informal institutional 
structures influence audience choices, (North, 1990), where formal institutions are weak, 
informal institutions; such as norms governing interpersonal relationships, must be 
escalated by firms and individuals for strategic and performance decision-making 
processes (Peng & Heath, 1996). Therefore, it is imperative researchers pay more 
attention to the sociological and psychological consequences of corporate governance in 
developing countries as the Anglo-American assumption of dispersed ownership and 
control, is not in consonance with the empirical realities in developing countries (Jiang, 
2006). 
The next section reviews corporate governance in Nigeria.  
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3.5 Corporate Governance in Nigeria: Mechanism and Structure 
3.5.1 Introduction 
In Chapter one, the growing economic profile of Nigeria and the theoretical implications 
of corporate governance scholarship in Nigeria were discussed. To enrich that discourse, 
this section focuses on areas of corporate governance in Nigeria, the regulatory 
mechanism for establishing good corporate governance and codes of corporate 
governance in Nigeria. 
3.5.2 Nigerian Governance Model 
Corporate governance is about how an organization is managed and commitment to 
values and ethical business conduct.  Governance covers a firm's culture, policies, firm 
structure and the way in it deals with different stakeholders.  For a solid corporate 
governance practice, a firm must conduct its affairs in such a manner as to ensure fairness 
to all stakeholders. Firm responsibilities entails quality management, visionary 
leadership, entrenched values and goals, respect for law and sense of social responsibility 
all of which corporate governance helps in achieving (Aguilera et al., 2008; Ofo, 2010). 
Effective corporate governance practices in Nigeria are essential to maintaining public 
trust (Wilson, 2006; Dabor & Adeyemi, 2009) helping to attract domestic and foreign 
investments (Oni, 2007). The corporate governance model in Nigeria mostly follows the 
Anglo-American model, with particular emphasis on protecting shareholders’ interests 
(Adegbite, 2012; Okike, 2007; Ahunwun, 2002). This stems from the fact that Nigerian 
corporate law and legislation is derived primarily from British corporate law. Despite the 
similarities in the governance models between Nigeria and the Anglo-Saxon model, there 
are contextual differences, such as social norms, highly hierarchical social structure, and 
concentrated ownership structures, which may hinder the effectiveness of formal 
corporate governance mechanisms in Nigeria (Adegbite, 2012; Okike, 2007; Ahunwun, 
2002).   
Consequently, there evolved a mixed theoretical frame for corporate governance in the 
country, where agency and stakeholder theories were majorly prominent in shaping the 
Nigerian corporate governance structure. Nonetheless, one must, however, note that the 
configuration of corporate governance and accountability in the country has been a mix 
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of several other theories on the subject. In the summary below, Yakasai (2001, p. 239-
240) identified five major theories in this regard and specifically examined their Nigerian 
applications): "(a) Stewardship hypothesis with the requirement that directors show a 
fiduciary duty towards the owners of the company. Implied in this theory is the fact that 
the power of directors over the enterprise is derived from their democratic appointment 
by shareholders at the Annual General Meetings (AGMs). In most less developed 
countries today, this largely remains a theory that has not and might not ever be practiced 
especially in those nations with dictatorial regimes. In Nigeria, until recently, the AGMs 
of many of the large corporations were fait accompli to rubber stamp government 
appointments and directives. (b) Organizational theory which traditionally recognizes the 
peak of organizational structure as the chief executive officer (CEO) and that the board 
of directors (BOD) is a mere imposition on such a structure. So for as long as functional 
reporting obeys such a structure, the BOD will remain a mere rubber stamp of the CEO's 
decisions. This theory draws its predominant application in less developed countries due 
to the ownership and control structure of enterprises most of which are family businesses 
and too small in size to warrant the type of corporate democracy witnessed in 
multinational companies such as HSBC, BT, House of Fraser, General Electric, etc.. (c) 
Stakeholder hypothesis which gathered momentum in the 1970s reflecting a societal fear 
that the large multinational corporations (MNCs) had become too imperialistic and 
powerful to be held accountable solely through the classical stewardship hypothesis. 
Environmentalists and consumerists particularly find a perfect ally in the stakeholder 
theory. The role of environmentalists in the oil-producing areas of the world such as the 
Niger Delta region in Nigeria is a classic example. Furthermore, the genesis of the 
government's domineering investment in the oil sector in Nigeria derived from this theory 
that oil was so strategic to the country that the whole nation became the all-important 
stakeholder. The same arguments were proposed as the premises for promulgating the 
moribund Nigeria Enterprises Promotion Acts of 1972, 1977 and 1989. (d) Agency theory 
postulates a different perspective of the nature of man seeking self-interest rather than an 
altruistic goal and as such cannot always be trusted. This is a real problem in any 
untransparent developing nation whereby corporate executives milk their companies and 
become “fat cats” while the investors become anemic, a situation very prevalent during 
   
51 
 
the Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) years in Nigeria. (e) The classical theory of 
the firm which recognizes four factors of production, the most important being the 
entrepreneur, who organizes and manages other inputs and he is responsible for the 
decisions, control, and direction of the company. 
For the developing countries of sub-Saharan Africa, things are not as straight-jacketed 
because of many factors/problems such as the consequences of colonization, the 
interventionist role of domestic governments, the poverty level and the impairment of 
private initiatives, amongst others. As a result of the impact of these theories, opinions 
typically differ with regards to the content, boundary, and relevance of corporate 
governance in developing countries, and Nigeria in particular (Tricker, 1996). This 
theoretical distortion further suggests that countries matter for corporate governance 
(Khanna et al., 2006). They matter because they determine what firms benefit or lose 
when they adhere to notions of good corporate governance principles (Doidge et al., 
2004). While there is no corruption-free society, in a developing country such as Nigeria, 
corporate governance issues are often discussed amidst the larger problem of endemic 
corruption. Particularly, firms have traditionally been less encouraged to adopt good 
corporate governance principles. This has conventionally left investors (especially 
minority shareholders) without efficient protection.  
Social environment determines what represents legitimacy and how firms and 
competition will react (March & Simon, 1993). Meyer & Rowan (1977, p. 340) posit that 
"institutionalized products, services, policies, and programs function as powerful myths 
and many organizations adopt them ceremonially." Leading from this, when society or 
institutions that govern firms in societies dictate new acceptable standards, firms strive to 
incorporate the new practices or procedures in their processes. The objective of the firm 
is its going concern nature regardless of the efficacy of the newly acquired practices or 
procedures. Hence, the ability of a firm to successfully integrate and embed these new 
practices in its processes increases their legitimacy. 
In Nigeria, firms are also likely to imitate their direct market competitors when they have 
relationships with other firms who also imitate their competitors (Westphal et al., 2001). 
This is so because firms often learn about corporate governance from the information 
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transferred through relationship obtained via networks (Benton, 2014). Firms may adjust 
their governance to match the average governance across all network neighbors (Benton, 
2014). Status and reputation can sometimes explain network emergence with regards to 
corporate governance and relationships with high-status firms and directors are more 
sought after, which in turn generates still greater status (Davis & Robbins, 2005). Similar 
to the study by Benton (2014) on networks, Nigerian firms prefer to form relationships 
with corporations that are already highly regarded or more popular firms or with 
companies with whom they share a third party tie. This indicates the need for legitimacy 
as they tend towards homogeneity. 
However, especially in weak institutional environments, firms typically claim adherence 
to the mandated regulatory corporate governance codes, but there is evidence that actual 
practices are heterogeneous (Khanna et al., 2006). Generally, in Nigeria, most firms 
quoted on the Nigerian stock exchange claim to achieve regulatory compliance with the 
code of corporate governance. Even though public information on corporate governance 
practices of firms is still limited or difficult to interpret in many regards by stakeholders. 
Nevertheless, good corporate governance practices have potential to partially compensate 
for weak institutional environments (Duner & Kinan, 2005; Klapper & Love, 2004) by 
distilling out the homogeneity in industries of a particular producer group.  Therefore, in 
Nigeria, firm-level practices matters more to firm value due to the weak institutional 
environment and weak investor protection (Duner & Kinan, 2005; Klapper & Love, 
2004).  
The prime agency for controlling and regulating all companies in Nigeria is the Corporate 
Affairs Commission (CAC) even though the prevalent weak institutional environment has 
made the CAC negligent (Okike, 2007). Moreover, securities law is regulated at the 
general capital market level, and the emphasis of the Nigerian Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) is usually on disclosure rather than substantive provisions regarding 
company structure (Hollister, 2005).  In a bid to maintain their legitimacy status, firms 
tend to bridge the gaps by presenting conformity with the institutionalized rules regardless 
of their actual activities (Meyer & Rowan, 1977). Therefore, it can be argued that the 
structures of many firms are more a reflection of their institutional environment or 
requirements rather than a presentation of their actual activities (Meyer & Rowan, 1977). 
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Leading from the homogeneity and the weak institutional environment therefore, the 
corporate governance projected by firms might not necessarily be an accurate 
representation. Neither might stakeholders assume the governance projected to be a true 
representation. This might not be unconnected to the corruption prevalent in such 
environment (Nakpodia & Adegbite, 2018). 
3.5.3 Corporate Corruption in Nigeria 
Corruption occurs when the power of official position is used for personal gain in a 
manner that contravenes (Nakpodia, 2015; Jain, 2001). Although corruption remains a 
global concern, it is endemic in Nigeria (Okike, 2007) and has been severally identified 
as the bane of the Nigerian economy (Akindele, 2005; Lawal, 2007). It has become rooted 
in the sociocultural, political and economic domains of the country (Shehu, 2005). 
As a consequence, the practice of corporate governance has not been spared the 
destructive effects of corruption. Previous literature emphasizes a negative relationship 
between governance and corruption (Jain, 2001). Evidence indicates that in countries with 
high levels of corruption, good corporate governance practices of firms resident in those 
countries are affected (Caron et al., 2012).  
Adekoya (2011) opined that, as firms cannot be isolated from the corruption that exists in 
their operational domain, corruption has infiltrated every stratum of Nigerian firms. This 
concern, as noted by Ahunwan (2002), has severely restricted the capacity of Nigerian 
entrepreneurs to entrench sound ethical practices. In Nigeria, the magnitude of corruption 
is escalated because of the indiscriminate use discretionary power (Ogbeidi, 2012), the 
extraction of economic rents (Tignor, 1993; Osoba, 1996) and the existence of weak 
institutions (Adegbite & Nakajima, 2011a). For example, the crisis, which engulfed the 
Nigerian banking sector in 2009, was attributable to poor corporate governance 
(Adegbite, 2012). 
Firms often violate rules set by firms for and about themselves. Many firms do not 
implement decisions. Hence, researchers have established that there is a gap between 
what organizations represent formally and how they are informally (Dalton, 1959; 
Downs, 1967; Homans, 1950). Moreover, in some situations, the firms conceal actual 
actions or make them quite vague. Hence, some of the activities of firms, which are myths, 
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become institutionalized appearing to be actual formal structures (Meyer & Rowan, 
1977). 
Given the extent of corruption, some literature (e.g., Aluko, 2002; Lawal, 2007) posits 
that corporate governance will continually be exposed to challenges until corruption is 
managed to the barest minimum possible. Therefore, in developing countries where 
corruption is rampant, even though firms project certain corporate governance drivers, 
stakeholders still need to apply discretion in decision-making. 
3.6 The Legal Regime for Banks in Nigeria 
3.6.1 Introduction 
The Companies and Allied Matters Act (CAMA), the Investment and Securities Act 
(ISA), and Banks and Other Financial Institution Act (BOFIA) are the three legislations 
that govern banks in Nigeria (Unini, 2015). 
3.6.2 Companies and Allied Matters Act  
Companies and Allied Matters Act (CAMA) is a mandatory legal document that deals 
with issues ranging from firm formation, duties and functions of directors, down to 
winding up and dissolution. It also states the powers of shareholders and lists the major 
players in corporate administration and governance of firms (Unini, 2015). 
CAMA also states the basic contents of the annual reports and stipulates that financial 
statement must have been rendered and submitted at least 21 days before the date of the 
the general meeting of the shareholders (Unini, 2015).  
3.6.3 Investment and Securities Act 
“The Investment and Securities Act 2007 (ISA) established the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC). The SEC is the main regulatory body for capital market and 
securities investments in Nigeria and ensures the protection of investors in Nigeria against 
fraud.  Before floating shares publicly, registration must be done with (Unini, 2015). 
The ISA Act places the fudicial responsibility on the Board of Directors of firms. 
Expedient prosecution for contravention of the provisions of the Act is done through the 
Investment and Securities Tribunal (IST). So, while CAMA deals with the incorporation, 
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the issue of shares and other company securities, and winding up of companies, ISA deals 
with the offer of shares to the public and the regulation of the capital market (Unini, 
2015). 
3.6.4 Banks and Other Financial Institutions Act 
Banks and Other Financial Institutions Act (BOFIA), assigned the regulation and 
supervision of banks and other financial institutions in Nigeria to the Central Bank of 
Nigeria (CBN). The CBN under BOFIA is empowered to regulate the financial sector and 
is the banker of last resort. The CBN is essential especially due to the sensitive position 
financial insitutions hold in the society. The CBN ensures those saddled with fuducial 
responsibility do not derelict their duties. BOFIA provides for the prosecution of any 
director who contravenes the provision of the Act. It also states how books of account 
should be maintained following extant accounting standards as may be prescribed by the 
CBN or other legislation from time to time. External auditors’ appointment must be 
approved by CBN (Unini, 2015). 
In the exercise of the foregoing powers and responsibilities, the CBN drafted the 
Mandatory Code of Corporate Governance for Banks in Nigeria.  
The next subsection reviews the code of corporate governance in Nigeria. 
3.6.5 Corporate Governance Regulation in Nigeria 
The Sir Adrian Cadbury report, published in 1992, can be said to be the bedrock upon 
which corporate governance codes were set.  Similarly, in the USA, strong regulatory 
enforced corporate governance can be said to have taken off fully in the 2000s especially 
after the Enron and WorldCom crises of 2001 with the enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act of 2002. The seeming success of this system put corporate governance on the reform 
agenda worldwide, culminating in the Organisation for Economic Corporation and 
Development (OECD) principles in 1997 that were largely modeled upon a stylized 
version of current U.S. practices. Expectedly, developed countries generally issued codes 
of corporate governance earlier than developing countries (Sahin, 2015). Effects of 
globalization and driven by financial integration (Khanna et al., 2006), many countries 
have issued corporate governance codes which they expect firms to adhere to voluntarily 
or mandatorily (Guillin, 2000; Nestor & Thompson, 2000).  
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For Nigeria, its first formal corporate governance code could be traced to the Code of 
Corporate Governance for Banks and Other Financial Institutions in Nigeria, which was 
issued by the Bankers' Committee in August 2003 (Okike, 2007). This Code was initiated 
by the Banker’s committee due to the banking crisis of the 1990s. The committee adduced 
poor corporate governance as a major contributor to the financial sector distress. The 
voluntary Code applied to all financial institutions operating in Nigeria at the time 
(Wilson, 2006) but was considered weak as it was not regulatory enforced. The Code was 
based on 11 Principles. These are: Responsibilities of the Board of Directors, Structure 
of the Board of Directors, The Chairman and the Chief Executive Officer, Appointments 
to the Board, Proceedings of the Board of Directors, Directors' Remuneration, Board 
Performance Assessment, Risk Management, Financial Disclosure, Relations with 
shareholders, and Audit Committee. (Report of Nigerian Bankers committee, 2003). 
Although the first Code was detailed, it was not enforceable and made little impact (Ofo, 
2013). Furthermore, in October 2003, just two months after the Banker’s committee’s 
Code, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) issued the Code of Best Practices 
on Corporate Governance in Nigeria (Ofo, 2013). Being the first regulatory issued code, 
the SEC code impacted the corporate governance scene in Nigeria (Okike, 2007, Ofo, 
2013). Soon after the release of this first SEC code, there was numerous developments in 
the corporate world. However, the SEC was slow to react thereby making the SEC code 
inadequate to address industry specific realities (Ofo, 2013). This led to regulators of 
specific sectors to issue industry-specific corporate governance codes. These codes, not 
only took into account the current situations of the specific sector it was made for 
(Osemeke & Adegbite, 2016). 
Following the consolidation exercise for banks in Nigeria in 2005, the Central Bank of 
Nigeria (CBN) issued a mandatory Code of Corporate Governance in 2006. The Code 
was meant to address the identified weaknesses in the corporate governance of banks in 
Nigeria (Wilson, 2006) and to forestall and deal with post-consolidation challenges. 
Failure to comply with the code of corporate governance will ensure the banks are 
subjected to different disciplinary measures ranging from fines to retrieval of banking 
license (Ofo, 2013). CBN updated its code of corporate governance in 2014 and renamed 
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it Code of Corporate Governance for Banks and Discount Houses in Nigeria and 
Guidelines for Whistle Blowing in the Nigerian Banking Industry. 
Lastly, owing to calls for a uniformed corporate governance code that can apply to all 
firms operating in Nigeria, the Financial Reporting Council of Nigeria (FRCN) 
introduced the combined code of corporate governance conduct for all Nigerian 
companies October 2016. This combined code as introduced by FRCN raised many 
concerns amongst industry players, stakeholders, and professionals given its far-reaching 
effect on management structures of private entities coupled with the jurisprudential issue 
relating to its validity (Nwafuru, 2016). The combined code was therefore criticized for 
its stifling provisions, which run afoul of existing corporate legislation and sector-based 
codes of corporate governance (Nwafuru, 2016), leading to its suspension in December 
2016. The combined code has been re-introduced in 2018 but is still subject to final 
approval. Unlike the suspended 2016 code, the new code covers all companies (public, 
private, concessioned and privatized companies). It also covers private- holding 
companies of public companies (Adegbite, 2018). The not-for-profit code remains 
suspended. The proposed 2018 combined code contains 28 core principles and 230 
practices which are recommended to enable flexibility of different regulators and 
companies implementing the principles (Adegbite, 2108). The 2018 combined code aims 
to standardize the practice of good corporate governance and induce voluntary 
compliance with the highest ethical standards across the Nigerian market. 
From the foregoing, it is evident that corporate governance regulations continue to evolve 
with new codes of conduct for corporate governance or revisions of existing ones 
emerging over time (La Porta et al., 2002; Berger et al., 2005). In Nigeria, there exists a 
multiplicity of governance codes. Osemeke & Adegbite (2016) define corporate 
governance regulatory multiplicity as the presence of different codes of conduct, which 
are there to regulate different and intertwined stakeholders in the corporate sector. In 
response to criticism such as those from Osemeke & Adegbite (2016), the FRCN 
introduced the combined code of corporate governance. Despite this valiant attempt by 
the FRCN to retaining the sectoral codes alongside the FRC code, the combined code 
might be burdensome on SMEs and seems to concentrate on the primacy of the 
shareholders (Adegbite, 2018). This study focused on the banking sector which has a 
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mandatory code of corporate governance which players in the sector must compulsorily 
abide. In any case, Moghalu (2011) argued that multiplicity of codes in a single country 
helps to satisfy different stakeholders especially firms in different industries who may 
have different stakeholders that have peculiar needs/expectations that cannot be 
accommodated with a single “one size fits all” code of corporate governance (Engle, 
2007). 
Ironically, more processes do not necessarily mean better regulations, compliance or even 
good practices. Indeed, over-regulation detracts firms from being innovative, taking risks 
and can even directly affect a firm's fortunes (Walsh & Seward, 1990). Perhaps not 
surprisingly, corporate governance codes are followed more in liberated countries with 
strong foreign institutional investors (Aguilera & Cuervo–Cazurra, 2004). Aguilera & 
Cuervo-Cazurra (2004) also reported that in today’s world, countries with weak legal 
protections are likely to introduce corporate governance codes even if many countries 
with weak legal and civil systems rarely revise their codes (Aguilera & Cuervo-Cazurra, 
2004). 
In most developing countries, the weak institutional environment means corporate 
governance is mainly treated as a ceremonial activity as it maintains appearances and 
validates the firms (Merton, 1940; March & Simon, 1958). Especially as regulation which 
can be considered an additional governance mechanism, can reduce the effect of other 
governance in coping with corporate governance problems effectively (Andres & 
Vallelado, 2008). Moreover, that a country's regulatory body makes it mandatory to adopt 
certain rules and disclose certain category of information, does not mean the quality of 
information provided is accurate as this is still dependent on firms management (Kent & 
Steward, 2008).  
Table 2.2 below is a compilation of all codes of corporate governance that have ever 
been issued in Nigeria.
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Table 3. 2 History of code of corporate governance in Nigeria 
Title of Code Month/Year 
Issued 
Code Issuer Nature of Code Pertinent Features of Code Remarks 
Code of Corporate 
Governance for 
Banks and Other 
Financial Institutions 
in Nigeria 
August/2003 Nigerian Bankers 
Committee 
Voluntary Focused on 11 governance Principles. 
These are: Responsibilities of the Board 
of Directors, Structure of the Board of 
Directors, The Chairman and the Chief 
Executive Officer, Appointments to the 
Board, Proceedings of the Board of 
Directors, Directors' Remuneration, 
Board Performance Assessment, Risk 
Management, Financial Disclosure, 
Relations with shareholders, and Audit 
Committee 
First recognized code of 
corporate governance issued in 
Nigeria. 
Code of Corporate 
Governance in 
Nigeria 
October/2003 Nigerian Securities 
and Exchange 
Commission 
Voluntary Dealt with the role and composition of the 
board, and recommended minimum (5) 
and maximum (15) board members. Dealt 
with rights of shareholders and 
establishment of Audit Committee 
Lacked any impetus in the 
Nigerian space as 
enforcement/monitoring was 
non-existent 
Code of Corporate 
Governance for 
Banks in Nigeria - 
Post Consolidation 
April/2006 Central Bank of 
Nigeria 
Mandatory Followed most of the existing principles 
of the August 2003 code but 
recommended a maximum board 
membership of 20. Also re-emphasized 
the recommended separation of roles of 
chairman and CEO. Recommended 
minimum establishment of Audit, Credit 
and Risk Management Committees 
First mandatory code which was 
enforced after a banking 
consolidation exercise in 2005 
which moved the minimum 
capital base of commercial banks 
from N2bn (approx. to $15.4M 
@ $1: N130 as at Dec 2005) to 
N25bn (approx. $192.3M) 
Code of Corporate 
Governance for 
Public Companies 
April/2011 Nigerian Securities 
and Exchange 
Commission 
Mandatory This code supersedes the 2003 Nigerian 
SEC code. It recommends that the 
majority of board members should be 
non- executive directors with at least one 
independent director. 
This code suggests that when 
there is a conflict between 
multiple codes concerning a 
company, the code with stricter 
provisions shall apply 
Code of Corporate 
Governance for 
Banks and Discount 
Houses in Nigeria 
and Guidelines for 
Whistle Blowing in 
May 
/2014 
Central Bank of 
Nigeria 
Mandatory This code superseded the CBN code of 
2006. It maintains most of the guidelines 
of the 2006 code but recommends the 
establishment of Risk Management, 
Board Audit (not the same as statutory 
Audit Committee) and Board Governance 
This code also made 
recommendations for Discount 
Houses. Discount houses provide 
an avenue for the trading of 
government securities like 
treasury bills. 
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the Nigerian Banking 
Industry 
and Nomination Committees as a 
minimum for Banks. Also stipulated that 
all committees must submit a charter for 
CBN's approval. It also introduced 
whistleblowing guidelines 
National Code of 
Corporate 
Governance 2016 
(the “Code”) 
October/2016 
 
*Suspended 
December 2016 
Financial 
Reporting Council 
of Nigeria 
Mandatory for 
Private Sector. 
Comply or explain 
for non-profit 
organizations 
 Made up of 3 distinct sections: 
Code of Corporate Governance 
for the Private Sector; the Code 
of Governance for Not-for-Profit 
entities; and the Code of 
Governance for the Public Sector. 
The Code of Corporate 
Governance for the Private 
Sector (the “Private Sector 
Code”) is mandatory while that 
for the Not-for-Profit entities will 
be operated on a “Comply or 
Justify non-compliance” basis in 
a manner similar to the United 
Kingdom’s Corporate 
Governance Code. On the other 
hand, the Code of Governance 
for the Public Sector will not 
become immediately operative 
until an executive directive is 
secured from the Federal 
Government of Nigeria for that 
code to take effect. 
Draft of the Nigerian 
Code of Corporate 
Governance (NCCG) 
2018 
June/2018 Financial 
Reporting Council 
of Nigeria 
Mandatory for 
Public & Private 
Sector. 
 
Remains 
suspended for non-
profit organizations 
Recognizes existing sectoral codes. 
Hence, contains 28 principles as the core 
of the code and 230 practices, which are 
recommended to enable flexibility of 
different regulators and companies 
implementing the principles. 
Still proposed and not yet fully 
implemented. 
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3.7 Governance of Nigerian Financial Institutions 
3.7.1 Introduction 
Preceding discussions have concentrated on the general nature of corporate governance 
regulation in Nigeria. In this regard, several corporate governance factors and their 
specific peculiarities in the Nigerian context have been examined. In this part, the author 
analyses the particular dimensions of the corporate governance regulatory model of the 
Nigerian banking sector. 
3.7.2 Background 
The corporate governance of financial service sector and more specifically of banks in 
developing countries has been almost ignored by researchers (Caprio & Levine, 2002). 
Even in developed countries, the corporate governance of this sector has been vaguely 
discussed in the literature (Macey & O’Hara, 2001). Most corporate governance and 
voluntary disclosures studies have been conducted using a sample excluding financial 
sector due to its special disclosure requirements (Reverte, 2009; Chau & Gray, 2010) or 
used a mixed sample of financial and non-financial firms. Such samples ignore the 
difference in reporting regulations and the regulatory bodies governing the banking 
sector and mandatory special reporting requirements (Jizi, 2013; Jizi et al., 2014). Banks 
governance is more sensitive to society influences since depositors who form a major 
part of a bank's stakeholders are the core funding source (Grove et al., 2011). Hence, 
effective governance in the financial sector efficiently monitors management behavior, 
avoids the risk of ethical violation and bad reputation (Arora & Dharwadkar, 2011). 
Following the argument above, the corporate governance of banks in developing 
countries is essential for many reasons. First, banks have a dominant position in the 
financial systems of developing countries and are essential engines of economic growth 
(King & Levine, 1993). Second, banks in these developing countries are major sources 
of finance for the majority of firms. Third, banks in developing countries provide the 
means of transactions and are the main store for the economy's savings. Given the 
importance of banks, their governance now assumes a central role given the peculiar 
contractual form of banking, corporate governance mechanisms for banks should 
encapsulate depositors and shareholders (Grove et al., 2011). 
Further, banks as financial intermediaries are the backbone of any economy playing a 
major role in managing client's assets and financing other industries as well as 
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households (Howells & Bain, 2008). They play a crucial intermediary role linking 
depositors and investors with borrowers (Howells & Bain, 2008). In performing this 
intermediary role, banks must be seen to be trustworthy and reputable without which 
acceptance by stakeholders (especially external) will be a challenge (Branco & 
Rodrigues, 2006; Rowley, 1997). Hence, to improve this stakeholders’ trust and 
commitment, banks must engage in effective dialogue with its audience (Simpson & 
Koher, 2002; Hess, 2007; Gray et al., 1995).  
In the financial crisis of 2007, the absence of clear understanding of the bank's complex 
operations and the dynamics of risk management damaged financial markets (Allen & 
Moessner, 2011; Gorton, 2009; Ivashina & Schorfstein, 2010). Whereas, any crisis can 
mean stakeholders lose trust, as investors faced with poor information have little or no 
choice but to stop dealing with the firms (Gorton, 2009). Hence, issues of firms 
accountability to society have been raised (Matten, 2006). Stakeholders such as 
investment analysts seek more firm-related information, especially with the increasing 
societal issues (Berthelot et al., 2012). Jizi (2013) supposes that banks with more 
effective corporate governance mechanism will encourage the disclosure of wider 
content. Consequently, stakeholders' acceptance is most likely to be achieved (Branco & 
Rodigues, 2006; Gray et al., 1995) and information asymmetry reduced, improving the 
firm's stock performance (Kothari et al., 2009; Akhigbe et al., 2008; Scholtens, 2008) as 
well as corporate image and trust (Gray et al., 1995; Li et al., 2010; Mackenzie, 2007).  
3.7.3 Corporate Governance in Nigerian Banks 
Corporate governance as a regulatory induced practice, is used to describe the way a firm 
is managed, monitored and held accountable (Rezael, 2008; Tricker, 2015). The global 
financial crisis of 2008, also affected the Nigerian financial sector with the CBN 
intervening in nine commercial banks. Indeed, the boards of five of the banks were 
dismissed, and the respective banks became state-owned through the Asset Management 
Company of Nigeria (AMCON). The collapse of the banks was blamed on poor corporate 
governance and inadequate supervision by regulators (Adegbite, 2012). As of 2018, there 
are 23 Nigerian commercial banks with over 5,600 branches nationwide. Sixteen of the 
banks are publicly owned and listed on the Nigerian stock exchange (NSE), six are 
privately owned. One bank is state-owned through the Asset Management Company of 
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Nigeria (AMCON). All Nigerian banks have a uniform financial year which ends 
December 31st, and by 2012 and all were International Financial Risk Management 
Standards (IFRS) compliant. 
The Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) is constitutionally empowered by the country to 
supervise and regulate activities of all financial institutions. Leaning on this provision, 
the CBN assumes jurisdiction over most activities of banks in its domain. The CBN code 
of governance for Nigerian banks aims to promote and guide minimum acceptable 
corporate governance standards for the banks. This regulatory enforced code is expected 
to give confidence to shareholders, investors (local and foreign), depositors and indeed 
all stakeholders especially those who might hold future financial claims against such 
organization. It is expected that this code of corporate governance should normally 
underpin the relationship between the banks and the stakeholders helping the banks 
operate successfully (Visser, 2013; Nwagbara, 2014).  In order words, the code of 
corporate governance as stipulated should expose the internal practices of the banks at 
least to a considerable minimum that allows internal and external stakeholders make 
informed decisions about each organization. As suggested by Filatotchev et al. (2007), 
good corporate governance should help a bank in terms of wealth creation and protection. 
However, corporate governance involves various problems of asymmetric information 
and in some cases incomplete or irrelevant disclosures. These attendant challenges 
necessitate some sort of public policy that aims to mitigate market failures and ensures 
companies move towards good and transparent corporate governance (Filatotchev et al., 
2007). This public policy can be in the form of governance codes. Chizema (2008, p.360) 
defined corporate governance codes as a "voluntary act of principles, recommendations, 
standards or best practices, issued by a collective body, and relating to the internal 
governance of corporations within a country." According to Weil & Manges (2003), code 
of corporate governance are principles or standards set internally by a firm but not 
necessarily binding on the firm. Some countries (such as Britain) operate comply or 
explain policy for their corporate governance while others (such as the United States of 
America and Nigeria) follow a mandatory comply policy. Fundamentally, the mandatory 
CBN code of corporate governance sought to address the principal-agent issue similar to 
that found in many developed environments (MacNeil & Li, 2006; Young et al., 2002). 
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This is evident as in the CBN May 2014 circular to banks and discount houses, only 
about ninety words seemed to address specifically other stakeholders. 
Nevertheless, despite the mandatory code of governance, the CBN has consistently had 
to hand hold Nigerian Banks with different banking crisis recorded in 1989, 1994, 2005 
and 2009 (Adegbite, 2012). Recently, the CBN mandatorily had to change the entire 
board of a bank late in 2016 with many of the erstwhile directors under investigations by 
the economic and financial crime commission. It should also be noted that Nigeria is a 
country where public accountability is secondary to other considerations such as political 
affiliations and influential connections (Amaeshi et al., 2006; Okike, 2007). This has left 
the country with a weakened regulatory system (Amaeshi et al., 2006; Okike, 2007).  
Furthermore, under the diffusion mechanism, firms adopt the governance provisions of 
their network neighbors (Benton, 2014) meaning there is some form of isomorphism 
among Nigerian Banks as it relates to corporate governance reporting. Banks in Nigeria 
in conformity with institutionalized organizations, seek to minimize inspections and 
evaluation by both internal and external stakeholders (Meyer & Rowan, 1977). Indeed, 
most accrediting agencies, boards of trustees, government agencies and individuals take 
for granted characteristics of a particular industry as long as the individual firms achieve 
measures of isomorphism. Legitimacy in some ways reduces the need to monitor firms 
rigorously thereby reducing transaction costs (Watson et al., 2002). This accrediting 
agencies, government agencies, etc., assume that the reputational or legal cost that firms 
incur if they get their corporate governance practices wrong (Beatty & Welch, 1996) is 
enough consideration for firms, as neglect to comply might lead to cost that is 
unquantifiable (Zhang, 2005). Therefore, if banks are unable to be isomorphic with their 
environment, they can fail (Meyer & Rowan, 1977) or can be punished by stakeholders 
for example through the stock market (Zuckerman, 1999). 
Having external recognition from regulatory institutions helps firms maintain some 
stability and preserves their going concern nature (Scott & Lyman, 1968). This 
confirmatory recognition by regulatory institutions also helps the banks to avoid having 
its conduct questioned, thereby enabling the banks to become part of a collective system 
instead of relying entirely on its performance for survival (Meyer & Rowan, 1977).  
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Hence, firms exist on a continuum where at one end are organizations whose success 
depends on the "relational networks and the other end organizations that depend on the 
confidence and stability achieved by isomorphism with institutional rules" (Meyer & 
Rowan, 1977, p. 343). Firms can move about on this imaginary continuum depending on 
many factors among which is how stakeholders perceive them. 
In Nigeria, the development in corporate governance and other regulations in the banking 
sector meant that some Nigerian banks (Zenith Bank, Guaranty Trust Bank, First Bank, 
Access Bank, and United Bank of Africa) were rated by the Banker magazine as among 
the world top 500 bank brands (Thisday, 2017). However, the institutional weaknesses 
mean investment analysts must still consider by themselves governance mechanisms 
projected and not take for granted the governance drivers as signaled by banks. 
3.8 Corporate Governance Mechanism in Nigerian Banks  
Inadvertently, the sometimes-overbearing influence of policies from developed countries 
can be seen throughout various activities in developing countries (Nakpodia et al., 2016). 
The effect on corporate governance in developing countries is not left out of this 
quagmire. Hence, directives from developed countries dictate how standards must 
resemble and must be integrated into local regulatory frameworks. This is not any 
different in Nigeria, as the direction of corporate governance seems to be an attempt to 
keep up with happenings in developed countries. However, the many different drivers of 
corporate governance indicate the complexity associated with firms (Krishnan & 
Visvanathan, 2009). The way firms behave is not static, and stakeholder's expectations 
shape some of the attitude of firms (Richardson et al., 1999). Hence, firm-level drivers 
of corporate governance could help signal to stakeholder's specific information about the 
organization (Lee et al., 1983). 
In the Nigerian banking sector, the CBN, in creating an ideal group of good corporate 
governance drivers for banks seeks to reduce or streamline the transaction costs.  
Mandatory uniform regulation can help overcome market failures and weak practice of 
corporate governance, but this uniformity might pose a problem to both internal and 
external stakeholders. This is because some of the regulatory induced corporate 
governance codes might be possible complementarities or even substituting one driver 
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for another might serve the same purpose. For investment analysts who have to rely on 
corporate governance cues to make investment decisions, the governance drivers 
projected by firms need to recognizable to elicit positive investment reactions. 
The drivers described below are identified mechanisms and drivers of good corporate 
governance as postulated by Adegbite (2015) for developing countries. This research 
focuses on corporate governance at the industry level (using firm-level antecedents) and 
how these antecedents are perceived by investment analysts. It is not an attempt to review 
the different regulatory regime, monitoring or implementation in Nigeria. The drivers are 
grouped into three categories of board of structure and composition mechanism, 
ownership mechanism, and accountability mechanism. These three categories are also a 
broad representation of corporate governance requirements for banks in Nigeria. 
3.8.1 Board of Director’s Mechanism (Structure and Composition) 
Corporate governance research usually investigates areas in which stakeholders interests 
can diverge and usually seeks to mitigate situations where agents/managers serve their 
interests alone to the detriment of the firm (Shleifer & Vishny, 1997). One way to ensure 
the interests of agents and principals converge is the establishment of boards of directors. 
Boards provide sound advice (Johnson et al., 1996; Westphal, 1999; Zahra & Pearce, 
1989) to a firm's management and also guarantee best interest of shareholders (Guest, 
2009). Hence, Fama & Jensen (1983, p. 311) describe the board of directors as the 
"common apex of the decision control systems of organizations, large and small." Further 
support for their position is found in legal tradition, which assumes that the board of 
directors is to behave like a consensus driven decision-making group with no individual 
director having the authority to act on behalf of the corporation, only as a body of 
directors (Bainbridge, 2008). 
Consequently, board monitoring has been described by Jensen (1993, p. 862) as the "apex 
of the internal control system." Board of directors are responsible for the governance of 
their companies" (Cadbury report, 1992, p.15). Hence, boards are primarily responsible 
for putting controls in place to ensure firms management behave in accordance with 
shareholders expectations of them. Therefore, the board is obliged to scrutinize the firm's 
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executive management's behavior and performance thoroughly to protect the interests of 
stakeholders (Hillman & Dalziel, 2003). 
Other strategic researchers such Dalton et al., (1999); Hillman & Dalziel, (2003); Pfeffer 
& Salncik, (1978); Benton, (2014); (2016) have confirmed that boards broaden 
relationships and expand the networks of firms. Furthermore, a growing number of 
studies (e.g., Carpenter & Westphal, 2001; Daily & Dalton, 1992; Geletkanycz & 
Hambrick, 1997) have confirmed that boards are a critical source of competitive 
advantage for firms as they provide invaluable resources. Boards also play strategic roles 
in the decision-making process of firms especially at growth or early stages of a firm's 
lifecycle (McNulty & Pettigrew, 1999). According to Hillman et al. (2000) and Lynall et 
al. (2003), boards provide advice, give legitimacy to firms, are a source of 
communication especially to external parties and help with resources for the firm. A mix 
of executive, non-executive directors, independent directors, and other board members 
can provide a wide range of expertise, which can objectively influence the firm's strategy 
and indeed performance (Anderson & Reeb, 2004; Davis et al., 1997; Deutsch, 2005). 
However, board of director mechanisms are understudied in the developing market 
context (Melo, 2015) where understanding about boards seems to be derived based on 
knowledge from international codes (Melo, 2015). Developing countries are usually 
characterized by weak institutional domestic environments and led by governments that 
can be classified as weak (Hoskisson et al., 2000). There is even less research at the firm 
level and industry level in terms of features of board structure and composition drivers 
of good corporate governance (Melo, 2015). This research studies three board structure 
and composition mechanism drivers (board independence, board heterogeneity, and 
board/director reputation) at the industry level. The board structure and composition 
mechanism drivers and their features reviewed are as identified by existing research 
primarily and seek to align the interests of managers with stakeholders (Filatotchev et 
al., 2007; Miller, 2010; Wahab & Holland, 2012; Lopes & Walker, 2012; Adegbite, 
2015). 
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3.8.1.1 Board Independence 
Board independence is one of the mandatory regulations that banks in Nigeria must 
comply with, as required by the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) corporate governance 
code (CBN Code), first formulated in 2006 and revised in 2014. The independence of 
board of directors is critical for a firm to be seen as having good corporate governance 
as it usually implies the desire of a firm to show managements’ objectivity (Langevoort, 
2001). Strategy and sociology researchers (Dalton et al. 1999; Benton, 2016) also note 
that independent boards broaden relationships and expand the networks of firms. 
Furthermore, strategy studies (Carpenter & Westphal, 2001; Daily & Dalton, 1994; 
Geletkanycz & Hambrick, 1997) have highlighted that boards are a critical source of 
competitive advantage for firms as they provide invaluable resources. Hence, the 
importance of relevant stakeholders being able to identify a board as independent cannot 
be underestimated. Some of these stakeholders (e.g., investment analysts) are more 
concerned about protecting themselves (and their clients or investing firms) from being 
exploited rather than disciplining management (Claessens & Yurtoglu, 2013). This need 
for self-protection or awareness is even more pertinent in developing countries, where 
the principal – principal agency challenge is prevalent. In such weak institutional 
environments, an independent board reduces risks and encourages minority shareholders 
and creditors to provide more financing to firms (Claessens & Yurtoglu, 2013).   
Board independence suggests a willingness to bring a high degree of rigour, scrutiny and 
objectivity to the evaluation of a company’s management (Langevoort, 2001; Adegbite, 
2015). The review of the economics, management and finance literatures does not 
provide unambiguous evidence in terms of the extent to which board independence has 
a positive effect on the firm’s efficiency and performance. Furthermore, management 
and business strategy research suggests that board independence has significant effects 
on “critical” organisational decisions, such as executive turnover, value-enhancing 
business strategies, and limitations on anti-take-over defences (Dalton et al. 1999).  
The literature (e.g Adegbite, 2015; Filatotchev. 2007) identify four feature of board 
independence. These are absence of CEO duality, more non-executive directors than 
executive directors on a board, presence of independent directors on a board anddispersed 
share ownership. 
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Berg & Smith (1978) in their study of Fortune 200 firms, report a negative relationship 
between CEO duality and ROI. In the same study, they conclude that there is no 
relationship between CEO duality and ROE or change in stock price. In their own study, 
Donaldson & Davis (1991) in their study of CEO governance and shareholder return, 
find that CEO duality was associated with significantly higher levels of ROE. While 
Chaganti, et al. (1985) found no relationship between CEO duality and corporate failure 
in the U.S. retailing industry.  
 
It is expected that a board comprises of executives and non-executives. The non –
executive directors are either independent or non-independent directors. The roles of the 
non-executive directors and independent directors is separate (CBN, 2014). The non-
executive directors (NEDs) need to play a role in monitoring the actions of the CEO and 
executive directors to ensure that the shareholders’ interests are well cared for and to add 
to the diversity of skills and expertise of the executive directors who manage the day to 
day activities of the firm (Abdullah, 2004). The CBN mandates that the board be 
composed of more non executives than executive directors. Awan (2012) report a 
positive relationship between NEDs and ROA and ROE. Similarly, Dehaene et al. (2001) 
report a positive significant relationship between non-executive directors and ROE.  This 
suggests that the independence of non-executive directors mitigates the agency problem 
and enhances firm performance (Dehaene et al., 2001). However, Collett & Hrasky 
(2005) found that a positive relationship existed between the proportion of inside 
directors and the market based measures of performance. 
 
According to Eisenberg (1976) independent directors play an important role in improving 
board effectiveness. Their impact might not be directly felt on firm operating 
performance but indirectly through management monitoring (Kesner & Johnson, 1990). 
These independent directors can also be beneficial for evaluating takeover proposals and 
monitoring and disclosing insider unethical transactions (Barnhart et al., 1994). The 
banking regulators in Nigeria also make it compulsory to have at least 2 independent 
directors on the board of a bank. A Central Bank of Nigeria circular (2007 pp 1) defines 
independent director as "a member of the Board of Directors who has no direct material 
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relationship with the bank or any of its officers, major shareholders, subsidiaries and 
affiliates; a relationship which may impair the director's ability to make independent 
judgments or compromise the director's objectivity in line with Corporate Governance 
best practices. 
 
On the issue of share ownership, on the one hand, Lin & Zhang (2009) examined 60 
Chinese banks between 1997-2004. They report that the big four commercial banks with 
concentrated ownership are less efficient and less profitable than other types of banks.  
On the other hand, Bian & Deng (2017) investigated Chinese banks between the 2007–
2014. They report that more ownership dispersion improves ROA, ROE and reduces the 
ratio of non-performing loans. Leech & Leahy (1991) investigate large British companies 
and report a negative relationship between ownership concentration and profitability. 
Demsetz & Villalonga (2001) did not find a significant relationship between ownership 
structure and firm performance. Interestingly, Ozili & Uadiale (2017) investigate the 
relationship between ownership composition and performance of Nigerian banks 
between 2006-2015. They find that banks with high ownership concentration have higher 
ROA, higher net interest margin and higher recurring earning power while banks with 
dispersed ownership have lower ROA but have higher ROE. 
 
3.8.1.2 Board Heterogeniety  
Banks in Nigeria exhibit diversity traits to project good corporate governance to 
stakeholders. The banks display this norm by projecting diversity in the composition of 
their boards and management to ensure firm survival (Daily & Dalton, 1994; Filatotchev 
& Toms, 2003; Hambrick & D'Aveni, 1992). Unlike Nigeria, in strong institutional 
international contexts, some diversity features are mandatory. For example, in Norway 
and in the EU, women representation on boards must be up to a minimum of 40% 
(Wiersema & Mors, 2016). As developing countries follow governance trends of 
developed countries, board heterogeneity has grown to become a (non-compulsory) 
fixture that can signal good governance, especially through increased board 
independence (Wiersema & Bantel, 1992).  A diverse board provides advice to the CEO 
and can be a source of support for roles which employees might be unable to fulfill 
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(Dalton et al., 1999; Hillman & Dalziel, 2003; Lorsh & Maclver, 1989; Zahra & Pearce, 
1989). The usefulness and effectiveness of this advice/support can depend on the varied 
experiences and diverse backgrounds of the members of the board (Carpenter, 2002; 
Westphal, 1999). The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision report of 2014 (BCBS, 
2014) expands guidance on the roles of the board of directors, specifically pointing out 
that the bank board should be composed of a diverse set of directors to reflect its 
complexity in operation.  
However, contextually, for developing countries, less is known about the particular board 
diversity features, in terms of age, gender, ethnic tribe, tenure of directorship, and 
multiple directorships that are important signals especially for external stakeholders. 
On age, the extant research in this space suggests that a healthy combination of both 
young and older directors should be represented on the board (Fox, 2007; Adegbite, 
2015). When profiling an individual, age is a dynamic proxy of an individual's life 
experience (Mannheim, 1949) and encompasses a wide range of factors that influence 
the formation of personal values during their lifespan (Medawar, 1952; Rhodes, 1983). 
Whether an age-diverse board provides comprehensive resources and expertise or leads 
to communication breakdown and conflicts remains an open question. Age diversity is 
particularly important in developing countries as these countries experience significant 
transformations over a relatively short period (Peng et al, 2008). Moreover, along with 
the transition of the economic system, there has simultaneously been a push towards 
cultural change (Stulz & Williamson, 2003). Specifically, the network of an age-diverse 
board may provide better access to capital and regulators (Macey & O'hara, 2003) and 
enable the bank to meet the needs of different customers and penetrate deeper into the 
market (Mishra & Jhunjhunwala, 2013) and into different markets. Further, older 
directors tend to be more knowledgeable and experienced, whereas younger directors are 
more energetic and have a greater appetite for adventures and new technologies (Mishra 
& Jhunjhunwala, 2013). There are no age restrictions for directors in Nigerian banks. 
On gender, international research on women and corporate governance credentials found 
that gender balance enables the board to pay more attention to audit and risk oversight 
(Makhlouf et al., 2018), consider more diverse categories of stakeholders when making 
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decisions, and are generally more thorough in a wide range of management and 
organisational performance (Krishnan & Park, 2005; Mahalakshmi & Reddy, 2017). 
Similarly, the Higgs Report in the UK, recommends that more women should be included 
on boards as the report suggests that demographic diversity increases board effectiveness 
(Adams & Ferreira, 2009).  However, on the contrary, Matsa & Miller (2013) reported 
that board without female members affected strategy more positively while Moncrief et 
al., (2000) reported no effect of women on performance.  
In Nigeria, the CBN code of corporate goverance 2014 encourages board diversity but 
does not impose gender representations on boards of banks. 
Similarly with gender, it has also been suggested that ethnic/tribal diversity of directors 
results in better governance (Jurkus et al., 2011) which causes the business to be more 
profitable. Although Karen J. Curtin, a former executive vice president of Bank of 
America, describes the interaction of the two propositions (gender and tribal diversity) 
in the following statement; "There is real debate between those who think we should be 
more diverse because it is the right thing to do and those who think we should be more 
diverse because it actually enhances shareholder value. Unless we get the second point 
across and people believe it, we're only going to have tokenism" (Brancato & Patterson, 
1999, p.7). Nigeria is a country with 250 different tribes and ethnicity (NPC & ICF 
Macro, 2009) but there are no guides on which tribes should be on boards of banks. 
However, the numerous tribes in the country usually means boards try as much as 
possible to have different tribal representations. Also, researchers such as Adegbite 
(2015) have proposed that tribal diversity should be reflected in board composition in 
Nigeria especially as tribal diversity has religious undertones in Nigeria (Nakpodia et al., 
2016).   
On tenure, Boeker (1992), Pfeffer (1982), Golden & Zajac (2001) and Finkelstein & 
Hambrick, (1996) argue that longer tenured boards inhibit creativeness while in contrast 
Hambrick & Mason (1984), Hambrick & D'Aveni (1992) suggest longer tenured boards 
supports better innovation. Corporate governance literature generally seems to favour 
boards with shorter tenure boards. In Nigeria, the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) code 
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of corporate governance (2014) stipulates that directors can only serve two tenures of 
5years each on the board of a bank.  
The issue of directors being on other firms' boards, research in this area suggests that the 
network relationships of directors provide positive resources for organizations 
(Filatotchev & Toms, 2003; Mizruchi, 1996; Mizruchi & Stearns, 1994; Benton, 2017). 
The knowledge and advantages gained from these relationships also might auger well for 
the going concern nature of firms (Carpenter, 2002). Some of these advantages are 
transferred to firms through outsider director(s) appointed onto the firm's board 
especially where the outsider director has prior board experience from other companies 
(Golden & Zajac, 2001; Pettigrew, 1992; Westphal & Fredrickson, 2001). Carpenter & 
Westphal, (2001), Westphal, (1999), and Benton (2017) find that there is a positive 
relationship between performance and when the directors have ties with companies in 
the same field as the ones where they are directors. These directors also bring some 
reputational capital to the boards (Geletkanycz & Hambrick, 1997; Lynall et al., 2003). 
Ferris et al. (2003) suggest that the past performance of the companies on which a 
director serves is positively associated with the number of board seats that he hold and 
that firms appointing a new director with multiple board seats experience positive 
announcement returns. The findings by Ferris et al. (2003) suggest that the market 
perceives the appointment of directors with multiple board seats as value enhancing 
(Cashman et al. 2012). In contrast, Fich & Shivdasani (2006) find that firms where 
directors have multiple board seats tend to have lower market to book ratios and are less 
likely to fire a CEO in response to poor performance. Cashman et al. (2012) also find 
that busy directors have a negative influence on performance. Similarly, scholars such as 
Mace, (1971); Pettigrew & McNulty, (1998); and Useem, (1984), (1993) suggest that 
boards directors on other boards amounts to CEOs consolidating their bases.  
3.8.1.3 Board (Director) Reputation 
When stakeholder access a firm’s quality, reputation of directors (especially non-
executive directors) is one of the factors of consideration (Certo et al., 2001). Directors 
perceived to be reputable may signal to external stakeholders that effective monitoring 
is in place (Shivdasani, 1993).  According to D' Aveni (1990, p. 121) " ... prestige helps 
to maintain an illusion of competence and control by influencing interpersonal reactions 
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to the individual. That is, prestige is taken as an indication that the manager (director) is 
competent, credible and trustworthy".  Reputation is also an important indicator of a 
firm’s credibility, overall position and performance potential (Davis & Mizruchi, 1999). 
A firm establishing its reputation through its directors is important given that potential 
investors may have little data on which to base a judgment about the quality of firm 
management (Certo et al., 2001). McGuire et al (1988) argue that reputation has little 
effect on measures of performance. However, Fombrum & Shanley (1990) suggest that 
McGuire et al.’s (1988) conclusion might be plausible in the short run. 
Banks make strategic attempts to influence the society by disseminating information. 
This information gets around through networks of interpersonal relationships or 
interlocking corporate ties (Mizruchi & Schwartz, 1987). Availability of information 
about a firm biases stakeholder’s judgement (Trevsky & Kahneman, 1974). Firm’s 
whose directors are frequently serenaded by the media develop better reputations than 
other firms in the social environment (Burt, 1983). The visibility of directors which 
occurs through press articles and mass media presentations (McQuail, 1985) also 
enhances the firm’s reputation. Greater reputational visibility for the firm can be expected 
when firms operate in homogenous environments (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). Firms 
use this popular identities as a basis of gaining market advantage (Downling, 1986). 
Thus, reputational visibility can be a differentiating factor of banks operating under the 
same corporate governance codes in Nigeria. 
 
Banks like most firms compete for customers. An important preclude to attracting 
customers is reputational status or credibility of directors. One way stakeholders assume 
a firm has reputation is through the credible reputation of the firm’s directors (Fombrum 
& Shanley, 1990) and this is especially true for banks. By being on the board of directors 
of a bank, the reputation of directors are enhanced and they come across as experts (Fama 
& Jensen, 1983). Positive reputation of directors can make different stakeholders 
attribute potential success to a firm (Freeman, 1984). Director’s prestigious and 
recognisable (name) may also confer legitimacy on the organization (Certo et al., 2001).  
Legitimacy via reputable recognised directors may assist the firm in overcoming any 
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information asymmetry problems that might otherwise deter potential investors (Certo et 
al., 2001). According to Pfeffer & Salancik (1978, p. 145), "Prestigious or legitimate 
persons or organizations represented on the focal organization's board provide 
confirmation to the rest of the world of the value and worth of the organization." 
Furthermore, reputation is an important signal of the quality and performance potential 
of the firm. This reputation confers some goodwill on the firm. D' Aveni (1990), suggest 
that goodwill reputation of directors/managers to the survival of bankrupt firms. This 
reputational goodwill provides a firm some degrees of freedom in dealing with creditors 
(D’Aveni, 1990). Indeed, when persons possessing this reputational goodwill exit a 
failing firm prior to bankruptcy, it signals to stakeholders that the firm is no longer 
deserving of their continued support.  As for reputation appearing in form of multiple 
directorship, Gilson (1990) suggest that reputational damage can be done to directors 
who are on board distressed firms. According to Gilson (1990 p. 376): "If directors are 
held responsible for their firms' financial distress, their reputations as expert monitors 
will suffer, and they will be less often asked to serve on other boards." Thus, the potential 
threat to the director’s reputation will encourage him/her to be more active in monitoring 
a firm’s management (Vafeas, 1999). The relationship between board reputation, as 
captured by service on multiple boards of directors, and performance may also be non-
linear (Shivdasani, 1993; Shivdasani & Yermack, 1999). Nevertheless, multiple 
directorships held by outside directors has been criticised by some business/financial 
press (Lublin, 2001).  
Du, 2011, finding suggest that in weak institutional environments, firm political 
connections are positively associated with debt offering amounts and issuer credit 
ratings. This political connections of directors of the firm, then contribute to firm 
reputation. Similarly, studies (e.g. Chaney et al., 2010; Faccio et al., 2006) that examine 
the relationship of political connections to firm reporting behavior (Chaney et al., 2010) 
or firm financing behavior (Faccio et al., 2006) have confirmed the link between political 
connections and preferential capital access. Political connections reputation can be 
established by hiring former government officials as directors (Hillman, 2005). 
Politically exposed directors contribute to a company’s reputation because such directors 
have higher personal reputation at stake than non-connected directors. However, 
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although the importance of political connections has been anecdotally accepted as a 
feature of developing countries economy, there is a lack of empirical work linking 
political connections reputation to investment decision making.  
 
3.8.2 External Ownership Mechanism 
It is argued that an effective mechanism for restraining manipulation by agents is the 
development of an appropriate ownership structure (Habbash, 2010). Ownership 
structure refers to "the identities of a firm's equity holders and the sizes of their positions" 
(Denis & McConnell, 2003, p. 2). Ownership structure decisions are posited as a panacea 
to agency problems among different stakeholders (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Similarly, 
McKnight & Weir (2009) found that ownership structure helps to reduce agency cost. As 
a result, the importance of ownership structure cannot be overemphasized. 
There is some debate regarding suitable ownership structure for firms.  Researchers such 
as Dalton et al. (2003) and Short (2004) posit that individual equity ownership by insiders 
can align insiders’ interests with those of the other shareholders, thereby leading to better 
decisions or higher firm value. For example, some research have linked stock ownership 
by employees and managers with firm performance (Dalton et al., 2003; Short, 2004) 
especially as agency theory suggests this might be an effective solution to problems 
between agents and shareholders (Tihaniy et al., 2003; Demsetz, 1983; Alchian & 
Demsetz, 1972). However, higher ownership by insiders may result in a “greater degree 
of managerial control, potentially entrenching managers” (Denis & McConnell, 2003, p. 
3). Also, in atomistic markets, individual shareholders do not have strong incentives to 
monitor management because of the lack of monitoring expertise, poor shareholder 
protection, and the free‐rider problem generated by costly monitoring.  
On the other hand, the problem of free riding that occurs due to diffuse shareholders may 
be less acute in the case of large, concentrated ownership. Large shareholders are also 
more likely to be well informed and to make better use of their voting rights. However, 
controlling shareholders, conditional on the regulatory and legal environment, may 
exploit their private benefits of control by diverting assets and profits out of the firm 
(Johnson et al., 2000). Furthermore, large equity owners may stimulate the firm to 
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undertake higher‐risk activities since shareholders benefit on the upside, whereas debt 
holders share the costs of failure. Majority ownership by block holders can also cause a 
situation where major firm decisions are taken in the interest of the block shareholders 
to the detriment of other shareholders (Denis & McConnell, 2003).   
Studies such as Weir (2007) suggests that different countries have different corporate 
governance practices owing to different ownership structure. In Nigeria, where the 
principal-principal agency problem is prevalent (Adegbite, 2015), the ownership 
mechanism will influence the reasoning of investment analysts. Hence, ownership 
structure has a significant influence over corporate governance practices (Li, 1994). 
Ownership drivers of concern for this research are shareholder activism and foreign 
institutional investors. 
3.8.2.1 Foreign (Institutional) Investors 
Institutional investors are a fast growing key factor in global capital markets. Their 
importance is evident as the assets they manage have tripled since the early 1990s. 
According to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) (2005), these institutional investors 
manage financial assets exceeding US$45 trillion (including over US$20 trillion in 
equities). Further, institutional investors are major players not just in developed markets; 
their role is rapidly growing in emerging market countries (see Khorana et al., 2005). 
Foreign institutional investors began to diversify into international equities in the last 
two decades (Desender et al., 2016). As a result, local firms became exposed to foreign 
practices which might be substantially different from the local norms (Campbell, 2004). 
The conventional approach to the coexistence of domestic and foreign investors in a 
domestic market is based on information asymmetries, in which foreign investors are 
typically depicted as being informationally disadvantaged (Kang & Stulz, 1997; Brennan 
& Cao, 1997). Although empirical evidence regarding the information asymmetry 
between domestic and foreign investors is quite mixed (Grinblatt & Keloharju, 2000; 
Seasholes, 2000; Froot et al., 2001; Choe et al., 2005; Froot & Ramadorai, 2008; Kalev 
et al., 2008; Chang et al., 2009; Chen et al., 2009). Investor heterogeneity means foreign 
and local investors possibly behave in different ways (Morris, 1995) especially given that 
foreigners in a domestic market are international investors who may invest in multiple 
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countries (Kang et al., 2010). Moreover, in some regard, “foreign investors are a return-
chaser across countries” (Kang et al., 2010, p. 2886). 
Literature of impact of foreign institutional investors is limited. Whereas, a few studies 
have investigated the impact of foreign ownership on firm downsizing (Ahmadijian & 
Robbins, 2005) employee wages (David et al., 2006), R&D and capital investments 
(David et al., 2006) and corporate performance (Miyajima & Kuroki, 2007); there is less 
known from the literature on the effect of foreign ownership on corporate governance 
practices of local Nigerian firms. Although Desender et al. (2016) examined when and 
how foreign ownership leads to changes in governance processes, there is a lacuna on 
how investment analysts perceive the effect of foreign institutional ownership on local 
firms especially in a developing country context where the weak institutional 
environment might make foreign ownership participation in equities desirable. Desender 
et al. (2016), in their study of Japanese firms, posit that the presence of foreign 
institutional investors in a firm leads to clashes with the local shareholders because the 
governance practices deployed by the local stakeholders might not address the agency 
conflicts that foreign institutional investors seek to protect their investment. Desender et 
al. (2016) therefore suggested that monitoring behavior of independent directors depends 
on the degree of foreign ownership in firms. This is contrary to the study by Ahmadjian 
& Robbins (2005), who find evidence of a limited impact of foreign institutional 
ownership when firms are deeply embedded in local norms and have dominant local 
shareholders. However, foreign institutional investors like large investors seemingly 
have little choice but to protect their investment (Admati et al., 1994; Agrawal & 
Knoeber, 1996). Hence, the market value of a local firm increases when major block 
purchase is made (Mikkelson & Rubak, 1985). 
In Nigeria, Nigerian SEC Code (2011) specifically requires "institutional shareholders 
and other shareholders with large holdings to seek to positively influence the standard of 
corporate governance in the companies in which they invest." The 2003 Securities and 
Exchange Commissions' Code on Corporate Governance (SEC Code) provided for 
shareholders owning 20% stake to have at least one representative on the board. 
Institutional shareholders are empowered to demand compliance and explanations for 
non-compliance of governance standards. It has also been reported by some studies on 
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Nigeria (e.g., Ahunwan, 2002; Bakre, 2007) that institutional shareholders have an 
opportunity to pursue better governance practices. Indeed, Lins (2003) finds that large 
non-management blockholders are associated with a higher firm value in emerging 
markets. This is corroborated by Stepanov & Suvorov (2017) who also find that the 
market value of firms with a large external blockholder tend to be higher. 
3.8.2.2  Effective Shareholder Groups Activism 
Just as established above on  dearth in literature of impact of foreign institutional 
investors in developing countries, the impact of shareholder activism in developing 
countries is also less investigated with notably contributions by (Uche et al., 2016; Sarkar 
& Sarkar, 2000; Amao & Amaeshi, 2008; Adegbite, et al., 2012). Sjöström (2008, p. 
142) describe shareholder activism as "the use of ownership position to actively influence 
company policy and practice." Therefore, shareholder activism is a sort of 
managerial/board corporate governance accountability mechanism (Adegbite et al., 
2012). Shareholder activism constitutes activities undertaken by a/some shareholder(s) 
to influence management and the board. Becht et al. (2009), described these actions to 
include selling shares or voice (letter writing, meetings with management and the board, 
forming shareholder associations, asking questions at shareholder meetings and the use 
of voting rights). Thus, activism is valued as a mechanism for corporate governance 
(Sarkar & Sarkar, 2000). 
However, there is a lacuna in literature on the effect of shareholder activism in Sub 
Saharan Africa, although there are some noteworthy works (e.g. Yakasai, 2001; Abdel 
& Shahira, 2002; Ahunwan, 2002; Rossouw, 2005; Okike, 2007; West, 2009; Adegbite 
& Nakajima, 2011; Adegbite, 2012; Adegbite et al., 2012; Uche et al., 2016). In Nigeria 
in particular, there is scant literature. However, one of the findings of the study by 
Adegbite et al. (2012) was that the market for corporate takeovers (with few exceptions 
such as Access Bank take over in 2001) and shareholder activism are quiet and seem 
corrupt in Nigeria (Adegbite et al., 2012). In response to the activism inactivity, the 
relevant authorities in Nigeria such as Corporate Affairs Commission (CAC) and the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) have in the last ten years actively 
encouraged shareholder activism and the rights of minority shareholders (Okike, 2007).  
Hence, the Independent Shareholders’ Association of Nigeria (ISAN), the Nigerian 
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Shareholders’ Solidarity Association (NSSA), the Association for the Advancement of 
the Rights of Nigerian Shareholders (AARNS) have been formed to promote shareholder 
activism in Nigeria. Furthermore, the Nigerian governance landscape has witnessed some 
block voting through shareholder associations, which was to counter dominant majority 
shareholders (Amao & Amaeshi, 2008; Uche & Atkins, 2015; Uche et al., 2016). This 
significant increase in the number and activities of shareholder associations in the past 
ten years has resulted in shareholders and other stakeholders knowing their rights and 
responsibilities.  
3.8.3 Accountability Mechanism 
Good corporate governance does not rely solely on having board committees or auditors, 
but must instead, be fully integrated within the organization. However, the oversight 
responsibility of the firm rests with the board of directors.  Whereas board time is limited, 
there are many issues that cannot be comprehensively deliberated upon in a full board 
meeting. Committees are therefore the most efficient and effective forum to discuss 
matters in-depth and find solutions to the company's problems. Hence, the members of 
the board are typically divided into subcommittees for functionality. 
In the banking sector, regulators expect that banks not only manage the funds of 
depositors but also must control the broader aspects of its environment. This necessitates 
the existence of internal control and risk management systems even if there is a lacuna 
of studies which educate on what particular system of internal control lead to good 
corporate governance (Solomon et al., 2000). Even though firms should gear towards 
safeguarding shareholder's value (Groves, 1999; Blackburn, 1999), risks can only be 
managed but not eliminated as risk-taking (no matter how adverse firms are to risk) leads 
to profit. This fact that risks cannot be eliminated totally necessitates the firm to consider 
all manners of risks that can afflict the firm (Informa Group, 2003). Due to the diverse 
nature of risks (including financial, legal, compliance, strategic, credit, process, internal, 
etc.), the board of directors are not directly responsible for managing risk but instead 
delegate to appropriate sub-committees while maintaining a supervisory role (Filatotchev 
et al., 2007). 
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Research has examined sub‐committees of the board as mechanisms for improving board 
effectiveness, for example, remuneration committees (Main & Johnston, 1993; Newman 
& Mozes, 1999; Newman, 2000) and nomination committees (Ruigrok et al., 2006). 
Some studies have suggested, for example, that the existence of remuneration 
committees affects the level and structure of top management pay (Conyon & Peck, 
1998), whereas other work has found evidence to the contrary (Daily et al., 1998). 
However, there is less research done on the perceptions of important stakeholders such 
as investment analysts on the various committee mechanism operational drivers. This 
research focuses on the independent audit committee, the pay for performance for 
executives, voluntary disclosure and board evaluation. 
3.8.3.1 Independent Audit Committee 
The audit committee is a subcommittee of the board. An audit committee is expected to 
monitor the reliability of the firm's accounting and auditing processes with a view to 
protect shareholder interests (Agoglia et al., 2011). According to Beasley et al., (2009, p. 
65) “An Audit committee is increasingly responsible for the quality of financial reporting 
and oversight of the audit processes” in large public companies. 
Many publications and studies (e.g., Arthur Andersen, 1998; BRC, 1999; Burke & Guy, 
2001; Thornton, 1997; KPMG, 1999; PWC, 1999; Rittenberg & Natr, 1993) prescribe 
three broad areas of audit committee oversight: (1) financial reporting, (2) internal 
controls to address key risks, and (3) auditor activity. The role of audit committees still 
generates huge debates as many studies provide conflicting results (Turley & Zaman, 
2004) despite some studies linking the committees to firm performance (Laing & Weir, 
1999). Initially, audit committees were seen as a response to transaction costs associated 
with the agency problem (Turley & Zaman., 2004). Studies have documented results 
which suggest that audit committees help firms state their earning correctly (Klein, 
2000), requiring less earning management when boards are independent (Larcker et al., 
2005) and less errors in reports (Dechow et al., 2000; Defond et al., 2002).  
However, communication and indeed management of risk can be undermined if firms 
approach audit reporting defensively or introduce bureaucratic processes or committees 
(Power, 1997). Also, some studies have suggested that audit committees serve to placate 
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the public rather than having any significant impact on the assurances of the firm's 
activities. Other studies have highlighted that the presence of executive directors on 
committees negatively influences audit reports (Collier & Gregory, 1999). Hence, there 
is no clarity on the effect of independent directors or even audit committees on firms' 
audit process (Romano, 2004).   
Audit and internal controls are always central to what internal stakeholders share with 
external stakeholders (Palepu & Healy, 2003) and gives assurance of compliance with 
government regulation (Grabosky, 1995). Auditors scrutinize the reports prepared by 
firms hence they are quite important elements for good corporate governance. 
Stakeholders generally show interest in the quality of financial reports with more 
emphasis placed on disclosure of corporate governance responsibilities (Baker & Owsen, 
2002). The obscure nature of accounting statements makes audit process extremely 
important in helping convene professionalism on firms (Preston et al., 1995) helping to 
cement the reputation of management (Podolny, 2001). Although, it is difficult to know 
the appropriate level of auditing required for firms as different factors combine to 
influence the quality of reports (Francis, 2004). Nevertheless, directors with relevant 
qualifications promote effectiveness in committees (Xie et al., 2003) and the quality of 
reports produced is enhanced (Felo et al., 2003). This suggests that making expertise a 
requisite for audit committee members is beneficial to stakeholders (Filatotchev et al., 
2007).  Especially as there are instances when directors lack genuine independence, or 
expertise in the audit area or little or no experience in oversight functions (Cohen et al., 
2002). 
In Nigeria, the law requires six members, at least three of whom must be independent, 
representing the shareholders. An independent director will be nominated as the 
chairperson. At least one of the members of the committee must be a financial or an 
accounting expert. The committee recommends to the board the selection and retention 
of the external auditors, deliberates on an ongoing basis the independence of the auditors, 
oversees the critical aspects of the firm’s accounting and disclosure requirements, and 
carries out risk assessment and procedures of the firm. Other functions of the audit 
committee are oversight of the system of internal controls in the company, disaster 
recovery readiness procedures, and internal audit function. 
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Furthermore, in the banking sector, regulators expect that banks not only manage the 
funds of depositors but also must control the broader aspects of its environment. This 
necessitates the existence of internal control and risk management systems even if there 
is a lacuna of studies which educate on what particular features of internal control lead 
to good corporate governance (Solomon et al., 2000). 
3.8.3.2 Remuneration committee (Pay for Performance).  
Studies in corporate governance have typically given more attention to audit committees 
and less attention to nomination and remuneration committees (Gregg et al., 1993). This 
neglect might be because nomination and remuneration committees are seen as not 
having a direct effect on performance. The remuneration subcommittee of the board 
should, ideally, be composed of nonexecutive and independent directors only. The 
function of the committee is to address the firm's compensation and remuneration issues. 
Usually, the board's remuneration committee decides on executive pay and takes their 
recommendations to the board for approval. 
Executive pay can be designed (Fama & Jensen, 1983) to serve as incentives for 
management to perform on behalf of shareholders (Eisenhardt, 1989). Remuneration is 
one of the tools board of directors can use to increase their control of managers (Zajac & 
Westphal, 1994) even if not all eventualities can be covered by this measure (Hart, 1995). 
Boards can also impose variable pay and targets for executives (Camara, 2001; Pass et 
al., 2000). This variable pay is commonly known as Pay for Performance and is designed 
such that portions of executive management remuneration are directly tied to the 
performance of the firm they manage. 
There, however, is no significant evidence to suggest this scheme promotes improved 
performance (Pass, 2003). Indeed, Murphy (2003) questioned the rationale of linking 
executives' pay to performance, as there seems to be no evidence suggesting the firm is 
positively affected by this incentive to management. For example, the remuneration of 
executives seemed to rise by the 90s (Smith & Szymanski, 1995) with some studies (e.g., 
Conyon & Leech, 1994; Tosi et al., 2000) suggesting the firm performance did not 
exactly reflect this rise. Also, Al-Matar et al. (2014) documented a positive but 
nonsignificant relationship between executive compensation and firm performance. 
   
84 
 
Fahlenbrach & Stulz (2010) posit that unreasonable incentives are reduced if the interests 
of executives and shareholders are aligned through executives' stock ownership. Also, 
according to Fahlenbrach & Stulz (2010), CEOs of Banks whose incentives were not 
properly aligned with shareholder interests performed worse during the financial crisis 
of 2008. 
Interestingly, Rosen (1990) suggests that the structure of linking executives' pay to firm 
performance promotes more loyalty from executives enabling them to act more in the 
interest of shareholders. Similarly, a study carried out by Conyon et al. (2011) posit that 
giving varying types of contracts to executives leads to different level of firm 
performances thereby providing positive evidence between firm performance and stock 
compensations to executives. However, there is a dearth of detailed information about 
executives' pay (Gregg et al., 1993). In developing countries, the complexities of the 
environment pose a different set of potential executive/shareholder abuse hence it is a 
wonder if executive compensation as an incentive mechanism actually aligns the interests 
of managers and shareholders (Adegbite, 2015). Executive share reward system also 
might not necessarily act as a good compensation scheme as this can potentially lead to 
short-termism and executive recklessness (Filatotchev et al., 2007). Specifically, as it 
relates to Nigeria, given the high rate of poverty in the country, there is societal 
disapproval with regards to paying executives huge bonuses by the Nigerian public and 
the regulatory bodies. 
3.8.3.3 Voluntary Disclosure 
Board accountability is related to value creation (Cadbury, 1992). The board of directors 
of a firm has a fiduciary responsibility to do what is best for the firm (Monks & Minow, 
2004). The process of accountability as described in the literature involves dialectical 
activity where users of information engage producers of the information in questioning, 
probing, discussing and which sometimes involves criticism (Mulgan, 2000; Roberts et 
al., 2005). Gidden (1984, p. 30) explains the board's accountability duty as to "be 
accountable for one's activities is to explicate the reasons for them and to supply the 
normative grounds whereby they may be justified'. This, therefore, requires the provision 
of transparent information from firm to stakeholders. 
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Information transparency can be, defined as the level of availability and accessibility of 
market information to its stakeholders (Granados et al., 2010). However, information 
which might lead to uncertainty in the market and blind decision making by stakeholders 
is withheld by most firms. Akerlof (1980) referred to this as information asymmetry, and 
typically, withholding information has negative consequences for stakeholders thereby 
leading to increased transaction cost (Williamson, 1985). Alternatively, firms gain 
market confidence and trust when it is perceived to be transparent in its disclosures 
(Stigler, 1961; Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Grossman & Hart, 1980; Grossman, 1981) 
thereby presenting some advantages over competitors in terms of cost of capital as 
uncertainty is reduced (Verecchia, 2001; Healy & Palepu, 2001). The type of information 
provided by a firm's management (relevant or irrelevant) plays a role in the public 
perception of the firm (Filatotchev et al., 2007). Bloomfield & O'Hara (1999) therefore 
postulate that transparency plays a fundamental role in market design, particularly, in the 
fairness and efficiency of the market.  
Information disclosures are of two types; mandatory and voluntary. Mandatory 
information is required by law such that any company operating in a country are expected 
to file annual returns and produce financial statements. In the case of Nigerian banking 
sector, all banks are expected by the end of first quarter of the year to have submitted 
their financial statements to the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) and publicly presented 
it if the banks are publicly quoted companies. This provision is mandatory, and sanctions 
will apply if violated without permission. As for voluntary disclosure, this is encouraged 
by the CBN in its code of corporate governance (2014). 
Voluntary disclosure relates to how information is disclosed in terms of quality and 
extent (Healy & Palepu, 2001; Core, 2001) which allows for good monitoring by 
investors (Filatotchev et al., 2007). When firms disclose beyond what is required, it 
lowers uncertainty and enables stakeholders to assess the true position of the firm (Meek 
et al., 1995). Nwagbara (2014) also discussed how voluntary corporate governance 
disclosures projects firm's actions and activities indicating accountability for both 
internal and external parties' scrutiny. "The Financial Accounting Standard Board 
(FASB)'s report identified several benefits of voluntary disclosure including reducing 
cost of capital, enhancing credibility, improving investors' relationship with the firm and 
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improving investment decisions and getting access to liquid markets" (Boesso, 2002 
p.17), so firms voluntarily disclose additional information that they believe satisfy 
interests of diversified stakeholders. 
Early studies of motives for voluntary disclosure (e.g., Grossman & Hart, 1980; 
Grossman, 1981; Milgrom, 1981) argue that management has the incentive to voluntarily 
disclose private information to reduce information asymmetry, mitigate adverse selection 
risk, and maximize firm value. However, this theoretical argument has yet to receive 
consistent empirical support (Bamber & Cheon, 1998; Nagar et al., 2003). It has been 
argued that firms may choose not to disclose information if the benefits of disclosure are 
outweighed by the associated costs, such as proprietary costs (Jovanovic, 1982; 
Verrecchia, 1983; 1990) and political costs (Cahan, 1992; Murphy, 1996; Watts & 
Zimmerman, 1978; 1986) or if the disclosures are aggregate in nature (Rajan & Sarath, 
1996).  
It is well known that an efficient and effective reporting/disclosure forms the bedrock for 
good corporate governance. However, too much disclose has the potential to increase 
transaction costs for firms as well as potentially erode some of their competitive 
advantage (Filatochev et al., 2007). Nevertheless, the more information provided, the 
lower the cost attached to capital (Watson et al., 2002). Thus, creating a perception of 
"rich disclosure environment, low information asymmetry" and reduced uncertainty is 
quite beneficial (Kothari et al., 2009, p. 1640). 
The study carried out on US firms by Lang & Lundholm (1993) relate more disclosure 
to larger firms, or when a firm's performance is good or when there is a need to raise 
funding.  Research has also shown that family/insider majority-owned firms (Ruland et 
al., 1990) or those with good news (Skinner, 1994) are less likely to disclose information 
while firms with institutional block holders (El-Gazzar, 1998) and those with bad news 
(Skinner, 1994) are likely to disclose more information. 
Also, a study by Cheng & Courtenay (2004) of Singapore suggests that firms with more 
independent directors disclose more information. Furthermore, Mangena & Pike (2004), 
Carcello & Neal (2003) and Klein (2002) all provide evidence that firms with more 
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independent audit committees provide better information even if this varies according to 
industry sectors (Abraham & Tonks, 2004; Walker & Tsalta, 2001). 
Using 43 listed Kenyan companies from four different sectors and employing a 
multivariate analysis, Barako et al. (2006) report that presence of audit committee, 
institutional and foreign ownership are positively significant with the level of voluntary 
disclose. Also, company size and firms with high debt ratio disclose more information 
(Barako et al., 2006). 
In addition, other studies have confirmed a positive relationship between disclosure and 
firms closely followed by expert analysts (Lang & Lundholm, 1996) which allows these 
followed firms have access to funding (Roulstone, 2002). There is also the decreased 
chances of insider trading (Frankel & Li, 2004).  
However, provision of private information about a firm has its cost consequences (Dye, 
1986) as some of this information might be trade secrets or propriety assets (Cormier & 
Gordon, 2001). Despite this, "private information immediately becomes a public good" 
(Campbell & Kracaw, 1980, p. 866). Private information is revealed only to a handful of 
investors helping to signal undervalued stocks (Campbell & Kracaw, 1980). This same 
private information can mislead investors and the public, so the "emergence of a signal 
of reliability in the production of information enables the market to identify the true value 
of firms" (Campbell & Kracaw, 1980, p. 876). Private information shared with block 
institutional investors can be made available through social media or other company 
certified sources. 
It has been argued that being transparent and providing informative content of disclosures 
assists in the management of agency conflicts, reduces information asymmetry, which in 
turn is likely to improve stock price and reduce volatility (Welker, 1995; Kothari et al., 
2009; Poshakwal & Courtis, 2005; Jenning & Stacks, 1985).  Research has also 
confirmed that when regulations are newly introduced, firms disclose more information 
(Bushee & Leuz, 2004). In general, companies satisfy the need for information to assess 
their future position and manage uncertainties by providing information beyond what is 
required (Meek et al., 1995). Although, in weak institutional environments, robust 
disclosures can lead to intellectual property or proprietary advantage being lost 
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(Verrecchia, 1983). Nevertheless, Healy et al. (1999) find that institutional investors are 
likely to invest more in firms that disclose more even though this might make shares of 
such firms less volatile (Healy et al., 1999). On the other hand, Sias (1996) posit that by 
increasing their holding, institutional investors might create temporary volatility in firm 
shares (Sias, 1996). 
Investment analysts always seek to have a clear understanding of how firms are being 
managed. Voluntary disclosures help reduce costs associated with complex investigation 
such as "demand for financial information reporting and disclosure arises from 
information asymmetry and agency conflicts between managers, outside investors, and 
intermediaries" (Kothari et al., 2009, p.1640). It is expected that effective communication 
by a firm with stakeholders should reduce information asymmetry, which should in turn 
reduce uncertainty (Meek et al., 1995; Poshakwale & Courtis, 2005). This can assure 
firms of their future (Meek et al., 1995). Therefore, firms might be unwilling to bear the 
opportunity cost associated with voluntary disclosures (Healey & Palepu, 2001). Despite 
the bid to meet good corporate governance practices, firms consider the cost to benefit 
tradeoff imperative (Aguilera, 2005). Some researchers have posited that not only firm 
variables such as size determine disclosure, but variable such as future earning potential 
also play a role (Abraham & Tonks, 2004). Disclosures also increase when firms are 
subject of takeovers or are witnessing declining performances (Holland, 2005). 
Overall, better-managed organizations tend to make more information disclosure 
especially information that will affect share price or debt pricing (Beekes & Brown, 
2005). Although, a study by Collett & Hrasky (2005) suggest that voluntary disclosure 
is more related to the raising of capital than raising of debt. Voluntary information 
provided voluntarily flows to the capital market, reduces the information asymmetry and 
bridges knowledge between the knowledgeable and uninformed (Kim & Verrecchia, 
1994). Reduced uncertainty has the potential to lead to more share purchase in the capital 
market (Diamond & Verracchia, 1991). 
Relating voluntary disclosures to the financial sector, Poshkwale & Courtis in their 2005 
study of 135 banks from Europe, US, Australia, and Canada, find that providing a high 
level of information afforded the banks to have a lower cost of capital as there was 
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reduced information asymmetry. This same relationship has been reported in other 
specialized industry by Kothari et al. (2009) who related disclosure content and risk when 
they sampled firms in financial, technology, telecoms and pharmaceutical industries 
between 1996-2001. However, voluntary disclosure level is considered to be a struggling 
issue in most firms and to identify the determinants of corporate governance that affect 
the disclosure level is a major task. Therefore, voluntary disclosure level is affected by 
some characteristics either related to the firm itself, firm characteristics or related to the 
firm governance body and corporate governance characteristics (Iskander, 2008). 
Subsections 2.3.8 above has covered the literature of corporate governance mechanisms 
under investigation in this study. The next section will cover investment analysts and 
their decision making. 
3.9 Corporate Governance of Nigerian Banks and Investment 
Analysts  
3.9.1 Introduction 
Corporate governance is important in managing not only the expectations of shareholders 
but also a broad group of stakeholders (Pava & Krausz, 1996), since neglecting other 
stakeholder’s expectations might hinder the achievement of the firm's goals (Kolk & 
Pinkse, 2010). Gill (2008) further suggested that corporate governance has integrated 
social aspects in decision making. The reallocation of risk from the risk producer and the 
societal level to the individual undermines the assumption of shareholders as the sole 
group of stakeholders who are exposed to risks without protections through the law 
(Schneider & Scherer, 2015). As extant literature has adequately addressed corporate 
governance and shareholders, (e.g., Daily et al., 2003; Judge, 2009), this study seeks to 
highlight the perception investment analysts on features of good corporate governance 
drivers in Nigerian banks. 
3.9.2 Investment analysts’ and their importance 
Investment Analyst have good investment knowledge which aids analysis of financial 
reports and decision making (Barker, 1998). These analysts also find industry specific 
information useful (Barker, 1998). Investors understanding of financial statements is 
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vague (Lee & Tweedie, 1981). Hence, outputs by analysts are valued by investors and 
corporate managers since the analysts provide important information such as forecasts, 
recommendations, target price, risk rating and detailed justification in reports which can 
have an impact on share price (Campbell & Slack, 2008). Investment analysts play an 
important role in corporate conduct since they are capable of shedding light on 
opportunistic corporate behaviour (Zhiyuan, 2010). Sell-side financial analysts typically 
just produce reports and might not directly engage in investing activities (Zhiyuan, 2010). 
Buy side investment analysts might not necessarily product reports for public 
consumption and they typically work for institutional investors in fund management 
firms (Zhiyuan, 2010). This thesis is concerned about investment analysts that make 
investment decisions on behalf of institutional investors, including pension funds, 
insurance companies, unit trusts, investment trusts, and other financial institutions, and 
also individual investors. The closeness of these buy-side analysts to their clients or 
employers mean they are not only concerned with operational and financial aspects of 
firms, but also the governance of their investee firms (Gullapalli, 2004). Contextual 
environmental information such as offline discussions with management (Pike et al., 
1993), qualitative private information disclosures (Holland, 1998; Marston, 1996) are 
more important than annual or interim reports.  
 
Prior strategic management research leans towards institutional or principal-agency 
theory to theorise on analysts’ contribution to better corporate governance effectiveness 
(Breur & Wiersema, 2018; Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Walsh & Seward, 1990). For 
example, Puffer & Weintrop (1991), examine the relationship between firm performance 
and CEO turnover, and argue that analyst earnings forecasts and not accounting 
performance, sets a board’s expectations of the CEO. They also find that when a firms 
earnings per share falls short of investment analysts’ expectations, the probability of 
CEO turnover increases. Similarly, Wiersema & Zhang (2011) posit that analyst stock 
recommendations affect CEO dismissal. They suggest that investment analysts “provide 
the board with third party certification of the CEO’s ability and performance” (Wiersema 
& Zhang, 2011, p. 1178). Also, firms with analysts’ downgrades or lower analyst 
recommendations have a greater probability of CEO dismissal (Wiersema & Zhang, 
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2011). Gomulya & Boeker (2014) examine how firms that have had to restate their 
financial statements restore their reputation in the market through CEO appointments. 
Hence, they suggest that investment analysts “are legitimate arbiters qualified to assess 
a firm and its leadership” (Gomulya & Boeker, 2014, p. 1764). Using data from Fortune 
survey of America’s most admired companies, Bednar et al. (2015) find that management 
quality are assessed more negatively for firms that used the poison pill to prevent 
unfriendly takeovers. Further, they report that the negative assessments of management 
quality is less severe if more firms in the industry adopt the poison pills. They thus 
conclude that investment analysts evaluate firm’s management based on the firm’s 
corporate governance practices (Bednar et al., 2015).  
 
In spite of studies that highlight how analysts increase corporate governance 
effectiveness, other studies (e.g., Westphal & Clement, 2008; Westphal & Graebner, 
2010; Biehl-Missal, 2011; Cohen et al., 2012; Washburn & Bromiley, 2014) have 
documented evidence that investment analysts opinions can be manipulated by firms’ 
management. Evaluation by analysts can be subjected and prone to bias (O’Brien et al., 
2005; Imam & Spence, 2016). Imam & Spence (2016) investigated the role of investment 
analysts’ in investors’ decision making process. They interview 49 sell-side and buy-side 
analysts and report that in the capital market, sell-side investment analysts play a multi-
faceted role. This role includes maintaining a cordial relationship with their 
clients/companies in order to earn a commission and secure preferential access to 
information sources. Imam  & Spence (2016) also report that sell side investment analysts 
have cognitive limitations hence their operations needs to be understood contextually. 
Westphal & Clement (2008) adopt a socio-political perspective on the relationship 
between top executives and investment analysts. They suggest when firms fail to meet 
analysts earnings forecast, executives engage in greater favour rendering especially 
toward high-status analysts and those employed by large firms. This executive favour 
then decreases the likelihood of subsequent investment downgrades even when the firms 
fail to meet analysts’ forecast (Westphal & Clement, 2008). Westphal & Graebner (2010) 
follow up Westphal & Clement (2008) study and report that when analysts’ stock 
recommendations decreases for a firm, the firms executive respond by increasing 
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proportion of outside directors (non-executive directors) on the board. Although, 
according to Westphal & Graebner (2010), the management still maintain actual board 
control since the executive directors appointed are friends the management can exert 
control over. Nevertheless, appointment of more outside directors influences subsequent 
investment analysts’ recommendation positively. 
Literature which looks at neo-institutional sociology and behavioural perspectives (e.g 
Fogarty & Rogers, 2005) focuses on the way in which analysts arrive at 
recommendations as a result of institutional pressures rather than calculative practices 
(Imam & Spence, 2016). Fogarty & Rogers (2005), Macintosh et al. (2000) conclude that 
financial analysts are the products of the institutional environment where they operate 
and that they rely far too heavily on management as a source of information. Thus, their 
independence is questioned. Similarly, Chen et al. (2014) posit that analysts are caught 
up in social networks which causes them to present “one view of companies in public 
and another in private” (Chen et al., 2014, p. 578). Therefore, analysts can be potentially 
“duped by the value creation stories spun by company management” (Holland, 2005, p. 
258).  Literature which look at behaviourial perspectives emphasis institutional pressures 
analysts face and make it clear that analysts do not rely only on rational analysis (Imam 
& Spence, 2016).    
The reviewed literature all highlight the role of investment analysts in influencing 
corporate governance especially through monitoring.  This study seeks to elaborate on 
sociological underpinning of investment analysts’ perception on drivers of good 
corporate governance. Corporate governance practices and procedures are specified by a 
variety of regulatory bodies and codes, including stock market listing rules, international 
and national governance codes, company laws, and financial regulations. This thesis pays 
special attention to the questions of which good corporate governance drivers are 
important for investment decision making. This thesis proceeds on the ideas that 
corporate governance issues are important in the investment decision making process for 
investment analysts (Zhiyuan, 2010). 
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3.9.3 Investment analysts who operate in Nigeria. 
Investment analysts are important for keeping capital market efficient (Palepu et al., 
2010). Despite the achievements recorded in the capital market, the market is still not 
deepenough. A comparative analysis of the equity market capitalization of the Nigerian 
market with major emerging markets of Asia, Europe and Latin America depicts the 
Nigerian market as relatively small. In other words, the market is not yet saturated. This 
thesis focuses on the perception of investment analysts who operate in the Nigerian 
market and are conversant with banking operations including corporate governance 
practices of Nigerian banks. There are about 225 Nigerian firms that operate in the capital 
market operators (Iyoha & Faboyede, 2011) with each employing varying number of 
investment analysts depending on the firm size. Many of these investment analysts work 
for international brokerage houses and investment banks that operate in Nigeria. Whether 
analysts are local based or foreign, they usually get similar, on-the-job training (Zhiyuan, 
2010). Therefore, local and foreign investment analysts may have developed and 
acquired very similar analytical skills and shared common views on certain issues in the 
investment research process. 
Also, there has been an increasing number of investment analysts who have studied or 
been studying for the Chartered Financial Analyst (CFA) investment professional 
qualification. The CFA is internationally regarded as gold standard for investment 
analysts (CFA Institute, 2018).  CFA Society Nigeria (2018) is the 137th Society of CFA 
Institute and one of five societies in Africa (CFA Society Nigeria, 2018).  According to 
its website, the society currently has about 230 members. The association seeks to 
promote highest investment practices standards. It is therefore unsurprising that 
corporate governance is included in the CFA curriculum and is regarded as an element 
that constitutes the “framework for making investment decisions” (The CFA Institute, 
2008, p. 20). Hence, investment analysts who have been studying for, or have obtained 
the CFA or indeed are trained in investment analysis, will be equipped with a basic 
understanding of issues related to corporate governance. Indeed some analysts may have 
worked as auditors, economists, accountants, bankers, or some other professional 
occupation that involves investment analysis before becoming investment analysts 
(Zhiyuan, 2010). Many professional bodies such as the Association of Chartered 
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Certified Accountants (ACCA), Chartered Institute of Management Accountants 
(CIMA), (Institute of Chartered Accountants of Nigeria (ICAN) and Association of 
National Accountants of Nigeria (ANAN) include corporate governance in their training 
programmes.  
Even though Nigeria follows the Anglo/Saxon governance model, several differences 
still exist between the corporate governance systems operated in Nigeria and the 
developed countries such as the US and the UK (see above sections in this chapter). 
Nevertheless, the main mechanisms of corporate governance are common to both local 
and international investment analysts.   
3.9.4 Investment Analysts and decision making. 
The delicate nature of specialized sectors such as banking means that regulators are 
always primed to minimize crisis. This led them to introduce codes of corporate 
governance which are supposed to be means or mechanisms which reduce agency 
conflicts and help the alignment of interests (Goranova et al., 2017). However, recent 
research has begun to document, that some firms' actual practices do not always 
acquiesce to codes as introduced by the regulators (Bednar et al., 2015; Chizema et al., 
2015). This might not be unconnected to the fact that many codes of corporate 
governances are merely an adoption of the ubiquitous Anglo/Saxon models of corporate 
governance. Moreover, the mandatory corporate governance codes impose homogeneity 
on the actors in the banking sector. The homogeneity creates a cloud of distrust by 
external stakeholder such that not all governance practices projected by firms are 
essential for investment decision making. However, experts such as investment analysts 
(Brauer & Wiersema, 2018) need to be able to make informed complex decisions relying 
on governance mechanisms of firms. Investment analysts as experts are acknowledged 
to possess highly developed problem solving and complex decision-making skills in their 
domains of expertise (Ericsson & Charness, 1994; Ericsson & Lehman, 1996; Glaser & 
Chi, 1988; Sternberg, 1997; Mcdonald et al., 2008). These special capabilities arise from 
the nature of the knowledge that they possess about their relevant domains (Ericsson & 
Charness, 1994; Ericsson & Lehman, 1996; Glaser & Chi, 1988; Sternberg, 1997; 
Mcdonald et al., 2008). Experts implicitly have deeper and complete knowledge about 
the critical issues in the areas in which they can claim expertise (Sternberg, 1997). 
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According to theory, experts proffer solutions based on two basic strategies: (1) 
application of “abstract knowledge about the problem domain (e.g., abstract knowledge 
about the key causal relationships in that domain) to identify and select problem 
solutions” (Mcdonald et al., 2008, p. 1158), and (2) application of analogical reasoning, 
which involves referencing specific prior challenges that they have faced, to identify 
effective solutions to current problems and avoid ineffective ones (e.g., Anderson et al., 
1997). “The kinds of knowledge experts possess renders them especially effective at 
solving problems using both of these basic strategies” (Mcdonald et al., 2008, p. 1158). 
The more profound and more efficiently organized abstract knowledge that investment 
analysts possess allows them to effectively solve complex problems through the 
application of abstract reasoning.  Many times, the ability to quickly process through 
large quantities of information might determine how effective a decision is (March, 
1994). Investment analysts have deeper abstract knowledge of investment activities, 
including more complete mental models of the critical causal relationships in investment 
domain (Glaser & Chi, 1988; Sternberg, 1997), hence their ability to separate features of 
corporate governance drivers into important and unimportant information. Furthermore, 
the possession of efficiently organized abstract knowledge enables investment analysts 
to recognize meaningful patterns in the complex corporate governance information to 
which they are exposed (Chase & Simon, 1973; Glaser & Chi, 1988; Sternberg, 1997). 
Also, the experience and expertise of investment analysts mean they have a good 
understanding of key underlying corporate governance principles that are critical to 
effective decision making in a particular investment domain (Chi et al., 1981).  
Investment activities being complex decisions can be made especially challenging 
because often these decisions must be made within strict time constraints. Advanced 
abstract knowledge contributes to quick good decisions making of experts such as 
investment analysts (Glaser & Chi, 1988) and this they do with substantially less 
extensive cognitive search than less expert decision makers. In the same vein, analogical 
reasoning requires decision-makers to infer meaningful comparisons between current 
challenges and specific example of issues that they may have been exposed to in the past 
(Thompson et al., 2000; Reeves & Weisberg, 1994). Investment analysts involved in 
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investing activities are better able to use analogical reasoning based on their prior 
experience (Reeves & Weisberg, 1994). 
Investment decisions are almost inevitably complex, and thus they create all sorts of 
significant challenges for investment analysts. Like many high-level strategic choices, 
investment decisions may involve large amounts of ambiguous data (Coff, 2003; Jemison 
& Sitkin, 1986), which causes information overload. This information must be 
considered under time pressure because of concerns regarding secrecy and competition 
(Jemison & Sitkin, 1986; Mcdonald et al., 2008). Investment decisions especially those 
targeted at a long-term horizon, long-term sophisticated strategic reasoning about how 
events may unfold and change the value of the target firm (Capron, 1999; Capron et al., 
1998; Mcdonald et al., 2008). Accordingly, based on the submission above, investment 
analysts with relatively high levels of expertise in making investment decisions will be 
especially able to effectively identify features of good governance drivers that will 
influence their investment decision making. 
Interestingly, according to the expertise literature, expertise tends to be specific to 
relatively narrow knowledge domains (Glaser & Chi, 1988; Ericsson & Charness, 1994; 
Ericsson & Lehman, 1996; Sternberg, 1997). This suggests that investment analysts are 
unlikely to possess general expertise in undertaking investments of all kinds, but become 
experts in making decisions about certain field they have considerable experience. From 
the foregoing, investment analysts who have actively operated in the banking sector 
would have accumulated both general and specific knowledge about the financial sector 
(Ericsson & Charness, 1994; 1997; Ericsson & Lehmann, 1996; VanLehn, 1996). Thus, 
experience is important to the kind of knowledge base that depicts high levels of 
expertise, and that supports high-quality decision-making (Mcdonald et al., 2008). 
Greater experience also leads to a more complete understanding of cause-and-effect 
relations in a particular domain; promotes more complete abilities to distinguish 
decision-relevant from decision-irrelevant information; and facilitates the development 
of more effectively organized knowledge (Ericsson & Charness, 1994; 1997; Ericsson & 
Lehmann, 1996; Van Lehn, 1996). 
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Finally, investment analysts are economic agents (Brauer & Wiersema, 2018) through 
which investment decisions are made. These economic agents desire to make informed 
decisions and corporate governance practices of firms present a yardstick for such 
decisions. In Nigerian banking sector, the corporate mismanagement excesses that 
occurred in the late 1990s and early 2000s led to the beginnings of corporate laws and 
codes reform. Although these codes are geared to the protection of shareholders, they 
can act as investment cues for investors who seek to understand governance mechanisms. 
However, organizational studies need a deeper understanding of the specific antecedents 
of organizational practices (Greenwood et al., 2014). Hence, as propositioned by Black 
et al. (2017) and Bebchuk et al. (2009), this research seeks to identify which features of 
governance drivers matter from the range of drivers that project good corporate 
governance.  
The next section provides a conclusion to the chapter. 
3.10 Conclusion 
Leading from the literature reviewed above, it is evident many corporate governance 
studies are focused on one or two core areas while neglecting other important drivers of 
corporate governance (Filatotchev et al., 2007). The effectiveness of this individual 
driver analysis is questioned especially when contradictory or ambiguous results are 
obtained for similar drivers (Li et al., 2010; Bear et al., 2010; Barnea & Rubin, 2010). 
The presence of other corporate governance elements further complicates the results of 
such isolated empirical corporate governance studies. Moreover, for individual firms, a 
different set of practices might produce more appropriate corporate governance structure 
(Agrawal & Knoweber, 1996). Hence rather than seeing corporate governance drivers in 
isolation, they may be better understood in terms of a complete combination (Li et al., 
2010; Bear et al., 2010; Barnea & Rubin, 2010, Filatotchev et al., 2007). Indeed, some 
prior studies (e.g., Ryan & Wiggins, 2002; Cheng, 2004; Wu & Tu, 2007; Coles et al., 
2008) have supported the view that firm-level governance factors have potential to solve 
agency problem. As a result, researchers build corporate governance indices and test 
whether they predict firm value or performances even though these indices are imperfect 
(Black et al., 2017).  The unreliability of these indices led Black et al., (2017) to suggest 
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caution in relying on research using corporate governance indices as a basis for firm-
level governance changes or country level legal (regulatory) reforms. Consequently, 
Adegbite (2015) reported nine firm level antecedents, which determine good corporate 
governance practices in Nigeria a developing country. However, Adegbite's research 
took views of board members and industry experts on what constitutes drivers of good 
corporate governance and did not provide for the views of expert stakeholders who might 
hold divergent views on signals emanating from the producer firms. Indeed different 
drivers can substitute or compliment themselves (Dalton et al., 2003; Hoskisson et al., 
2002) permitting various interpretations by stakeholders. This current study will test nine 
antecedents of good corporate governance in a weak institutional setting in a particular 
category of producers (Nigerian banks) from the viewpoint of investment analysts with 
the aim to determine what particular corporate governance features lead to investment 
decision making.  
Also, Schneider & Scherer (2015 p.318) hold that a "democratization of corporate 
governance required by law or soft law might be a way to indirectly tackle governance 
gaps." Just as Schneider & Scherer (2015) propose that further research is necessary to 
find ways to process and balance legitimate claims towards an organization and its 
efficiency. Legitimacy is defined by Suchman (1995, p.574) as "a generalized perception 
or assumption that the actions of an entity are desirable, proper or appropriate within 
some socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs, and definitions." Going 
further, Palazzo & Scherer (2006) suggest that "moral legitimacy" is more relevant than 
pragmatic or cognitive legitimacy as sources of corporate legitimacy. Leading from this, 
Gomez & Korin (2008) show that corporate governance is necessary to signal 
trustworthiness and establish confidence such that investors are willing to invest in the 
firm and that other stakeholders' consent to the activities of the firm.   Therefore, 
corporate governance, which plays a central role in securing corporate accountability, 
has to adapt to the changing economic and political operations conditions of corporations 
if it is to remain capable of filling this objective. Hence, instead of corporate governance 
being centered on the protection of corporate shareholders, it needs to secure corporate 
accountability to all those affected by corporate action, even indirectly (Schneider & 
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Scherer, 2015; Brauer & Wiersema, 2018). This research will provide empirical evidence 
revealing what corporate governance drivers signal to investment analysts.  
Furthermore, different industries might have different corporate governance drivers 
(Khaana et al., 2006). Indeed, contingencies of industries may also differ depending on 
contextual environment making generalization quite difficult. Therefore, industry focus 
research might be critical and important for policymaking or public understanding 
(Filatotchev et al., 2007). Jizi (2013) underscores the fact that there is a dearth of studies, 
which have considered the importance of examining the impact of banks internal 
corporate governance mechanism and reconciling its consequences on banks value. 
Therefore, further research is needed on why particular governance drivers as projected 
by banks might not mean the same thing to the external stakeholders such as investment 
analysts. Especially in a weak institutional environment where there is evidence that 
firms through selective compliance to a multiplicity of codes (Osemeke & Adegbite, 
2016) can signal effective or ineffective corporate governance. This study will present 
the psychological underpinnings to what the features of drivers of good corporate 
governance drivers in the banking sector of Nigeria mean to investment analysts. 
The corporate governance literature on governance mechanisms in developing countries 
leaves the following questions unanswered; 1a. Which board structure and composition 
governance drivers’ features matter to investment analysts for investment making 
decisions and why? 1b.Which external ownership governance drivers’ features matter to 
investment analysts for investment decision making and why? 1c.Which accountability 
mechanism governance drivers’ features matter to investment analysts for investment 
decision making and why? This research focuses on these questions. 
The thrust of the study is the perception of investment analysts as it concerns good 
corporate governance practices of Nigerian banks. As posited by Di Maggio (1997), 
existing schemas control how a given situation is perceived by audience members 
thereby allowing the audience members to overlook or distort perceptions to fit their pre-
existing beliefs thereby enabling decision-making. In weak institutional settings, 
corporate governance serves as a lawful means to ensure a firm can continue to serve 
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interests of stakeholders as well as signal the capacity to continually serve these interests 
(Gomez & Korine, 2008). 
This chapter has provided a review of the literature on corporate governance definitions 
generally, how it relates to weak institutional environment as well as how corporate 
governance operates in Nigeria, our contextual study site. The mechanisms of good 
corporate governance were also reviewed. Consequently, investment analysts and their 
importance was established. 
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Chapter Four:  Hypotheses Development 
 
4.1 Introduction 
Quantitative research has its ontological and epistemological philosophy nested in 
positivist/scientific research. This type of research uses the generation and testing of 
hypothesis that can be measured and conclusions reported theoretically (Edmondson & 
McManus, 2007). Hypothesis transforms research questions into testable propositions 
that lead to knowledge generation that confirm or disconfirm proposed theories 
(Edmondson & McManus, 2007).  
 
Drawing on the reviewed literature and the thesis theories (stakeholder, signalling and 
social cognition theories), this chapter will develop hypotheses for features of the nine 
drivers of good corporate governance identified in the literature (Filatotchev et al., 2007; 
Adegbite, 2015) and investment decision making of investment analysts. The chaper will 
be divided into nine sections, with each section developing hypothesis for operational 
items for a particular driver of good corporate governance. 
 
4.2 Board Structure and Composition Driver 1: Board 
independence and features of board independence. 
According to Rashid (2018), an independent board is a corporate board that has more 
non-executive directors who are not related to the top executives of the firm and have 
limited or no business dealings with the firm to avoid potential conflicts of interests. This 
summary is similar to mandatory recommendations on board characteristic of the 
Nigerian Central Bank code of corporate governance 2014. Independence of board of 
directors is named as critical for a firm to be seen as practicing good corporate 
governance as it usually implies the desire of a firm to show management objectivity 
(Langevoort, 2001).  
 
Board independence suggests a willingness to bring a high degree of rigor, scrutiny, and 
objectivity to the evaluation of a company's management (Langevoort, 2001). The review 
of the economics and corporate finance literature does not provide unambiguous 
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evidence that the extent of board independence has a positive effect on the firm's 
efficiency and performance. However, management and business strategy research 
suggest that this corporate governance parameter has significant effects on "critical" 
organizational decisions, such as executive turnover, value-enhancing business strategy, 
and limitations on anti-take-over defenses. These "critical" decisions are, in turn, related 
to efficiency improvement and superior performance that investment analysts will 
consider when making investment decisions.  
 
Firstly, management and international business strategy literature suggest that the 
absence of CEO/Chairman duality promotes efficiency and better firm performance 
(Filatotchev et al., 2007; Black & Kim, 2007). When one principal occupies both CEO 
and chairman position, such principal will be presumed to have an overbearing impact 
on the firm (Ahunwan, 2003).  However, empirical research on the duality-performance 
relationship has produced mixed results. Berg & Smith (1978) in their study of Fortune 
200 firms, report a negative relationship between CEO duality and ROI. In the same 
study, they conclude that there is no relationship between CEO duality and ROE or 
change in stock price. In their own study, Donaldson & Davis (1991) in their study of 
CEO governance and shareholder return, find that CEO duality was associated with 
significantly higher levels of ROE. While Chaganti, et al. (1985) found no relationship 
between CEO duality and corporate failure in the U.S. retailing industry. 
 
Banks occupy a sensitive and important fiduciary role in the economy; hence the CBN 
have separated the role of chairman and CEO. However, in Nigeria, many CEOs, upon 
retirement, become the chairmen (or even when they are not CEOs or chairmen), 
continue to retain strong influences on the bank (Adegbite 2015). This situation is 
common especially as many Nigerian CEOs are majority (or strong minority) owners of 
their company's shares which enables easy transmutation of CEOs into the Chairmen of 
companies (Ahunwan, 2003). The presence of such domineering persons in a bank can 
negate the separation of roles as intended by the CBN. As a result, investment analysts 
are expected to accord importance to the proper separation of the role for CEO and 
chairman. Thus; 
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Hypothesis 1a: CEO duality will have a negatively significant relationship with 
investment decision making. 
 
Secondly, typically globally, corporate governance divides the issue of share ownership 
into two broad categories of concentrated or dispersed share ownership (Goldberg et al., 
2016). In dispersed share ownership system, it is expected that there is a separation of 
ownership and control, such that neither the directors nor the management typically hold 
significant blocks of the firm’s shares. Instead, share ownership is dispersed among many 
institutional and retail shareholders. Dispersed ownership systems are more common in 
English speaking countries such as the United States and United Kingdom, where capital 
tends to be raised on stock and bond markets from widely dispersed investors (Goldberg 
et al., 2016).   
 
It is assumed that the agentic problem stakeholders face is better monitored in a dispersed 
share ownership structure (Goldberg et al., 2016). For investment analysts, more 
dispersed share ownership also improves their ability to easily to trade and arbitrage. 
However, in the dispersed share ownership structure, management seem to exercise 
broad discretion, or may act opportunistically (Goldberg et al., 2016). Thus, for dispersed 
share ownership structure, the concept of an independent board is even more necessary 
for monitoring of management (Langevoort, 2001). For concentrated share ownership 
structure, the true independence of the board is doubtful as the controlling shareholder 
might be more dominant (Goldberg et al., 2016). 
 
Although Nigeria’s corporate governance codes are Anglo-Saxon influenced, 
concentrated share ownership is typically more common with a controlling shareholder 
or family (Adegbite, 2015), or a small number of block holders who hold either majority 
or de facto control and places their representatives on the controlled firm’s board of 
directors (Goldberg et al., 2016). Nevertheless, for the banking sector, the CBN mandates 
that transfer or share acquisition of more than 5% of the bank shares are expected to be 
reported and approved by the CBN within 7 days of such acquisition (CBN, 2014). 
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Propositions by researchers such as Ahunwan, (2003), Okike, (2007) and Adegbite 
(2015) are that a dispersal of share ownership is a precursor to achieving board 
independence in Nigeria. This is also supported by the CAMA Act for the establishment 
of public companies in Nigeria.  Investment analysts are also expected to view dispersed 
share ownership as an attribute that protects their investment as well as provides them 
with an avenue to easily exit a position. Thus; 
 
Hypothesis 1b: Dispersed share ownership will have a positively significant relationship 
with investment decision making 
 
Thirdly, a number of commentators argue that the absence of governmental direction and 
the resulting lack of uniformity in key board dimensions encourage certain shareholder 
abuses commonly attributed to the separation of ownership and control in large 
corporations. More specifically, if the selection of directors is left virtually to the 
discretion of the very parties whose behavior the board is supposed to monitor. 
Consequently, corporate governance reformers propose a more activist governmental 
role in mandating high standards of board practice. The government assumes this more 
active role by assuring that directors are chosen on the basis of their ability to ratify 
managerial decisions, monitor strategy implementation, and mete out rewards and 
penalties on the basis of managerial performance. 
 
In Nigeria, the CBN code of corporate governance of 2014, specifically recommends 
banks to have a minimum of two independent directors. A Central Bank of Nigeria 
circular (2007 pp 1) defines independent director as "a member of the Board of Directors 
who has no direct material relationship with the bank or any of its officers, major 
shareholders, subsidiaries and affiliates; a relationship which may impair the director's 
ability to make independent judgments or compromise the director's objectivity in line 
with Corporate Governance best practices. There are also regulatory provisions which 
encourage all board committees (especially board audit committees) to be composed of 
independent directors, including members of shareholders' associations. This provision 
should encourage investment analysts into assuming the decisions of firms are 
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independently scrutinized hence their investments are even more protected by the 
presence of these independent directors. Thus; 
 
Hypothesis 1c: Presence of independent directors will have a positively significant 
relationship with investment decision making. 
 
Lastly, the 1992 Cadbury Report initiated a debate about the main functions and 
responsibilities of non-executive directors (NEDs). Essentially, the non-executive 
director's role is to provide creative, independent oversight and constructive challenge to 
the executive directors. Today, it is generally accepted that non-executive directors make 
essential contributions to the proper running of firms and, therefore, more widely to the 
economy at large. The presence of NEDs brings an independent judgment to bear on 
issues of resources including key appointments, strategy, performance, and standards of 
conduct. Leading from this and just as prescribed by the CBN code of corporate 
governance, (2014), Adegbite (2015) proposed a healthy combination of executive and 
non-executive directors to promote effective corporate governance. This is supported by 
studies by Awan (2012) and Dehaene et al. (2001) which posit that more NEDs on a 
board lead to improved performance. Also, Collett & Hrasky (2005) found that a positive 
relationship existed between the proportion of inside directors and the market based 
measures of performance. However, some studies (e.g. Klein et al., 2004; Macavoy & 
Millstein, 2003) show that the traditional role and overbearing influence of family 
ownership on the appointment of board members limits the oversight function and 
independence of NEDs. Nevertheless, the presence of more NEDs than executive 
directors will mean investment analysts will be assured of people not engaged with the 
day to day running of the business are on the board. These people are expected to come 
with experience and they have a reputation to protect (Adegbite, 2015).  In environments 
of uncertainty, this might be an important consideration for investment 
analysts.Moreover, in Nigeria, the CBN prescribes and mandates that over 50% of the 
board seats must be held by NEDs. 
 
Thus; 
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Hypothesis 1d: The presence of more NEDs to executive directors will have a positively 
significant relationship with investment decision making. 
 
4.3 Board Structure and Composition Driver 2: Board 
heterogeneity and features of board heterogeneity. 
 
Blau (1977 p.276) defines diversity as the "great number of different statuses among 
which a population is distributed." Indeed, in a weak institutional environment where 
organization survival is feared, board heterogeneity and governance may be very 
important (Daily & Dalton, 1994; Filatotchev & Toms, 2003; Hambrick & D'Aveni, 
1992). 
 
It has been suggested that board heterogeneity can increase board independence 
(Wiersema & Bantel, 1992).  Boards may provide advice to the CEO and can be a source 
of support for roles which employees might be unable to fulfill (Dalton et al., 1998; 1999; 
Hillman & Dalziel, 2003; Lorsh & Maclver, 1989; Zahra & Pearce, 1989). The usefulness 
and effectiveness of this advice/support can depend on the experience and diverse 
background of the members of the board (Carpenter, 2002; Baysinger & Butler, 1985; 
Kaplan & Reishus, 1990; Westphal, 1999). 
 
The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision report of 2014 (BCBS, 2014) expands 
guidance on the roles of the board of directors, specifically pointing out that the bank 
board should be composed of a diverse set of directors to reflect its complexity in 
operation. However, contextually, what particular board heterogeneity, in terms of age, 
human capital and ethnic tribe are important diversity parameters? 
 
It has been propositioned that of a healthy combination of both young and older directors 
be represented on the board (Fox, 2007; Adegbite, 2015). When profiling an individual, 
age is a dynamic proxy of an individual's life experience (Mannheim, 1949) and 
encompasses a wide range of factors that influence the formation of personal values 
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during our lifespan (Medawar, 1952; Rhodes, 1983). Whether an age-diverse board 
provides comprehensive resources and expertise or leads to communication breakdown 
and conflicts remains an open question. 
 
Age diversity is particularly important in developing countries as these countries 
experience significant transformations over a relatively short period. Moreover, along 
with the transition of the economic system, there has simultaneously been a push towards 
cultural change (Stulz & Williamson, 2003). Therefore, investment analysts investing in 
this distinctive cultural environment, assume directors in different age cohorts tend to 
hold diverse values that can affect the quality and process of decision-making. The 
investment analysts will presume that directors of different ages expand the board 
member networks and contacts (Macey & O'hara, 2003; Mishra & Jhunjhunwala, 2013). 
The network may lead firms to benefit from improved access to their external 
constituents (Hillman et al., 2000). Specifically, the network of an age-diverse board may 
provide better access to capital and regulators (Macey & O'hara, 2003) and enable the 
bank to meet the needs of different customers and penetrate deeper into the market 
(Mishra & Jhunjhunwala, 2013). 
 
Further, older directors tend to be more knowledgeable and experienced, whereas 
younger directors are more energetic and have a greater appetite for adventures and new 
technologies (Mishra & Jhunjhunwala, 2013). Therefore, investment analysts are likely 
to assume that an age-diverse board may further an organization's understanding of its 
current marketplace and industry dynamics and improve its performance. Thus; 
 
Hypothesis 2a. Age has a positively significant relationship with investment decision 
making. 
 
On gender, a study conducted in May 2002 by conference board of Canada on women 
and corporate governance credentials found that more gender balance tends to enable the 
board to pay more attention to audit and risk oversight; consider more diverse categories 
of stakeholders while making decisions, and are generally more thorough in a wide range 
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of management and organisational performance (Mahalakshmi & Reddy, 2017). The 
Higgs Report, recommends that more women be included on boards as the report 
suggests that demographic diversity increases board effectiveness (Adams & Ferreira, 
2009).  Women benefit the boardroom dynamics by bringing a collaborative leadership 
style through increased listening, social support, and win-win problem-solving 
(Mahalakshmi &, Reddy, 2017). Although women are often collaborative leaders, they 
do not shy away from controversial issues (Mahalakshmi &, Reddy, 2017). The 
perspectives women bring are often of great value, and often differing from their male 
counterparts. This difference of opinion can mean women are inspirational to a firm's 
diverse workforce (Campbell, 1996). Even though their representation on the boards is 
very less, there are records of proven competence and trust by women around the globe 
(Mahalakshmi & Reddy, 2017). For investment analysts operating in developing 
countries, a gender balance on a board is likely to signal enhanced competence levels and 
more effectiveness. Thus 
 
Hypothesis 2b: Gender has a positively significant relationship with investment decision 
making. 
 
Just as it has been propositioned about gender, it has been suggested that ethnic/tribal 
diversity of directors results in better governance which causes the business to be more 
profitable (Mckinsey, 2015). Although Karen J. Curtin, a former executive vice president 
of Bank of America, describes the interaction of the two propositions (gender and tribal 
diversity) in the following statement; "There is real debate between those who think we 
should be more diverse because it is the right thing to do and those who think we should 
be more diverse because it actually enhances shareholder value. Unless we get the second 
point across and people believe it, we're only going to have tokenism" (Brancato & 
Patterson, 1999, p.7).  In Nigeria, the numerous tribes in the country usually means 
boards try as much as possible to have different tribal representations. This might not be 
unconnected with the presumption that when tribes make their own decisions about what 
approaches to take and what resources to develop, they consistently out-perform 
decision-makers of other tribes (Krepps & Caves, 1994). Also, researchers such as 
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Adegbite (2015) have also proposed that tribal diversity should be reflected in board 
composition in Nigeria especially as tribal diversity has religious undertones in Nigeria 
(Nakpodia et al., 2018).  In Nigeria, a country with many tribes and ethnicity (NPC & 
ICF Macro, 2009), investment analysts will attribute a tribally diverse board with 
business opportunities and hence improved performance. Thus; 
 
Hypothesis 2c: Tribe has a positively significant relationship with investment decision 
making. 
 
On tenure, Boeker (1992), Pfeffer (1982), Golden & Zajac (2001) and Finkelstein & 
Hambrick, (1996) argue that longer tenured boards inhibit creativeness while in contrast 
Hambrick & Mason (1984), Hambrick & D'Aveni (1992) suggest longer tenured boards 
supports better innovation. Corporate governance literature generally seems to favor 
boards with shorter tenure boards. In Nigeria, the CBN code of corporate governance 
(2014) stipulates that directors can only serve two tenures of 5years each on the board of 
a bank. This policy of revolving directors after specific tenures should not only encourage 
innovation (Pfeffer, 1982), investment analysts will expect that tenure limitation should 
also eliminate sit tight syndrome common in developing countries context (Nakpodia & 
Adegbite, 2018). Thus; 
 
Hypothesis 2d: Shorter tenure of directors on a board has a positively significant 
relationship with investment decision making. 
 
Further, on the issue of directors being on other firms' boards, research in this area 
suggests that the network relationships of directors provide positive resources for 
organizations (Filatotchev & Toms, 2003; Mizruchi, 1996; Mizruchi & Stearns, 1994; 
Benton, 2017). The knowledge and advantages gained from these relationships also 
might auger well for the going concern nature of firms (Carpenter, 2002). Some of these 
advantages are transferred to firms through outsider director(s) appointed onto the firm's 
board especially where the outsider director has prior board experience from other 
companies (Golden & Zajac, 2001; Pettigrew, 1992; Westphal & Fredrickson, 2001). 
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Carpenter & Westphal, (2001), Westphal, (1999), and Benton (2017) find that there is a 
positive relationship between performance and when the directors have ties with 
companies in the same field as the ones where they are directors. These directors also 
bring some reputational capital to the boards (Geletkanycz & Hambrick, 1997; Lynall et 
al., 2003). Ferris et al. (2003) suggest that the past performance of the companies on 
which a director serves is positively associated with the number of board seats that he 
hold and that firms appointing a new director with multiple board seats experience 
positive announcement returns. The findings by Ferris et al. (2003) suggest that the 
market perceives the appointment of directors with multiple board seats as value 
enhancing. In contrast, Fich & Shivdasani (2006) find that firms where directors have 
multiple board seats tend to have lower market to book ratios and are less likely to fire a 
CEO in response to poor performance. Cashman et al. (2012) also find that busy directors 
have a negative influence on performance. Similarly, scholars such as Mace, (1971); 
Pettigrew & McNulty, (1998); and Useem, (1984), (1993) suggest that boards directors 
on other boards amounts to CEOs consolidating their bases. Nevertheless, in Nigeria the 
shortage of pool of individuals to have as directors (Adegbite, 2015) means directors 
being on different boards is inevitable and would positively impact decisions of 
investment analysts. Thus; 
 
Hypothesis 2e: Multiple directorships has a positively significant relationship with 
investment decision making. 
 
4.4 Board Structure and Composition Driver 3. Board (Directors’) 
Reputation and features of board reputation. 
 
D'Aveni (1990 pp121) defines prestige or positive reputation as the "property of having 
status." Audiences routinely rely on the reputation of firms and its directors in making 
investment decisions, career choices and product choices (Dowling, 1986). Indeed 
reputation can enhance access to capital markets (Beatty & Ritter, 1986) and attract 
investors (Milgrom & Roberts 1986a). Moreover, it has also been suggested that 
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reputation as a variable can influence positive firm performance (Hall, 1993; Knight & 
Pretty, 1999). 
 
Hence, firstly, beyond the agentic perspective of governance, various researchers 
advocate a broadening of the corporate governance agenda to encompass a stakeholder 
and legitimacy perspective (Tirole, 2001; Aguilera et al., 2006; Deakin & Whittaker, 
2007).  Following this stakeholder-agentic perspective, the board of directors can be seen 
as a mechanism of visibility, legitimacy, and reputation, as its role is to ensure that the 
company is managed efficiently, top management has oversight and stakeholders' 
interests are taken into consideration at the highest levels of decision making (Michelon 
& Parbonetti, 2010). Certo (2003) suggests that when boards have prestigious members, 
there is enhanced visibility, especially among external stakeholders. In developing 
countries, replete with weak institutions, the visibility of directors reflects positively on 
the firm if the directors are deemed people of prestige.  Therefore, reputation is depicted 
as the visibility of board members and how this visibility reflects in the minds of 
investment analysts when they make investment decisions. Thus; 
 
Hypothesis 3a: Reputation as visibility has a positively significant relationship with 
investment decision making. 
 
Secondly, a firm's current reputation is determined by the signals that the public receives 
concerning its behaviors, whether directly from the firm or via other information 
channels, such as the media or the stock market. Directors' reputational orderings 
crystallize in the statuses of firms within an industrial social system (Shrum & Wuthnow, 
1988) and thereby constitute an important avenue for reconciling economic and 
sociological contributions in the minds of audiences (Fombrun, 1986).  Thus, reputable 
board members usually bring credibility to the company (Adegbite, 2015). In developing 
countries, there is a limited market for this group of highly experienced and reputable 
directors (Adegbite, 2015) and the need to increase the number of such individuals, which 
relates to raising aspirations towards professionalism and good behavior (Chun-An & 
Chuan-Ying, 2008). 
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Furthermore, Diamond (1989) theoretical model predicts that agents (directors) have 
stronger incentives to maintain their reputation as it becomes a more valuable asset. It is 
therefore unsurprising that highly reputed directors dissent more often (Jiang et al., 
2016). Some studies (e.g., Fahlenbrach et al., 2010) seem to suggest that directors who 
sit on boards of distressed firms see their reputations tarnished with less future 
directorships offers (Fahlenbrach et al., 2010). Similarly, Fich & Shivdasani (2007) 
report that when firms are involved in financial fraud lawsuit, outside directors of the 
firm experience a reduction in other firm board seats they hold. Leading from this, when 
a firm has directors perceived as credible this will help mitigate some agency risks, as 
stakeholders will assume such directors will seek to protect their credibility and not want 
to be associated with failure. Thus; 
 
Hypothesis 3b: Reputation as credibility has a positively significant relationship with 
investment decision making. 
 
Investment analysts are expected to have diverse preferences over a firm's actions, 
process, and outcomes, and reputational assessments depend upon the congruence 
between the apparent behaviors of the firm and the preferences of those publics (Fombrun 
& Shanley, 1990). McGuire et al. (1988), in a study of the Fortune 500, found that prior 
return on assets was highly correlated with a firm's reputation for social responsibility, 
which suggests that firms' reputational ranking is associated with goodwill stakeholders 
transmit to the firm in terms of economic preferences of the external stakeholders 
(Fombrun & Shanley, 1990). Similarly, Mizruchi (1996, p. 276) report that "boards of 
directors perform an important function regarding the reputation of a firm……. When 
investors decide whether to invest in a company, they consider the firm's strength and 
the quality of its management". Therefore, investment analysts will assume the goodwill 
directors of a firm possess, translates to reputation for the firm. Thus 
 
Hypothesis 3c: Reputation as goodwill has a positively significant relationship with 
investment decision making. 
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Investment analysts are likely to be swayed positively when they recognize the names of 
directors. This might be due to the previous achievements of such directors. A similar 
comparison is the UK educational system where UK universities do better on reputation 
than on actual student/lecturer academic performance. This position is supported by 
Pfeffer & Salanik (1978, p. 145) who posit that "prestigious or legitimate persons or 
organizations represented on the focal organization's board confirms to the rest of the 
world the value and worth of the organization”. Investment analysts are likely to trust 
that directors with recognized names bring reputation to a firm as such directors with 
recognized names will not want to be associated with failure. For example, Srinivasan 
(2005) posits that directors lose reputational capital if firms they sit on boards of firms 
that restate earnings. Thus 
 
Hypothesis 3d: Reputation as a recognized name has a positively significant relationship 
with investment decision making. 
 
The presence of politically connected individuals (usually referred to as 
strongmen/women) are prevalent in many of the organizations in developing countries 
(Adegbite et al., 2012). Perhaps this is not surprising as Adegbite (2012) argued alliances 
with government officials is a key determinant of corporate success. Evidence also 
supports the notion that boards with directors who possess some political connection 
(Carpenter, 2002; Daily et al., 1999; Filatotchev & Bishop 2002; Pettigrew 1992; Zahra 
& Pearce 1989) perform better at fundraising activities (Certo, 2003; Filatotchev & 
Bishop, 2002; Certo et al., 2001). However, although this political connection is relevant 
in developing countries, so much authority lies with individuals rather than institutions 
and might render whatever advantage superficial and temporary. Therefore, in 
developing countries, investment analysts will assume a firm with politically connected 
people might not necessarily be able to attract more business continually and hence make 
better returns. Thus; 
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Hypothesis 3e: Reputation as politically connected individuals has a negatively 
significant relationship with investment decision making. 
 
Finally, Benton (2014) finds that there is a positive relationship between board and 
performance when the directors have ties with companies in the same field as the ones 
where they are directors. These directors also bring some reputational capital to the 
boards (Geletkanycz & Hambrick, 1997; Lynall et al., 2003).  By appointing individuals 
with ties to other important organizations, the firm signals to potential investors that it is 
a legitimate enterprise worthy of support. 
 
Following another line of thought, directors receive more benefits from sitting on 
different performing boards (Fahlenbrach et al., 2010). The receipt of benefits provides 
an incentive for directors, as the directors know that they can only receive additional 
directorship in future if the firms they sit on their board are performing (Yermack, 2004; 
Ferris et al., 2003).  The weak institutions in Nigeria coupled with the weak industrial 
economic base means the emergence of this group of highly experienced and reputable 
directors is limited (Adegbite, 2015). Indeed researchers such as Chun-An & Chuan-
Ying (2008) and Adegbite (2015), advocate that there is a need for developing countries 
such as Nigeria to encourage individuals who will have high aspirations towards 
professionalism and good behavior. Therefore, investment analysts will assume that 
directors are on multiple boards only because they bring benefit to firms and improve 
performance. 
 
Hypothesis 3f: Reputation reflected in multiple directorships has a positively significant 
relationship with investment decision making. 
 
4.5 External Ownership Mechanism Driver 1. Foreign (large) 
institutional shareholders and features of foreign institutional 
shareholders. 
Institutional shareholders are businesses that own shares in a quoted company. Some 
block shareholders might be individuals with 5% or more shareholding in firms. The size 
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of their holdings means institutional investors are expected to provide adequate policing 
of corporate management in ways which individual dispersed shareholders are 
incapacitated to do (Jacoby, 2007; Prevost & Rao, 2000; Romano, 2001). Therefore, 
ownership by foreign and independent institutional investors enhances shareholder value 
(Ferreira & Matos, 2008). Activist institutional shareholders, particularly foreign 
institutional investors, are believed to play a positive role in external monitoring, 
especially when large controlling shareholders may potentially engage in expropriation 
by pursuing exclusive benefits through their influence on management. In particular, as 
"outsiders," foreign institutional investors are more likely to perform arms-length 
monitoring, thereby benefiting minority shareholders (Ferreira & Matos, 2008). Since 
foreign institutional investors seemingly have little choice but to protect their investment 
(Admati et al., 1994; Agrawal & Knoeber, 1996), investment analysts are likely to view 
positively firms where foreign institutional investors have shares.  
 
Also, foreign institutional investors are often believed to play more of a role in prompting 
changes in corporate governance practices than domestic fund managers (Gillan & 
Starks, 2003). As a result, board representation by foreign institutional investors 
represented by someone with sufficient human capital and knowledge of the Nigerian 
business terrain will help the board challenge the weak institutional deficiencies 
(Adegbite, 2015). Especially as the Nigerian SEC Code (2011) specifically requires 
“institutional shareholders and other shareholders with large holdings to seek to 
positively influence the standard of corporate governance in the companies in which they 
invest." The 2003 Securities and Exchange Commissions' Code on Corporate 
Governance (SEC Code) also provided for shareholders owning 20% stake to have at 
least one representative on the board. 
 
Therefore, foreign institutional shareholders with representation on boards are expected 
to demand compliance and explanations for non-compliance of governance standards. 
Some studies on Nigeria (e.g., Ahunwan, 2002; Bakre, 2007) have reported that 
institutional shareholders have an opportunity to pursue better governance practices. 
According to Yakasai (2001), institutional shareholders are in a strategic position and 
   
116 
 
can better engage with firm managers than small shareholders. This group of investors 
dialogue with management, hence, can play an essential role in improving firms 
corporate governance practices by influencing board nominations and bridge the 
communication gap with shareholders (Ajogwu, 2007).  Thus; 
 
Hypothesis 4a: Presence of foreign institutional investors on the board of a firm has a 
positively significant relationship with investment decision making. 
 
In Nigeria, both local and foreign institutional investors are currently playing limited 
roles in the corporate governance of listed firms (Adegbite, 2015) with most of them 
focused on short-term returns. This is, however, changing as some studies (such as 
Adegbite, 2015) have contended that large institutional investors, especially 
foreign/international ones, can promote good corporate governance in Nigeria. The 
conventional approach to the coexistence of domestic and foreign investors in a domestic 
market is based on information asymmetries, in which foreign investors are typically 
depicted as being informationally disadvantaged (Kang & Stulz, 1997; Brennan & Cao, 
1997). Nevertheless, investor heterogeneity means foreign and local investors possibly 
behave in different ways (Morris, 1995), especially given that foreigners in a domestic 
market are international investors who may invest in multiple countries (Kang et al., 
2010). According to Kang et al. (2010, p. 2886), "foreign investors are a return-chaser 
across countries while domestic investors prefer home-country stocks to overseas ones." 
In addition, local institutional investors possess local knowledge about norms and 
practices which foreign institutional investors do not have. Investment analysts are likely 
to perceive that this local knowledge is pertinent for business exigencies and performance 
advantages even if it is short term. Thus; 
 
Hypothesis 4b: The importance of local institutional investors compared to foreign 
institutional investors has a positively significant relationship with investment decision 
making. 
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Globally, since the 1980’s capital markets have been hugely influenced by globalization. 
The growth in international integration among world capital markets was mainly 
explained by the decision made by corporations to consider cross-listing as a means of 
overcoming investments barriers and making a firm's shares accessible to foreign 
investors (Ghadhad & Hellera, 2015). These motivations were related to different 
considerations related essentially to market segmentation (Abdallah & Ioannidis, 2010; 
You et al., 2013), to information environment (Amira & Muzere, 2011; Lee & Valero, 
2010), to liquidity (Abdallah et al., 2011; Silva & Chavez, 2008) and to the legal 
environment of the firm (Doidge, 2004; Reese & Weisbach, 2002; You et al., 2013). This 
cross-listing is another interesting development in the Nigerian market space. It is well 
known that financial markets in developing countries are not as liquid as those of 
developed countries. The illiquidity is regarded as a major factor for the high volatility 
in developing countries markets and a significant impediment to financial market 
development. 
 
Further, Mitto (1992) findings indicate that the listing decision exposes firms to scrutiny 
making such firms to have a greater appeal for foreign investors irrespective of their size 
and industry. Using a 57-year global foreign listing sample, Sarkissian & Schill (2016) 
find results consistent with gravity-model implications and economic-synergy arguments 
of cross-listing decisions, cross-listing waves in a given host country coincide with the 
outperformance of the host and proximate home countries' economies and financial 
markets. Although the valuation gains from listings associated with cross-listing waves 
are transitory (Sarkissian & Schill, 2016), investment analysts are likely to consider that 
foreign listing positively. Furthermore, under the weak corporate governance institutions 
in developing countries, investment analysts’ considerations might be based more on 
other considerations rather than on economic merits, serving as a vehicle to signal the 
quality (Luo & Elliott, 2014). Investment analysts who operate in developing countries 
are likely to positively view firms that cross-list as this might mean they are easily able 
to vote with their feet (MaCahery et al., 2016) if, for example, they are less pleased with 
the performance of governance practices. Thus, 
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Hypothesis 4c: Foreign listing as a proxy for the well-managed firm has a positively 
significant relationship with investment decision making. 
 
4.6 External Ownership Mechanism Driver 2. Effective shareholder 
activism and features of effective shareholder activism 
Shareholder activism constitutes activities undertaken by shareholder(s) to influence 
management and the board. Two emergent classes of shareholders in Nigeria are 
sophisticated and reputable shareholder (Adegbite, 2015). Sophisticated shareholders are 
the emergent middle class (mainly young and middle-aged professionals), who do not 
necessarily belong to any shareholder association (Adegbite, 2015). They make efforts 
to attend annual general meetings (AGMs) and other meetings regularly and in the 
process have developed a degree of sophisticated expertise with regard to scrutinizing 
companies' governance (Adegbite, 2015). They also ask important questions on issues 
bordering on several aspects of corporate disclosures—including financials, ethical 
investments, corporate social responsibility and employee relations during AGMs. Some 
even engage in letter writing (Adegbite, 2015; McCahery et al., 2016). Hence, the flurry 
of activities by these sophisticated shareholders increase scrutiny of firms and their 
management. Thus; 
 
Hypothesis 5a: Presence of sophisticated shareholders has a positively significant 
relationship with investment decision making. 
 
A different classification from those described above is reputable shareholders. 
Reputable shareholders are high-calibre individuals with a record of excellent behaviour 
and distinguished accomplishments in various high-profile corporate positions 
(Adegbite, 2015; Peng, 2004). Given the challenge of corporate corruption and recurring 
corporate scandals in Nigeria, persons of high standards of integrity continue to 
constitute a powerful and positive force for informed and ‘veteran shareholder activism' 
(Adegbite, 2015; Peng, 2004). This is because popular people in networks influence 
others and can influence firms’ performance. Cognitively, this positive influence means 
that they have more associates (Benton & You, 2017) as well as increased network ties 
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(Barabasi & Albert, 1999).  However, it is possible that investors may be concerned with 
activism other than purely financial returns (Blair, 1995). This other concerns which can 
be found in social or political motivations (Hendry et al., 2007) may make reputable 
shareholders champion their own preferences (Garten, 1992; Rock, 1991). For example, 
Hendry et al. (2007) find that although shareholder activism literature mainly assume 
activism is motivated by a desire to maximise shareholder value, alternative motivations 
such as political/moral motivations might spur activism. 
 
As a result, the reputation and influence of these set of shareholders suggests that 
investment analysts when making investment decisions will consider the reputable 
shareholder group’s behaviour as having a disciplining control on a firm’s management. 
Thus, activism by reputable shareholders can induce spill-over effects on account of their 
visibility. In Nigeria, anecdotal evidence supports the notion that reputable shareholders 
belong to the group of investors that possess financial and social wherewithal (Nakpodia 
& Adegbite, 2018). The financial and social capital ensures that reputable people control 
management as they have direct links to the bank’s management. For the Nigerian 
banking sector, the CBN ensures that shares acquisition or disposal above 5% are 
reported within 7 days of such transaction. On this evidence, activism by reputable 
shareholders can frame the actions of their audiences including investment analysts. Thus 
 
Hypothesis 5b: Presence of reputable shareholders has a positively significant 
relationship with investment decision making. 
 
Also, activist shareholders are always eager to get the best returns for their investment. 
According to Gillan & Starks (1998), a shareholder activist is an investor who tries to 
change a firm's present situation without necessarily resulting in a change of firm's 
management or control. Primarily, the activist shareholders focus on poorly performing 
firms in their portfolio with the aim to pressurize firms' management for improved 
performance (Gillan & Starks, 2003). Although, such activism seem to be left to hedge 
funds/block shareholders especially in firms or industries where dispersed shareholders 
are in majority (Bebchuk & Weisbach, 2010). This is because of transaction costs, which 
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makes individual shareholders unwilling to monitoring of activities of firms, thereby 
resulting in the free-rider problem (Bebchuk & Weisbach, 2010).  The Nigerian 
environment, which is steeped in weak institutions increases transaction costs for 
investors hence investment analysts, will appreciate the presence of activist shareholders 
in a firm.  
 
Activism by shareholders exists under the assumption that shareholders by engaging in 
some form of participatory activism, can check managerial entrenchment or 
opportunistic behavior (Black, 1992; Gillan & Starks, 1998; 2000; Rubach & Sebora, 
2009). Becht et al. (2009) argued that activism could work for or against the firm's 
interest. On the one hand, it can resolve the agency problems associated with firms with 
dispersed ownership helping to improve their performance (Black, 1992). While on the 
other hand, it can also be a means by large block holders who are influential, to be 
opportunistic for personal benefits (Ivanova, 2017). “Direct knowledge of the 
interactions between institutional investors and portfolio firms is limited” (Ivanova, 
2017, p. 179), especially in the Nigerian context, where engagements are similar to 
private dialogue which occur behind the scenes in the UK (Becht et al., 2010; McCahery 
et al., 2016).  Although some researchers (e.g., Uche et al., 2016) posit that executive 
management of firms dominates the shareholder associations thereby impeding activism, 
investment analysts will expect that activism checks management excesses especially 
considering most businesses in Nigeria that have dominant shareholders, are either 
family owned or family influenced (Adegbite, 2015).Thus; 
 
Hypothesis 5c: Presence of institutional activist shareholders has a positively significant 
relationship with investment decision making. 
 
4.7 Accountability Mechanism Driver 1. Pay for Performance and 
features of pay for performance:  
Pay for performance is the act of linking executive management/directors' remuneration 
to firm performance. Incentive compensation is an important tool for a firm trying to 
improve employee performance. If designed well, an incentive plan motivates the 
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employee to work harder, smarter, and in better alignment with the firm's objectives 
(Gibbs, 2012). Designed wrongly, however, can have the opposite effect. Regular, large 
payments to CEOs highlight the potential for misalignment with firm performance that 
is generally associated with managerial opportunism (Core et al., 1999; Gomez-Mejia & 
Wiseman, 1997; Jensen & Murphy, 1990; Tosi et al., 2000). In fact, according to Turner 
(2009, p.79) "there is a strong prima facie case that inappropriate incentive structures 
played a role in encouraging behavior which contributed to the financial crisis" in 2008. 
 
Nevertheless, remuneration is one of the tools board of directors can use to increase their 
control of managers (Zajac & Westphal, 1994) even if not all eventualities can be covered 
by this measure (Hart, 1995).  The inability to cover all loopholes or gaps in contracts 
shareholders have with managers makes the option of linking pay with firm performance 
attractive (Fama, 1980) with incentives which might help overcome the challenges of 
agency problem (Murphy, 1985; Beatty & Zajac, 1994; Fama, 1980).  Hence, in 
developing countries, clear compensation schemes can be designed to serve as incentives 
for management to perform on behalf of shareholders (Eisenhardt, 1989). Pay for 
performance leads to greater compensation transparency (Conyon & Sadler, 2010), and 
investment analysts will rely on this transparency for investment decision making.  
 
This concept is a relatively recent practice in Nigeria beginning in the early 2000s and is 
still very much at its infancy (Adegbite, 2015). The Nigerian banks, which are typically 
at the forefront of modern developments in Nigeria, (Lewane, 2012), utilize this 
governance driver on a wide scale in the hope that pay for performance would bring about 
a cultural change and encourage higher levels of individual and organization 
performance (Kessler & Purcell, 1992). Hence, to mitigate the stakeholder agentic 
problem, pay for performance now forms a key element of Nigerian banks' compensation 
strategies thereby positioning it as a key driver of good corporate governance in a weak 
institutional environment such as Nigeria. Thus 
 
Hypothesis 6a: Clear compensation schemes has a positively significant relationship with 
investment decision making. 
   
122 
 
 
From agency theory perspective, when executives' pay is tied directly to performance, 
the executives will strive to maximize shareholder interests and ensure good governance 
(Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Harvey & Shrieves, 2001; Randøy & Nielsen, 2002). 
However, pay for performance as a driver of good corporate governance has been linked 
to the tendencies for increased risk‐taking (Lin et al., 2012; Tang, 2012). This has led 
some researchers to reignite the debate regarding the effectiveness of reward schemes 
packages in mitigating agency conflicts in modern corporations (Goering, 1996; Murphy, 
1997; Van Essen et al., 2012; Berger et al., 2013; Cook & Burress, 2013). 
 
Nevertheless, firms with high levels of institutional ownership and investment analyst 
participation are better at linking pay and performance. This adeptness ensures 
performance and pay link works in both good times and bad times (Kang et al., 2010). 
This suggests that active investment analysts and large shareholders can provide an 
important disciplining influence on the structure of senior executives' pay (Bell & Van 
Reenan, 2012). Therefore, investment analysts are likely to positively associate with 
reward schemes for executives as this will ensure management perform and are also 
concerned about the long-term going concern of the firm. Thus; 
 
Hypothesis 6b: Management rewards schemes is acceptable and has a positively 
significant relationship with investment decision making. 
 
Lastly, pay for performance is used to reward employees with a financial payment (cash 
or stocks), following an assessment of their performance and typically, the achievement 
of objectives (Suff et al., 2007). In developing countries such as Nigeria, employee 
reward scheme is common in the banking sector. According to Baron (1983, p. 123), 
“motivation is an accumulation of different processes which influence and direct our 
behavior to achieve some specific Goal.” Although it has been suggested that some 
employee schemes might cause short term performance disposition by managers, 
(Filatotchev et al., 2007; Berger et al., 2013; Cook & Burress, 2013), in today’s business 
environment, employee rewards impacts job satisfaction positively (Danish & Usman, 
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2010). Therefore, firms seeking best performance from their employees can ensure their 
commitment through employee reward schemes. Especially as employee commitment is 
based on reward and recognition (Andrew & Kent, 2007).  
 
Indeed, Rosen (1990) suggests that the structure of linking managers/executives' pay to 
firm performance promotes more loyalty from executives enabling them to act more in 
the interest of shareholders. Also, Lawler (2003) suggest that the prosperity and survival 
of firms can be linked to how they treat their employees. Therefore, even though there 
appears to be a societal apathy towards performance-related executive compensation 
(Adegbite, 2015), investment analysts who operate in the Nigerian environment will be 
used to employee reward schemes in the banking sector and will expect such schemes 
link with firm performance. Thus; 
 
Hypothesis 6c: Employee reward scheme has a positively significant relationship with 
investment decision making. 
 
4.8 Accountability Mechanism Driver 2. Independent audit 
committees and features of independent audit committee: 
Audit Committee is independent when the majority of the members are independent and 
are not influenced by the firm or management (CBN code of corporate governance, 
2014). 
 
Firstly, audit and internal controls are always central to what internal stakeholders share 
with external stakeholders (Palepu & Healy, 2003) and gives assurance of compliance 
with government regulation (Grabosky, 1995). Hence, the independence of the audit 
committee is essential. From about the late 90s to early 2000, audit committee has been 
projected as a mechanism for good corporate governance internationally (Bhasin, 2015). 
An audit committee is expected to monitor the reliability of the firm's accounting and 
auditing processes to protect shareholders interests (Agoglia et al., 2011)  and prevent 
attempts to manipulate earnings numbers (Klein, 2002). Also, an audit committee is a 
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mechanism to hold "external" auditors accountable for the scope, nature, and quality of 
their work (Dignam, 2007). 
 
For the general public and all stakeholders, audit committees are increasingly more 
responsible for the quality of reports that emanate from firms (Beasley et al., 2009). To 
further enhance the audit committee responsibility, the United States in 2002 enacted the 
Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX) Act, requiring that all US publicly traded companies establish an 
"independent" audit committee. This action of the US has been replicated by a noticeable 
increase in the number of countries now "mandating" the use of independent audit 
committees (Bhasin, 2015). Hence, investment analysts operating in Nigeria will accord 
importance to reports emanating from independent audit committees. Thus; 
 
Hypothesis 7a: Importance of audit committee reports has a positively significant 
relationship with investment decision making. 
 
However, the ability of the independent audit committees to reduce the likelihood of 
fraud has been disputed (Beasley, 1996). Studies such as Pucheta-Martinez & de Fuentes 
(2007 p.1407) have posited that the “the mere presence of an audit committee does not 
reduce the occurrence of error and non-compliance qualifications." However, the same 
study also determined that other factors, such as the size and independence of an audit 
committee do have a significant impact on certain aspects of financial reporting.  Also, 
Lam (2000) found that the appearance of audit committee independence enhances auditor 
independence and improves transparency in financial reporting. 
 
In Nigeria, the CAMA Act and the CBN code of corporate governance both mandate that 
audit committees be independent. However, the independence of these committees 
becomes questioned if the members are perceived not to be people with moral 
uprightness and individual integrity. Nevertheless, an independent audit committee is 
assumed to have a beneficial effect on enhancing the quality of disclosures, in reducing 
discretionary earnings management, increasing the informativeness of earnings, and in 
general enhancing the value of the firm (Bhasin, 2015). Thus  
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Hypothesis 7b: Perception of non-independence of individuals on the audit committee 
has a negatively significant relationship with investment decision making. 
 
4.9 Accountability Mechanism Driver 3. Voluntary disclosure and 
features of voluntary disclose: 
The Financial Accounting Standard Board (FASB, 2000) describes voluntary disclosures 
as information not explicitly required by accounting standards or rules and are outside of 
the mandatory financial statements. 
 
Firstly, information transparency can be, defined as the level of availability and 
accessibility of market information a firm provides to its stakeholders (Granados et al., 
2010). The type of information (relevant or irrelevant) provided by a firm's management 
plays a role in the public perception of the firm (Filatotchev et al., 2007). Stakeholders 
always seek to have a clear understanding of how firms are being managed. This helps 
reduce costs associated with complex investigation as "demand for financial information 
reporting and disclosure arises from information asymmetry and agency conflicts 
between managers, outside investors, and intermediaries" (Kothari et al., 2009, p. 1640). 
Information disclosures are of two types; mandatory and voluntary. Mandatory 
information is required by law such as any company operating in a country are expected 
to file annual returns and produce financial statements. Voluntary disclosure relates to 
how information is disclosed in terms of quality and extent (Healy & Palepu, 2001; Core, 
2001) which allows for good monitoring by investors (Filatotchev et al., 2007). 
 
Although voluntary corporate governance disclosures project firm's actions and activities 
indicating accountability for stakeholders' scrutiny (Nwagbara, 2014), firms and their 
management signal the unobservable qualities of their firms to potential investors via the 
observable quality of their financial statements (Zhang & Wiersema, 2009). Since these 
financial statements are mandatory, investment analysts operating in weak institutional 
environments might be more inclined to rely on mandatory reports which already have 
been approved by the regulatory authorities. Thus. 
   
126 
 
 
Hypothesis 8a: Mandatory information has a positively significant relationship with 
investment decision making. 
 
Secondly, when firms disclose beyond what is required, it lowers uncertainty and enables 
stakeholders assess the true position of the firm (Meek et al., 1995). Shehata (2014) 
shows that voluntary disclosure is an effective way to disseminate corporate information 
to stakeholders about the business to reduce information asymmetry and agency conflicts 
between managers and investors. Similarly, Lan et al. (2013) argue that firms might 
benefit from giving investors additional corporate information to exploit the disclosure 
benefits that exceed disclosure costs, such as lower capital or debt cost. Sengupta (1998) 
suggested that underwriters and bondholders consider a firm's disclosure policy when 
determining the risk premium they should apply to interest rates on a firm's debt 
instruments. This means outside investors can then rely on the information provided by 
the company to make their decisions. Thus; 
 
Hypothesis 8b: Voluntary disclosures as a signal of accountability has a positively 
significant relationship with investment decision making. 
 
Lastly, accounting research provides evidence that investors rely on corporate disclosure 
revealed by managers (Sletten, 2012). For example, Chiang (2005) found a positive 
association between voluntary disclosure of corporate governance information and the 
ability to raise equity capital. Another interesting finding by Chiang (2005) is that the 
more transparent disclosures, the better the operating performance of the firm. Similarly, 
researchers document that timely, comprehensive and transparent disclosure on some 
fundamental issues will improve the quality of corporate governance in Nigeria. Many 
of these issues relate to voluntary disclosures. Thus; 
 
Hypothesis 8c: Voluntary information as a signal of performance has a positively 
significant relationship with investment decision making. 
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4.10 Accountability Mechanism Driver 4: Board evaluation and 
features of board evaluation. 
Board evaluations are a way to assess board performance (Ingley & van der Walt, 2002; 
2005; Leblanc, 2005; Leblanc & Schwartz, 2007; Long, 2006; Minichilli et al., 2007; 
Gabrielsson & Huse, 2004; Kiel & Nicholson, 2005). Evaluation helps prevent potential 
governance failures (Kiel & Nicholson, 2005). Hence, when an evaluation is done 
transparently, it can lead to the creation of value for boards (Rasmussen, 2015) and 
improves many aspects of board functions including accountability, decision making, 
communication and general teamwork (Kiel & Nicholson, 2005). More so, transparent 
board evaluations can draw the attention of stakeholders to responsibility levels of board 
members (Kiel & Nicholson, 2005; Vandebeek et al., 2016). However, in Nigeria, the 
abridged version of the board evaluation report is what is presented in annual reports 
while the full reports are kept for only internal management consumption. As external 
stakeholder, investment analysts will review board evaluations and the transparency of 
such reports will be positively linked to the trustworthiness of the firm. This abridged 
version is likely to be frowned upon by investment analysts leading them to distrust the 
transparency of the abridged reports. Thus; 
 
Hypothesis 9a: Perception of non-transparency of evaluation report has a negatively 
significant relationship with investment decision making. 
 
Secondly, according to Cadbury (1999), boards of directors are the bridge between the 
shareholders and the management of the firm. However, recent scandals have put the 
spotlight on the board of directors, and as a result, boards of directors have faced much 
criticism. For example, Drucker (1974) described boards as follows: "...the board of 
directors is an impotent ceremonial and legal fiction . . ." While Lorsch & MacIver 
(1989), in studying American boards, concluded that too many acted more like pawns of 
their CEO rather than the potentates the law intended them to be. 
 
Therefore, there is intense scrutiny on boards of directors by institutional investors and 
other market parties. In some circumstances, major institutional investors have put 
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pressure on incompetent directors and have been demanding enhanced disclosure of 
board practices (Van Den Berghe & Levrau, 2004). This level of scrutiny suggests that 
investment analysts consider evaluation reports to be essential for assessing monitoring 
oversights of directors. Thus; 
 
Hypothesis 9b: Necessity of evaluation report has a positively significant relationship 
with investment decision making. 
 
Thirdly, board evaluations have been considered in corporate governance discussion for 
a while even though few studies (with the notable exception of Rasmussen (2015)), have 
tried to study the effectiveness of evaluations. Following corporate failures, many 
suggestions have been made about how to improve the governance of firms in order to 
rebuild trust. In Nigeria, the CBN code of 2014 stipulates that boards should be evaluated 
by an outside consultant. This results in box-ticking exercise by the banks in Nigeria as 
all directors are rated as performing well (Adegbite, 2015). Some researchers such as 
Carey (1993), Bassett (1998) and Adegbite (2015) have suggested that self-evaluation of 
directors is the preferred alternative. Nevertheless, in developing countries, the 
information contained in evaluation reports will be used by investment analysts in 
arriving at investment decisions. Thus; 
 
Hypothesis 9c: Information contained in the evaluation report has a positively significant 
relationship with investment decision making. 
 
Lastly, board evaluations can draw the attention of stakeholders to responsibility levels 
of board members (Kiel & Nicholson, 2005; Vandebeek et al., 2016).  Hence, board 
evaluations can be viewed as a system that allows board members to address potential 
shortcomings for effective team functioning.  Moreover, such evaluations may contribute 
to the formation of a collective team identity (Van Der Vegt & Bunderson, 2005; 
Edmondson et al., 2007; Homan et al., 2008; Bezrukova et al., 2009), through discussing 
organizational goals (Nederveen Pieterse et al., 2013) and shared objectives (van 
Knippenberg et al., 2011). 
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Board members may also be evaluated on the basis of them meeting their assigned targets 
and responsibilities to the firm.  Hence, board effectiveness can be determined by a 
thorough board evaluation. Evaluation also helps in determining if board members are 
acting in the best interests of the firm and promoting the highest standards of corporate 
governance (Governance Professionals of Canada, 2016). Therefore, since corporate 
governance is about doing the right things and doing the things right, investment analysts 
will positively associate the performance of directors with evaluations of such directors. 
Thus; 
 
Hypothesis 9d: Evaluation report as an indication of director performance has a 
positively significant relationship with investment decision making. 
 
4.11 Conclusion 
This chapter drew on the extant literature reviewed in chapter three and the thesis theories 
(stakeholder, signalling and social cognition theories) discussed in chapter two to 
develop hypotheses for features of the nine drivers of good corporate governance 
identified in the literature (Filatotchev et al., 2007; Adegbite, 2015) and investment 
decision making of investment analysts.  The features were grouped into 1. Board 
Composition and Structure Mechanism, 2. External Ownership Mechanism and 3. 
Accountability Mechanism.  
 
Board Composition and Structure Mechanism is composed of three drivers 1. Board 
Independence 2. Board Heterogeneity 3. Board (Director’s) Reputation. For Board 
Independence, four features were identified from the literature and developed into 
hypotheses. For Board Heterogeneity, five features were identified from the literature 
and developed into hypotheses. For Board Reputation, six features were identified from 
the literature and developed into hypotheses.  
 
External Ownership Mechanism is composed of two drivers. 1. Foreign (Institutional) 
Investors and 2. Effective Shareholder Activism. For Foreign (Institutional Investors and 
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Effective Shareholder Activism, three features were identified from the literature and 
developed into hypotheses for both drivers.  
 
Accountability Mechanism is composed of four drivers. 1. Voluntary Disclosure 2. 
Independent Audit Committee 3. Pay for Performance and 4. Board Accountability. For 
Voluntary Disclosure, Independent Audit Committee, Pay for Performance, and Board 
Accountability, three, two, three and four features were identified respectively from the 
literature and developed into hypothesis. 
 
In order to effectively address the identified gaps in research, it is important that an 
appropriate methodology for undertaking the study be identified and implemented such 
that it maximizes the researcher's potential to undertake the study (Holden & Lynch, 
2004). Thus, the next chapter discusses the methodology of the study which is used in 
this research and the reasons behind its adoption. Furthermore, the tools and techniques 
employed are also discussed. 
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Chapter Five: Methodology 
5.1 Introduction   
A major cornerstone of this research is the research of Adegbite (2015) which identified 
nine firm level antecedents of good corporate governance of Nigerian firms, a study 
which was carried using qualitative methods. As stated in chapter one, this research 
sought to obtain the perspectives of investment analysts as regards their perception of 
features of good corporate governance drivers in a specialized regulated industry 
(banking sector) and how these features affect investment decision-making.  
To explore and understand the main issues revealed by this current study, a range of 
methods were used to explore what we know and how we know what we know (Goles 
& Hirschheim, 2000). The empirical analysis was done through primary data obtained 
via a mixed method. Saunders et al. (2007) define mixed-methods as using both 
quantitative and qualitative data in one study at the same time (parallel) or one after the 
other (sequential). This type of research has been welcomed because it achieves 
integration through analyzing quantitative and qualitative data (Cassell et al., 2005; Boyd 
et al., 2012; Johl et al., 2012). Furthermore, Creswell & Clark (2011) suggest reasons for 
choosing mixed-methods as a research methodology. They explain that a mixed-methods 
approach helps overcome the deficiencies in a study if only a quantitative or qualitative 
approach is used. For example, quantitative research is less likely to answer ‘why' a social 
phenomenon happens. 
Moreover, a quantitative approach does not provide a detailed interpretation of the 
obtained results (Cohen et al., 2002). Morgan & Smircich (1980) and Johl et al. (2012) 
argue that a qualitative approach alone provides less reliable and less credible findings. 
Thus, a mixed-methods design provides in-depth explanation and understanding of 
phenomena (Johl et al., 2012; Bryman, 2012). This approach, which is consistent with 
prior approaches in related studies (e.g., Albasam, 2014) advances the methodological 
breadth and depth of corporate governance research in Nigeria.  
The chapter is organized broadly into Part A, B and C. Part A covers research philosophy, 
paradigm, approach, and design. Part B covers the quantitative methodology, model 
specification, model instrument, variables measurements, quantitative survey, and 
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administration. Part C covers the qualitative methodology, an overview of the qualitative 
methodology, interview design, data collection, ethical issues, and data analysis. 
 
5.2 Part A. 
5.2.1 Research Philosophy - Ontology and Epistemology  
The research process includes five layers named the research process 'onion.' The first 
layer is the research philosophy. Second, the research approach layer. Third, is the 
research strategy layer. Fourth layer referred to the research time horizons. The fifth 
layer, data collection methods. Each layer includes a different set of choices that the 
researcher is required to choose to imply his/her research (Saunders et al., 2003). Just as 
social science emphasizes four assumptions of ontology, human nature, epistemology 
and methodology (Burrell & Morgan, 1979). These assumptions have their philosophical 
underpinnings in either objectivism or subjectivism. 
 
Figure 5. 1 A scheme for analysing assumptions about the nature of social science 
  
Source: Burrell & Morgan (1979 p.3). Burrell, G., & Morgan, G. (1979). Sociological Paradigms and Organizational Analysis. 
Heinemann: London. 
   
133 
 
 
 
Ontological expectations/conventions are concerned with what we believe constitutes 
‘social reality' (Blaikie, 2000, p. 8). The researcher’s ontological perspective takes into 
consideration issues such as whether ‘the world exists independently of the researcher’s 
perceptions of it’ (Greener, 2011, p.6) or subjective and multiple, as seen by participants 
(Collins & Hussey, 2009). The quantitative part of this research was conducted within 
the framework of the principles and assumptions of science. These assumptions, as 
Cohen et al., (2002) noted, are “determinism, empiricism, parsimony, and generality.”  
While the qualitative part of this research was anti-positivism.  
"Objectivism ontology adheres to the view that only "factual" knowledge gained through 
observation (the senses), including measurement, is trustworthy. Objectivist thinkers 
adopt a scientific method as a means of knowledge generation. According to Bryman, 
(2004, p. 16-18), "objectivism is an ontological stance which argues that social 
phenomena and their meanings have presences which are independent of social actors 
and implies that the social phenomena and categories that are frequently in discourse 
have an existence which are independent or separate from actors. Subjectivism on the 
other hand assumes that events and happenings are not independent occurrences and 
social environment interaction plays a role.” Going further, Saunders et al. (2007) posit 
that social phenomena are created from perceptions and actions of social actors. 
According to Gray (2004), ontology focuses on ‘what is' while epistemology focuses ‘on 
what it means to know.' Epistemology is representative of `the possible ways of gaining 
knowledge of social reality, whatever it is understood to be. In short, claims about how 
what is assumed to exist can be known' (Blaikie, 2000, p. 8). It is the theory of method 
or basis for knowledge (Marsh & Stoker, 2002). Epistemology is typically either 
positivism or interpretivism. 
5.2.1.1 Positivism 
As epistemology is interested in what we deem to be knowledge from researcher and 
what is being researched (Hussey & Hussey 1997), the quantitative study part of this 
study will help bring to fore the perception of investment analysts about the drivers of 
corporate governance as projected by actors in the banking sector in Nigeria. Hence, the 
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positivist part of the study will establish through quantitative means, which will be 
independent of the researcher (Hussey & Hussey, 1997), the important features of drivers 
of good corporate governance in the banking sector. The philosophy behind this positivist 
view is that a cause and effect relationship exists in the universe (Aguinis & Glavas, 
2012; Baker & Quéré, 2014; Bitektine & Miller, 2015). This view portends that nothing 
happens by chance as there reasons for every occurrence (Bitektine & Miller, 2015). 
 
Positivism refers to “working with observable social reality and that the end product of 
such research can be law-like generalizations similar to those produced by the physical 
and natural scientists” (Remenyi et al., 1998, p. 32). In positivism epistemology, the role 
of the researcher is objective and concerns only data collection and interpretation with 
the research findings observable and quantifiable. The main aim of the theory is to create 
testable hypotheses (Bryman & Bell, 2003). This will entail a detailed methodology, 
which can be replicated (Gill & Johnson, 2002). Positivism also supposes the researcher 
is independent of his research and unbiased (Hussey & Hussey, 1997). 
 
It should be noted that positivism as an epistemology is associated with some 
disadvantages such as experience being relied on as a valid source of knowledge. This is 
in spite of the fact that, a range of basic and important concepts such as time, cause and 
space are not experience based. Further, positivism assumes that all types of processes 
can be regarded as a variation of relationships between individuals or actions of 
individuals. Also, adoption of positivism in business and management studies can be 
criticized for reliance on the status quo. In other words, research findings in positivism 
studies are only descriptive; thus they lack insight into in-depth issues (Albassam, 2014). 
To overcome some of the shortcomings of the positivism, this research also recognized 
the interpretivist epistemology. 
5.2.1.2 Interpretivism 
Interpretivism refers to `the details of the situation to understand the reality or perhaps a 
reality working behind them' (Remenyi et al., 1998, p. 35). Interpretivist epistemology 
indicates that researchers have to adopt `empathetic stance,' which is considered to be a 
challenging task to enter the social world of the research subjects and understand their 
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world from their point of view. This epistemological position claims generalization is not 
important (Saunders et al., 2007). 
 
Interpretivism is based on the principles of idealism and social reality not being objective. 
Rather, the interpretation of social phenomena is highly subjective and shaped by 
individuals' perceptions and beliefs (Morgan & Smircich, 1980; Collis & Hussey, 2009).  
Morgan & Smircich (1980) and Collis & Hussey (2009) posit that interpretivism 
developed as a result of the inability of positivism to meet certain needs of social 
scientists. They identified criticisms of the positivist paradigm, which brought about 
interpretive paradigm ideas such as (i) impossibility to separate people from the social 
contexts; (ii) to understand people their perceptions of their activities have to be 
examined; (iii) results and important findings can be ignored in a highly structured 
research design; (iv) research is part of what researchers observe and not necessarily 
objective; and (v) understanding complex phenomena using a single measure can be 
misleading. For example, positivism cannot measure perceptions and beliefs necessary 
depths while the interpretive paradigm is more innovative in opening up the social world. 
  
While positivists measure social phenomena, interpretivism explores the complexity of 
social phenomena to develop an understanding (Bryman, 2012). According to Creswell 
& Clark (2011), interpretivism paradigm explores, explains and develops an 
understanding to clarify or illustrate the meaning of terms. This is different from the 
quantitative measures of phenomena that occur logically (scientifically) in the social 
world. As the interpretive paradigm is usually associated with the qualitative approach, 
this study uses semi-structured interviews in addition to the statistical analysis of 
quantitative data.  
 
The semi-structured interviews are useful in filling the gaps of the quantitative analysis 
of data, comparing and supporting the results from two methods (Saunders et al., 2007), 
and helping develop a deep understanding of the empirical results (Saunders et al., 2007; 
Boyd et al., 2012). 
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5.2.2 Research Paradigm 
The paradigm is a good way of understanding and explaining social phenomena based 
on ontological and epistemology positions (Saunders et al., 2003; 2007). Corbetta & 
Patrick (2003) in pointing out the importance of paradigm, posit that scientific research 
that is done without paradigm lacks orientation and criteria for selection, such that all 
issues, methods, and techniques are equally legitimate. Likewise, Bryman (2004, p.2012) 
confirms that paradigm means how a study should be conducted and how its results 
should be interpreted. 
 
Table 5. 1 Approaches within the two main paradigms  
Panel A: Common terms used to describe the paradigms   
Positivism  Interpretivism  
Quantitative  Qualitative  
Objective  Subjective  
Scientific  Humanist  
Traditionalist  Phenomenological  
 
Panel B: Features of the paradigms  
Positivism  Interpretivism  
Large sample is involved  Used with small samples   
Concerned with hypothesis 
testing  
Helpful in generating theories  
Produces precise, objective 
and quantitative data  
Produces ‘rich’ subjective and qualitative data   
Produces results with high 
reliability but low validity  
Produces findings with low reliability but high validity  
Allows results to be 
generalized from the 
sample to the population 
All findings can be generalized from one setting to another setting 
Source: Collis and Hussey (2009, pp.58, 62). Business Research A Practical Guide for Undergraduate 
& Postgraduate Students. 3rd Edition. Palgrave Publishers, London, UK. 
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Table 5. 2 Positivism and interpretivism paradigm assumptions  
Assumption  Concept  Positivism  Interpretivism  
Ontological   The nature of 
reality.  
Reality is objective and 
singular, separate from 
the researcher.  
 
Reality is subjective and 
multiple, as seen by participants.  
Epistemological  The 
relationship 
of the 
researcher to 
that being 
researched. 
   
Researcher is independent 
from that being researched.  
Researcher interacts with that 
being researched.  
Axiological  The role of 
values.  
Research is value-free and 
unbiased.  
Researcher acknowledges that 
research is value-laden and 
biases are present.  
Rhetorical  The language 
of research.  
Researcher writes in a 
formal style and uses the 
passive voice, accepted 
quantitative words and set 
definitions.   
  
Researcher writes in an informal 
style and uses the personal voice, 
accepted qualitative terms and 
limited definitions.   
  
Methodological  
  
The process of 
research.  
Deductive process  
Study of cause and 
effect with static 
design (categories are 
isolated beforehand) 
Research is context-
free Generalisations 
leading to prediction, 
explanation, and 
understanding 
Results are accurate and 
reliable through validity 
and reliability.  
Inductive process  
Study of mutual simultaneous 
shaping of factors with emerging 
design (categories identified 
during the research process) 
Research is context-bound 
Patterns and/or theories are 
developed for understanding 
Findings are accurate and 
reliable through verification. 
  
Source: Creswell (1994, p.5) Research Design: Quantitative and Qualitative Approaches. 1st Edition, 
SAGE Publications, London, UK and Collis & Hussey (2009, p.58). Business Research A Practical 
Guide for Undergraduate & Postgraduate Students. 3rd Edition. Palgrave Publishers, London, UK. 
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Panel A of Table 5.1 shows common terms of these two paradigms. Panel B presents a 
summary of the features of each paradigm, including sample size, hypotheses, theories, 
data, reliability, validity, and generalisability of data. 
4.2.3 Research Approach 
Approach for research can either be deductive or inductive (Saunders et al., 2003) or can 
be mixed. Dominant in science research is the deductive approach where “laws provide 
the basis of explanation, permit the anticipation of phenomena, predict their occurrence 
and therefore allow them to be controlled” (Hussey & Hussey, 1997, p. 52). 
Consequently, Robson (2002) lists five sequential stages through which deductive 
research will progress: 
 
1. Deducing a hypothesis from the theory (hypothesis is a testable proposition about the 
relationship between two or more events or concepts);  
2. Indicating how the variables will measure the proposed relationship between two 
specific variables; 
3. Testing this operational hypothesis (this will involve an experiment or some other form 
of empirical inquiry); 
4. 4. Examining specific outcomes of an inquiry (confirms or modifies the theory); 
5. If necessary, modifying the theory in light of the findings. 
 
Deductive research aims to explain causal relationship between variables leading to the 
hypothesis development. Consequently, it is required to collect quantitative data, or 
sometimes even qualitative data, to test the developed hypothesis using a highly 
structured methodology to facilitate replication of the findings (Gill & Johnson, 2002). 
 
The inductive approach begins with the observations while theories are proposed towards 
the end of the research process consequent upon observations (Goddard & Melville, 
2004). Inductive research "involves the search for pattern from observation and the 
development of explanations – theories – for those patterns through series of hypotheses" 
(Bernard, 2011, p.7). The researcher can alter the direction of the study as no theories or 
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hypotheses applies at the beginning of the research. Therefore, theory follows the 
research data rather than vice versa (Saunders et al., 2003). 
 
This current study draws upon stakeholder-agency theory which considers investment 
analysts perspective on agentic issues (Hill & Jones, 1992), signalling theory (Spence, 
1973) which helps to bridge information asymmetry gaps and reveals signals from agents 
to principals, and social cognition theory (Bandura, 1986) which helps analyse decision 
making/perceptions of social actors. The first part of this research benefits from an 
objective ontology hence a positivist approach to that portion of the study. The 
independent nature of the first part of the study will clearly distinguish it as a scientific 
research as there would be minimal interaction with my research participants (Wilson, 
2010). In other words, the first part of the research is based purely on facts as indicated 
by the responses obtainable from participants thereby making research consider the 
world to be external and objective.  
 
The positivist part of the research will consider the perspectives of investment analysts 
on drivers of good corporate governance in banks in Nigeria. The identified features of 
each governance driver will be tested to know how they influence investment analysts' 
decision-making. For this part of the study, the philosophical assumptions of positivism 
are assumed; hence, a nomothetic methodology would be suitable which means that it 
set out to establish law-like generalizations (Gill & Johnson, 1991). This will be the case 
with this research as the respondents will have questionnaires distributed to them and 
these questionnaires will be analyzed for emergent patterns and results 
interpreted.Variables (independent and dependent) are utilized during quantitative 
research as the research primarily concerned with the relationships between them to 
establish the causal structure of the variables. The objective ontology where the 
researcher is objective and separate from data (Gaffikin, 2005) means variables are a 
representation of the real world and can objectively determine the established causal 
relationship where the outcome can be generalized to other (similar) situations (set of 
variables). 
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The survey technique is appropriate to this type of quantitative research and usually 
associated with the deductive approach (Saunders et al., 2003). Surveys give a picture of 
what many people think or report doing and are often used in descriptive or explanatory 
research (Neuman, 1997). The survey technique facilitates the research of the `what' 
question in the form of `how many' or `how much' (Yin, 2003). Surveys permit the 
collection of a large volume of data from a sizable population economically and give the 
researcher more control over the research process (Saunders et al., 2003). 
 
As a result, the first part of this research adopted an objectivism ontology and positivist 
epistemological position. This part of the research used a deductive methodological 
approach because it fits with testing the employed theory by setting a set of research 
hypotheses. Consequently, the first part of the research employed quantitative research 
to be appropriate with the objectivist ontological position to examine the set of developed 
hypotheses. 
 
However, although the first part of the research was conducted with an objective 
ontology and positivist epistemology, the second part required a qualitative approach. In 
contrast to the positivism, interpretivism or anti-positivism limits the distance between 
the researcher and that being researched (Collis & Hussey, 2009). Thus, qualitative is 
different from quantitative research as it allows for closer interaction with human beings 
in the social context, or observing social phenomena over a long period. In this study, it 
was necessary to understand why certain features of good corporate governance drivers 
led to investment decision making while others did not.  Therefore, the interpretivist 
paradigm suggests semi-structured interviews to develop a researcher's interaction with 
interviewees. 
5.2.3  The Research Design  
The mixed-methods (quantitative and qualitative) research is discussed in this section in 
accordance with the research questions. Therefore, this section provides reasonings on 
why mixed-methods approach was chosen.   
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5.2.3.1 Mixed-Methods Research Design  
This study employed the mixed methodology. According to Saunders et al. (2007), 
mixed-methods use both quantitative and qualitative data parallel or sequentially in one 
study at the same. This type of research achieves integration through analyzing 
quantitative and qualitative data (Cassell et al., 2005; Johl et al., 2012; Boyd et al., 2012; 
Albassam, 2014). As a result, the importance of mixed-methods research has grown 
during the past twenty years (Molina-Azorin, 2012; Albassam, 2014). 
 
Creswell & Clark (2011) explain that if a quantitative or qualitative approach is used in 
a study, the mixed-methods approach helps overcome the study deficiencies. This is 
because a quantitative study by itself unlikely to answer ‘why' a social phenomenon 
happens. Moreover, a quantitative approach does not provide a detailed interpretation of 
the obtained results (Cohen et al., 2002). On the other hand, Morgan & Smircich (1980) 
and Johl et al. (2012) argue that a qualitative approach by itself provides less credible 
and reliable findings. Thus, a mixed-methods design provides in-depth understanding 
and explanation of phenomena (Johl et al., 2012; Bryman, 2012; Albassam, 2014). 
 
Recently, due to increased attention given to the behavior of individuals and firms 
(Clarke, 1998), management studies have focussed more closely on mixed-methods 
designs (Albassam, 2104). It is generally agreed that mixed methods designs produce 
more reliable and credible findings than when only one single method is used in a study 
(Boyd et al., 2012; Molina-Azorin, 2012). Therefore, the mixed-methods design in this 
study makes a valuable contribution to corporate governance literature and studies (e.g., 
Mengoli et al., 2009; Johl et al., 2012; Molina-Azorin, 2012; McNulty et al., 2013; 
Zattoni et al., 2013) on developing countries.  The mixed method further helped to 
provide a flexible relationship with the respondents, encouraging a great depth and 
richness of context (Aaker et al., 2001). It thus offered a better understanding of the 
subject matter as they relied on understanding processes, behaviors, and conditions 
(Flick, 1992; Wang, 2006; Van Maanen, 1979). 
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The use of the mixed method enables this study to triangulate the quantitative and 
qualitative findings thereby encouraging a great depth and richness of context (Aaker et 
al., 2001).  
5.2.3.2 Principles for Designing Mixed-Methods Research  
According to Creswell & Clark (2011), there are key principles for designing mixed-
methods research. First, the level of interaction between the quantitative and qualitative 
methods is an important principle. There are two levels of interaction: (i) the independent 
level; and (ii) the interactive level. The independent level relies on separating the 
quantitative and qualitative research questions and the processes of data collection and 
data analysis. The independent approach mixes the two methods in the study’s 
conclusion. The interactive approach happens at different stages during the study, usually 
before the final interpretation of the results. Thus, one research method depends on the 
other, or follows the other, during the data collection and analysis processes.   
 
Second, the researcher must ensure that the methods used are appropriate for answering 
the research questions of the study (Morgan, 1998). The researcher needs to determine 
explicitly which method is more important (Greene et al., 1989; Morgan, 1998). Creswell 
& Clark (2011) suggest three possible options to weight mixed-methods designs: equal 
priority, quantitative priority, and qualitative priority. Third, the timescale of the research 
is another key principle. Timing within the mixed-methods design can be in one of three 
forms: concurrent, sequential or a multiphase combination. 
The current study initially focuses on the quantitative method because of the nature of 
the research problem and questions. This approach is desirable in examining what 
features in good corporate governance drivers influence investment decision making. 
This study employs the two methods (quantitative and qualitative) interactively 
(Creswell & Clark, 2011) such that the quantitative study was conducted first, then the 
findings from the quantitative study were used to develop semi-structured questions for 
the qualitative study. In doing so, the study uses sequential timing by collecting and 
analyzing quantitative data first. 
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The importance of mixed-methods design was fundamental in designing the framework 
for this study. Creswell & Clark (2011) point out that there are four main mixed-methods 
designs: (i) the convergent parallel design; (ii) the explanatory sequential design; (iii) the 
exploratory sequential design and (iv) the embedded design. 
 
Figure 5. 2 Prototypical versions of the four major research designs  
 
(a) The convergent parallel design  
 
(b) The explanatory sequential design  
 
(c) The exploratory sequential design  
 
(d) The embedded design  
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Source: Creswell & Clark (2011, p.69). Designing and Conducting Mixed Methods Research, 2nd 
Edition. SAGE Publications, London, UK. 
 
First, the convergent parallel design relies on conducting quantitative and qualitative 
methods simultaneously (see Figure 5.2.a). In this design, the researcher processes the 
methods equally and keeps them independent throughout data analysis, and then mixes 
the results to interpret them overall. Second, the explanatory sequential design depends 
on two distinct interaction phases (see Figure 5.2.b). Researchers use sequential timing, 
starting with the quantitative design, to collect and analyze data. Then, the qualitative 
method follows the empirical results to interpret the initial findings; for example, if a 
researcher conducts interviews to gain in-depth insights from quantitative results (e.g., 
Johl et al., 2012; Haniffa & Hudaib, 2007).  Third, the exploratory sequential design is 
the opposite of the explanatory sequential design. It starts with qualitative data in the first 
phase (see Figure 5.2.c). Fourth, the embedded design occurs when the researcher 
collects and analyses quantitative and qualitative data within a traditional quantitative or 
qualitative design (see Figure 5.2.d). For example, the researcher may add a quantitative 
method to a qualitative one, such as a case study, or add a qualitative method within a 
quantitative one, such as an experiment.  
 
The explanatory sequential design is considered the most straightforward mixed methods 
design (Creswell & Clark, 2011). This study employs the explanatory sequential design. 
In the current study, the first phase started with the quantitative method, through 
collecting and analyzing quantitative data. In the second phase, some of the quantitative 
findings needed additional explanation (see Mengoli et al., 2009; Johl et al., 2012). 
( before, during or after )  
Quantitative (or Qualitative) Data  
Collection and Analysis   
  
  
  Quantitative (or Qualitative) 
Data Collection and Analysis 
Before, During, or After 
   
Interpretation   
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Therefore, these results were used to develop the qualitative method. More precisely, the 
quantitative results were used to develop some of the qualitative research questions, 
interview process, and data collection procedures. 
 
The rationale for using this design (two sequential stages) is summarised as follows. 
First, the qualitative method (interviews) provides additional analysis to explore the 
reasons why certain features are considered important for investment decision making 
and others are not. Second, it seeks to increase the robustness of the empirical findings 
(Mengoli et al., 2009). Third, the qualitative method enabled the researcher to understand 
the thought process of investment analysts operating in a weak institutional environment. 
Mixed-methods research poses some challenges (Bryman, 2007; Johl et al., 2012). 
Indeed, according to Creswell & Clark (2011), mixed methods may not be able to 
overcome all research problems. Moreover, using solely quantitative or qualitative 
methods does not necessarily diminish the value of a study.  The next section identifies 
some challenges of using the mixed method. 
5.2.3.3 The Challenges of Using Mixed-Methods Research  
This section addresses the challenges of using mixed-methods research. These challenges 
are: (i) the absence of an agreed philosophical framework (ii) achieving integration 
between the quantitative and qualitative methods and (iii) issues related to practical 
considerations. 
 
Molina-Azorin (2012) indicates that mixed-methods design is relatively new compared 
to using a single method in research. Hence, there is no agreed philosophical framework 
for mixed-methods research designs and mixed-methods as a research paradigm (Smith 
& Heshusius, 1986; Morgan, 1998).  However, Bryman (2004, p.453) posits that the 
"quantitative and qualitative approaches as paradigms are not inextricable, but 
intertwined in terms of epistemological assumptions, values, and methods." Even if prior 
literature has mostly ignored the mixed method paradigm (Morgan, 1998). Creswell & 
Clark (2011, p.15) suggest that "one way to help convince others of the utility of mixed-
methods is to locate exemplary mixed-methods studies in the literature on a topic or in a 
content area and share studies to educate others." Thus, this research using the Nigerian 
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banking sector for context provides insightful knowledge on corporate governance 
drivers in developing countries different from the usual Anglo-Saxon themed studies. 
 
The second challenge is to achieve integration between quantitative and qualitative 
research. Bryman (2007) suggests that the development of mixed-methods studies 
collides with the inability of researchers to integrate the findings of quantitative and 
qualitative results. Greene et al. (1989) examine this problem by reviewing 57 mixed-
method studies to examine the level of integration between quantitative and qualitative 
approaches. Their findings indicate that 44% of the studies achieved no integration 
between the two methods. However, 32% featured integration when they interpreted the 
findings, while only five studies (about 9%) achieved integration during the analysis and 
interpretation.  Bryman (2007) indicates two reasons for this lack of integration. First, 
the integration of quantitative and qualitative findings may not always be intended. For 
instance, when researchers use mixed-methods, each approach is designed in isolation 
from the other, and integration may not be the priority of the researcher. Second, there 
are gaps in the literature in terms of analysis and interpretation of mixed-methods 
research (Cassell et al., 2005; Bryman, 2007).  
 
The other challenge involves practical considerations in conducting mixed-methods 
research. Creswell & Clark (2011) point out a number of important issues that should be 
taken into account before conducting such research. For example, mixed-methods 
research demands certain skills, time and resources for extensive data collection and 
analysis. Hence, according to Creswell & Clark (2011), mixed-methods design is only a 
realistic approach if researchers have the requisite skills. Therefore, researchers must 
have an in-depth understanding of quantitative and qualitative approaches separately 
before designing mixed-methods research (Morgan, 1998). 
 
Also, researchers should develop an understanding of data collection and analysis 
techniques for each method. More specifically, Collis & Hussey (2009) indicate that 
researchers using quantitative methods should be aware of the logic of hypothesis testing 
and should have the ability to perform statistical analysis. In addition, they should be 
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familiar with important issues such as reliability and validity. Similarly, there are certain 
skills required to conduct qualitative data collection and data analysis. For example, 
researchers should be familiar with the process of conducting semi-structured interviews 
(Molina-Azorin, 2012). In addition, other skills, such as coding qualitative data and 
developing terms and descriptions based on these codes, are also necessary.  
 
Nevertheless, these skills alone are not sufficient to conduct mixed-methods research. It 
is necessary to ensure that mixed-methods research can be done within the specific 
timeframe of the research (Creswell & Clark, 2011). Also, it is argued that mixed-
methods data collection is demanding in terms of time and effort, which is a limitation 
of this approach. Data collection takes time because different data are used in the 
different approaches (Morgan, 1998). Furthermore, the cost of data collection is another 
important issue, where mixed-methods may entail a greater cost than a single method 
(Creswell, 2009). For example, an interviewer may need to travel to conduct interviews, 
which may be financially costly. In contrast, the researcher may obtain quantitative data 
directly from websites or surveys at a lower cost. These are the important issues to 
consider before choosing a mixed-methods approach.    
Next section discusses the part B of the chapter (quantitative method). 
 
5.3 Part B Quantitative Method 
5.3.1 Introduction of Quantitative Method 
Leaning on the stakeholder- agency, signaling and social cognition theories, the 
overwhelming emphasis of this research is on the efficacy of the various corporate 
governance mechanism drivers in spurring investment decisions by investment analysts. 
The stakeholder-agency theory encapsulates the corporate governance problem relating 
to the fact that the corporate governance mechanism driver's signals provide assurance 
that managers remain both honest and dynamic over time (Dore, 2005). 
 
In this study, ‘good' corporate governance is undertaken within the Nigerian societal 
perspective. Within this Nigerian perspective, the notion of ‘good' corporate governance 
is seen as involving both the creation of wealth as well as minimization of risks to all 
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stakeholders (Page, 2005; Filatotchev & Wright, 2005).  While corporate governance 
operates at the firm level, its effectiveness also has social prerequisites (Filatotchev et 
al., 2007). Therefore, this research attempts to extend our understanding of ‘good' 
corporate governance issues beyond the narrow confines of regulatory conformity and 
instead embraces the perspective of investment analysts who are increasingly more 
important in the economy. 
 
This perspective also suggests examining the effectiveness of corporate governance 
drivers in Nigeria in a holistic fashion. Even though in the banking sector, these drivers 
are addressed by regulation, the study evaluates to what extent the corporate governance 
mechanism drivers are effective in investment decision making of investors. This 
research relied on corporate governance mechanism drivers of good corporate 
governance in Nigeria as identified by Adegbite (2015) supported by other studies such 
as Filatotchev et al. (2007). The corporate governance mechanism drivers of good 
corporate governance are also represented in the 2014 code of corporate governance of 
the Central Bank of Nigeria. The identified drivers were used to develop a survey 
questionnaire that included "families" of the corporate governance mechanism drivers. 
Each "family" comprised a number of specific, observable and measurable 
operationalizations of a particular driver, and the respondents were invited to score each 
feature on a 5-point Likert scale, with 1 = strongly agree, and 5 = strongly disagree. 
5.3.2 Model Specification 
This section presents the nine models with which the hypotheses of this study were tested. 
 
Model 1: Board Independence Induced Propensity To Make Favourable Investment 
Decision = β0 - β1(BI1) + β2(BI2) + β3((BI3) + β4(BI4) + β5(BI5) + β6(Gen) + β7(BG) 
+ β8(AGE) + β9(IA) + β10(TNY) + β11(FS) + εi 
 
where Board Independence Induced Propensity to Make Favourable Investment Decision  
= estimated dependent variable score, β0 = constant/cuts, β = regression coefficients, and 
Board Independence predictors (BI1-5) = independent variables, Gender (GEN), 
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Background (BG), AGE, International affiliation (IA), Experience (TNY)  and Firm Size 
(FS) are control variables. εi is the individual firm effect. 
 
Model 2: Board Diversity Induced Propensity To Make Favourable Investment Decision 
= β0 + β1(BD1) + β2(BD2) + β3((BD3) + β4(BD4) + β5(BD5) + β6(Gen) + β7(BG) - 
β8(AGE) - β9(IA) - β10(FS) - β11(TNY) + εi 
 
where Board Diversity Induced Propensity to Make Favourable Investment Decision  = 
estimated dependent variable score, β0 = constant/cuts, β = regression coefficients, and 
Board Diversity predictors (BD1-5)= independent variables, Gender (GEN), Background 
(BG), AGE, International affiliation (IA), Experience (TNY)  and Firm Size (FS) are 
control variables. εi is the individual firm effect. 
 
Model 3: Board Reputation Induced Propensity To Make Favourable Investment 
Decision = β0 + β1(BR1) + β2(BR2) + β3((BR3) + β4(BR4) + β5(BR5) + β6(BR6) + 
β7(Gen) + β8(BG) + β9(AGE) + β10(IA) + β11(FS) + β12(TNY)  + εi 
 
where Board Reputation Induced Propensity to Make Favourable Investment Decision  
= estimated dependent variable score, β0 = constant/cuts, β = regression coefficients, and 
Board Reputation predictors (BR1-6) = independent variables, Gender (GEN), 
Background (BG), AGE, International affiliation (IA), Experience (TNY)  and Firm Size 
(FS) are control variables. εi is the individual firm effect. 
 
Model 4: Foreign Institutional Investors On a Board Induced Propensity To Make 
Favourable Investment Decision = β0 + β1(FI1) + β2((FI2) + β3(FI3) +  β4(Gen) + 
β5(BG) + β6(AGE) + β7(IA) + β8(FS) + β9(TNY) + εi 
 
where Foreign Institutional Investors On a Board Induced Propensity to Make 
Favourable Investment Decision  = estimated dependent variable score, β0 = 
constant/Cuts, β = regression coefficients, and Foreign Institutional Investor predictors 
(FI1-3) = independent variables, Gender (GEN), Background (BG), AGE, International 
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affiliation (IA), Experience (TNY) and Firm Size (FS) are control variables. εi is the 
individual firm effect. 
 
Model 5: Shareholder Activism Induced Propensity To Make Favourable Investment 
Decision = β0 + β1(SA1) + β2(SA2) + β3(SA3) + β4(Gen) + β5(BG) + β6(AGE) + 
β7(IA) + β8(FS) + β9(TNY) + εi 
 
where Shareholder Activism Induced Propensity to Make Favourable Investment 
Decision  = estimated dependent variable score, β0 = constant/Cuts, β = regression 
coefficients, and Shareholder Activism predictors (SA1-3) = independent variables, 
Gender (GEN), Background (BG), AGE, International affiliation (IA), Experience 
(TNY)  and Firm Size (FS) are control variables. εi is the individual firm effect. 
 
Model 6: Voluntary Disclosure Induced Propensity To Make Favourable Investment 
Decision = β0 + β1(VD1) + β2(VD2) + β3((VD3) + β4(Gen) + β5(BG) + β6(AGE) + 
β7(IA) + β8(FS) + β9(TNY) + εi 
 
where Full and Transparent Information Disclosure Induced Propensity to Make 
Favourable Investment Decision  = estimated dependent variable score, β0 = 
constant/cuts, β = regression coefficients, and Voluntary Disclosure predictors (VD1-3) 
= independent variables, Gender (GEN), Background (BG), AGE, International 
affiliation (IA), Experience (TNY) and Firm Size (FS) are control variables. εi is the 
individual firm effect. 
 
Model 7: Audit Committee Induced Propensity To Make Favourable Investment 
Decision = β0 + β1(AC1) - β2(AC2) + β3(Gen) + β4(BG) + β5(AGE) + β6(IA) + β7(FS) 
+ β8(TNY)  + εi 
 
where Audit Committee Induced Propensity to Make Favourable Investment Decision  = 
estimated dependent variable score, β0 = constant/cuts, β = regression coefficients, and 
Audit Committee Independence predictors (AC1-2) = independent variables, Gender 
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(GEN), Background (BG), AGE, International affiliation (IA), Experience (TNY) and 
Firm Size (FS) are control variables. εi is the individual firm effect. 
 
Model 8: Pay For Performance Induced Propensity To Make Favourable Investment 
Decision = β0 + β1(PF1) + β2(PF2) + β3((PF3) + β4(Gen) + β5(BG) + β6(AGE) + β7(IA) 
+ β8(FS) + β9(TNY)  + εi 
 
where Pay For Performance Induced Propensity to Make Favorable Investment Decision  
= estimated dependent variable score, β0 = constant/Cuts, β = regression coefficients, 
and Pay For Performance predictors (PF1-3)= independent variables, Gender (GEN), 
Background (BG), AGE, International affiliation (IA), Experience (TNY)  and Firm Size 
(FS) are control variables. εi is the individual firm effect. 
 
Model 9: Board Evaluation Induced Propensity To Make Favourable Investment 
Decision = β0 - β1(BE1) + β2(BE2) + β3((BE3) + β4(BE4) + β5(Gen) + β6(BG) + 
β7(AGE) + β8(IA) + β9(FS) + β10(TNY)  + εi 
 
where Board Evaluation Induced Propensity to Make Favourable Investment Decision  = 
estimated dependent variable score, β0 = constant/Cuts, β = regression coefficients, and 
Board Evaluation predictors (BE1-4) = independent variables, Gender (GEN), 
Background (BG), AGE, International affiliation (IA), Experience (TNY)  and Firm Size 
(FS) are control variables. εi is the individual firm effect 
5.3.3 The Model Instrument 
This model is applied to investment analysts who invest in the Nigerian banking sector 
using a predesigned questionnaire that is based on a previous study by Adegbite (2015) 
which is validated to fit the Nigerian banking context. 
5.3.3.1 Item generation: 
From existing literature (e.g., Adegbite, 2015; Filatotchev et al., 2007; MaCahery et al., 
2016; Fomburn & Shanley, 1990)),  the theoretical foundations already provides 
adequate information on constructs of corporate governance drivers, hence for the 
quantitative study, this research employed a deductive scale development process.  
   
152 
 
5.3.3.2 Item development: 
 As suggested by Hinkin (1998), the statements employed in the questionnaire were 
simple, short and in clear, unambiguous language familiar to investment analysts who 
are the respondents of the questionnaire. Importantly, items were kept consistent in all 
sections for each construct so that behavior items were not mixed up with items that 
require affective responses (Harrison & McLaughlin, 1983). Leading questions were 
avoided to eliminate bias responses.  
5.3.3.3 Content Validity Assessment:  
After generation of the questionnaire items, content validity was carried out. First, two 
professors vast in the corporate governance field reviewed the questionnaire and made 
corrections to remove questions that may be perceived as double-barrelled, repeated or 
unclear. Consequently, the researcher included definitions in all sections to remove 
ambiguity and clearly define what construct is being measured (Schriesheim et al., 1993). 
5.3.3.4 Number of items:  
As much as possible, the items in the questionnaire were kept short and simple so that 
respondents do not get bored (Schmitt & Stults, 1985). In all, 11 sections were created, 
and a total of 52 item questions were retained in the questionnaire. 
5.3.3.5 Items scaling: 
The scales of strongly agree, agree, neither agree nor disagree, disagree and strongly 
disagree as originally developed by Likert (1932), were adopted especially as the 
coefficient alpha reliability has been shown to increase in the use of 5 points (Lissitz & 
Green, 1975). 
5.3.4 Measurements of the independent variables 
The literature review chapter discussed the drivers of good corporate governance in 
depth. The features of the drivers described in the literature review will serve as the 
independent variables for this present study. The rationale for this is that the drivers are 
already established by prior literature (e.g., Filatotchev et al. 2007; Adegbite, 2015). In 
particular, Adegbite, (2015) identified these drivers as antecedents of good corporate 
governance in Nigeria.
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Table 5. 3 Independent Variables 
 
Defining Variable Definition Features of 
Defining Variable 
Measurements/Proxy 
Board Independence  A board is independent 
when it has more 
outside (non-executive) 
directors than (inside) 
executive directors 
such that conflict of 
interest is minimized. 
1.CEO Duality 
2.NEDs: EDs 
3.Independent 
Directors 
4.Dispersed Share 
Ownership 
Questionnaire technique 
by measuring the 
perceptions of the 
respondent investor 
sample on a 5-Point 
Likert scale (1 strongly 
agree -5 strongly 
disagree) 
Items developed 
following Filatotchev et 
al., 2007; Adegbite, 
2015) 
Board 
diversity/Heterogeneity 
Board diversity aims to 
cultivate a broad 
spectrum of 
demographic attributes 
and characteristics in 
the boardroom.  
1.Gender 
2.Age 
3.Tribe 
4.Tenure 
5.Multiple 
Directorship 
Questionnaire technique 
by measuring the 
perceptions of the 
respondent investor 
sample on a 5-Point 
Likert scale (1 strongly 
agree -5 strongly 
disagree).  
Items developed Pfeiffer, 
1982; Filatotchev et al., 
2007; Adegbite, 2015) 
Board (Directors’) 
Reputation 
Prestige or positive 
reputation of a board is 
the perception the 
society has of the board 
and is typically based 
on the perception of the 
positive character of 
individual members of 
the board 
 
1.Credibility 
2.Visibility 
3.Recognized 
Name 
4.Goodwill 
5.Politically 
Connected 
Questionnaire technique 
by measuring the 
perceptions of the 
respondent investor 
sample on a 5-Point 
Likert scale (1 strongly 
agree -5 strongly 
disagree).                  
Items developed 
following Fombrun & 
Shanley, 1990: 
Filatotchev et al., 2007; 
Adegbite, 2015) 
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Foreign (or Large 
institutional) investors 
institutional 
shareholders are 
businesses that own 
shares in a quoted 
company 
 
1.Foreign Share 
Ownership and 
Presence on Board 
2.Importance of 
Local: Foreign 
Investor 
3.Effects of 
Foreign Listing  
Questionnaire technique 
by measuring the 
perceptions of the 
respondent investor 
sample on a 5-Point 
Likert scale (1 strongly 
agree -5 strongly 
disagree). 
Items developed 
following  (Huang & 
Zhu, 2015; Filatotchev et 
al., 2007; Ferreira & 
Matos, 2008; Adegbite, 
2015) 
Effective shareholder 
group activism 
Shareholder activism 
occurs when 
shareholders (anyone 
or group of persons) 
use of ownership 
position to actively 
influence company 
policy and practice 
 
1.Importance of 
Sophisticated 
Activist 
Shareholders 
2.Importance of 
Reputable Activist 
Shareholders 
3.Importance of  
Institutional 
Activist 
Shareholders 
Questionnaire technique 
by measuring the 
perceptions of the 
respondent investor 
sample on a 5-Point 
Likert scale (1 strongly 
agree -5 strongly 
disagree). 
Items developed 
following (MaCahery et 
al., 2016),: Filatotchev et 
al., 2007; Adegbite, 
2015) 
Pay for Performance 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The act of linking 
executives’ 
pay/remuneration to 
firm performance 
 
1.Clear 
compensation 
schemes 
2.Rewards 
Schemes 
Acceptability for 
Management 
3.Employee reward 
schemes 
Questionnaire technique 
by measuring the 
perceptions of the 
respondent investor 
sample on a 5-Point 
Likert scale (1 strongly 
agree -5 strongly 
disagree) 
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 Items developed 
following: (Filatotchev et 
al., 2007; Adegbite, 
2015) 
Voluntary Disclosure Information 
transparency is defined 
as the level of 
availability and 
accessibility of market 
information to its 
stakeholders. 
Information usually 
includes the following: 
financial/operating 
results; ownership 
structure; members of 
the board of directors 
and management; 
quantitative and 
qualitative matters 
relating to employees 
and other stakeholders 
in the corporation; 
governance structures 
and policies; corporate 
targets and prospects, 
etc. 
1.Mandatory: 
Voluntary 
Importance 
2.Voluntary 
disclosures as a 
signal of 
accountability 
3.Voluntary 
information as a 
signal of 
performance 
Questionnaire technique 
by measuring the 
perceptions of the 
respondent investor 
sample on a 5-Point 
Likert scale (1 strongly 
agree -5 strongly 
disagree) 
Items developed 
following (Filatotchev et 
al., 2007; Adegbite, 
2015) 
 
Independent audit 
committee 
Audit Committee is 
independent when the 
majority of the 
members are 
independent and are 
not influenced by the 
firm or management    
1.Importance of 
audit committee 
reports 
2.Perception of 
non-independence 
of individuals on 
the audit 
committee 
Questionnaire technique 
by measuring the 
perceptions of the 
respondent investor 
sample on a 5-Point 
Likert scale (1 strongly 
agree -5 strongly 
disagree) 
Items developed 
following (Filatotchev et 
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al., 2007; Palepu & 
Healy, 2003; Adegbite, 
2015) 
Board Evaluation   Board evaluations are a 
way to assess board 
performance allowing 
board members to 
address potential 
organizational 
shortcomings. 
Alternatively, 
individual board 
members can be 
evaluated on the 
fulfillment of their 
specific board 
functions 
1.Report 
Transparency 
2.Report Necessity 
3.Report as 
Measure of 
Performance 
4.Quality of 
Information in 
Report 
 
Questionnaire technique 
by measuring the 
perceptions of the 
respondent investor 
sample on a 5-Point 
Likert scale (1 strongly 
agree -5 strongly 
disagree) 
Items developed 
following (Van den 
Berghe & Levrau, 2004: 
Filatotchev et al., 2007; 
Adegbite, 2015) 
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5.3.5 Dependent Variable Definition and Measurement 
The literature review chapter shed light on decision making as a cognitive measure. 
Hence, in this present study, decision-making is our dependent variable.  
 
Table 5. 4 Dependent Variable 
5.3.6 The Control Variables Definition and Measurements  
In addition to the independent variables mentioned previously, six control variables are 
considered in this research to control for individual demographic and experience 
characteristics that may affect the perception of the investment analyst.  These variables 
are considered to be fundamental for ensuring that the tests concentrate more accurately 
on the differences created by perceptions of good corporate governance driver features. 
Arguably, there may be other variables that can influence perceptions of investment 
analysts on drivers of good corporate governance in Nigerian banks which are not 
included in the used model. More precisely, there are three reasons for limiting the study 
to these variables: (i) some variables lack a theoretical link with perception of investment 
analysts on drivers of good corporate governance; (ii) non-availability of data, which 
limits the use of other variables; and (iii) it is in line with prior studies that widely use 
these specific variables, which can facilitate comparison of the findings with those of 
previous studies. 
 
Table 5. 5 Control Variables 
 
 Definition Measurements/Proxy 
Firm Size Since investment analysts all work 
for firms that make investments, 
then the turnover(total 
investment) of the firm represents 
firm size 
Interval scale which will be grouped 
into an ordinal scale. 
 
Item developed following (Jensen & 
Meckling, 1976; Bebchuk & Weisbach, 
2010) 
 Defining Variable Definition Measurements/Proxy 
Investment Decision 
Making 
Asking the analyst if each defining 
independent variables described 
above encourages him to make 
favorable investment decisions 
Questionnaire technique by measuring 
the perceptions of the respondent 
investor sample on a 5-Point Likert scale 
(1 strongly agree -5 strongly disagree) 
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International 
Affiliate 
If the investment firm is an 
international firm or a subsidiary 
of an international firm 
Dummy variable (Yes or No) 
Item developed following (Haniffa and 
Cooke, 2002; Barako et al., 2006; Ntim 
et al., 2012a; Samaha et al., 2012, 
MaCahery et al., 2016) 
Gender Male or Female Nominal Variable 
Item developed following (Rajdev & 
Jssciw, 2013; Jain & Mandot, 2012) 
Total years of 
experience 
This is the number of years an 
investment analyst has spent 
making investments on behalf of 
investors 
Interval scale which will be grouped 
into an ordinal scale. 
 
Item developed following (Rajdev & 
Jssciw, 2013; Jain & Mandot, 2012) 
Background This is the area of specialization 
of the investment analysts 
Nominal Scale 
 
Item developed following (Rajdev & 
Jssciw, 2013; Jain & Mandot, 2012) 
Age How old the investment analyst is Interval scale which will be grouped 
into an ordinal scale. 
 
Item developed following (Rajdev & 
Jssciw, 2013; Jain & Mandot, 2012) 
 
5.3.7 Questionnaire Survey 
A questionnaire is simply a ‘tool’ for collecting and recording information about a 
particular issue of interest. It is mainly made up of a list of questions, but should also 
include clear instructions and space for answers or administrative details (Babbie, 1995).  
Questionnaires offer information that can be generalized, should always have a definite 
purpose that is related to the objectives of the research, and needs to be clear from the 
outset how the findings will be used (Babbie, 1995).  
Especially for the sample population, questionnaire is particularly suited for the research 
as respondents will be free to express themselves without fear of being identified (Falgi, 
2009). There are two types of questionnaire self-administered and interviewer 
administered (Saunders et al., 2007). The self-administered is divided into three types: 
Internet-mediated questionnaire, postal questionnaire, and delivery-collection 
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questionnaire. The interviewer-administered questionnaire is divided into two types: 
telephone and structured interview. 
 
This research made use of self-administered questionnaire due to the spread of the 
respondents making it cheaper than any other type of survey. It is also easier for the 
respondents to complete, improves chances of anonymity thereby increasing response 
rate.  
5.3.7.1 Design of Questionnaire 
As earlier stated in the literature review, the cornerstone of this current study is the work 
of Adegbite (2015) which postulated nine firm level drivers of good corporate 
governance for firms in developing countries even though the research data collected 
through a triangulation of qualitative methods. The main objective of this current study 
is to obtain perspectives of investment analysts on features of drivers of good corporate 
governance and influence these features have on their decision-making.  Accordingly, 
research hypotheses focused on all postulated features of drivers of good corporate 
governance as it relates to the decision making of investment analysts. 
 
In designing the questionnaire, extreme care was taken in ensuring that the questions 
asked are relevant to the research. Most of the questions were modifications from 
previous researches to suit the purpose though some were created especially for this 
study.  Standardized questions for the theme and areas to be covered was prepared.  
 
The questionnaire was divided into ten sections; 1.General information. 2. Set of 
questions related to board independence. 3. Set of questions related to board 
heterogeneity. 4. Set of questions related to board (directors’) reputation. 5. Set of 
questions related to board evaluation. 6. Set of questions related to foreign (large) 
institutional shareholders. 7. Set of questions related to effective shareholder activism. 8. 
Set of questions related to performance related executive compensation. 9. Set of 
questions related to full and transparent information (voluntary disclosure) 10. Set of 
questions related to independent audit committees. 
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Additionally, to increase the research legitimacy and importance, the questionnaire was 
accompanied by a cover letter from Durham Business School. All questions in this study 
have been measured by adopting the five-point Likert scale used extensively in social 
science research, ranging from 5= strongly agree, 4=agree, 3 = neutral, 2= disagree, 1 = 
strongly disagree. Likert scales are good at measuring opinions, beliefs and attitudes as 
it will show the varying degree to which respondents agree/endorse a statement 
(DeVellis, 2003). Since Nigeria's main language is English, the questionnaire was 
administered in English language hence there were no translation issues. 
5.3.7.2 Piloting the questionnaire and assessment of validity 
Questionnaires may have challenges such as unclear language, unsuitable questions, 
questions that are difficult to place or answer, missing data, low response rates, long 
winding questions (Pornuptham, 2006). DeVellis, (2003) defined validity of a study as 
the ability to present findings that are consistent with theory or conceptual values. Hence, 
to validate the questionnaire for this study, a pilot test was conducted in case there are 
areas not well covered or not very clear. Pilot study enables researchers to carry out trial 
analysis of a small sample, and the analysis should tally with the results of the main study 
(Burgess, 2001). For this purpose, questionnaire was distributed to 12 investment analyst 
contacts of this researcher. Fink (1995) suggested that ten respondents are enough to 
carry out a pilot study. 
5.3.7.3 Questionnaire administration:  
The questionnaire was administered in a pilot test to twelve (12) investment analyst 
randomly contacted by the researcher from his pool of contacts. Eventual total number 
of respondents was 161. This should be adequate as the item intercorrelations are stong 
(Guadagnoli & Velicer, 1988). Moreover, the total population of investment analysts that 
operate in the Nigerian market is about 1,400. Of this 1,400, about 200 are personal 
contacts of the researcher whom he had interacted with while working in the financial 
sector. 
 
Additionally, a comprehensive database of investment analysts containing detailed 
information (emails, phone numbers, etc.) of 1,200 investment analysts who purchase 
equities or fixed income transactions in Nigeria, was obtained from an investor relations 
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manager contact of the researcher. In all, 1400 questionnaires were distributed, and 161 
responses were received. Of the 161, 141 of the filled questionnaire were usable in the 
survey with 115 (8.6%) completely filled. This response rate is higher than surveys used 
in finance (e.g., 5.3% in Brav et al. (2008a),  4.3%; Dichev et al. 2013; McCahery et al., 
2016; 5.4%).  
 
In a survey of the opinions of economic agents such as this one, naturally the study faced 
the risk that respondents answer in a strategic or untruthful fashion. To mitigate these 
concerns, the survey was conducted anonymously and did not require respondents to 
reveal their names or employers. The researcher further emphasized that individual 
responses would be treated as confidential. Furthermore, discussions with a number of 
the respondents indicated that they were quite passionate about the topic and would not 
have spent time filling the questionnaire if they intended to answer untruthfully. Other 
criticism of this type of questionnaire includes the inability of the researcher to draw 
more meanings from the respondents and bias toward the researcher's thoughts in 
preparing the questions. The semi-structured interviews conducted in the second part of 
this research helped to overcome the criticism of researcher's bias. 
 
Given that the survey was administered using Qualtrics, a web-based survey tool, only 
one observation per investment analyst was recorded. Full details of the questionnaire 
items are provided in Appendix I. The survey questions are in line with previous studies 
(Filatotchev et al., 2007; Hendry et al., 2007; Aguilera et al., 2008; Adegbite 2015), and 
were pre-tested through a pilot test to ensure their validity, reliability and contextual 
relevance. 
 
This methodology was aimed at achieving two objectives. First, a relatively high score 
across the population of respondents would indicate the high importance of particular 
drivers of good corporate governance when it comes to investment decision making. 
Second, following MaCahery et al. (2016) using significance relationships obtained via 
ordered logit regressions, various features that describe a particular driver (or a particular 
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driver can be manifested in the form of),  were ranked in terms of their relative 
importance to the vis-à-vis other features in the same family. 
5.3.8 Descriptive Data for Questionnaire Respondents  
This section discusses the descriptive statistics for the demographic information which 
include: the respondent's gender, age, work experience, local or international investor, 
and occupation background. Table 5.6 below shows that there were 102 male (72.34%) 
and 35 respondents were female individual investors (24.82%) (4 of the investment 
analysts did not provide their gender). Table 5.7 shows that majority of the respondents 
(45.39%) were between the ages of 31-40 while 35.46% were between the ages of 41-
50. This age bracket of between 31-50 are typically the most active investment analysts. 
Only 1 of the investment analysts was over 60. About 120 (85.11%) of the investment 
analysts had majority of working experience in the area of banking and finance.  In terms 
of the total number of years as an investment analyst, the respondents were quite well 
spread. About 15 (10.67%) had 1-5 years investing experience, while 36 (25.53%) had 
5-10years investing experience, 52 (36.88%) had 10-15years investing experience, 26 
(18.44%) had 15-20years investing experience, while 12 (9.92%) had over 20years work 
experience. 
 
91 (64.54%) of the respondents work for local investment companies while 50 (35.46%) 
work for foreign companies. In terms of annual turnover of the firms these investment 
analysts work for, 20 (14.18%) work for firms with N100M-N1BN annual turnover, 30 
(21.28%) worked for companies with N1BN – N10BN. Majority of the investment 
analysts 46 (32.62%) work for companies with turnovers in excess of N100BN which is 
approximately ($320M). 
 
Table 5. 6 Gender 
 Frequency Percentage Cumulative 
Male 102 72.34 72.34 
Female 35 24.82 97.16 
Unstated 4 2.84 100 
Total 141 100.00  
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Table 5. 7 Age 
 Frequency Percentage Cumulative 
21-30 15 10.64 10.64 
31-40 64 45.39 56.03 
41-50 50 35.46 91.49 
51-60 11 7.80 99.29 
Over 60 1 0.71 100.00 
Total 141 100  
 
Table 5. 8 Background 
 Frequency Percentage Cumulative 
Banking & Finance 120 85.11 85.11 
Economics 4 2.13 87.24 
Accounting 6 2.84 90.08 
Legal & Political 3 4.26 94.33 
Others 8 5.67 100.00 
Total 141 100  
 
Table 5. 9 Years of Experience 
 Frequency Percentage Cumulative 
0-5years 15 10.67 10.67 
5-10years 36 25.53 36.17 
10-15years 52 36.88 73.05 
15-20years 26 18.44 91.49 
Over 20 years 12 9.92 100.00 
Total 141 100  
 
Table 5. 10 International Affiliation 
 Frequency Percentage Cumulative 
Local 91 64.54 64.54 
Foreign 50 35.46 100.00 
Total 141 100.00  
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Table 5. 11 Annual Turnover 
 Frequency Percentage Cumulative 
N1M-100M 12 8.51 8.51 
N100M-N1BN 20 14.18 22.69 
N1BN-N10BN 30 21.28 43.97 
N10BN-N100BN 33 23.40 67.38 
Over N100BN 46 32.62 100.00 
Total 141 100.00  
5.3.9 Non-response bias 
Non-response bias occurs when the eligible non-respondents differ substantially from the 
respondents in terms of the variables of interest (Armstrong & Overton, 1977). Non-
response bias is quite problematic since it means that the sample of a given study is not 
representative of its sampling frame, which implies that the results obtained are not 
generalizable. The method typically used by researchers to assess for non-response bias 
consists of making a comparison between respondents and non-respondents with regard 
to the variables of interest. According to Armstrong & Overton (1977), people who 
respond to later waves (a "wave" here means the response generated by a stimulus, e.g., 
a follow up email – cf. Armstrong & Overton, 1977) are expected to be similar to non-
respondents, since they only responded to the survey because of an increased stimulus. 
 
In order to determine early versus late respondents, the number of working days between 
the first email contact and the day in which respondents completed the survey was 
computed. Early respondents were defined as those respondents pertaining to the first 
quartile of the distribution. Late respondents were defined as the respondents belonging 
to the last quartile of such distribution. 
5.3.9.1 Response Bias Assessment 
Generalisability is an important issue in academic research, and as such there are "great 
concerns regarding the extent to which data used in a research project reflects a broader 
population, including the possibility of non-response bias" (Blair & Zinkhan, 2002, p.4). 
Accordingly, non-response is seen as one major source of sample bias. Hence, it is 
suggested that the role of non-response in sample quality should be addressed (Hair et 
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al., 2006; Blair & Zinkhan, 2002). Blair & Zinkhan (2002) suggest that best practices 
should be followed to control non-response bias. It is, therefore, recommended that the 
ideal way to handle non-response bias is to reduce the non-response itself (Hair et al., 
2006). However, it is still possible that the impact of non-response bias on sample quality 
can be estimated after the full-study is completed (Rindfleisch et al., 2008). It was 
assumed that those that responded after the first follow-up were no different from non-
respondents (Churchill, 1995). The notion is that firms that "respond less readily are more 
like non-respondents” (Armstrong & Overton, 1977, p.397). 
 
Subsequently, the study had two unequal group data sets. Using procedures suggested by 
Armstrong & Overton (1977), the first group, which consisted of 104 respondents, were 
those that responded with only one stimulus prompting while the second group consisted 
of 31 respondents who only responded after a second or third prompt by the researcher. 
The study then conducted a t-test on the two groups (Armstrong & Overton, 1977). The 
t-test is used to determine if two sets of data are significantly different from each other 
(Pallant, 2013). Table 3.13 below shows the result of the t-test conducted for various 
variables.  
 
Table 5. 12 Response Bias Assessment 
 
Variables Mean of Early 
Respondents (N=104) 
Mean of Late 
Respondents (N=31) 
Sig. of t-values  
(2-tailed) 
Annual Turnover 3.64486 3.322581 0.2317 
CEO Duality 1.894231   2   0.6538   
Multiple Directorship 3.029412 3.038462 0.9697 
Clear Compensation 
Schemes 
2.851064 3.181818 0.2185 
Influence of 
Independent Directors 
1.817308 1.83871 0.9152 
Presence of 
Sophisticated Activist 
Shareholders 
1.969072 2.227273 0.2170 
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Results, as shown in table 5.12, indicate that the differences between the means for early 
respondents and that of late respondents were not significant at five percent significant 
level. This suggests that the mean difference observed in the two groups was due to 
chance (Churchill, 2005). Thus, it can be said that there were no significant differences 
between responding and non-responding participants in the study. Accordingly, it is 
considered that non-response bias did not create any major impact on the host of variables 
used in this study. Moreover, this study used a mixed method research design hence 
follow up interviews were conducted with 27 top management investment analysts. 
5.3.10 Statistical methods of questionnaire analysis 
The model was first analyzed using descriptive statistics of the collected data. Also, the 
Pearson and Spearman correlation was used to identify the correlation between the 
variables. Other descriptive tests such as frequencies, percentages for responses and 
mean scores for respondents according to the level of agreement for each group of 
questions. 
 
Subsequently, the ordered logit regression was applied to investigate the association 
between investment decision-making, as a dependent variable, and the different features 
of drivers of good corporate governance, as independent variables. The model was 
statistically analyzed using the STATA 15.1 statistical package. 
5.3.11 Ordered Logit Regression 
Logit and probit models are almost as common as linear regression (Krueger & Lewis-
Beck, 2008).  Logistic regression is used when the dependent variable is binary in nature 
(Aguinis, 2004). However, when the dependent variables are limited (i.e the interval that 
the underlying dependent variable fall in range but not an exact value as found in Likert 
type scales, then we use the ordered logit regression (Long & Freese, 2006). When 
analysisng using the ordered logit regression, the following assumptions must be met. i. 
The dependent variable should be measured at the ordinal level e.g use of Likert scales. 
ii. One or more independent variables that are continuous, ordinal or categorical. iii There 
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is no multicollinearity6. iv. The odds are proportional7 (Laerd Statistics, 2019; Long & 
Freese, 2006).  
 
The data used in this research meet the ordered logit assumptions. 
 
5.3.11a. Endogeneity 
Endogeneity refers to situations in which an explanatory variable in a multiple 
regression-type setup correlates with the disturbance term (Wooldridge, 2010). Murphy 
(1997, p. 4) states that, “the methods chosen should be appropriate to the research 
question and the inferences drawn should be consistent with what was actually attempted 
in (the) study”.  Hence, research that seeks to “produce coefficients that capture the 
magnitude of the true (causal) relationship rather than just an association or a correlation” 
should concern itself with the problem of endogenity (Antonakis et al., 2014, p.4). This 
present research does not claim a causation, rather the coefficients are interpreted as an 
association. As a result, this research did not concern itself with endogeneity problems. 
 
The next section describes the qualitative methodology. 
 
5.4 Part C. Qualitative Methodology 
5.4.1 Introduction of the Qualitative Method 
Van Maanen (1983 p. 9) defines qualitative methods as “an umbrella term covering an 
array of interpretive techniques which seek to describe, decode, translate, and otherwise 
come to terms with the meaning, not the frequency, of certain more or less naturally 
occurring phenomena in the social world.” There are many different types of qualitative 
method such as ethnography, interviews, case studies, and observations which can be 
applied to collect data. 
 
According to Zattoni et al. (2013), the mixed findings occasioned by the use of agency 
theory in governance studies serves as motivation to employ qualitative designs. Further, 
                                                          
6 Multicollinearity occurs when you have two or more independent variables that are highly correlated with each other. This leads to problems with 
understanding which variable contributes to the explanation of the dependent variable and technical issues in calculating an ordinal regression. 
7 Proportional odds means that each independent variable has an identical effect at each cumulative split of the ordinal dependent variable. 
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qualitative research design explores how governance actors and institutions actually 
engage with governance practices (McNulty et al., 2013; Albassam, 2014). Furthermore, 
according to Mengoli et al. (2009), qualitative research can increase the robustness of 
quantitative results through comparison of the findings. 
 
This research sought an understanding of why particular features of corporate 
governance drivers are important to investment analysts who make investment decisions 
in Nigeria. The subjective perceptions of people helped to provide a rich and valuable 
source of information to our research inquiry (Bryman, 2015).   
5.4.2 Overview of Qualitative Research  
By the 1970s, qualitative research approaches gained popularity among researchers in 
social sciences (Morgan & Smircich, 1980; Scott & Garner, 2013). The increasing use 
of qualitative research reflects the importance of closely studying human behavior in the 
business environment (Hesse-Biber & Leavy, 2011). Thus, qualitative research in 
business studies aims to provide detailed interpretations of quantitative results by 
exploring how, why and what (Creswell &Clark, 2011). 
 
Qualitative research is a holistic approach that generates knowledge from different angles 
and can be used in different fields of study (Hesse-Biber & Leavy, 2011).  Qualitative 
research can be conducted when: (1) explaining social phenomena (2) exploring and 
understanding social reality; and (3) offering a rich description of social life (Hesse-Biber 
& Leavy, 2011). According to Bryman (2012), there are three main steps to conducting 
qualitative research. First, determine the research problem and identify the research 
questions. Second, select an appropriate data collection method. Third, analyze and 
interpret the data using selected data analysis techniques. 
 
Qualitative research is characterized as a flexible approach in studying human behavior 
and experiences (Silverman, 2011). According to Lichtman (2013), there are general 
considerations when conducting qualitative research. First, no single method in 
qualitative studies that fits every research project. Second, qualitative research does not 
aim to examine hypotheses and simply employs the inductive approach (see Bryman, 
   
169 
 
2012). Third, qualitative research explores social phenomena in detail. Thus, qualitative 
research methods explore in depth a limited number of cases and themes rather than a 
large number of samples. 
5.4.3 Reliability and Validity in Qualitative Research  
Reliability and validity are important in qualitative research (Bryman, 2004). Reliability 
(although commonly associated with quantitative research) refers to the possibility of 
reproducing the same results if the research were repeated (Golafshani, 2003; Collis & 
Hussey, 2009). However, unlike quantitative data, reliability and validity in qualitative 
studies rely mainly on data collection and analysis processes (Hesse-Biber & Leavy, 
2011; Golafshani, 2003).  Therefore, there are no specific tests that can be applied to all 
qualitative methods to examine reliability and validity (Bryman, 2004). 
 
There are three main criteria to enhance the reliability of interviews (Silverman, 2011). 
1. An understandable and clear interview guide should be developed for interviewees. 
Especially as a clear interview guide can ensure precision in the analysis and coding of 
the data. 2. For the findings to be more reliable, accurate taping and transcribing is 
required. 3. Inter-coding reliability needs to be maintained.  
 
The extent to which the interpretation of the results accurately reflects the phenomena 
under consideration is know as validity (Collis & Hussey, 2009). Interview validity is 
determined by the extent to which interviewees are willing or able to provide 
knowledgeable data (Barriball & While, 1994). Therefore, careful selection of 
interviewees is important. 
 
When two or more methods are adopted in exploring answers to research questions, a 
triangulation is applied to verify the findings. Triangulation improves research validity 
(Hesse-Biber & Leavy, 2011; Silverman, 2011). This study used a mixed-methods 
approach; thus, triangulation helps in verifying whether the qualitative findings match 
the results obtained from the quantitative methods.  
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5.4.4 Semi-structured interviews 
An interview is a research method to obtain data (life narratives) through the experiences 
and perceptions of groups or individuals (Scott & Garner, 2013). It is one of the most 
comprehensively applied approaches of data collection in social sciences, will help the 
researcher to gather validity and consistency that are relevant to research questions 
(Saunders et al., 2007). To be able to conduct the interview, the researcher must possess 
the skill to be able to obtain responses from the interviewee without allowing self-bias to 
intervene in the process (Kamel, 2006). 
 
Interview surveys can either be non-standardised/ standardized (Healey, 1991) or 
structured/semi-structured/unstructured (Saunders, 2007). Structured interviews are 
designed to be used with a specified set of research questions (Bryman, 2012). In semi-
structured interviews, the interviewer has a list of questions, with the flexibility to pursue 
other topics that arise during the interview (Collis & Hussey, 2009). Such interviews are 
not limited to the prepared questions and as such, allows the researcher to ask follow up 
questions during the interview (Collis & Hussey, 2009). Structured interviews are 
frequently used in quantifying results because they rely on specific answers (Scott & 
Garner, 2013). Semi-structured interviews in contrast, allow the interviewer the freedom 
to ask diversified questions based on given answers (Liew, 2007; Haniffa & Hudaib, 
2007; Johl et al., 2012). This makes semi-structured interview the most appropriate type 
of interview technique for exploring opinions on corporate governance in detail (Liew, 
2007; Bailey & Peck, 2013; Piesse et al., 2012). 
 
This study makes use of the semi-structured interview as it provides a deep understanding 
of social phenomena (Bence et al., 1995; Hussey & Hussey, 1997). Bryman & Bell 
(2003) posit that semi-structured interviews are good for explaining and understanding 
events, patterns, and forms of behavior as well as providing a more accurate picture of 
respondents' positions. This study uses semi-structured interviews in order to obtain the 
opinions of seasoned investment analysts on why certain features of corporate 
governance drivers are associated with investment decision making and others are not. 
This conforms with the view of Hussey & Hussey (2007) who posit that interviews are 
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appropriate technique to use when required information is sensitive or potentially 
confidential. 
 
The use of semi-structured interviews is increasing and preferred by researchers as they 
help explore answers to research questions in detail. (Bryman, 2004; McNulty et al., 
2013; Soobaroyen & Mahadeo, 2012). The researcher will develop a list of questions, 
called the interview guide, which helps guide discussion about the issue from all aspects 
even though interviewees have the right to share their opinions and thoughts. This 
opportunity for interviewees to share their views is very important (Bryman, 2004; 
Humphrey & Lee, 2004). Using this method allows the researcher flexibility to prepare 
a list of themes and questions that may vary from one interview to interview. In essence, 
deep and varied questions are asked and discussed during semi-structured interviews. 
Also, interviewees are able to express their opinions clearly according to their 
experiences and knowledge (Saunders et al., 2007). According to Berg (2007), the semi-
structured interview method, unlike other interview types, can enable the researcher to 
obtain rich astute information or explore uncovered problems in prearranged questions 
related to the research topic.   
 
In this study, in-depth interviews were conducted over a 4 week period between 
December 2017 and January 2018 using the semi-structured interview technique. This 
approach, while encouraging a two-way communication, offered the researcher more 
latitude to ask further questions as a reaction to what is considered a significant response. 
Thus, information generated from the semi-structured interviews did not only provide 
answers but also offered reasons for those answers (Flick, 2014). The methodology is 
consistent with previous studies on corporate governance drivers in Nigeria (e.g., 
Adegbite, 2015; Nakpodia & Adegbite, 2018). 
5.4.4.1 Semi-structured interviews design and data collection  
This section presents the design and data collection process of the semi-structured 
interviews used in the current study. Particularly, it addresses the selection of 
interviewees, explains the design of the interview guide, discusses the procedure of 
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conducting the interviews and addresses the ethical issues related to the interview 
process.  
5.4.4.1.1 Selection of Interviewees  
Theoretical sampling can help the researcher identify concepts and themes pertinent to 
the research problem (Corbin & Strauss, 2008). In this study, theoretical sampling was 
used to select the interviewees. Participants were drawn from investment analysts who 
operate in the Nigerian business environment.  The participants were all senior 
management who are experienced in making investments and were particularly familiar 
with investments in the Nigerian banking sector. They included managing directors, chief 
investment officers, asset managers, investment analysts, and fund managers (See table 
5.13 below). All these executives were familiar with the code of corporate governance 
for banks and hence with corporate governance mechanism drivers. Given the positions 
of the interviewees, this research benefited from their insider views of the drivers of good 
corporate governance in sub-Saharan Africa (see also Adegbite, 2015; Filatotchev et al., 
2007; Aguilera et al., 2008; Hendry et al., 2007; Bogdan & Taylor, 1975; Das, 1983; Van 
Maanen, 1998; Patton, 1980). Also, this enriched data prevented similitude and served 
as an experimental control mechanism upon which different views were assessed and 
compared. 
 
It is also important to highlight that sample size issues in qualitative research are often 
influenced by ‘saturation’ concerns. A considerable volume of literature in qualitative 
research suggests that ‘how many’ is not what matters (Mason, 2010; Burmeister & 
Aitken, 2012). A researcher should, therefore, aim to satisfy himself/herself that he/she 
has learned, and understands the phenomenon, enough to enable knowledge generation. 
This was the basis for determining the sample size (see Pope et al., 2000; Mason, 2010). 
Given that the researcher has substantial corporate experience in Nigeria8, the study 
participants with the requisite profile were contacted personally via emails, social media, 
and telephone calls, outlining the research agenda. After exhausting personal contacts, 
the snowballing technique also proved beneficial in gaining access to high-caliber 
                                                          
8 Until embarking upon his Ph.D. studies, the researcher was the deputy head of international funding in a top commercial bank in Nigeria, a role which 
involved regular interaction with foreign and local investment analysts.   
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respondents (Denscombe, 2010; Stigliani & Ravasi, 2012). As a result, 27 interviews 
were conducted until saturation was achieved. The number of interviewees is consistent 
with related studies. For example, Adegbite et al. (2013) conducted 26 in-depth 
interviews, Nakpodia (2015) conducted 24 interviews, Ogbechie & Koufopoulos (2007) 
and Okpara (2011) interviewed 20 respondents, while Uys (2008) conducted 18 
interviews to generate their findings. 
 
There was a very high degree of agreement amongst respondents' comments, which were 
also mainly in alignment with the quantitative studies. The data collected were largely 
representative due to the multi-stakeholder participation and the lack of commonality 
among the respondents who refused/or could not be interviewed. In order to minimize 
respondents' position bias (Miller et al., 1997), respondents who satisfied the purposive 
sampling requirement of competence were those selected (Hughes & Preski, 1997). 
 
Table 5. 13 Interviewees Details and Codes 
Code Position Organization 
CP1 Chief Investment Officer Large Closed Pension Company 
OP1 Chief Investment Officer Large Open Pension Company 
MF1 MD Medium sized investment company 
OP2 Chief Investment Officer Large Open Pension Company 
OP3 Chief Investment Officer Medium Open Pension Company 
OP4 Chief Investment Officer Large Open Pension Company 
MF2 MD Medium sized investment company 
LA1 Fund Manager Large Asset Managers 
LF1 Senior Fund Manager Large Investment Company 
MF3 Group Executive Medium Investment Company 
LF2 Chief Investment Officer Large Asset Managers 
LC1 Chief Analyst Large Capital Market Company 
LA2 MD Large Asset Managers 
LC2 Chief Analyst Large Capital Market Company 
LC3 President Large Capital Market  
CP2 Chief Investment Officer Large Closed Pension 
LC4 Director Large Capital Market 
LC5 MD Large Capital Market 
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LC6 Principal Director Large Capital Market 
LC7 Deputy Chief Investment Officer Large Capital Market 
MA1 MD Medium Asset Managers 
LA3 MD Large Asset Managers 
OP5 Fund Manager Large Open Pension 
OP6 Deputy Chief Investment Officer Large Open Pension 
LA4 Business Development Manager Large Asset Managers 
MF4 Chief Investment Officer Medium Investment Company 
LC8 CEO Large Capital Market 
 
5.4.4.1.2 Designing the Interview Guide  
An interview guide is used to organize the research questions in semi-structured 
interviews (Corbin & Strauss, 2008). Bryman (2012) suggests that an interview guide for 
semi-structured interviews should be a brief list of questions that address the research 
problem. This study follows Gilbert (2008) in designing the interview guide following 
three steps. First, the framework of the interview guide which is derived from the 
research problem is determined. The guide is designed to clearly identify the themes to 
be used in analyzing the interview data. Second, formulate the interview questions.  The 
questions should be designed to (i) demonstrate knowledge of the individuals; (ii) reveal 
the views of the interviewee; (iii) explore the interviewee's emotional responses, and (iv) 
reveal interviewees' personal experiences (Lichtman, 2013). According to Charmaz 
(2002), questions asked during the interview can be of three types: (1) opening questions 
that start the discussion; (2) intermediate questions that investigate the issues in detail; 
and (3) concluding questions that assist in obtaining advice and recommendations (as 
cited by Bryman, 2004). 
 
A number of considerations were taken into account when formulating the questions. 
First, the researcher formulated interview questions in a way that helped elicit more 
accurate answers (Bryman, 2004). Second, the questions were designed not to be too 
narrow, because that may limit follow-up questions or clarifications of the main issue 
during interviews (Bryman, 2004). Third, the questions were ordered, to ensure a 
reasonable flow so that the research issue could be discussed properly (Bryman, 2004). 
Fourth, as this study employs a mixed-methods approach, the questions were designed 
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to help achieve integration between quantitative and qualitative approaches (Creswell & 
Clark, 2011).  
 
The third step is to review the proposed interview guide (Lichtman, 2013; Gilbert, 2008).  
According to Gilbert (2008), there is no standardized interview guide thus, the 
constructed guide in this research was reviewed by the researcher's supervisors and 
discussed at conferences with colleagues. Their reviews assisted in identifying issues 
previously not considered and ensured the validity and reliability of the interview data 
(Lichtman, 2013). After the review process, the proposed amendments were taken into 
account, and the final design was eventually developed. The interviews were conducted 
and transcribed in English, as Nigeria is an English speaking country. 
5.4.4.2 Semi-structured Interviews: Process and Reflection  
Building on the above discussion, this section addresses the procedure of conducting the 
interviews. Specifically, it discusses the type of interviews and the stages in which they 
were conducted. In this study, one-to-one interviews, instead of a focus group, were 
employed for three reasons. First, the interview questions sought information about the 
practitioners' personal experiences. Focus groups interviews conflict with the 
confidentiality that may be required by interviewees (Saunders et al., 2007). Second, one-
to-one interviews allow interviewees to be able to freely express themselves without 
restrictions that may be imposed by the presence of third parties that may be associated 
with focus groups (Bryman, 2004). In other words, interviewees can expand on issues 
they see as important. Third, there are practical difficulties with gathering practitioners 
in one place at one time, due to the tight schedules associated with their high job profiles 
(mainly senior corporate executives, such as CEOs, and Chief Investment Officers). 
Moreover, the researcher was keen to conduct face-to-face interviews rather than online 
or telephone interviews because: (i) body language is important in dialogue, such as 
facial expressions that cannot be captured in telephone interviews (Bryman, 2004; 
Yazdifara et al., 2008); and (ii) face-to-face interviews develop an atmosphere of ease 
and trust between interviewer and interviewees (Bryman, 2004).  
Conducting the interviews took approximately three weeks: from December 27, 2017, to 
January 19, 2018. Although this period covers the year-end Christmas and New Year 
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holidays, most investment analysts were working and the holidays were over by January 
5th, 2018. Furthermore, the researcher took advantage of the relaxed environment to 
conduct the interviews. Interviews lasted between 30 and 70 minutes. All of the 
interviews were conducted in locations suggested by the investment analysts. Also, the 
interviews were taped after obtaining consent from the interviewees. All interviews were 
taped.  Taping the interviews helped ensure accurate data and reduced mistakes in 
transcribing the interviews (Barriball & While, 1994). 
 
The interviews were conducted in three stages. The first stage was the preparation before 
starting the interview. In this stage, the researcher obtained further information about the 
background and experience of the interviewee. Having this information improved the 
interaction with the interviewees (see Liedtka, 1992).  In the second stage, before asking 
questions, the investment analysts were asked to allow taping of the interview. They were 
assured of the confidentiality of the information used by the researcher. After that, the 
practitioner was asked briefly about his professional background (e.g., Bailey & Peck, 
2013). Then, practitioners were given an overview of the research objectives and themes. 
This helped to give them a general idea about the information the researcher was seeking, 
which assisted in maintaining the conversation during the interview process (Coleman et 
al., 2010). After the introduction, the researcher opened up the inquiry through the 
questions presented in the interview guide. During the interview, the practitioner was 
given the freedom to express his opinions and ideas even if they were not directly linked 
to the questions asked. Therefore, the semi-structured interviews obtained rich data 
(Creswell & Clark, 2011). The interview guide was followed to ensure that all of the 
questions were asked, and notes were taken in order to record the essential points in the 
interview (Corbin & Strauss, 2008). 
 
In the third stage, at the end of the interview, the researcher expressed his gratitude to the 
interviewees for their time and reassured them about the confidentiality of the 
information. They were offered a copy of the thesis if desired. 
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5.4.4.3 Ethical Issues Related to the Interviews  
Ethical issues are important to consider in a qualitative approach where interviewer and 
interviewees interact (Bryman, 2012). Research ethics can be considered in three stages, 
as follows: (i) before conducting the interviews; (ii) during the data collection; and (iii) 
after conducting the interviews (Saunders et al., 2007). The first stage involves 
accessibility to organizations, data sources, and participants. This starts by exploring the 
organizational contexts and providing interviewees with an understanding of the issues 
surrounding the research problem (Liedtka, 1992; Saunders et al., 2007). In the second 
stage, research ethics are considered during data collection, informed by the principle of 
informed consent. Bryman (2012) suggests that interviewees should be informed about: 
(i) what the research is about; (ii) its objectives; (iii) who is sponsoring it; (iv) the nature 
of their participation in the research; and (v) their right to withdraw from the interview 
at any time. The third stage, after conducting the interviews, considers research ethics 
during the data analysis and results reporting; for example, maintaining the 
confidentiality of data during analysis and interpretation of the results. The interviewees 
should have a reasonable expectation that the information provided will be treated 
confidentially (Lichtman, 2013). The researcher must ensure that the interviewees’ 
privacy will not be violated, such as by revealing their identity in this thesis or any other 
later publication (Bryman, 2012). Commitment to ethics makes for better research. Also, 
ethics are considered in accurately reflecting the interviewees’ viewpoints when results 
are reported and coded (Liedtka, 1992). Lichtman (2013) suggests some other ethical 
considerations during the interviews, such as behaving appropriately and avoiding 
questions about interviewees’ personal lives.  
 
5.4.4.4 Analysis of semi-structured interviews  
The current study uses a thematic analysis approach in analyzing qualitative data 
(Boyatzis, 1998; Bailey & Peck, 2013). As discussed earlier, a mixed-methods approach 
is used in this study, based on the explanatory sequential design. This means that 
conducting the interviews is the second stage after obtaining quantitative findings. Using 
thematic analysis in this study helps explore, in depth, corporate governance drivers and 
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their features. Furthermore, the reasoning behind results obtained in the quantitative 
study were explored (Boyatzis, 1998; Bailey & Peck, 2013). 
 
For analytical procedures, this study used two phases of data analysis, in line with the 
corporate governance literature (e.g., Haniffa & Hudaib, 2007; Bailey & Peck, 2013; 
Nakpodia & Adegbite, 2018). These two phases are, first, the pre-coding phase, and 
second, the coding or categories phase. In the first phase, the interviews were transcribed. 
The study adopted a verbatim approach in transcribing the interviews. In total, each 
interview was an average of twenty pages, transcribed. To ensure accuracy, the 
transcription was read while listening to the tape.  
 
After all of the interviews had been transcribed, the researcher started reading memos 
and the interviews to build up an initial conceptual framework to identify concepts and 
categories (e.g., Bailey & Peck, 2013). In doing so, the researcher read all the transcripts 
twice, to develop a general idea, and wrote in the margins and underlined the fundamental 
and pertinent issues in the data (Corbin & Strauss, 2008). From the first reading, 
preliminary concepts emerged through the use of memos (the researcher’s notes during 
and after the interview process), which helped establish reliable and clear coding cards 
(Saldana, 2013). Saldana (2013) argues that it is not possible to implement a coding 
system from an initial reading of the data; at least two cycles of reading are required to 
get a good coding framework. Thus, the researcher re-read the transcripts to filter the 
concepts; this also enhanced the validity of coding. 
 
Procedure for Analysing Data  
Unlike quantitative data, qualitative data consists of words and observations; hence its 
analysis and interpretation are necessary to bring order and generate understanding 
(Taylor-Powell & Renner, 2003). Boeije (2009) explains that, in the context of research, 
analysis describes the processing of data in order to answer the research questions. It 
involves an extensive array of procedures aimed at systematically addressing research 
questions.  By placing research findings on a continuum, the degree of transformation of 
data during the data analysis process from description to interpretation is indicated 
(Sandelowski & Barroso, 2003b).  For research that employs a relatively low level of 
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interpretation, approaches such as content analysis, descriptive phenomenology, and 
thematic analysis are suitable. This is in contrast to hermeneutic phenomenology or 
grounded theory, where a higher level of interpretive complexity is required.  The current 
study uses a thematic analysis approach in analyzing qualitative data. 
 
Thematic analysis is mainly described as "a method for identifying, analyzing and 
reporting patterns (themes) within data" (Braun & Clarke, 2006, p. 79) 
 
Why Thematic Analysis?  
The nature of study and a researcher's paradigm disposition bear significant influence on 
the technique employed to analyze the data (Miles & Huberman, 1994). Taking the 
researcher's ontological and epistemological position into consideration, the study 
engages thematic analysis in view of its alignment with the researcher's philosophical 
preference and study objectives. By breaking texts into smaller units of content, thematic 
analysis aims to analytically examine narrative materials from life stories submit them to 
descriptive treatment (Sparker, 2005). Thematic analysis helps answer questions about 
what concerns of people about an event and what reasons people have for using or not 
using a procedure or service (Ayres, 2007b). 
 
Furthermore, thematic analysis provides a rich and detailed, yet complex, account of the 
data because it is flexible (Braun & Clarke, 2006). According to DeSantis & Noel 
Ugarriza (2000), thematic analysis is used to search and identify common threads that 
extend across an entire interview (or set of interviews). This study posits that addressing 
corporate governance concerns requires an investigation into the psychological reasoning 
of investment analysts.  
 
Thematic Analysis Process: NVivo as an Aid  
The use of software in analyzing data has been introduced into qualitative research 
(Mayring, 2000). Hence, analyzing qualitative data can be done either manually or by 
utilizing computer-assisted qualitative data analysis software (CAQDAS) programme 
(Nakpodia et al. 2016). For this study, CADQAS was used to support, and not replace, 
the stages of text interpretation (Mayring, 2000). Therefore, the researcher's knowledge 
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significantly informed the data analysis in this study. There are many software packages 
for qualitative research, and some of the widely-used qualitative data analysis 
programmes include NVivo, ATLAS/ti, and MAXQda (Bazeley & Jackson, 2013). This 
study used the NVivo software to support its data analysis process because of benefits 
inherent in it. These benefits include visual exploration of ideas, facilitation of open 
coding, access to original transcribed data and the ability to search key texts and attach 
memos to coded data (Leech & Onwuegbuzie, 2011; Bazeley & Jackson, 2013).  
 
Analysis of the transcribed data involved three stages; preparation, organizing and 
reporting (Elo & Kyngäs, 2008). In the preparation state, to enable the researcher make 
sense of the data, basic unit of text to be classified (units of analysis) (Zhang & 
Wildemuth, 2009) were identified. This stage required data immersion (Polit & Beck, 
2012); the interviews were listened to and transcribed materials were read many times. 
NVivo use was minimal at this stage. 
 
The organizing stage, which is the second stage involved open coding, grouping 
identified codes, creating categories from identified codes and engaging in abstraction 
(Elo & Kyngäs, 2008). Abstraction in research involves providing a broad description of 
the concerns and generation of categories (Polit & Beck, 2012).  One of three approaches 
(conventional content analysis, directed content analysis or summative content analysis) 
can be used for interpreting meaning from text data (Hsieh & Shannon, 2005). In this 
study, the directed approach was employed. This approach was employed to allow for 
more insights on corporate governance scholarship in Nigeria considering the lack of 
depth (Adegbite, 2015).  The directed approach offered a structure which facilitated the 
identification of concepts as the initial coding categories from existing theory (Potter & 
Levine‐Donnerstein, 1999), i.e. a priori code, and concurrently, assisted the identification 
of emerging themes from the data. This approach links with the flexibility often 
associated with the thematic analysis. The first activity in the organizing stage was 
coding. According to Miles & Huberman (1994), in investigation of research material, 
coding represents the starting point.  The final stage was based on an abstraction 
procedure reporting. Inferences were drawn by identifying subcategories with related 
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characteristics.This were then grouped as generic categories and a main category 
established from these linkages.  
 
Development of the Coding Frame  
The study generated a large volume of data, which enhanced the possibility of "getting 
lost in the data" (Schreier, 2012, p. 58), so it was essential the researcher maintained 
focus. The ‘word frequency' and ‘query' tools were used to generate themes initially and 
this process produced a mass of themes. However, some of the terms were relevant while 
others were not. For example, terms such as ‘that,' ‘like,' ‘which,' etc., which featured 
prominently, were categorised as irrelevant. Subsequently, the researcher used the ‘stop 
word' function in Nvivo to isolate these irrelevant terms. 
 
Figure 5. 3 Themes from Nvivo 11 Extract 
 
 
The second stage of coding involved the generation of generic categories (themes) from 
the data and the sub-categories were grouped under higher order headings (Burnard, 
1991). There were three main sources of identifying categories in this study: (i) the 
research questions; (ii) the literature on corporate governance drivers; and (iii) the results 
obtained from the quantitative part of this study.  Following suggestions of Dey (2003), 
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the objective of this stage was to reduce the number of sub-categories by collapsing those 
that are similar or dissimilar into broader higher order categories. Corbin & Strauss 
(2008) posit that the constant comparisons approach is essential because: (i) it helps 
researcher to understand the meaning of events and eliminates ambiguity about the 
issues; (ii) it stimulates the exploration of the concepts used in data analysis; (iii) it helps 
the researcher test basic assumptions, biases and perspectives; (iv) it helps the researcher 
in examining the results obtained; and (v) it helps in the development of the link between 
themes and subthemes. 
 
The main themes emerging from the data are Nigeria, people, environment, enforcement, 
corruption, institutions, government, codes, investments, banks, rating matrix, and 
decision making influences amongst others. From the procedures performed on the data, 
two coding strands emerged. First, some themes generated from the quantitative study 
were reinforced with similar themes from the data, and secondly, the data produced 
several new sets of relevant themes. These themes were subsequently subjected to a 
process of successive sorting to generate the subcategories for the coding frame.  The 
next stage was ‘grouping,' i.e., identifying similar or related themes and examining the 
variations and reasons for these variations. This procedure helped to condense the array 
of themes identified. Using the grouping approach proposed in Elo & Kyngäs (2008), 
three levels of groupings emerged. The first grouping recognized similarities in themes 
and grouped them accordingly. These groups are the subcategories. It is important to note 
that there are instances where some themes were deemed good enough to be recognized 
as properties or elements of other themes. 
 
From this process, the next category of grouping emerged. These new, higher order 
groups (Burnard, 1991) represent the generic categories (Elo & Kyngäs, 2008). This 
process ensured further consolidation of subcategories and facilitated effective 
comparison of research outcomes across the generic categories. The grouping and 
categorization of data embodies the abstraction stage of analysis. The abstraction stage, 
however, requires that another category is generated. This category, i.e. the main 
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category presents the basis of the formulation of a general description of the research 
concerns (Elo & Kyngäs, 2008). 
 
Figure 5. 4 Sample Illustration of Abstraction Process (Coding Frame) 
 
Source: Adapted from Elo and Kyngäs (2008). The qualitative content analysis process. Journal of 
Advanced Nursing, 62(1), pp. 107–115. 
 
Consequently, the data analysis and discussion for the qualitative aspect of this study, 
presented in the findings chapters, were structured based on this process.  
 
5.5 Conclusion 
This chapter was divided into three parts. 
 
The first part introduced the mixed-methods research, discussed the research design used 
as well as the philosophical assumptions of the research methodology. This study 
employs both positivist and interpretivist paradigms. These paradigms were used due to 
their suitability for the researcher's worldview, the research questions, the nature of the 
research problem, and the researcher's psychological attributes. The chapter explained 
why the mixed-methods research design was appropriate for this study and explained 
why this approach was chosen. Particularly, explanatory sequential mixed-methods 
design was used for this study. The study used sequential timing, first using a quantitative 
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design for collecting and analysing data. Then, qualitative data from semi-structured 
interviews follows the statistical results.  
 
Mixed-methods helps to overcome the weaknesses of a single method. It provides 
impetus for a more detailed understanding of the research problem. Importantly, the 
mixed methods design was most appropriate to answer the research questions especially 
as it helps to improve the reliability of the findings in corporate governance studies, as 
they examine the behaviour of individuals and firms alike.  
 
The second part introduced the quantitative method used in the research. In this part, the 
hypotheses for the quantitative study were developed. Following which the model 
specification and variables measurements were discussed. The part of the study also 
discussed the questionnaire survey, design and administration. Finally, for the 
quantitative section, the data collected were described, and the statistical methods used 
in the analysis were discussed.  
 
The third part of this chapter presented the qualitative method used in this study. The 
study employed qualitative methods to explore real-life governance issues. Also, 
reliability and validity in qualitative research were discussed briefly in the first section. 
This third part also presented the data collection process using semi-structured 
interviews. More precisely, it discussed the selection of the interviewees. A total of 
twenty seven (27) interviews were conducted. This third part also discussed ethical issues 
considered before and after conducting the interviews. Also discussed was the data 
analysis procedure.  
 
The next chapter presents the findings and discussions obtained from the investment 
analysts' perception on features of drivers of board structure and composition mechanism 
on investment decision making. 
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Chapter Six: Perception of Investment analysts on 
Features of Board Structure and Composition Drivers.  
 
6.1 Introduction 
As stated earlier in chapter one, the literature on the drivers of good corporate governance 
does not provide a clear validation of the individual board structure and composition 
mechanism drivers. This is especially so as most of the publications are usually focused 
on one-two aspects of "good" governance, without providing an overall picture of the 
relative importance of a wider range of board structure and composition drivers to 
stakeholder groups such as investors or investment analysts. 
 
In developing countries, where institutions are weak (La Porta et al., 1999), it even 
becomes more difficult for external stakeholders to decipher good corporate governance 
in the presence of mechanisms such as board independence, board reputation and board 
heterogeneity amongst others. As such, studies on board of director 
structure/composition in developing economies have become increasingly important to 
shareholders (including potential investors), investment analysts and regulators (Melo, 
2015; Rashid, 2018), especially since the board of directors is the apex of internal 
governance control mechanics (Fama & Jensen, 1983).  One way to ensure the interests 
of agents and principals converge is the establishment of a board of directors. Further 
support for boards' importance, structure and composition is also found in legal tradition, 
which assumes that the board of directors is to behave like a consensus driven decision-
making group with no individual director having the authority to act on behalf of the 
corporation, but only as a body of directors (Bainbridge, 2008). Hence, boards are 
primarily responsible for putting controls in place to ensure firms' management behave 
in accordance with shareholders expectations of them (Cadbury report, 1992). 
 
Board of director mechanisms are however understudied in the developing country 
contexts, characterized by weak institutional domestic environments (Hoskisson et. al., 
2000; La Porta et al., 1999;2000; Adegbite, 2015; Nakpodia & Adegbite, 2018), where 
understanding about boards seems to be derived based on knowledge from international 
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governance codes (Melo, 2015). There is even less research at the firm and industry 
levels in relation to the features of board structure/composition which send signals of 
good corporate governance to external stakeholders (Melo, 2015; Adegbite, 2015; Black 
et al., 2017; Rashid, 2018). As a governance mechanism, the board is obliged to 
scrutinize the firm's executive management's behavior and performance to protect the 
interests of stakeholders (Hillman & Dalziel, 2003). Boards provide advice, give 
legitimacy to firms, and are a source of communication especially to external parties 
(Hillman et al., 2000; Lynall et al., 2003). A mix of executive, non-executive directors, 
independent directors can provide a wide range of expertise, which can objectively 
influence the firm's strategy and indeed performance (Anderson & Reeb, 2002; Davis & 
Greve., 1997; Deutsch, 2005). 
 
Therefore, to identify the validity and importance of the individual board structure and 
composition driver features in a systematic manner in developing countries, this research 
uses the results of an expert survey. Investment analysts were asked to rate each 
individual operationalization on a 5-point Likert scale (1 = strongly agree, 5 = strongly 
disagree). Individual scores allowed the researcher to verify the importance of a 
particular driver feature relative to other features in the same "family." The three board 
structure and composition drivers studied are presented in three separate parts. For each 
part, after defining each particular driver, each feature of the driver is then described. 
Subsequently, the descriptive results of respondents view on each feature is presented, 
following which the ordered logit regressions results are presented. Also in this chapter, 
the quantitative and qualitative findings are triangulated and discussed. 
 
6.2 Part A. Board Structure and Composition 1: Board 
independence  
Addressing the question of which board independence features depict independence most 
in developing countries, is quite challenging especially given the weak institutional 
environment and the general distrust/corruption prevalent in the society.  
 
   
187 
 
We shed light on which features of board independence when recognized by investment 
analysts, generates a considerable measure of confidence that the board is independent. 
6.2.1. Statistical Analysis of study variables 
6.2.1.1. Descriptives of Board Independence Features in Nigeria 
Tables 6.1-6.5 reports percentage and frequencies of respondents that believe features of 
board independence describe independence. These tables present further evidence of a 
generally high level of engagement by the respondents especially given the specialist 
nature of our respondent sample selection. The standard deviations of these features are 
also very close to 1, which indicates further the high agreement amongst the respondents. 
In table 6.1, 81.48% of respondents agree or strongly agree that CEO duality does not 
portend board independence. For CEO duality, the mean was 1.9185 with a standard 
deviation of 1.1464. Similarly, in table 6.5 where 83.70% of the investment analysts 
agree or strongly agree that free float/diverse share ownership of shares of a company is 
likely to portend independence, and only 7.41 disagree or strongly disagree. The mean 
of diverse share ownership feature was 1.7556 with a standard deviation of 0.9261, which 
indicates again the agreement among respondents. 
 
The findings that free float is important for investment decision making points to the 
short tenure mindset of investors.  A major concern for the investment analysts is the 
tradability of the shares of a company, probably for easy exit in turbulent times. This 
finding is consistent with literature (e.g., La Porta et al., 1999; Adegbite, 2015, Nakpodia 
& Adegbite, 2018) that suggests that the weak institutions in developing country means 
the investors distrust the independence of boards of companies and will only be happy to 
invest in shares of firms during the good times or when the see arbitrage opportunities. 
 
Also, 67.41% of the respondents strongly agree or agree that the presence of more non-
exec than execs represents board independence while 14.07% disagree or strongly 
disagree (as high as 21.48% stayed neutral). Now although the majority of the 
respondents recognize that more non-execs on a board should lead to less conflict of 
interest, the level of disagreement or neutrality suggests that evidence of this feature is 
not overwhelming. Again, this seems consistent with the literature (e.g., Adegbite, 2015; 
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La Porta et al., 1999) that posit that in developing countries, many of the firms are family 
owned hence the boards are dominated by family or close associates of majority owners. 
Indeed, only 64.44% of respondents agree or strongly agree that more non-execs than 
execs on a board represent board independence. 
 
Table 6. 1 CEO Duality 
 Frequency Percent Cumulative 
Strongly Agree 61 45.19 45.19 
Agree 49 36.30 81.48 
Neither Agree or Disagree 8 5.93 87.41 
Disagree 9 6.67 94.07 
Strongly Disagree 8 5.93 100 
 
Table 6. 2 Perception of no conflict when Non-Exec are more than Exec 
 Frequency Percent Cumulative 
Strongly Agree 45 33.33 33.33 
Agree 46 34.07 67.41 
Neither Agree or Disagree 25 18.52 85.93 
Disagree 14 10.37 96.30 
Strongly Disagree 5 3.70 100 
 
Table 6. 3 Perception of Independence when Non-Exec are more than Exec  
 Frequency Percent Cumulative 
Strongly Agree 44 32.59 32.59 
Agree 43 31.85 64.44 
Neither Agree or Disagree 29 21.48 85.93 
Disagree 18 13.33 99.26 
Strongly Disagree 1 0.74 100 
 
Table 6. 4 share ownership/ free float  
 Frequency Percent Cumulative 
Strongly Agree 66 48.89 48.89 
Agree 47 34.81 83.70 
Neither Agree or Disagree 12 8.89 92.59 
Disagree 9 6.67 99.26 
Strongly Disagree 1 0.74 100 
 
Table 6. 5 Influence of independent directors  
 Frequency Percent Cumulative 
Strongly Agree 62 45.93 45.93 
Agree 49 36.30 82.22 
Neither Agree or Disagree 12 8.89 91.11 
Disagree 10 7.41 98.52 
Strongly Disagree 2 1.48 100 
Table 6. 6 Summary of board independence features  
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 Mean STD. 
DEV 
Min Max Frequency Aggregate of 
strongly agree and agree (%) 
CEO Duality 
 
1.918519 1.146389         1 5 81.48 
Perception of no conflict 
when Non-Exec are more 
than Exec 
2.17037   1.116636          1 5 67.41 
Perception of 
Independence when Non-
Exec are more than Exec 
2.177778 1.057078 1 5 64.44 
Drivers shares/ free float 1.755556     .9261271 1 5 83.70 
Influence of independent 
directors  
1.822222    .9763369   1 5 82.22 
6.2.1.2 Test for Normality of Board Independence Features 
The Skewness and Kurtosis tests were conducted and provided evidence of fairly normal 
distribution of the variables. For Skewness, the value of symmetrical distribution is zero 
(Gujarati, 2003; Brooks, 2008). For Kurtosis, the hypothesis of non-normality can be 
rejected if its value is 3 (Gujarati, 2003; Brooks, 2008). 
 
Table 6. 7 Skewness/ Kurtosis Test for Normality 
 OBS  
PR(SKEWNESS)   
PR(KURTOSIS) ADJ 
CHI2(2)    
PROB>CHI2 
CEO DUALITY  
 
0.0000 0.0265        26.26          0.0000 
 
Perception of no 
conflict when Non-
Exec are more than 
Exec 
0.0006 0.7289        10.23    0.0060 
Perception of 
Independence when 
Non-Exec are more 
than Exec  
0.0228         0.0016       12.67          0.0018 
 
Drivers shares/ free 
float 
0.0000         0.0400      22.81          0.0000 
Influence of 
independent directors  
0.0000         0.0410    22.64          0.0000 
 
Table 6.7 which reports normality of board independence features shows that the 
Skewness values for most of the variables fall between 0.000 and 0.0228. For Kurtosis 
test statistics, the variables fall between 0.0016 and 0.7289 indicating a normal 
distribution 
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6.2.1.3. Spearman and Pearson Correlation of Board Independence Features 
A correlation matrix was used to test the direction and magnitude of the linear 
relationship between the variables. This test helps to discover the potential presence of 
multicollinearity among the variables. There could be multicollinearity if a correlation 
coefficient between two variables is large. Following Ntim et al. (2012a) and Ntim & 
Soobaroyen (2013), the Pearson and Spearman correlation coefficients are reported in 
Table 6.8. The table shows the correlation matrix for the dependent, independent and 
control variables employed for the board independence and decision making models. 
However, the magnitude and direction of the correlation coefficients add to the evidence 
that there was no major problem of non-normality among the variables in the models 
(Ntim &Soobaroyen, 2013). In addition, the correlations among the variables were fairly 
low, indicating that there was not a serious multicollinearity problem (see Haniffa & 
Hudaib, 2006; Dam & Scholtens, 2012; Ntim et al., 2012a; Ramly, 2012).
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Table 6. 8 (obs=141) Correlation of Board Independence Features 
 
Pearson Correlation  
 gen age bg tny sub annut bi1iv bi2iv bi4iv bi5iv bi6iv bi3dv 
             
gen 1.0000            
age -0.1507 1.0000           
bg -0.0423 0.1098 1.0000          
tny -0.1066 0.5590 -0.1844 1.0000         
sub 0.0425 -0.0785 -0.0496 -0.0129 1.0000        
annut -0.1037 -0.1139 -0.1075 0.0087 0.2891 1.0000       
bi1iv -0.0393 -0.0168 -0.0015 -0.0051 -0.0859 -0.0119 1.0000      
bi2iv 0.2170 -0.1407 -0.0866 -0.0017 -0.1653 -0.0961 0.3119 1.0000     
bi4iv 0.1783 -0.2114 -0.1053 -0.0845 -0.0071 -0.0357 0.2401 0.6933 1.0000    
bi5iv 0.1474 -0.0568 0.0664 -0.1037 -0.0833 0.0531 0.2124 0.1621 0.2244 1.0000   
bi6iv 0.1286 0.0789 0.0577 0.0421 -0.0229 -0.0060 0.0962 0.1915 0.2787 0.2409 1.0000  
bi3dv 0.1326 -0.1429 -0.0151 -0.0931 -0.0836 -0.1282 0.1047 0.2766 0.3406 0.2183 0.1509 1.0000 
 
 
Spearman Correlation 
 gen age bg tny sub annut bi1iv bi2iv bi4iv bi5iv bi6iv bi3dv 
             
gen 1.0000             
age -0.1532 1.0000            
bg -0.0104 0.0394 1.0000           
tny -0.0897 0.5458 -0.1751 1.0000          
sub 0.0425 -0.0459 -0.0525 -0.0026 1.0000         
annut -0.1313 -0.1002 -0.1568 -0.0007 0.2864 1.0000        
bi1iv -0.0445 -0.0434 -0.0244 -0.0117 -0.0482 0.0279 1.0000       
bi2iv 0.2264 -0.1769 -0.1042 -0.0243 -0.1518 -0.0837 0.2477 1.0000      
bi4iv 0.1960 -0.2266 -0.1008 -0.0917 -0.0145 -0.0576 0.1319 0.6704 1.0000     
bi5iv 0.1880 -0.0395 0.0874 -0.1150 -0.1021 -0.0013 0.1425 0.1448 0.2228 1.0000    
bi6iv 0.1623 0.0513 0.0487 -0.0238 -0.0387 -0.0734 0.0767 0.1725 0.2633 0.2893 1.0000   
bi3dv 0.1523 -0.2152 0.0679 -0.1605 -0.0558 -0.1139 0.0130 0.2758 0.3121 0.1999 0.1448 1.0000 
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6.2.1.4. Ordered Logit Regression of Board Independence Features Against 
Decision Making. 
The ordered logit regression (Table 6.9) was used to investigate the relationship between 
features of board independence and decision-making.  The table will reveal that nine 
submodels were built, each with varying independent variables. Sub model with Adjusted 
R2 of 0.08716 was the best fit. This model can explain 8.71% of the variables relationship. 
When seeking only a weak signal in the presence of a lot of noise, and even a small signal 
can be of interest, then R-squared of even 10% or lower can have some information (Nau, 
2018).  Moreover, as suggested by Nau (2018), the results obtained from this regression were 
cross validated through the semi-structured interviews conducted. Other studies reported 
similar low R-squared values. For example, McCahery et al. (2016) reported R-squared of 
10% in their study. 
 
For robustness, ordered probit regression was conducted and produced similar results to the 
ordered logit regression. See appendix 3.
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Table 6. 9 Ordered logit regressions of features of board independence against investment decision-making influence of board independence  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
VARIABLES bi3dv bi3dv bi3dv bi3dv bi3dv bi3dv bi3dv bi3dv bi3dv 
          
gen 0.518 0.292 0.262 0.384 0.404 0.278 0.230 0.146 0.116 
 (0.392) (0.409) (0.407) (0.400) (0.402) (0.411) (0.416) (0.418) (0.421) 
age -0.487* -0.415 -0.381 -0.536* -0.526* -0.417 -0.380 -0.444 -0.460 
 (0.272) (0.279) (0.281) (0.279) (0.275) (0.279) (0.281) (0.287) (0.289) 
bg 0.0760 0.0907 0.110 0.0589 0.0539 0.0907 0.110 0.0921 0.0863 
 (0.160) (0.160) (0.162) (0.160) (0.162) (0.160) (0.161) (0.162) (0.163) 
tny -0.0573 -0.0934 -0.0581 -0.00939 -0.0575 -0.0964 -0.0670 -0.0268 -0.0259 
 (0.203) (0.207) (0.209) (0.207) (0.203) (0.207) (0.210) (0.214) (0.214) 
sub -0.237 -0.128 -0.283 -0.171 -0.248 -0.133 -0.279 -0.226 -0.219 
 (0.379) (0.385) (0.388) (0.385) (0.380) (0.386) (0.398) (0.403) (0.402) 
annut -0.149 -0.126 -0.132 -0.183 -0.151 -0.123 -0.125 -0.154 -0.155 
 (0.143) (0.145) (0.145) (0.146) (0.144) (0.146) (0.146) (0.150) (0.150) 
bi1iv 0.0601     -0.0550 -0.0789 -0.127 -0.129 
 (0.159)     (0.170) (0.171) (0.173) (0.174) 
bi2iv  0.366**    0.384** 0.0594 0.0658 0.0728 
  (0.166)    (0.175) (0.229) (0.230) (0.231) 
bi4iv   0.561***    0.541** 0.494** 0.468* 
   (0.183)    (0.248) (0.251) (0.255) 
bi5iv    0.434**    0.377** 0.364* 
    (0.188)    (0.190) (0.192) 
bi6iv     0.282    0.117 
     (0.195)    (0.205) 
/cut1 -1.374 -0.542 -0.00901 -0.860 -1.136 -0.609 -0.0715 0.255 0.345 
 (0.923) (0.971) (0.997) (0.919) (0.905) (0.992) (1.026) (1.048) (1.061) 
/cut2 0.339 1.212 1.792* 0.910 0.586 1.144 1.730* 2.109** 2.198** 
 (0.916) (0.977) (1.011) (0.922) (0.900) (0.997) (1.040) (1.068) (1.082) 
/cut3 1.774* 2.664** 3.278*** 2.365** 2.020** 2.594** 3.212*** 3.621*** 3.714*** 
 (0.981) (1.040) (1.078) (0.990) (0.966) (1.061) (1.107) (1.143) (1.159) 
/cut4 3.426*** 4.326*** 4.951*** 4.018*** 3.679*** 4.256*** 4.886*** 5.299*** 5.401*** 
 (1.325) (1.371) (1.403) (1.333) (1.316) (1.386) (1.424) (1.453) (1.470) 
Pseudo R2 .0370 .0542 .0710 .0557 .0439 .0546 .0719 .0859 .0871 
 
Observations 131 131 131 131 131 131 131 131 131 
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Standard errors in parentheses 
                                                                                                *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Codes  
Gender  GEN 0 Male 1 Female 
AGE AGE 21-30 – 1, 31-40 -2, 41-50 – 3, 51-60 -4, Over 60 - 5 
Your Background (Which area have you gained most of your 
working investment experience) 
BG Banking and Finance – 1, Pol Science -2, Economics – 3, Accounting – 4, Others - 5 
Total number of years you have spent as an analyst TNY 0-4 – 1,5-9 – 2, 10-15 – 3, 16-20 – 4, Over 20 -5 
Is your firm a subsidiary/affiliate of an international company? SUB Yes- 1, No -0 
What is the annual investment turnover of your company? AnnuT N1M-N100M -1, N101M-N1bn – 2, N1bn-N10bn – 3, N10bn-N100bn – 4, Over N100bn - 5 
When the CEO of the bank is NOT the same as the chairman, 
I am inclined to think there is minimal conflict of interest on 
the board  
BI1IV CEO DUALITY 
To reduce the conflict of interest on a bank’s board, the 
number of non-exec directors must be more than exec 
directors on the board of a bank 
BI2IV Perception of no conflict when Non-exec are more than exec 
When I perceive the board of a bank to have minimal or no 
conflict of 
interest, I am inclined to make investment recommendations. 
BI3DV Investment decision making bias based on board independence 
To guarantee board independence, the number of non-
executive directors 
must be more than executive directors on the board of a bank 
BI4IV Perception of independence when non-exec are more than exec (Control Question) 
Shares of a bank owned by different individuals/ organizations 
rather than concentrated in the hands of a few individuals/ 
organizations, helps to achieve 
  less conflict of interest in a bank’s board 
BI5IV Diverse ownership/free float 
Presence of at least two independent directors helps to 
minimize conflict 
of interest on a bank’s board 
BI6 Influence of independent directors 
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Table 6. 10 Summary of the hypothesis and the findings obtained from the regression. 
 
Dependent Variable  Decision Making influence of Board Independence 
  
Independent 
variable  
No. 
Hypothesis  
Expected 
sign  
Finding sign  Finding 
significance  
Hypothesis status  
CEO duality  1a  -  -  Insignificant  Rejected  
 
Diverse share 
ownership 
1b +  +  Significant at 
the 10% level  
Accepted  
 
Perception of 
no conflict 
when non-
exec are 
more than 
exec 
 
1ci +  +  Insignificant   Rejected  
Perception of 
independence 
when non-
exec are 
more than 
exec 
 
1cii +  + Significant at 
the 10% level  
Accepted  
Presence of  
2 or more 
independent 
directors  
 
1d +  +  Insignificant  Rejected  
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6.2.2. Discussions and Triangulation of Qualitative and Quantitative 
Findings of Features of Board Independence Driver 
Model 1: Board Independence Induced Propensity to Make Favourable Investment Decision 
= β0 -0.13(BI1) + .07(BI2) + 0.47(BI4) + 0.36(BI5) + 0.12(BI6) + .12(Gen) + .09(BG) -
.46(AGE) -.22(IA) -.16(FS) -.03(TNY) + εi 
6.2.2.1 Preamble 
Board independence connotes a willingness to bring a high degree of rigor, scrutiny, and 
objectivity to the evaluation of a company's management (Langevoort, 2001). 85.95% of 
survey respondents agree or strongly agree that board independence is important for 
investment decision making. According to interviewee LC2, independence “to a large extent 
means that there is high transparency." According to the respondents, board independence 
means interests of minority and majority shareholders are aligned. Interviewee LC2 states 
thus “in terms of how the institution is run, I expect to see some strong alignment between 
the board and the minority shareholders as well and so, not too much of a link between the 
board and management but clearly showing a strong proper representation of minority 
investors on the on the board of the institution.” 
 
Supporting this view of independence, interviewee MA1 highlights that “independent board 
means that the board is separate, the activities of the board is separate from that of the 
company in terms of conflict. You are trying to ensure that there is no conflict of interest".  
Further supporting this view, interviewee LC5 posits that independence means, "the 
situation which will arise that will make the board have a conflict of interest, are almost 
zero. So, that includes any kind (of conflicts of interests). The board should not have a stake 
in the company in terms of loans; they should not be suppliers, they should not have anything 
that can make the managing director (MD) (of the bank) or anybody blackmail them or arm 
twist them into a decision”. With respect to transparency of a board and a firm generally, 
interviewee MA1 posits that transparency occurs when “the directors are not borrowing 
from the company, the company is not lending to the directors, no insider dealings, 
everybody (every director) maintains the business of providing strategic visions to the 
organization. Also, they (the directors) are leading along that line (of providing strategic 
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vision for the firm) and not so much of their (own personal) interests that can endanger the 
interest of other stakeholders in the company." 
 
However, the negative societal influences (Nakpodia & Adegbite, 2018) and distrust in 
regulatory compliance (Osemeke & Adegbite, 2016) in Nigeria where the cultural 
expectations are that "you do not bite the hands that feed you" or allows people to be 
subservient to benefactors casts doubts on the board independence. This is highlighted by 
interviewee LC3 who posits thus, "the board should be independent and devoid of control 
from anywhere and where control can come from.  For instance, there was a regulation by 
CBN that you cannot be MD of a bank for more than ten years.  Then for the chairmanship 
of the bank has a specific limit on when you can stay there. What you find out is that when 
those people are going (MD or Chairman), they have groomed somebody internally and they 
say this person is going to replace him on the board, specifically the chairman. What you 
find is that that new chairman still reports to the previous chairman or MD. So, the concept 
of independence that you are looking for at the board has been short-circuited at that point.”  
 
Controlling for gender, age, background, experience, international affiliation and annual 
turnover in this study, did not affect the results of the regression. For example, as expected, 
age is negatively statistically significant correlated with board independence (β= -.74, 
p<.05). This suggests that the older investment analysts are, the less they believe the board 
independence variable as signaled by banks. However, the total number of years is also 
negatively statistically correlated with board independence although not statistically 
significant (β= -0.03). This suggests that the more experienced investment analysts are less 
likely believe the board independence variable as signaled by banks. This finding suggests 
that corruption and societal distrust has permeated the whole society. This distrust of board 
independence as presented in Nigerian banks by investment analysts is further corroborated 
by interviewee CP2 who states thus, "…the question is if my mentor comes to meet me, 
somebody that had trained me and helped me rise to the rank and says, hey! Look, I need 
you to do one or two things… Is there a chance that I would say, no? I doubt it very much”. 
6.2.2.2 Features of board independence driver 
CEO duality: That CEO duality is a matter of debate is not in doubt even if the OECD 
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Principles (2004) and CBN code (2014) specify that the same person should not hold CEO 
and chairperson positions. In Nigerian banking industry, the role of the CEO is mandatorily 
separated from the chairman leaving no room for CEO duality. Despite this regulation, 
results from this study present some ambiguity. 
 
From the regression analysis, CEO duality is negatively statistically correlated with 
investment decision making (β= -.13, p= 0.46) but it is not statistically significant. The 
interviews produce mixed findings. On the one hand, interviewee LC3 posits, “I will not 
recommend or invest in a company that has the MD/CEO as the chairman. Because control 
is definitely weak across the board. Corporate governance is weak. Control is weak, and 
objectivity has been thrown to the bush. So, I will not likely invest in such companies”. 
Similarly, MF1 posits, “In this environment, we have seen people who left as MD, who are 
owner-founder of banks, or owner-manager and the situation is not that different. When they 
leave as maybe chairman or managing director, they still find a way to run the organization 
behind the scene. So, what you see is that underneath they still call the shot, even though 
they are not managing director or they are not chairman. So, typical outgoing managing 
director that is the owner-manager can sit in the comfort of his home and call the board 
meeting into this house." This is in alignment with literature which suggests that 
consolidating the roles of the CEO and that of the chairman into one position amounts to 
undue concentration of power and influence into one individual, which jeopardizes board 
independence (Fama, 1980; Fama & Jensen, 1983; Lorsh & Maclver, 1989; Molz, 1988; 
Shleifer & Vishny, 1997). 
 
On the other hand, some interviewees were neutral on the benefits of non-duality, as they 
believe that in the Nigerian environment, CEO non-duality is more a nomenclature game. 
Interviewee OP2 describes the situation thus, "I mean we have seen in Nigeria, a number of 
CEOs who then became board chairman and I mean there are probably other situations or 
factors involved, all of which I cannot highlight but even that, despite not quite being a case 
of being both CEO and chairman at the same time, has from our perspective not impeded 
the level of transparency and has not brought in a level of conflicts of interest. So, we have 
had figurehead CEOs essentially, and we have had chairmen who appear to be more 
chairman and CEOs at the same time". In such situations, similar to the literature supporting 
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CEO duality, the investment analysts are presuming CEO duality can in fact aid firm 
performance (Daily & Dalton, 1992; 1994; Beatty & Zajac, 1994; Boyd, 1994). 
 
In any case, even though the relationship between CEO duality and investment decision 
making is negative as predicted, the non-significance of the finding suggests that we cannot 
confidently associate CEO duality to decision to invest or not. In the same vein, from the 
qualitative findings, it can be deduced that the thought process of the investment analysts on 
the issue of CEO duality is not uniform. While some investment analysts feel strongly about 
the negative influence of CEO duality, some others were of the opinion that CEO duality is 
not necessarily a negative but is rather dependent on the specific individual occupying both 
roles. Therefore, H1a is not supported. 
 
Diverse share ownership: This feature of board independence is positively statistically 
significantly correlated with investment decision making (β=.36, p<.01). This suggests that 
investment analysts presume that the more free float shares of a company, the more likely 
the board will be independent. This is consistent with the literature on Nigeria, which 
suggests that dispersal of share ownership is a precursor to achieving board independence 
(Adegbite, 2015). Hence in line with the literature, the majority of the interviewees were 
categorical that free float of shares is the feature of board independence that influences them 
the most. This might not be unconnected with the short-tenured nature of investments in the 
country.  Interviewee LF2 puts it as thus "for me it (diversity of shares) is my preference. If 
you take Nigeria as an example, although you do not have that within the banking space 
where one or two people hold a significant chunk of the company shares. But if you take a 
cue from the consumer space where you have the international companies with an 
international parent holding about sixty, forty percent of the shares. It immediately affects 
the free float of such a company, and for me, an investor one of my key concentration is ease 
of moving in and out-, liquidity. So, the more shares you have in the hands of many 
shareholders, the better for me. i.e., the more free float of company you have the better for 
me. So, some of the investment decisions that I look at is I need to be able to exit a stock in 
2 to 3 days. Anything that takes longer than that then it kind of influences my decision 
negatively. So, the more the free float of a company's shares the more inclined on I am to 
invest in it.”  
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The importance of diverse share ownership is corroborated by interviewee MF3 who posits 
thus; “if you understand that capital market, at least the secondary market, part of the 
requirements is that certain… what they call free float, has to be in the market, at least 
twenty five percent of that free float has to be in the hands of the public, I mean that is set 
for a reason so, that you do not have undue influence. One person cannot have controlling 
shares and sway decisions of the organization. We will like to see independence in a lot of 
all these things. Therefore the more vast or disperse the shareholding I think, the more 
attractive it will be in my opinion." 
 
Some investment analysts however expressed some reservations. For example, interviewee 
OP3 states, “in this environment, it (diverse share ownership) is a double-edged sword. On 
the positive side, having dispersed ownership means that we do not have any blocks of 
interest that can essentially grab the control of the business but the flipside, as we have seen 
in some cases is that, where there are no strong interests, then sometimes it becomes a free-
for-all and you then have some senior management, some executive management who then 
treat the company however they want because there are no blocks of interest to challenge 
them, who have sufficient shareholding to challenge them. So, we have seen the flip side 
which is blocks of interest in some cases proved to incorporate good governance, but of 
course, you always run the risk if the values of those blocks are not positive that they run the 
company aground”.  
 
This reservation might not be unconnected to the nature of business holding in Nigeria where 
families still dominate (La Porta et al., 1999). Interviewee OP1 put it as follows “yes, we like 
dispersed share ownership I think, but we do not necessarily dislike concentrated 
shareholdings either. Generally, dispersed share ownership is better but sometimes 
concentrated share ownership is useful depending on where it is concentrated and whose 
hands, right? So, if you look at X9 Bank as a case in point, over time it has become a lot 
more attractive to us due to the concentration of shareholding in the hands of X group, which 
is an institutional shareholder." 
                                                          
9X or XX has been used to protect the name of the banks as this can be very sensitive disclosure 
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Overall, the findings of the interviews are in alignment with the quantitative study, which 
suggested that diverse share ownership provides most the appearance of board 
independence. 
Therefore, Hypothesis 1b is supported. 
 
Non-executive directors(i): From the regressions analysis, perception of investment 
analysts is that there is less conflict of interest when there are more non-executive to 
executive directors, although the results were statistically not significant (β=.07, p= 0.75). 
In developing countries, many firms are family owned (La Porta et al., 1999; Adegbite, 
2015); hence investment analysts operating in the Nigerian environment also relate 
contextually with respect to board composition. The institutional weakness prevalent in the 
country plays on the minds of investment analysts. Interviewee OP4 points to the agency 
problem thus "there are some management (agents) that can wreck your business.  I mean 
look at the Nigerian business environment for example if you set up a business, you put 
somebody to oversee the business. (Having) somebody who does not have shares in the 
business can wreck10 you, right. I mean so the controls are supposed to be there. Ordinarily, 
in an ideal world, in an ideal situation there should not be this issue but you know we are 
humans I mean the humans will always have their own selfish interests at heart”.  
Further, the investment analysts generally alluded to distrust on the benefits of having more 
non- executive directors on a board than executive directors. According to interviewee MF1, 
“I have seen from my own experience that people come to the board as a result of oh, I know 
A or B… the managing director appointed me to this board or some influential person, 
especially political influence, now that we are at the realm of politics. I have seen people….I 
am a member of certain board, I have seen people appointed to the board, and they cannot 
contribute anything. In the first place, their coming to the board is more or less like oh! I 
have settled11 you.  That is where you are going to reap your reward for working hard for 
me. So, the mindset that comes to the board is not the mindset that wants to add value; add 
to discussion. It is the mindset of oh, I have been settled. Give me board allowance, give me 
board fee, and maybe you are a producer (of certain products); let me have steps into your 
                                                          
10 Wreck refers to poor management which leads to the collapse of the business 
11 Settle is a Nigerian slang which implies you have been paid by a benefactor or you are compromised 
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business. Compensate me one way or the other through what you are doing. If I am selling 
Bournvita. (They will say) Oh, allocate two trucks or three trucks of Bournvita12 to my wife. 
So, they come to the board for pecuniary benefit not because they want to add value to the 
organization.” Interviewee OP1 further corroborates this thus, “theoretically if you go by the 
book, yes we want to see more independents, we want to see more non-executives, and we 
want to see separation of roles. But we realized that there is a whole lot more grey than 
black and whites in this market, so we spend a lot of time looking at the grey areas. Who are 
these people? What have they done before? What was their track record? What is the market 
noise about them? And I think those things carry a lot more weight for us than how many 
independents are there? How many executives are there? Who these people are is a lot more 
important to us than the numbers (of non-executives to executives)”. 
 
From the above, when the question was posed to respondents on if more non-executives on 
the board represented independence, the finding was positive but not significant. The 
findings find support from the studies by Klein et al. (2004) and Macavoy & Millstein 
(2003). Hence, from the foregoing, H1c (i) is not supported. 
 
Non-executive to executive directors (ii): According to interviewee LF1 "for an 
independent board, you expect to have a larger number of non-executive members, 
especially you have the chairman as a non-executive remember. So, that is again looking at 
the numbers in terms of composition, you expect to have more non-executive members on 
the board than executive members. So, that to some extent will balance the power and make 
the board to a larger extent independent" Similarly, from the regressions analysis, the 
perception of investment analysts is that there are more chances of a board being independent 
when there are more non-executive than executive directors. This feature of board 
independence is positively statistically significantly correlated with investment decision 
making (β=.47, p<.01). Triangulating the regression results with the analysis from the 
interviews reveals that investment analysts will rather have a board with more non related 
NEDs than EDs. According to interviewee LA1 “at least from the perspective of more 
external directors, it means there is a certain level of independence the board should have”. 
                                                          
12  Bournvita is a food beverage produced by a food and beverage company. It was used metaphorically by the interviewee 
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This is despite the distrust of the operating environment in developing countries where many 
board members are nominees of major principals (Adegbite, 2015; Ahunwan, 2002).  
 
In furtherance of this finding, interviewee OP2 posits thus "Independence like I said earlier 
is not really about the form, all right, or the framework. It is really about the substance that 
you see. But you cannot have the substance without the framework, or we cannot have the 
substance without the form. So, a few things come to mind. I would love to see things like 
strong individuals on the board, especially in the non-executive capacity". This finding also 
find support from the literature where non-executive directors generally bring different 
strategic perspective to a firm's board based on their own background and orientation 
(Carpenter, 2002; Carpenter & Westphal, 2001; Carpenter et al., 2003; Beatty &  Zajac, 
1994; Westphal & Zajac, 1995; Golden & Zajac, 2001). In any case, the Nigerian SEC code 
(2008) and CBN code (2014) mandates that the board must be composed of executive 
(insider) and non-executive (outsider) directors, the majority of which must be non-
executives. 
 
From the above, when the question was posed to respondents on if more non-executives on 
the board represented independence, the finding was positive and significant with investment 
decision making. The finding finds support from the study by Collett & Hrasky (2005) which 
suggests that an appropriate proportion of NEDs to EDs can positively influence 
performance. Hence, from the foregoing, H1c (ii) is supported. 
 
Independent Director - In the Nigerian banking sector “at least two (2) non-executive board 
members should be independent directors (who do not represent any particular shareholder 
interest and hold no special business interest in the bank) appointed by the bank on merit” 
(CBN Circular, 2007 p. 1). However, just as argued about more non-executive directors, 
there is a distrust of this board independence feature by the investment analysts. For 
example, interviewee LC2 states, “for me I think ultimately I would argue that in our 
environment anyway, there is a lot of talk. So, I think currently with most banks, there is a 
push to have board members that are termed independent, and I think to a large extent, 
expectation of independent is more showing that not necessarily linked to the management 
team per se but are a better representation of the shareholders and I will tag it that most 
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cases, the appointments are still done by the existing board anyways.  So, the nominations 
(still) come from the board even if it might be approved by shareholders at AGMs but those 
names still come from the board. So, sometimes it is difficult to argue independently when 
its members of the board that more or less nominate those independent board members”.  
 
The literature argues that independent directors are more able to mitigate the agency problem 
by reducing managerial opportunism (Fama, 1980; Bebchuk & Weisbach, 2010). However, 
the finding on this feature though positive statistically with investment decision making, was 
not significant (β=.12, p= 0.57).  
 
Therefore, H1d is not supported. 
 
The next subsection presents findings of driver two (board heterogeneity) of board structure 
and composition. 
 
6.3 Part B Board Structure and Composition Driver 2: Board 
Heterogeneity. 
The next sub-section reveals which board heterogeneous features depicts diversity and 
influence investment decision making most in developing countries.  
6.3.1. Statistical Analysis of study variables 
6.3.1.1 Descriptives of board heterogeneity features in Nigeria 
Tables 6.11-6.15 reports percentage and frequencies of respondents that believe certain 
features of board heterogeneity describe diversity of the board. Table 6.16 ranks the features 
on the frequencies of agree + strongly agree. Again, these tables present further evidence of 
a generally high level of engagement by the respondents especially given the specialist 
nature of our respondent sample selection. For table 6.11, 69.53% of respondents agree or 
strongly agree that gender portends diversity while 11.72% of the investment analysts 
disagree or strongly disagree. Interestingly, as high as 18.75% stayed neutral. These findings 
are consistent with the literature on gender diversity of boards (e.g., Mahalakshmi & Reddy, 
2017) even if the results suggest that developing countries are still behind the curve in 
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accepting the issue of gender diversity. For table 6.12, 67.97% of respondents agree or 
strongly agree that age portends diversity while 15.63% of the investment analysts disagree 
or strongly disagree. Again, as high as 16.41% stayed neutral. This finding is consistent with 
literature (e.g., Mishra & Jhunjhunwala, 2013) on the need to balance youth and experience 
of boards members especially in the 21st century given the advent of technology. For table 
6.13, only 50.78% of respondents agree or strongly agree that tribe portends diversity while 
22.66% of the investment analysts disagree or strongly disagree. As high as 26.56% stayed 
neutral. These findings are somewhat inconsistent with existing literature (e.g., Adegbite, 
2015) on the importance of tribe diversity of boards and instead seem to suggest that tribe is 
not a critical consideration of investors when thinking about the diversity of boards. This 
becomes quite important if we consider that there are over 250 tribes (NPC & ICF Macro, 
2009) in Nigeria.  
 
For table 6.14, 82.81% of respondents agree or strongly agree that tenure portends diversity 
while only 7.03% of the investment analysts disagree or strongly disagree. These findings 
are consistent with the literature (Pfeffer, 1982; Nakpodia & Adegbite, 2018) on tenure 
diversity of boards as literature favor shorter tenure for directors. It is also important to know 
that the CBN 2014 code of corporate governance caps board members tenure to a maximum 
of two tenures of 5years maximum limits. For table 6.15, only 34.37% of respondents agree 
or strongly agree that multiple directorships portend diversity while 29.69% of the 
investment analysts disagree or strongly disagree. This is contrary to literature especially 
those focused on developed countries where advantages of board networks are documented 
(Benton, 2017). 
 
The closeness of the mean and standard deviation of all the features indicates the level of 
agreeness by the respondents. 
 
Table 6. 11 Gender  
 Frequency Percent Cumulative 
Strongly Agree 56 43.75 43.75 
Agree 33 25.78 69.53 
Neither Agree or Disagree 24 18.75 88.28 
Disagree 11 8.59 96.88 
Strongly Disagree 4 3.13 100 
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Table 6. 12 Age 
 Frequency Percent Cumulative 
Strongly Agree 42 32.81 32.81 
Agree 45 35.16 67.97 
Neither Agree or Disagree 21 16.41 84.38 
Disagree 16 12.50 96.88 
Strongly Disagree 4 3.13 100 
 
Table 6. 13 Tribe 
 Frequency Percent Cumulative 
Strongly Agree 21 16.41 16.41 
Agree 44 34.38 50.78 
Neither Agree or Disagree 34 26.56 77.34 
Disagree 14 10.94 88.28 
Strongly Disagree 15 11.72 100 
 
Table 6. 14 Tenure 
 Frequency Percent Cumulative 
Strongly Agree 49 38.28 38.28 
Agree 57 44.53 82.81 
Neither Agree or Disagree 3 10.16 92.97 
Disagree 7 5.47 98.44 
Strongly Disagree 2 1.56 100 
 
 
Table 6. 15 Multiple directorship13 
 Frequency Percent Cumulative 
Strongly Agree 10 7.81 7.81 
Agree 34 26.56 34.37 
Neither Agree or Disagree 46 35.94 70.31 
Disagree 26 20.31 90.62 
Strongly Disagree 12 9.38 100 
 
Table 6. 16 Summary of features describing heterogeneity 
 Mean STD. DEV Min Max Frequency aggregate of strongly 
agree and agree (%) 
Gender 2.015625 1.122317 1 5 69.53 
Age  2.179688     1.118447           1 5 67.97 
Tribe 2.671875 1.21739           1 5 50.78 
Tenure 1.875       .9135894    1 5 82.81 
Multiple 
Directorship   
3.03125     1.07906      1 5 34.37 
                                                          
13 Responses were obtained in reverse order.   
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6.3.1.2 Test for normality of board heterogeneity features 
The Skewness and Kurtosis tests were conducted and provided evidence of fairly normal 
distribution of the variables. For Skewness, the value of symmetrical distribution is zero 
(Gujarati, 2003; Brooks, 2008). ). For Kurtosis, the hypothesis of non-normality can be 
rejected if its value is 3 (Gujarati, 2003; Brooks, 2008).  Table 6.17 which reports normality 
of board heterogeneity features shows that the Skewness values for most of the variables fall 
between 0.000 and 0.5056, which indicates symmetrical or nearly symmetrical distribution. 
For Kurtosis test statistics, the variables fall between 0.0136 and 0.9191, indicating normal 
distribution. 
 
Table 6. 17 Skewness/kurtosis tests for normality for board heterogeneity features 
 OBS  
PR(SKEWNESS)   
PR(KURTOSIS) ADJ 
CHI2(2)    
PROB>CHI2 
Gender  
 
0.0002 0.9191     11.92         0.0026 
 
Age 
 
0.0013 0.4362         9.60           0.0082 
Tribe 
 
0.0230 0.0648                7.78        0.0204 
Tenure  
 
0.0000         0.0136        22.18          0.0000 
Multiple Directorship  0.5056            0.1034        3.16         0.2062 
 
 
6.3.1.3 Spearman and Pearson Correlation of Board Heterogeneity Features 
A correlation matrix was used to test the direction and magnitude of the linear relationship 
between the variables. This test helps discover the potential presence of multicollinearity 
among the variables. There could be multicollinearity if a correlation coefficient between 
two variables is large. Following Ntim et al. (2012a) and Ntim & Soobaroyen (2013), the 
Pearson and Spearman correlation coefficients are reported in Table 6.18. The table shows 
the correlation matrix for the dependent, independent and control variables employed for the 
board heterogeneity and decision-making models. However, the magnitude and direction of 
the correlation coefficients add to the evidence that there is no major problem of non-
normality among the variables in the models (Ntim &Soobaroyen, 2013). In addition, the 
correlations among the variables are fairly low, indicating that there is not a serious 
multicollinearity problem (see Haniffa & Hudaib, 2006; Dam & Scholtens, 2012; Ntim et 
al., 2012a; Ramly, 2012).
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Table 6. 18 (obs=124) Correlation of Board Heterogeneity Features 
Pearson Correlation  
 gen age bg tny sub annut bh1iv bh2iv bh3iv bh4iv bh5iv bh6dv 
             
gen 1.0000            
age -0.1530 1.0000           
bg -0.0180 0.0885 1.0000          
tny -0.1446 0.5811 -0.1598 1.0000         
sub 0.0189 -0.0934 -0.0168 -0.0233 1.0000        
annut -0.0977 -0.1108 -0.0898 0.0092 0.2943 1.0000       
bh1iv 0.0342 -0.1403 -0.0344 -0.0970 0.0150 -0.0664 1.0000      
bh2iv 0.0444 -0.1044 0.0701 -0.0527 -0.0798 0.0064 0.4184 1.0000     
bh3iv -0.0065 -0.0662 -0.0794 0.0302 -0.0853 -0.0335 0.4271 0.5224 1.0000    
bh4iv -0.1396 -0.0629 0.1279 -0.1469 -0.0716 -0.1811 0.1656 0.1532 0.2073 1.0000   
bh5iv 0.0053 -0.0670 0.0062 0.0836 0.1559 0.0582 -0.2308 -0.3536 -0.2390 -0.1538 1.0000  
bh6dv 0.2179 -0.0964 -0.0467 -0.0224 -0.1101 -0.1080 0.2874 0.4279 0.3500 0.2672 -0.3514 1.0000 
 
Spearman Correlation 
 gen age bg tny sub annut bh1iv bh2iv bh3iv bh4iv bh5iv bh6dv 
gen 1.0000             
age -0.1554 1.0000            
bg -0.0027 0.0441 1.0000           
tny -0.1317 0.5703 -0.1590 1.0000          
sub 0.0189 -0.0616 -0.0102 -0.0131 1.0000         
annut -0.1309 -0.0958 -0.1218 -0.0027 0.2854 1.0000        
bh1iv -0.0192 -0.1305 -0.0237 -0.0745 0.0231 -0.0879 1.0000       
bh2iv 0.0387 -0.0896 0.0546 -0.0305 -0.0764 -0.0140 0.3847 1.0000      
bh3iv 0.0094 -0.0697 -0.1193 0.0422 -0.0750 -0.0576 0.3955 0.4851 1.0000     
bh4iv -0.1377 -0.0204 0.1093 -0.0868 -0.0729 -0.1605 0.2192 0.1864 0.2220 1.0000    
bh5iv 0.0097 -0.0345 0.0036 0.0796 0.1539 0.0451 -0.2480 -0.3712 -0.2523 -0.1882 1.0000   
bh6dv 0.2127 -0.1323 -0.0785 -0.0144 -0.1083 -0.1536 0.3163 0.4105 0.3601 0.3309 -0.3467 1.0000 
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6.3.1.4 Ordered Logit Regression of Board Heterogeneity Features against 
Decision Making 
The ordered logit regression (Table 6.19) was used to investigate the relationship between 
features of board heterogeneity and decision-making.  The table will reveal that nine 
submodels were built each with varying independent variables. Sub model with Adjusted R2 
of 0.1537 was the best fit. This model can explain 15.37% of the variables relationship. 
When seeking only a weak signal in the presence of a lot of noise, and even a small signal 
can be of interest, then R-squared of even 10% or lower can have some information (Nau, 
2018).  Moreover, as suggested by Nau (2018), the results obtained from this regression were 
cross validated through the semi-structured interviews conducted. Other studies reported 
similar low R-squared values. For example, McCahery et al. (2016) reported R-squared of 
10% in their study. 
 
A summary of the results from the ordered logit and hypothesis can be found in table 6.20 
below. For robustness, ordered probit regression was conducted and produced similar results 
to the ordered logit regression. See appendix 3. 
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  Table 6. 19 Ordered logit regressions of features of board heterogeneity against investment decision making influence of board heterogeneity 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
VARIABLES bh6dv bh6dv bh6dv bh6dv bh6dv bh6dv bh6dv bh6dv bh6dv 
          
gen 0.882** 0.780* 0.945** 1.205*** 0.935** 0.794* 0.820** 1.092** 1.098** 
 (0.422) (0.410) (0.419) (0.424) (0.417) (0.414) (0.416) (0.430) (0.433) 
age -0.283 -0.304 -0.291 -0.313 -0.550** -0.287 -0.283 -0.253 -0.406 
 (0.266) (0.267) (0.265) (0.260) (0.275) (0.270) (0.272) (0.276) (0.288) 
bg -0.0741 -0.141 -0.0424 -0.168 -0.0567 -0.116 -0.0935 -0.175 -0.139 
 (0.193) (0.188) (0.191) (0.199) (0.199) (0.191) (0.193) (0.205) (0.205) 
tny 0.204 0.177 0.138 0.246 0.342 0.192 0.171 0.205 0.322 
 (0.203) (0.204) (0.202) (0.202) (0.211) (0.206) (0.207) (0.212) (0.220) 
sub -0.450 -0.326 -0.351 -0.368 -0.273 -0.367 -0.360 -0.344 -0.289 
 (0.375) (0.375) (0.375) (0.368) (0.379) (0.377) (0.378) (0.380) (0.384) 
annut -0.111 -0.162 -0.140 -0.0613 -0.153 -0.144 -0.145 -0.0882 -0.0979 
 (0.134) (0.134) (0.136) (0.136) (0.135) (0.135) (0.135) (0.139) (0.140) 
bh1iv 0.516***     0.255 0.191 0.176 0.184 
 (0.161)     (0.173) (0.181) (0.180) (0.181) 
bh2iv  0.781***    0.674*** 0.573*** 0.545*** 0.429** 
  (0.168)    (0.182) (0.200) (0.200) (0.203) 
bh3iv   0.571***    0.222 0.182 0.141 
   (0.152)    (0.186) (0.185) (0.190) 
bh4iv    0.713***    0.564** 0.485** 
    (0.210)    (0.221) (0.219) 
bh5iv     -0.774***    -0.520*** 
     (0.177)    (0.188) 
/cut1 -0.815 -0.605 -0.593 -0.340 -4.558*** -0.182 0.0312 1.145 -0.978 
 (0.925) (0.885) (0.916) (0.968) (1.035) (0.935) (0.953) (1.057) (1.312) 
/cut2 1.165 1.508* 1.433 1.657* -2.451** 1.956** 2.185** 3.386*** 1.373 
 (0.924) (0.890) (0.920) (0.972) (0.963) (0.949) (0.971) (1.095) (1.305) 
/cut3 2.688*** 3.120*** 2.952*** 3.192*** -0.889 3.593*** 3.820*** 5.076*** 3.126** 
 (0.969) (0.943) (0.962) (1.025) (0.967) (1.006) (1.026) (1.160) (1.346) 
/cut4 4.456*** 4.969*** 4.744*** 4.976*** 0.925 5.459*** 5.699*** 6.955*** 5.054*** 
 (1.115) (1.101) (1.111) (1.169) (1.090) (1.164) (1.184) (1.297) (1.457) 
 211 
 
 
                        Standard errors in parentheses 
                   *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Codes 
Gender GEN 0 Male 1 Female 
AGE AGE 21-30 – 1, 31-40 -2, 41-50 – 3, 51-60 -4, Over 60 - 5 
Your Background (Which area have you gained most of your working 
investment experience) 
BG Banking and Finance – 1, Pol Science -2, Economics – 3, Accounting – 4, Others - 5 
Total number of years you have spent as an analyst TNY 0-4 – 1,5-9 – 2, 10-15 – 3, 16-20 – 4, Over 20 -5 
Is your firm a subsidiary/affiliate of an international company? SUB Yes- 1, No -0 
What is the annual investment turnover of your company? AnnuT N1M-N100M -1, N101M-N1bn – 2, N1bn-N10bn – 3, N10bn-N100bn – 4, Over N100bn - 5 
For accountability to all stakeholders and continued success of the bank, it is 
important for the board to consist of both male and female 
BH1IV Gender 
For accountability to all stakeholders and continued success of the bank, it is 
important for the board to consist of people in different age brackets 
BH2IV Age 
For accountability to all stakeholders and continued success of the bank, it is 
important for the board to consist of people of different tribes 
 
BH3IV Tribe 
For accountability to all stakeholders and continued success of the bank, it is 
important for the board to consist of people that have spent different lengths 
of time on the board. 
BH4IV Tenure 
It is important that members of a bank board are on boards of many other 
companies 
BH5IV Multiple directorship 
Having a board that consists of both male and female, and/or people in 
different age brackets, and/or people of different tribes and/or people that 
have spent different lengths of time on the board is important and influences 
my investment decision-making 
BH6DV Investment decision making 
 
Pseudo R2 0.0635 0.1000 0.0759 0.0677 0.0912 0.1064 0.1107 0.1307 0.1537 
Observations 124 124 124 124 124 124 124 124 124 
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Table 6. 20 A summary of all of the hypotheses and findings for the board heterogeneity and its 
features and decision-making model 
 
 
Dependent Variable  Decision Making influence of Board 
Heterogeneity  
  
Independent 
variable  
No. 
Hypothesis  
Expected 
sign  
Finding 
sign  
Finding 
significance  
Hypothesis 
status  
Gender 2a  + + Insignificant  Rejected  
 
Age 
 
2b +  +  Significant at the 
5% level 
Accepted 
Tribe 
 
32c +  + Insignificant  Rejected 
Tenure 2d +  +  Significant at 5% 
level  
 
Accepted 
Multiple 
directorship 
2e +  -  Significant at the 
1% level  
Rejected 
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6.3.2. Discussions and Triangulation of Qualitative and 
Quantitative Findings of Board Heterogeneity and its features 
 
Model 1: Board Heterogeneity Induced Propensity to Make Favourable Investment 
Decision = β0 + .18(BH1) + .43(BH2) + .14((BH3) + .46(BH4) - .52(BH5) + .1.10(Gen) - 
.14(BG) -.41(AGE) - .29(IA) -.10(FS) + .32(TNY) + εi 
6.3.2.1 Controls applied in the models 
 
Investment Analysts’ Gender (Control): 
Gender is positively statistically significantly correlated with investment decision 
making (β=.1.10, p<.05). This suggests that females are more likely to assume 
heterogeneity affects investment decision making. This finding is consistent with the 
behavioral literature, which suggests that investment analysts' behavioral patterns can be 
influenced by their gender (Gunay & Demirel, 2011). Furthermore, the study by 
Mahalakshmi & Reddy (2017) has suggested that women are less represented on boards 
hence it is unsurprising that female investment analysts will assume a gender balance is 
necessary. Relevant literature (for example, Barber & Odean, 2001a; Niederle & 
Vesterlund, 2007) points to the fact that men tend to manifest overconfidence to a greater 
degree than women. For instance, Barber & Odean (2001b) found that male investors 
trade more actively than female investors trade, incur higher transaction costs, and as a 
result, earn lower returns. Similarly, Hair et al. (1998) and Shu et al. (2004) have also 
documented greater overconfidence in men.  
 
Age:  
As expected, the age of investment analysts is negatively statistically significantly 
correlated with investment decision making (β=-.41, p<.05). This suggests that older 
investment analysts are, the less they to believe that heterogeneity is needed on the board. 
This finding is explained by the fact that with more experience, investment analysts be it 
male or female are less likely to be gender biased. This is consistent with literature where 
demographic and socioeconomic factors have been found to be predictors of risk 
tolerance behavior (Worthington, 2006). For instance, Faff et al. (2009) found that the 
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higher the age of individuals, the lower the risk tolerance. Other studies have also 
revealed a negative association between age and risk-taking (for example, Garling et al., 
2009; Gilliam et al., 2010; Faff et al., 2009).   
 
Total number of years of experience: 
Experience of investment analysts is positively statistically significantly correlated with 
investment decision making (β=.32, p<0.1). This suggests that the more experienced 
investment analysts are more likely believe the board diversity variable is an important 
variable to be signaled by banks. This is an unexpected finding. One can perhaps attribute 
this to the recent push to have more women on boards. Indeed some countries (e.g., 
Norway) have passed laws to compulsorily have up to 40% female representations on 
boards (Wiersema & Mors, 2016). 
 
Despite this indifference to heterogeneity by investment analysts, the features of board 
heterogeneity are presented below. 
6.3.2.2 Features of board heterogeneity driver 
 
Gender 
Gender as a feature of board heterogeneity is positively statistically correlated with 
investment decision making although not statistically significant (β=.18, p=.31). 
Findings from the interviews suggests that although investment analysts are more likely 
to presume that gender is good for board heterogeneity, it is not an important 
consideration for investment decision making. For example, interviewee CP1 stated that 
". I will if I can, I will try to seek such balance, right. But it (gender) will not be primary 
consideration for me. Like I always say when I have conversations around gender 
balance. I believe that merit has to go first, performance has to go first. What is of interest 
to me, are people with the right energy, people with the right exposure, people with the 
right exposure and experience basically." 
 
Similarly, interviewee OP1 who is female corroborates "I do not think it matters, to be 
honest. In terms of making investment decisions, I do not think it matters. But just for the 
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cause of advancing the cause of women, I would be happy to see that (women are on the 
board)”. Interviewee LC1 puts it thus, “when I look at the board that (gender) is not a 
primary thing that comes to my mind. I do not really look at the gender. I would rather 
look at the name and see what you can do. So, gender is one of the least of things I 
consider when I look at the board”. Interviewee MF3 was even more categorical “I am 
very agnostic, as far as that is concerned. The board can be all female can be all male it 
does not matter to me". These results are consistent with the literature on gender on 
boards. While there has been a general nudge towards encouraging more women on 
boards (e.g., Mahalakshmi & Reddy, 2017) but there is no consensus on the effect of 
either sex on the board. Thus, hypothesis 2a is not supported. 
 
Age 
Age is positively statistically significantly correlated with investment decision making 
(β=.43, p<.05).  This suggests that investment analysts presume that the age of members 
on the board is important feature for board diversity and it influences investment decision 
making. This feature was related by the interviewees to experience and innovation. 
According to interviewee OP3 "in most businesses we want to see two things, we want 
to see a strong track record of senior executive management, but we also want to see a 
lot of innovation which tends to be tied to the younger." Age diversity is particularly 
important in developing countries as these countries experience significant 
transformations over a relatively short period. Moreover, along with the transition of the 
economic system, there has simultaneously been a push towards cultural change (Stulz 
& Williamson, 2003). 
 
Following similar sentiments, interviewee LF1 posits, “at least, the essence of board is 
to have the kind of skills that cut across different field and also generation. If you have 
board that is very old, their ideas would also be very old, and of course with new people, 
they embrace more of… we all know that technology is a major enabler for virtually all 
businesses now and the desire to actually use technology to power a business you cannot 
find it in the older generation as such. So, if you have a board that has the young and 
vibrant people you tend to see a lot of changes taking place and some calculated risks 
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taking because that is what the business is all about." 
 
From the existing literature, Mishra & Jhunjhunwala, (2013) ascribe age of board to 
business exigencies and market penetration. Agreeing with this, interviewee LF2 states 
that “(age is important) maybe not in terms of ratios but in terms of ideas. So take the 
FinTech age now, it is always good to have young people maybe one or two. So, a lot of 
things are changing right now even within the financial space, FinTech all of that, and 
in Nigeria typically what you find is retired people being members of the board and so 
their adaptability to changes in the environment might be slow. So, in cases where you 
have younger people who are more in sync with things that are going on, they might help 
influence the board in the direction of where the market is going". 
Similarly, interviewee LC5 opines as follows "It (age) is positive, it is some additional 
points to say that they will probably have an extensive idea pool to choose from and they 
will probably discuss a lot of issues and might not be blindsided by current events." 
Interviewee LA3 was even more assertive when stating as follows “it (age) will influence 
my decision in investment and the reason is that you are having a combination of 
aspiration and experience; aggressiveness and maturity. I mean, I mean young people 
are very aggressive. They want to take the risk, the old one, they have taken the risk and 
they know what is going on they can share their experience.” 
As evidenced above, age is one of the key factors that affect investment analysts' view 
on heterogeneity. The literature supports these findings as older people are linked with 
experience while younger people are thought to be more risk takers. Jianakoplos & 
Bernasek (2006) study documents that older people tend to take less financial risk than 
younger people do. This is further supported by Evans (2004) who provided evidence 
that investors under 30 years old tend to take more risks than do older ones.  Furthermore, 
according to Rana et al. (2011), age influences the attitudes towards risk-taking, both 
directly and indirectly. Similarly, other studies have documented a negative association 
between age and risk-taking (for example, Garling et al., 2009; Gilliam et al., 2010; Faff 
et al., 2009; Hira et al., 2007; Sadiq & Ishaq, 2014). Therefore, H2b is supported. 
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Tribe 
Tribe is positively statistically correlated with investment decision making but not 
statistically significant (β=.14, p=.46). Findings from the interviews suggests that 
although investment analysts presume that tribe is an important feature for diversity, they 
do not associate it importantly with investment decision making. According to 
interviewee CP1 “when you board a plane, you do not ask where your pilot is from. Or 
where the co-pilot is from. So that (tribe) is not a factor in the quality of governance. 
There are great people and terrible people from all tribes.” Going further, interviewee 
OP2 states, “Knowledge transcends tribal instincts, and I do not want to believe that if 
you have federal character14, and then all of a sudden you make better decisions.” 
 
Similarly, interviewee LF2 posits, “So, speaking in the context of Nigeria, I saw 
something recently. I think it was on social media where they tried to characterize the 
banks into groups. So, some banks they call the Yoruba banks, some banks they call them, 
some banks they call them Igbo banks. But the point really is in the context of Nigeria if 
a bank is deemed a South Western Bank you tend to have more board members from that 
part of the country. Again for me my opinion, I do not think it makes much of a difference 
in terms of tribe, and so it would not sway me for or against investing in the stock”. 
 
Rather, investment analysts seem to feel tribe concerns business expediencies for firms 
in Nigeria (Adegbite (2015). This is further highlighted by interviewees as follows 
interviewee OP3 "Not as important a consideration for us and if I think about it again…, 
sometimes the benefit can be seen from a business development standpoint, it would 
suggest that the organization is able to do business across the country without, I mean 
with maybe fewer constraints. But in terms of our experience, we have not necessarily 
found that tribe advantage has been sustainable. It is not as important as having good 
management, even if they are from the same tribe or region". Hence, consideration of 
tribe of boards in Nigerian environment stands the risk of being considered as "tokenism" 
                                                          
14 Federal character is used as an interjection and it describes a situation where Nigerian businesses have people from 
different tribes represented so as to present the business as not being ethnically biased 
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(Karen J. Curtin, a former executive vice president of Bank of America, reported in 
Brancato & Patterson, 1999, p.7). Thus, H2c was not supported. 
 
Tenure  
Tenure is positively correlated with investment decision making and the relationship is 
statistically significant (β=.49, p<.05). This suggests that investment analysts presume 
that different tenures of directors signal experience and idea rotation. According to 
interviewee OP5 "in terms of how long someone has been part of the board speaks to his 
influence or the type of decisions he is going to take.” The literature suggests that the 
policy of revolving directors after specific tenures should not only encourage innovation 
(Pfeffer, 1982), it should also eliminate sit tight syndrome common in developing 
countries context (Nakpodia & Adegbite. 2018). Accordingly, interviewee MA1 refers 
to this feature thus “I think that experience has value but freshness also has value. So my 
view of the way the board should work is you should keep people who know enough of 
the business but also allow new ideas to come in. So there should be some level of 
rotation within the board system, where after a certain number of years, people just have 
to go". This reasoning is in line with the CBN code of corporate governance which 
prescribes a director tenure of five years in the first instance but renewable for another 
five years making a maximum tenure of 10 years. 
 
The significant statistical finding is supported by the interviewees. For example, 
interviewee MF4 puts the importance as follows “that (tenure) is something to weigh in 
on my investment decision, yes. Except if I see that for some reason the level of exits 
where you have people spend maybe just one or two years maximum on the board, then 
I would want to pry further to find out whether there were concerns they had that made 
them leave the board.” However, some interviewees expressed some reservations about 
this feature. For example LC4 posits as follows “It (tenure) is not high up there. But, I 
would like to see new people are coming to the board at some time, we do not have a 
static board that does not change with time you know, you need fresh ideas, fresh 
thoughts, new ways of thinking coming into a board, it helps.” Overall, H2d is supported.  
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Multiple Directorship 
Multiple directorship is negatively statistically significantly correlated with investment 
decision making (β= -.52, p<.01). This finding is consistent with study by Cashman et 
al. (2012) that find that busy directors have a negative influence on performance. This 
feature was however contrary to the literature which suggests that multiple directorship 
provide positive resources for organizations (Filatotchev & Toms, 2003; Mizruchi, 1996; 
Mizruchi & Stearns, 1994). In the Nigerian environment, the elites are usually the ones 
represented on the boards and “a lot of board directors don't respect the fine lines 
between being a non-executive director and an executive director of banks. They try to 
meddle, they try to maybe push their thoughts forcefully across even though they don't 
have all the factors that they need to consider” (MF2). Hence, multiple directorship 
might signal ability to exert coercive pressure and is view negatively by analysts. This is 
contrary to the literature especially those focused on developed countries where 
advantages of board networks are documented (Benton, 2017). Benton (2017) also finds 
that there is a positive relationship between board and performance when the directors 
have ties with companies in the same field as the ones where they are directors. However, 
in Nigeria where there is a shortage of reputable directors (Adegbite, 2015), multiple 
directorship can reflect negatively in the minds of investment analysts especially where 
the directors have questionable characters or are corrupt elites (Nakpodia & Adegbite, 
2018) who can sometimes seem above the laws and institutions in their countries. 
According to interviewee LC6, “Nigeria is quite small especially in circles, you've got 
political circles where you see recycling every four years as we all see. In banks you can 
see that in terms of directorships, I guess it goes past corporate governance, it’s societal, 
there's always a link and sometimes those links are a bit very strong.”Thus, H2e is 
therefore rejected. 
 
The next subsection presents part C which is the findings of driver three (board 
reputation) of board structure and composition. 
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6.4 Part C. Board Structure and Composition Driver 3. Board 
(directors’) Reputation.  
We next study which board reputation features depicts investments analysts 
understanding of reputation and influences investment decision making the most in 
Nigeria.  
6.4.1 Statistical Analysis of Study Variables 
6.4.1.1 Descriptive of Board Reputation Features in Nigeria 
Tables 6.21- 6.26 report percentage and frequencies of respondents belief reputation 
represents. For table 6.21, 96.88% of respondents agree or strongly agree that reputation 
leads to visibility. For table 6.22, 97.66% of respondents agree or strongly agree that 
reputation brings credibility. None of the investment analysts disagreed or strongly 
disagreed. Furthermore, the mean was 1.210938 while the standard deviation was 0.4637 
indicating very close agreement among the respondents. These findings are consistent 
with the literature on the representation of credible individuals on a board. 
 
For table 6.23, 96.88% of respondents agree or strongly agree that reputation brings along 
goodwill. For table 6.24, 65.63% of respondents agree or strongly agree that reputation 
will be conferred on a board due to recognized names on the board. 14.07% of the 
investment analysts disagree or strongly disagree while 20.31% stayed neutral. Despite 
the insistence of the CBN code of corporate governance (2014) that board members be 
people of repute, the finding represents interesting inconsistences with the literature on 
the reputation of boards. This might be connected to the fact that in developing countries, 
the decadence in the society (Nakpodia, 2015) means that a recognized name might not 
necessarily be reputable. 
 
For table 6.25, 72.66% of respondents agree or strongly agree that politically exposed 
person on the board of a bank might influence the reputation of board members positively 
or negatively. This is interesting as despite the weakness in the institutional environment 
and the assumptions that politically exposed persons affect the reputation of a bank, the 
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results from this survey suggest otherwise. For table 6.26, 65.63% of respondents agree 
or strongly agree that multiple directorship by board members is a sign of reputation. 
This is not an overwhelming majority and is interesting as some scholars (Benton, 2017) 
posit that directors in a network and boards of other firms bring different learnings to the 
board. 
 
Table 6. 21 Reputation leading to Visibility 
 Frequency Percent Cumulative 
Strongly Agree 78 60.94 60.94 
Agree 46 35.94 96.88 
Neither Agree or Disagree 3 2.34 99.22 
Disagree 0 0.00 99.22 
Strongly Disagree 1 0.78 100 
 
Table 6. 22 Reputation leading to credibility 
 Frequency Percent Cumulative 
Strongly Agree 104 81.25  81.25 
Agree 21 16.41 97.66 
Neither Agree or Disagree 3 2.34 100 
Disagree 0 0 - 
Strongly Disagree 0 0 - 
 
Table 6. 23 Reputation leading to goodwill 
 Frequency Percent Cumulative 
Strongly Agree 103 80.47 80.47 
Agree 21 16.41 96.88 
Neither Agree or Disagree 3 2.34 99.22 
Disagree 1 0.78 100 
Strongly Disagree 0 0 - 
 
Table 6. 24 Reputation meaning recognized name  
 Frequency Percent Cumulative 
Strongly Agree 39 30.47 30.47 
Agree 45 35.16 65.63 
Neither Agree or Disagree 26 20.31 85.94 
Disagree 14 10.94 96.88 
Strongly Disagree 4 3.13 100 
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Table 6. 25 Reputation as politically connected person 
 Frequency Percent Cumulative 
Strongly Agree 40 31.25 31.25 
Agree 53 41.41 72.66 
Neither Agree or Disagree 21 16.41 89.06 
Disagree 9 7.03 96.09 
Strongly Disagree 5 3.91 100 
 
Table 6. 26 Reputation as multiple directorship 
 Frequency Percent Cumulative 
Strongly Agree 26 20.31 20.31 
Agree 58 45.31 65.63 
Neither Agree or Disagree 29 22.66 88.28 
Disagree 11 8.59 96.88 
Strongly Disagree 3 3.13 100 
 
 
Table 6. 27 Summary of features describing reputation  
 Mean STD. 
DEV 
Min  Max Frequency aggregate of 
strongly agree and 
agree (%) 
Reputation leading to Visibility 1.4375   .624311         1 5 96.88 
Reputation leading to credibility 1.210938     .463678           1 3 97.66 
Reputation leading to goodwill  1.234375 .524733           1 4 96.88 
Reputation meaning recognized 
name 
2.210938     1.091501           1 5 65.63 
Reputation as politically 
connected person 
2.109375     1.051691           1 5 72.66 
Reputation as multiple 
directorship 
2.289063      .989332         1 5 65.63 
 
6.4.1.2 Test for Normality of Board Reputation Features 
The Skewness and Kurtosis tests were conducted and provided evidence of fairly normal 
distribution of the variables. For Skewness, the value of the symmetrical distribution is 
zero (Gujarati, 2003; Brooks, 2008). ). For Kurtosis, the hypothesis of non-normality can 
be rejected if its value is 3 (Gujarati, 2003; Brooks, 2008). 
 
Table 6.29 which reports board reputation features shows that the Skewness values for 
most of the variables fall between 0.000 and 0.0027, which indicates symmetrical 
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distribution. For Kurtosis test statistics, the variables fall between 0.0000 and 0.5335 
indicating normal distribution. 
 
Table 6. 28 Skewness/Kurtosis Tests for Normality 
 OBS  
PR(SKEWNESS)   
PR(KURTOSIS) ADJ 
CHI2(2)    
PROB>CHI2 
Reputation leading to Visibility 0.0000 0.0000 50.23 0.0000 
Reputation leading to credibility 0.0000 0.0000         47.10 0.0000 
Reputation leading to goodwill  0.0000 0.0000 61.29                 0.0000 
Reputation meaning recognised 
name 
0.0027 0.5335 8.41          0.0149 
Reputation as politically 
connected person 
0.0001         0.1963       14.81          0.0006 
Reputation as multiple 
directorship 
0.0014         0.4199         9.50 0.0087 
6.4.1.3 Spearman and Pearson Correlation of Board Reputation Features 
A correlation matrix was used to test the direction and magnitude of the linear 
relationship between the variables. This test helps to discover the potential presence of 
multicollinearity among the variables. There could be multicollinearity if a correlation 
coefficient between two variables is large. Following Ntim et al. (2012a) and Ntim & 
Soobaroyen (2013), the Pearson and Spearman correlation coefficients are reported in 
Table 6.29. The table shows the correlation matrix for the dependent, independent and 
control variables employed for the board reputation and decision-making models. The 
magnitude and direction of both the Pearson correlation coefficients (parametric) and 
Spearman correlation coefficients (non-parametric) appear to be relatively similar. This 
adds to the evidence that there is no major problem of non-normality among the variables 
in the models (Ntim & Soobaroyen, 2013). In addition, the correlations among the 
variables were fairly low, indicating that there was not a serious multicollinearity 
problem (see Haniffa & Hudaib, 2006; Dam & Scholtens, 2012; Ntim et al., 2012a; 
Ramly, 2012). 
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Table 6. 29 (obs=124) Correlation of Board Reputation Features 
Pearson Correlation  
 gen age bg tny sub annut br1iv br2iv br3iv br5iv br6iv br7iv br4dv 
              
gen 1.0000             
age -0.1530 1.0000            
bg -0.0180 0.0885 1.0000           
tny -0.1446 0.5811 -0.1598 1.0000          
sub 0.0189 -0.0934 -0.0168 -0.0233 1.0000         
annut -0.0977 -0.1108 -0.0898 0.0092 0.2943 1.0000        
br1iv 0.1636 -0.1799 0.0310 -0.2360 -0.2038 -0.0575 1.0000       
br2iv 0.0064 0.0238 0.0591 -0.0626 -0.1493 -0.1229 0.1441 1.0000      
br3iv -0.0200 -0.0224 -0.0826 -0.0223 -0.1339 -0.0008 0.2674 0.6884 1.0000     
br5iv 0.1821 0.2953 -0.0973 0.0612 0.0146 -0.0819 0.1835 0.2150 0.1654 1.0000    
br6iv 0.1705 0.1500 0.0034 -0.0460 -0.0384 -0.2144 0.2608 0.1301 0.1249 0.5142 1.0000   
br7iv 0.1111 0.0441 -0.0693 -0.0727 -0.0537 -0.1882 0.2469 0.2347 0.2405 0.4342 0.4719 1.0000  
br4dv -0.0132 -0.0208 0.0645 -0.1839 -0.2194 -0.0583 0.3028 0.4938 0.4966 0.4265 0.2789 0.4772 1.0000 
 
Spearman Correlation 
 gen age bg tny sub annut br1iv br2iv br3iv br5iv br6iv br7iv br4dv 
              
gen 1.0000              
age -0.1554 1.0000             
bg -0.0027 0.0441 1.0000            
tny -0.1317 0.5703 -0.1590 1.0000           
sub 0.0189 -0.0616 -0.0102 -0.0131 1.0000          
annut -0.1309 -0.0958 -0.1218 -0.0027 0.2854 1.0000         
br1iv 0.1206 -0.2144 0.0582 -0.2546 -0.2182 -0.0587 1.0000        
br2iv 0.0353 -0.0206 0.0623 -0.0353 -0.1710 -0.0936 0.2163 1.0000       
br3iv 0.0209 -0.0783 -0.0744 -0.0064 -0.2175 0.0004 0.2737 0.7078 1.0000      
br5iv 0.2085 0.2638 -0.1003 0.0550 -0.0044 -0.1017 0.2405 0.1781 0.1548 1.0000     
br6iv 0.1714 0.1074 0.0213 -0.0664 -0.0424 -0.2126 0.2917 0.1243 0.1496 0.4911 1.0000    
br7iv 0.1269 0.0008 -0.0769 -0.0693 -0.0771 -0.2081 0.2909 0.2306 0.2809 0.4187 0.5696 1.0000   
br4dv 0.0312 -0.0436 0.0684 -0.1444 -0.2114 -0.0679 0.3915 0.4356 0.4959 0.4488 0.3522 0.4519 1.0000 
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6.4.1.4 Ordered Logit Regression of Board Reputation Features against Decision 
Making 
The ordered logit regression (Table 6.30) was used to investigate the relationship 
between features of board reputation and decision-making.  The table will reveal that 
eleven submodels were built each with varying independent variables. Sub model with 
Adjusted R2 of 0.3249 was the best fit. This model can explain 30.49% of the variables 
relationship. When seeking only a weak signal in the presence of a lot of noise, and even 
a small signal can be of interest, then R-squared of even 10% or lower can have some 
information (Nau, 2018).  Moreover, as suggested by Nau (2018), the results obtained 
from this regression were cross validated through the semi-structured interviews 
conducted. Other studies reported similar low R-squared values. For example, McCahery 
et al. (2016) reported R-squared of 10% in their study. 
 
A summary of the results from the ordered logit and hypothesis can be found in table 
6.31 below. For robustness, ordered probit regression was conducted and produced 
similar results to the ordered logit regression. See appendix 3. 
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Table 6. 30 Ordered logit regressions of features of board reputation against investment decision making influence of board reputation 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
VARIABLES br4dv br4dv br4dv br4dv br4dv br4dv br4dv br4dv br4dv br4dv br4dv 
            
gen -0.166 -0.0700 -0.00408 -0.662 -0.163 -0.220 -0.296 -0.237 -0.743 -0.746 -0.803 
 (0.442) (0.443) (0.443) (0.464) (0.432) (0.447) (0.471) (0.473) (0.505) (0.506) (0.517) 
age 0.252 0.203 0.283 -0.535* -0.0181 0.0397 0.275 0.302 -0.310 -0.316 -0.307 
 (0.277) (0.277) (0.280) (0.312) (0.282) (0.291) (0.282) (0.284) (0.329) (0.330) (0.344) 
bg 0.0551 0.00700 0.126 0.251 0.0889 0.160 -0.0103 0.0494 0.255 0.253 0.293 
 (0.175) (0.191) (0.185) (0.176) (0.172) (0.179) (0.191) (0.192) (0.199) (0.198) (0.204) 
tny -0.272 -0.384* -0.437** -0.192 -0.256 -0.255 -0.299 -0.344 -0.250 -0.246 -0.245 
 (0.206) (0.212) (0.215) (0.211) (0.206) (0.213) (0.213) (0.216) (0.225) (0.226) (0.233) 
sub -0.707* -0.749* -0.707* -1.349*** -1.011** -1.154*** -0.502 -0.508 -1.062** -1.051** -1.249** 
 (0.417) (0.421) (0.428) (0.453) (0.408) (0.431) (0.434) (0.438) (0.492) (0.490) (0.515) 
annut 0.0262 0.0816 -0.0258 0.0988 0.120 0.207 0.0811 0.0288 0.133 0.139 0.245 
 (0.150) (0.151) (0.150) (0.159) (0.151) (0.158) (0.154) (0.155) (0.171) (0.172) (0.179) 
br1iv 0.979***      0.977*** 0.816** 0.505 0.486 0.408 
 (0.318)      (0.317) (0.322) (0.342) (0.345) (0.350) 
br2iv  2.212***     2.219*** 1.455** 1.115* 1.127* 1.088* 
  (0.438)     (0.443) (0.571) (0.590) (0.589) (0.590) 
br3iv   2.087***     1.053** 1.204** 1.193** 1.121** 
   (0.422)     (0.510) (0.515) (0.514) (0.520) 
br5iv    1.193***     1.032*** 0.990*** 0.906*** 
    (0.231)     (0.250) (0.272) (0.280) 
br6iv     0.600***     0.0904 -0.118 
     (0.202)     (0.238) (0.251) 
br7iv      1.163***     0.823*** 
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      (0.224)     (0.261) 
            
/cut1 1.274 2.134** 1.867* 0.972 0.779 2.672** 3.985*** 3.939*** 4.633*** 4.726*** 6.135*** 
 (1.083) (1.060) (1.039) (0.983) (1.009) (1.133) (1.246) (1.244) (1.341) (1.360) (1.497) 
/cut2 3.430*** 4.615*** 4.429*** 3.402*** 2.905*** 5.126*** 6.649*** 6.724*** 7.726*** 7.821*** 9.459*** 
 (1.134) (1.167) (1.148) (1.033) (1.048) (1.208) (1.387) (1.400) (1.512) (1.529) (1.687) 
/cut3 5.149*** 6.921*** 6.654*** 5.281*** 4.638*** 7.008*** 9.041*** 9.257*** 10.41*** 10.51*** 12.29*** 
 (1.246) (1.410) (1.365) (1.162) (1.176) (1.356) (1.625) (1.670) (1.811) (1.829) (2.003) 
/cut4 6.277*** 8.307*** 8.014*** 6.603*** 5.781*** 8.245*** 10.48*** 10.77*** 12.04*** 12.14*** 13.81*** 
 (1.489) (1.680) (1.635) (1.455) (1.433) (1.612) (1.886) (1.936) (2.070) (2.088) (2.197) 
 
Pseudo R2 
 
.0798 
 
.1477 
 
.1602 
 
.1629 
 
.0747 
 
.1571 
 
.1877 
 
.2060 
 
.2824 
 
.2830 
 
.3249 
 
Observations 124 124 124 124 124 124 124 124 124 124 124 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Codes  
Gender GEN 0 Male 1 Female 
AGE AGE 21-30 – 1, 31-40 -2, 41-50 – 3, 51-60 -4, Over 60 - 5 
Your Background (Which area have you gained most of 
your working investment experience) 
BG Banking and Finance – 1, Pol Science -2, Economics – 3, Accounting – 4, Others - 5 
Total number of years you have spent as an analyst TNY 0-4 – 1,5-9 – 2, 10-15 – 3, 16-20 – 4, Over 20 -5 
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Is your firm a subsidiary/affiliate of an international 
company? 
SUB Yes- 1, No -0 
What is the annual investment turnover of your company? AnnuT N1M-N100M -1, N101M-N1bn – 2, N1bn-N10bn – 3, N10bn-N100bn – 4, Over N100bn - 5 
 
Positive character of board members increases the 
visibility of the bank. 
 
BR1IV Reputation as visibility 
Positive character of board members is essential for the 
credibility of the bank 
BR2IV Reputation as credibility 
Positive character of board members increase the goodwill 
of the bank 
BR3IV Reputation as goodwill 
Positive character of board members influences 
investment decision making 
BR4DV Investment decision making 
Presence of directors with prestigious names  BR5IV Reputation as recognized name 
Presence of directors that are politically connected 
influences (positively or negatively)  
BR6IV Reputation as politically connected person 
 
Presence of directors  who are on boards of other firms   BR7 Reputation reflected in multiple directorship 
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Table 6. 31 A summary of all of the hypotheses and findings for the board reputation features 
and decision-making model. 
 
 
 
 
Dependent Variable  Decision Making influence of  Board Reputation 
Independent 
variable  
No. 
Hypothesis  
Expected 
sign  
Finding 
sign  
Finding significance  Hypothesis 
status  
Reputation as 
visibility 
1  + + Insignificant when all controls 
were applied but significant in 
all other submodels 
Accepted  
Reputation as 
credibility  
2 +  +  Significant at the 10% level Accepted 
Reputation as 
goodwill  
3  +  +  Significant at the 5% level Accepted 
Reputation as 
recognized 
name 
4 +  +  Significant at the 1% level Accepted 
Reputation as 
politically 
connected  
5  -  -  Insignificant  Rejected 
 
Reputation as 
multiple 
directorship 
6 + + Significant at the 1% level Accepted 
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6.4.2 Discussions and Triangulation of Qualitative and Quantitative 
Findings of Board Reputation and its Features 
Model 1: Board Reputation Induced Propensity to Make Favourable Investment Decision 
= β0 + .41(BR1) + 1.09(BR2) + 1.12(BR3) + .91(BR5) -.12(BR6) +.82(BR7) - .80(Gen) + 
.29(BG) -.31(AGE) -1.25(IA) -26(FS) + .25(TNY) + εi 
6.4.2.1 Preamble 
One major way firms signal legitimacy is through the reputation of the firm which 
routinely manifests from the reputation of the firm's directors (Dowling, 1986). 
Similarly, according to MF1, reputation control is board responsibility. Hence 
interviewee MF1 posits that "It is a joint liability for whatever happens on the board. So, 
they (board members) want to control that reputation. In my own opinion, this (reputation 
control) appears to be one of the key fundamentals, but that makes the board focus on 
what they are supposed to be doing”. However, the word “reputation” seems to lend itself 
to ambiguities. For example, interviewee MA1 opines as follows “The word "repute," in 
itself is a word that allows a lot of ambiguities and if you speak to ten people, they will 
define it differently” Corroborating this, interviewee LC8 states as follows “how do you 
define a person of repute. An opinion is what determines”  
 
Hence for regulators, the legal connotation of "persons of repute" is what is followed. In 
weak institutional environments, this reliance on legal interpretation of repute brings 
homogeneity to this important signaling mechanism thereby creating a distrust of this 
driver in the environment. For example, interviewee OP6 stated that "yes, CBN will have 
to rely on those (laws and rules). But, I can rely on what I can decipher”. This regulatory 
distrust is further highlighted by interviewee OP1 who stated as follows “I even do not 
know what that (reputation) means. I do not understand. Is it a paper qualification you 
are looking at, is it running criminal background check and nothing comes or is it I mean, 
I do not know what metric you use to measure reputable”. Similarly, interviewee LC6 
questions the reputation requirement of CBN as follows “there is a big difference 
between on paper and in reality. So, on paper yes someone can be extremely clean, right 
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educational, right experience, but if you see someone, such as this person owing X 
amount of billion over the course of years and has basically made no effort to sanitize it 
or restructure or pay down even a portion, then it does question certain parts” 
 
Despite this ambiguity of reputation, audiences routinely rely on the reputation of firms 
and its directors in making investment decisions, career choices and product choices 
(Dowling, 1986). In support of literature, interviewee LC5 states as follows “for me, it 
(reputation) is 60% (of my decision to invest). That is true board reputation, not CBN 
reputation. The true reputation of the board is like 60% of my reason to invest. So, the 
reputation of the board yes, it is extremely important.” Corroborating this, interviewee 
OP3 states that “our view is that half of our review process is reviewing the people and 
core in that is reviewing the executive management as well as the board of directors of 
these banks. We say it is 50 percent of the consideration. Meaning if you fail, there is no 
score you can get on the other side that can get you across." 
 
Similarly, in line with stakeholder-agentic theory (Hill & Jones, 1992), interviewee LC4 
states as follows "from the constitution of a board and from historical practices, you can 
tell the very well run companies, from the way the board is composed, people who are 
on the board, the decision making process of the board. And, you can tell a lot about how 
a company is expected to be run sometimes, although it does not turn out that way. But, 
I think when one needs to start making investment decisions, that is a good place to start 
with.” Therefore, the importance of reputation means moving beyond the agentic 
perspective of corporate governance or the legitimacy perspective as advocated by 
Tirole, (2001) to include the social cognition angle (Bandura, 1991). 
 
As investment analysts give their interpretations to reputation requirements, revealing 
features of reputation is essential. 
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6.4.2.2 Control variables applied in the model 
In this study, international subsidiary is negatively statistically significantly correlated 
with investment decision making (β=-1.25, p<.05). This suggests that investment 
analysts that work for international companies are less likely to believe the board 
reputation variable as signaled by banks. This is understandable as they are less likely to 
understand the Nigerian environment hence instead apply a stereotypical judgment.  
6.4.2.3 Board Reputation Features Findings 
 
Reputation as visibility  
Reputation as visibility is positively statistically correlated with investment decision 
making although not statistically significant in sub model 1 (β=.41, p<.24), it is 
significant in all other submodels at 5% confidence level (10% confidence level in sub 
model 9). This suggests that the reputation of directors precedes them and is visible. Bank 
directors are usually known and visible to investment analysts, hence, their reputation is 
easily deciphered (Adegbite, 2015; Fombrun & Shanley, 1990). Interviewee LC1 posits 
thus “sometimes when I speak to clients and make recommendations for them, (I suggest 
to the clients) I think they (X bank) are relatively strong (healthy), I think you should 
invest in them, etc. I have heard a lot of them (clients) or a couple of them say “that bank 
I am not going to touch it, I do not believe in their management15, I do not like them, I 
do not think they are the independent or I do not think it is well run”  Interviewee LC5 
corroborates this as follows “If you have been in this industry for 20 years and you just 
know, there are some people you do not know too well and get to know them, and they 
are okay, they are good. So, It just by gist, you have been in the industry for 20years, you 
talk to your peers, you talk to people who know you. Once somebody is on the board, by 
the time you ask 10, 15 people, you will know if he has a (positive) reputation that will 
be visible and unhidden 
 
                                                          
15 This inference is because the management are visible and so their character/antecedent is known. 
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Therefore, H3a is supported albeit when all controls were considered, it was not 
statistically significant. 
 
Reputation as credibility 
Reputation as credibility is positively statistically significantly correlated with 
investment decision making for all submodels (β=1.088, p<0.1). This suggests that 
investment analysts presume that credibility is associated with reputation driver. The 
limited market for credibility in the weak Nigerian environment (Adegbite, 2015) means 
when investment analysts assume directors to be credible; they are inclined to make 
favorable investment decisions. Interviewee MF3 highlights this as follows "If my 
assessment of them (directors) is credible enough and they have enough experience to 
make in my opinion, to take the best decisions for the company. I think I will lean on the 
numbers at that point in time but not really reputation of those behind the board. At least 
I think they (the board directors) have a pass mark as far as that is concerned." 
 
In line with the stakeholder-agentic perspective (Hill & Jones, 1992), the credibility of 
directors signals positively to investment analysts giving them the confidence to believe 
projections made by firms (Milgrom & Roberts 1986a). In support of the theory and 
statistical results, interviewee LF2 highlights as follows “a lot of things that happen in 
the banks are more management driven.  So, if the management of a bank comes out of 
the start of the year and gives you guidance or because they have given you that guidance 
and if you have a credible board they would ensure that their staff they live up to those 
projections or guidance that they have been given. And personally, for me there are some 
banks in Nigeria that I would not touch just because I feel that they are not efficient, the 
strategies are not top down”. From the foregoing, H3b is supported. 
 
Reputation as goodwill 
Reputation as goodwill is positively statistically significantly correlated with investment 
decision making (β=1.12, p<.05). This suggests that investment analysts presume that 
goodwill is associated with board reputation and influences investment decision making. 
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Interviewee LC1 explains the situation thus “I think what you see around the banking 
sector, a lot of the tier 1 names or top tier (bank) names probably benefit from that 
(goodwill) a lot, because you know most of those banks are relatively well respected in 
terms of corporate governance and board composition. But the lower tier (goodwill) 
names might not be as strong as what you see in the top tier names. But I think overall 
this is something that is very important". 
 
Similarly, the goodwill firms' benefit from having certain directors might be impinged 
by perception about individual directors. Interviewee LC2 highlights this thus "so, 
beyond the CBN and SEC screening, we know (about reputation) from information in the 
market. So, the CBN screening is one level. The information I have on individuals is 
another level that we also check so. CBN would have screened for you to even be on the 
board in the first instance but if for some reason by virtue of what information I have 
access to in the market I still have concerns about who sits on the board of a bank, it will 
also affect my decision on whether I  am investing, what volume on my funds to be 
invested in such an entity”. From the foregoing, H3c is supported.  
 
Reputation as recognized name 
Reputation as recognized name is positively statistically significantly correlated with 
investment decision making (β=.91, p<.01). Unsurprisingly, in societies such as Nigeria 
where reputable directors are scarce (Adegbite, 2015), directors having recognized name 
will be a signal to investment analysts to associate recognized name with board 
reputation variable and make investment decisions. Indeed, investment analysts take 
considerable efforts to research the names of board directors. Interviewee CP1 highlights 
this as follows “it (name) is something I pay increased attention to without any doubt. It 
is just something I look at, and in fact I do what you call an IDD (integrity due diligence). 
When I do not know these names, the typical names appointed to bank boards, then that 
will be the name that most jump at me all right. If the name is not someone that I am 
familiar with, I would usually just do a google check and do an IDD”.  
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Although, the uncertainty prevalent about information authenticity in the Nigerian 
environment (Adegbite et al., 2013) still means investment analysts are skeptical even 
when names are recognizable. Interviewee OP1 posits as follows "so, perception is not 
always reality so, there are people where you know, great reputation, people say good 
things about them for whatever reason, they have good PR (public relation), good 
branding but I do not know if there is substance behind that.”. Nevertheless, H3d is 
supported. 
 
Reputation as politically connected 
Reputation as politically connected is negatively statistically correlated with investment 
decision making although not statistically significant (β= -.12). Findings from the 
interviews suggests that investment analysts presume that the more politically connected 
board a board is, the less likely the board will be reputable and less likely they will make 
positive investment decisions. This finding is accentuated by interviewee LC3 as follows 
"so, reputation is a big issue. There are some people if they are on the board of company 
today you would not invest in that company”. The institutional environment in Nigeria 
where politics and business are easily interwoven (Adegbite, 2015) affects investment 
decisions.  Interviewee MF1 put is as such “yes it (politically connected persons) will 
affect me in my reasoning. Because, I worked in two banks and I have seen how one of 
the banks I worked for, how politics killed that bank”. This can mean investment analysts 
hold back on investment volumes or even are dissuaded from making investments.  
Interviewee OP2 highlights this as follows “yes we worry about politically exposed 
persons. Chances are that we would either not fully invest as much as we want to or we 
may totally not invest. If the person is politically exposed, it will be a matter of time 
before either their transactions are politically expedient as opposed to rational 
expediency".  The link between politics and reputation is therefore termed negative by 
investment analysts. This is despite most businesses being linked to some politically 
exposed persons in some way. This point is made by interviewee OP3 who said "we have 
avoided investing in banks where directors are politically connected. That said, when 
you filter through this, there is talk about how many degrees of connection. If you look 
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hard enough, you find that everyone is connected in some way, shape or form." However, 
the insignificance of the results from the quantitative study and the double-edged nature 
of political connection in Nigeria leads to rejection of the hypothesis. 
Therefore H3e is not supported. 
 
Reputation reflecting in multiple directorship 
Reputation reflecting in multiple directorship is positively statistically significantly 
correlated with investment decision making (β=.82, p<.01). Unsurprisingly, in societies 
such as Nigeria where reputable directors are scarce with a limited pool of such 
individuals (Adegbite, 2015), reputable directors will indeed be courted by many firms. 
H3f is supported. 
 
6.5 Conclusion 
This chapter presented board structure and composition drivers findings. This chapter 
represented the study one results of this thesis. The chapter was divided into Part A-C. 
Part A was for board independence, B, for board heterogeneity and C, for board 
reputation. Part A presented the summary descriptive statistics of the board 
independence, following which test for normality, correlation and ordered logit 
regressions were discussed. Finally, the findings of the quantitative and qualitative 
studies were triangulated for a robust discussion. Subsequently, part B and C were 
reported in similar manner. 
 
From Part A of this chapter, the psychological reasoning findings of the investment 
analysts obtained through interviews when triangulated with the regression analysis 
reveal that due to the weak institutional environment and a systemic distrust; CEO duality 
while viewed negatively by most of the interviewees, in Nigeria, the absence of CEO 
duality does not necessarily mean the board is independent. This is consistent with the 
literature that suggests that CEO duality (especially, unity of command) might be 
especially useful in complex environments (Boyd, 1995) and transitional economies 
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(Peng et al., 2007).  Also, having more non-executives than executive directors on a 
board does not mean there is will be no conflict of interests especially, as most businesses 
are family oriented or dominated by strongmen. However, the findings confirm that 
presence of more non-executive directors on a board projects some level of 
independence. Independent directors though helpful in bringing some measure of probity 
into board reasoning, they can be influenced by bank management and dominant 
principal. Diverse share ownership is the preferred indication of board independence. 
This feature is also preferred because it provides an easy exit either for profit taking or 
dissatisfaction with the firm practice/performance.  
 
For Part B, the psychological reasoning findings of the investment analysts obtained 
through interviews when triangulated with the regression analysis reveal the following; 
although majority of female investment analysts interviewed expressed sentiments for 
having more women representations on boards, gender diversity is still irrelevant in 
perception of investment analysts when making investment decisions. Age diversity is 
positively received and is linked with innovation and business experience. Similarly, 
tenure was positively viewed and suggested as a feature that might eliminate sit tight 
syndrome common in Nigeria. Tribe is only relevant for business expediencies for the 
firm but not as an investment decision-making factor. Investment analysts ascribe 
multiple directorship to the nature of firm ownership in Nigeria as firms are still 
dominated by family or influential beneficial owners. These findings are consistent with 
prior literature such as Adegbite (2015). Finally, multiple directorship as a feature of 
board heterogeneity can indeed have negative consequences for firms.  
 
For Part C, the importance of reputation to investment decision cannot be overstated.  For 
example, according to interviewee LC5 “I personally feel many times , what you have to 
do is tell me who are the people on the board of directors of a company  and I can guess 
with a lot of accuracy where the company will be in five years.“ A board’s reputation is 
most acutely on display during times of severe corporate controversy or distress. In these 
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circumstances, the specific actions of the board come under a public microscope and 
become an unquestionable factor in public trust in the company. However, the weak 
institutional environment leaves room for distrust on the reputation variable. This is 
highlighted by interviewee OP2 “the extent that qualified reputation means and who is 
the judge of the reputation. What if I am not reputable but I put somebody there who is 
reputable. I think CBN is trying to ensure corporate governance but like I said, 
corruption is endemic in the entire system. There are reputable people but what if the 
CBN governor is my friend and I can get him to say yes, its okay for me to be on the 
board regardless of my reputation” 
 
Furthermore, for part C, the psychological reasoning findings of the investment analysts 
obtained through interviews when triangulated with the regression analysis reveal the 
following; Majority of investment analysts interviewed interpret reputation differently 
from the Central bank of Nigeria (CBN). While they do understand and agree that CBN 
conducts a “fit and proper” test before directors are appointed onto boards of Nigerian 
banks, they feel that the weak institutional environment might still allow people of 
disrepute onto boards of banks. Furthermore, they believed the CBN definition of 
“person of repute” is based more on legal interpretation. Credibility of directors is 
extremely important and can determine success or otherwise of the bank. The name 
precedes the person, hence a director’s name is a brand that can enhance or diminish the 
reputation of a board. In Nigeria, it is believed that most persons of repute are connected 
politically, and hence the degree to which the director is involved in politics is what is 
most critical in determining how being politically exposed affects the director’s 
reputation. 
 
As no governance arrangement is costless (or flawless), the overall effect of an 
arrangement has to be assessed for its costs and benefits in relation to feasible alternatives 
(Williamson, 1996). Policymakers have also responded to the perceived shortcomings of 
the existing governance composition structures with a series of initiatives, most of which 
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included an emphasis on board independence, increased board diversity and on board 
reputation. In many EU countries for example, there exists already corporate governance 
rules on diversity either in the form of directives or in the form of European regulation. 
However, the weak institutional environment prevalent in developing countries such as 
Nigeria, leads to a distrust of features of board composition. 
 
Hence, this chapter provided a ranking of features of board structure and composition 
governance drivers in a developing country, a gap in literature recognised by researchers 
(e.g. Black et al., 2017; Filatotchev et al., 2007). Secondly, the opinions of some of the 
top executive investment analysts was obtained to understand the “why” behind the 
importance or otherwise of board structure and composition features signalled by 
Nigerian banks. Thirdly, institutional theoretical account has been variously used to 
supplement some of the limitations of agency theory (Nakpodia, 2015). This study 
research relied on less investigated stakeholder agency, signalling and social cognition 
theories to provide investment analysts’ insights applicable in weak governance 
environments.  Potentially, this research provides coherent theoretical generalisation that 
can go beyond the Nigerian case and help in providing generalizations for developing 
countries with weak institutional environments. 
 
Discussions in this chapter also help to contribute to the social cognitive aspects of 
corporate governance with insights from a less discussed research site–Nigeria (Jackson 
& Deeg, 2006; Bohle & Greskovits, 2006; Taylor & Nolke, 2008; Adegbite et al., 2013). 
Empirically, this further adds to the budding literature on corporate governance in 
African countries (Briston, 1978; Abor, 2007; Kyereboah-Coleman, 2007; Mangena & 
Chamisa, 2008; Sanda et al., 2010; Bokpin, 2011; Mahadeo et al., 2012; Mangena, 
Tauringana, & Chamisa, 2012; Ntim, Opong, & Danbolt, 2012; Ntim & Soobaroyen, 
2013; Adegbite, 2015; Nakpodia & Adegbite, 2018).  
 
The next chapter present the findings on the ownership mechanism drivers.  
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Chapter Seven: Investment Analysts and Perception of 
External Ownership Drivers.  
 
7.1 Introduction 
A key factor in global capital markets is the fast growing importance of institutional 
investors. According to the International Monetary Fund (2005) (IMF), these 
professional investors manage financial assets exceeding US$45 trillion (including over 
US$20 trillion in equities). In recent years, financial globalization has further opened 
emerging markets that were previously off-limits to international investment (Khorana 
et al., 2005). One such important example is the openness of Nigeria's domestic stock 
market to foreign institutional investors. As at March 2017, the number of listed firms 
on the Nigerian Stock Exchange (NSE)  was 186, with a market capitalization of N8.5 
trillion (about $25 billion) (NSE Bulletin, 2017). Furthermore, the Nigerian Stock 
Exchange has been operating an Automated Trading System (ATS) since April 27, 1999, 
with dealers trading through a network of computers connected to a server. The ATS has 
facilities for remote trading and surveillance. Consequently, many of the dealing 
members trade online from their offices in Lagos and all the thirteen branches across the 
country. The NSE is highly representative of a modern developing country market. 
 
Foreign investors have increasingly invested in this important developing market. 
Activist institutional shareholders, particularly foreign institutional investors, are 
believed to play a positive role in external monitoring, especially when large controlling 
shareholders may potentially engage in expropriation by pursuing exclusive benefits 
through their influence on management. In particular, as "outsiders", foreign institutional 
investors are more likely to perform arms-length monitoring, thereby benefiting minority 
shareholders (Ferreira & Matos, 2008; Huang & Zhu, 2015). CBN code of governance,  
just as a number of UK  government reviews (e.g., Kay, 2012; Myners, 2001), puts an 
emphasis on the responsibility of investors to act as "stewards" of the companies they 
hold shares in, which entails "holding the board to account for the fulfillment of its 
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responsibilities" (Financial Reporting Council, 2012, p. 1). However, just as 
propositioned by Aguilera et al. (2015) that external stakeholders are ignored, there is 
little evidence on the impact of presence of foreign institutional investors on investment 
analysts who make investment decisions in Nigeria., so to the best of the researcher's 
knowledge, we offer the first exploration of this issue. 
 
Also, shareholder activism has continued to grow with the globalization of markets, as a 
force for good corporate governance (Adegbite, 2012; 2015; Becht et al., 2009). It mainly 
operates on the premise that shareholders, as activist owners, can check managerial 
opportunistic tendencies and, thus, signal effective corporate governance (Black, 1992; 
Gillan & Starks, 1998, 2000; Rubach & Sebora, 2009).  There is, however, a shortage of 
studies on the impact of shareholder activism activities in developing countries (Sarkar 
& Sarkar, 2000; Amao & Amaeshi, 2008; Adegbite et al., 2012). Furthermore, to the best 
of this researcher's knowledge, which shareholder groups’activism is effective and leads 
to investment decision making in developing countries, have not been studied. 
 
The two external ownership drivers which are the main variables of this study are 
reviewed in the sections below. After defining each driver, the features of each driver are 
then described. Subsequently, the descriptive results of respondents view on each feature 
are discussed following which the ordered logit regressions results are presented. Also 
in this chapter, the findings are discussed. 
 
7.2 Part A. External Ownership Driver 1: Foreign Institutional 
Investors  
The next subsection presents the results of the features of foreign institutional investors 
(and foreign listing) revealed from the perspective of investment analysts. 
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7.2.1. Statistical Analysis of Study Variables 
7.2.1.1. Descriptives of Foreign Institutional Investors Features in Nigeria 
Tables 7.1-7.3 reports percentage and frequencies of respondents’ perspective on features 
of foreign institutional investors. These tables present further evidence of a generally 
high level of engagement by the respondents especially given the specialist nature of the 
respondent sample selection.  
 
In table 7.1, less than half of respondents (42.98%) believe local institutional investors 
have the same effect as foreign institutional investors. The mean is 2.818 while a standard 
deviation of 1.057 indicates that there is less variation among the investment analysts. 
This is interesting and suggests investment analysts place more premium on the presence 
of foreign institutional investors than local institutional investors even though foreign 
investors might be “return chasers” (Kang et al., 2010, p. 2886). Further, this perception 
by investment analysts conforms with literature which provides evidence suggesting that 
foreign investors are more informed and outperform their domestic counterparts 
(Seasholes, 2004; Grinblatt & Keloharju, 2000; Karolyi, 2002; Froot & Ramadorai, 
2008). 
For table 7.2, 73.55% of respondents agree or strongly agree that foreign institutional 
investors on the board of a bank create the impression of a bank to invest in. The mean 
is 2.124 while a standard deviation of 0.8618 indicates that there is even less variation 
among the investment analysts on this feature.  Investment analysts might perceive that 
foreign investors on a board connote that high due diligence has been observed on the 
investee firm (Desender et al., 2016). For example, Bradshaw et al. (2004) found that US 
foreign investors will invest in firms with similar high generally accepted accounting 
standards. Again, this finding is supported by literature that suggests that foreigners 
prefer to invest in stocks with less information uncertainty to overcome their information 
disadvantages (Kim & Li, 2015).  
   
243 
 
For table 7.3, 76.03% of respondents agree or strongly agree that foreign listing of the 
shares of a bank creates the impression of a bank that is well managed. The mean is 
2.0248 while a standard deviation of 1.0004 indicates that there is less variation among 
the investment analysts. This affirmation might not be unconnected with higher 
transparency and due diligence associated with listing in developed economies compared 
to what is obtainable in Nigeria. Considering that the literature reveals that investors are 
willing to pay a premium for better-governed firms in less-developed markets (Khanna 
& Zyla, 2012), this positive affirmation by investment analysts is in alignment with 
literature that suggests foreign investment in a firm confirms the firm as one with high 
status (Mikkelson & Rubak, 1985).  
 
Table 7. 1 Local Institutional investors on a board compared to foreign institutional investors.  
 Frequency Percent Cumulative 
Strongly Agree 12 9.92 9.92 
Agree 40 33.06 42.98 
Neither Agree or Disagree 31 25.62 68.60 
Disagree 34 28.10 96.69 
Strongly Disagree 4 3.31 100 
 
Table 7. 2 Presence of foreign institutional investor on a board 
 Frequency Percent Cumulative 
Strongly Agree 27 22.31 22.31 
Agree 62 51.24 73.55 
Neither Agree or Disagree 23 19.01 92.56 
Disagree 8 6.61 99.17 
Strongly Disagree 1 0.83 100 
 
Table 7. 3 Foreign listing as a proxy for well-managed company 
 Frequency Percent Cumulative 
Strongly Agree 41 33.88 33.88 
Agree 51 42.15 76.03 
Neither Agree or Disagree 17 14.05 90.08 
Disagree 9 7.44 97.52 
Strongly Disagree 3 2.48 100 
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Table 7. 4 Summary of features of foreign (institutional) investors  
 Mean STD. DEV Min Max Frequency aggregate 
of strongly agree and 
agree (%) 
Local Institutional investors 
on a board compared to 
foreign institutional 
investors 
2.818182     1.056724           1 5 42.98 
Presence of foreign 
institutional investor on a 
board 
2.123967 .8618802           1 5 73.55 
Foreign listing as a proxy for 
well managed company 
2.024793     1.003849           1 5 76.03 
7.2.1.2. Test for Normality of Foreign Institutional Investors features 
The skewness and kurtosis tests were conducted and provided evidence of fairly normal 
distribution of the variables. For skewness, the value of the symmetrical distribution is 
zero (Gujarati, 2003; Brooks, 2008). ). For kurtosis, the hypothesis of non-normality can 
be rejected if its value is 3 (Gujarati, 2003; Brooks, 2008). 
Table 7.5 shows that the skewness values for most of the variables fall between 0.0001 
and 0.8980, which indicates mostly symmetrical distribution. For kurtosis test statistics, 
the variables fall between 0.0002 and 0.2521 indicating normal distribution. 
 
Table 7. 5 Skewness/Kurtosis tests for normality 
 OBS  
PR(SKEWNESS)   
PR(KURTOSIS) ADJ 
CHI2(2)    
PROB>CHI2 
Local Institutional investors 
on a board compared to 
foreign institutional investors 
0.8980         0.0002       11.58          0.0031 
Presence of foreign 
institutional investor on a 
board 
0.0023        0.2521 9.29        0.0096 
Foreign listing as a proxy for 
well managed company 
0.0001         0.1548     15.00          0.0006 
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7.2.1.3. Spearman and Pearson Correlation of Foreign Institutional Investors 
Features 
A correlation matrix was used to test the direction and magnitude of the linear 
relationship between the variables. This test helps to discover the potential presence of 
multicollinearity among the variables. There could be multicollinearity if a correlation 
coefficient between two variables is large. Following Ntim et al. (2012a) and Ntim & 
Soobaroyen (2013), the Pearson and Spearman correlation coefficients are reported in 
Table 7.6. The table shows the correlation matrix for the dependent, independent and 
control variables employed for the foreign institutional investors and decision-making 
models. The magnitude and direction of both the Pearson correlation coefficients 
(parametric) and Spearman correlation coefficients (non-parametric) appear to be 
relatively similar. This adds to the evidence that there is no major problem of non-
normality among the variables in the models (Ntim & Soobaroyen, 2013). In addition, 
the correlations among the variables are fairly low, indicating that there is not a serious 
multicollinearity problem (see Haniffa & Hudaib, 2006; Dam & Scholtens, 2012; Ntim 
et al., 2012a; Ramly, 2012).  
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Table 7. 6 (obs-117) Correlation of Foreign (& Local Institutional) Investors Features 
Pearson Correlation  
 gen age bg tny sub annut ii1iv ii2iv ii3iv ii2dv 
           
gen 1.0000          
age -0.1716 1.0000         
bg 0.0237 0.0828 1.0000        
tny -0.1741 0.5774 -0.1934 1.0000       
sub -0.0021 -0.1124 -0.0052 -0.0365 1.0000      
annut -0.0921 -0.0891 -0.0711 0.0190 0.3523 1.0000     
ii1iv -0.0379 -0.0082 -0.1133 0.1272 0.0605 0.0572 1.0000    
ii2iv 0.1159 -0.1283 0.0302 -0.0316 0.0492 -0.1366 0.2263 1.0000   
ii3iv 0.0306 -0.0293 -0.0589 -0.0587 -0.0665 0.0309 0.2170 0.3939 1.0000  
ii2dv 0.1272 -0.1112 -0.0418 -0.1106 0.1883 -0.0187 0.2175 0.4655 0.4109 1.0000 
 
 
Spearman Correlation 
 gen age bg tny sub annut ii3iv ii4iv ii5iv ii2dv 
           
gen 1.0000           
age -0.1777 1.0000          
bg 0.0379 0.0212 1.0000         
tny -0.1646 0.5665 -0.1932 1.0000        
sub -0.0021 -0.0841 -0.0014 -0.0278 1.0000       
annut -0.1356 -0.0732 -0.1098 -0.0007 0.3292 1.0000      
ii3iv -0.0417 -0.0054 -0.1189 0.1226 0.0552 0.0681 1.0000     
ii4iv 0.1359 -0.1321 0.0752 -0.0280 0.0797 -0.1490 0.2248 1.0000    
ii5iv 0.0536 -0.1049 -0.0246 -0.1574 -0.0494 0.0372 0.1866 0.3839 1.0000   
ii2dv 0.1390 -0.1352 -0.0582 -0.1450 0.1765 -0.0413 0.2121 0.5271 0.3926 1.0000 
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7.2.1.4. Ordered Logit Regression of Foreign (& Local Institutional) Investors 
Features against Decision Making 
The ordered logit regression (Table 7.7) was used to investigate the relationship between 
features of foreign (& local institutional) investors and decision-making.  The table will 
reveal that five submodels were built each with varying independent variables. Sub 
model with Adjusted R2 of 0.1704 was the best fit. This model can explain 17.04% of 
the variables relationship. When seeking only a weak signal in the presence of a lot of 
noise, and even a small signal can be of interest, then R-squared of even 10% or lower 
can have some information (Nau, 2018).  Moreover, as suggested by Nau (2018), the 
results obtained from this regression were cross validated through the semi-structured 
interviews conducted. Other studies reported similar low R-squared values. For example, 
McCahery et al. (2016) reported R-squared of 10% in their study. 
 
A summary of the results from the ordered logit and hypothesis can be found in table 7.8 
below. For robustness, ordered probit regression was conducted and produced similar 
results to the ordered logit regression. See appendix 3. 
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Table 7. 7 Ordered logit regressions of features of foreign (institutional) investor against investment decision making the influence of foreign 
institutional investors  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES ii2dv ii2dv ii2dv ii2dv ii2dv 
      
gen 0.519 0.237 0.423 0.281 0.319 
 (0.410) (0.427) (0.425) (0.429) (0.437) 
age -0.0539 0.108 -0.0871 0.122 0.0978 
 (0.270) (0.277) (0.278) (0.279) (0.287) 
bg -0.0727 -0.130 -0.0244 -0.124 -0.0844 
 (0.194) (0.204) (0.201) (0.203) (0.206) 
tny -0.249 -0.321 -0.0735 -0.355* -0.256 
 (0.201) (0.204) (0.206) (0.207) (0.215) 
sub 0.873** 0.894** 1.210*** 0.883** 1.074** 
 (0.401) (0.403) (0.414) (0.405) (0.417) 
annut -0.221 -0.0860 -0.271* -0.0961 -0.163 
 (0.147) (0.149) (0.148) (0.149) (0.152) 
ii3iv 0.445**   0.247 0.201 
 (0.175)   (0.183) (0.188) 
ii4iv  1.281***  1.216*** 0.964*** 
  (0.235)  (0.239) (0.256) 
ii5iv   0.979***  0.608** 
   (0.213)  (0.241) 
/cut1 -1.024 0.826 -0.0606 1.282 1.874* 
 (0.982) (1.030) (0.998) (1.085) (1.134) 
/cut2 1.128 3.382*** 2.299** 3.866*** 4.524*** 
 (0.979) (1.075) (1.017) (1.138) (1.194) 
/cut3 2.412** 4.877*** 3.720*** 5.357*** 6.082*** 
 (1.015) (1.142) (1.077) (1.203) (1.269) 
/cut4 4.232*** 6.811*** 5.645*** 7.273*** 8.039*** 
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 (1.205) (1.343) (1.283) (1.390) (1.458) 
      
Pseudo R2 .0571 .1424 .1114 .1486 .1704 
Observations 117 117 117 117 117 
 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Codes  
Gender GEN 0 Male 1 Female 
AGE AGE 21-30 – 1, 31-40 -2, 41-50 – 3, 51-60 -4, Over 60 - 5 
Your Background (Which area have you gained most of your 
working investment experience) 
BG Banking and Finance – 1, Pol Science -2, Economics – 3, Accounting – 4, Others - 5 
Total number of years you have spent as an analyst TNY 0-4 – 1,5-9 – 2, 10-15 – 3, 16-20 – 4, Over 20 -5 
Is your firm a subsidiary/affiliate of an international 
company? 
SUB Yes- 1, No -0 
What is the annual investment turnover of your company? AnnuT N1M-N100M -1, N101M-N1bn – 2, N1bn-N10bn – 3, N10bn-N100bn – 4, Over N100bn - 5 
When foreign institutional shareholders hold the shares of a 
bank, it influences my investment decisions 
II2DV Decision making influence of Institutional Investors 
Presence of local institutional shareholders influence my 
investment decision making exactly the same way as the 
presence of foreign institutional shareholders 
II3IV Local Institutional Investors on a board compared to foreign institutional investors 
Presence of a representative of foreign institutional 
shareholders on board of a bank leads to the bank being well 
managed and accountable 
II4IV Presence of Foreign Institutional Investors on a board 
If a bank’s shares are listed on a foreign stock exchange, I 
perceive the bank to be accountable and well managed 
II5IV Foreign listing as a proxy for well managed 
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Table 7. 8 A summary of all of the hypotheses and findings of features of foreign (& local 
institutional) investors and decision-making model. 
 
7.2.2. Discussions and Triangulation of Qualitative and Quantitative 
Findings of Features of Foreign (Institutional) Investors Driver. 
Model 1. Foreign (Institutional) Investors Induced Propensity to Make Favourable 
Investment Decision = β0 + .96(FI4) + .20((FI3) +61(FI5) + 0.32Gen) - .08(BG) 
- .10(AGE) + 1.1(IA) - .26(TNY) - .16(FS) + εi 
7.2.3.1 Control applied in the models  
Age is negatively statistically correlated with investment decision making although not 
statistically significant (β= -.10, p=.73).  One can assume that older investment analysts 
are, the less likely to believe that foreign institutional investors are important for 
investment decision making. Background is negatively statistically correlated with 
investment decision making although not statistically significant (β= -.08, p=.68). One 
can assume that investment analysts that are not specialist in banking shares/equities are 
Dependent Variable  Decision Making influence of Foreign 
(Institutional) Investors  
Independent 
variable  
No. 
Hypothesis  
Expected sign  Finding sign  Finding 
significance  
Hypothesis 
status  
      
Presence of 
foreign 
institutional 
investor on a 
board 
1 +  + Significant at the 
1% level 
Accepted 
Importance of 
local 
Institutional 
investors on a 
board 
compared to 
foreign 
institutional 
investors 
 
2 +  +  Insignificant Rejected 
Foreign listing 
as a proxy for 
well managed 
company 
3 +  + Significant at the 
5% level 
Accepted 
   
251 
 
less likely believe that foreign institutional investors for investment making decisions. 
Total number of years is negatively statistically correlated with investment decision 
making although not statistically significant (β= -0.26, p=.23). One can assume that the 
more experienced investment analysts are less likely believe that foreign institutional 
investors are necessary for boards of banks or investment decision making. 
International subsidiary is positively statistically significantly correlated with investment 
decision making (β=1.1, p<0.5). As expected, investment analysts that work for 
international companies believe that foreign institutional investors on the board of banks 
are essential and it also affects investment decision making. Firm Size is negatively 
statistically correlated with investment decision making although not statistically 
significant (β= -.16, p=.29). One can assume that investment analysts that work in larger 
organizations, are less likely to believe that foreign institutional investors are important 
for investment decision makings. 
7.2.3.2 Foreign (Institutional) Investor Features 
 
Presence of Foreign Institutional Investors on a board 
Presence of Foreign Institutional Investors on a board is positively statistically 
significantly correlated with decision-making (β=.96, p<.01). This suggests that 
investment analysts presume that foreign institutional investors on the board of bank is 
positive for investment decision making. In line with stakeholder-agency theory, this 
finding suggests that investment analysts are likely to make positive investment decision 
about a bank when foreign investors have representation on the bank’s board under the 
assumption that the agentic issues are somewhat mitigated. One plausible possibility for 
this finding is the increase in the value of a firm after it witnesses increased outside 
investment (Mikkelson & Rubak, 1985; Ferreira & Matos, 2008). Also, investment 
analysts are likely to assume that foreign institutional investors have done their due 
diligence (Desender et al., 2016) before investing in shares of a bank. Espousing similar 
reasoning, interviewee MF1 posits that “Foreign institutional investors, they look at 
things critically well. They have done their research. They look at it (investee firm) 
   
252 
 
critically well, and that is why you see their investment are usually few. Mostly (they 
invest in) companies that have a foreign affiliate.” This conforms to studies by Kang & 
Stulz (1997) and Dahlquist & Robertsson (2001), who find that foreign investors hold 
disproportionately more shares of large firms and firms with greater recognition or 
visibility in international markets. 
Similarly, according to Aggarwal et al. (2011), in common law countries, foreign 
institutional investors investing in shares of a firm is a validation of the practices of that 
firm. Hence, in accordance with the literature, investment analysts who invest in Nigeria 
psychologically associate foreign investors on the board of a bank as a feature that drives 
good corporate governance. Interviewee OP5 explains agreement with literature as 
follows “yes because I think foreign institutional investors are sort of like a validation. 
Even as it is now (in Nigeria), you have the tier one banks; you have X bank and XX 
Bank. There is no international investor that comes into our local market that does not 
look at those names (X and XX banks) first because they (X and XX Banks) portray an 
image of a very good bank with a high level of corporate governance.  So, theirs' (foreign 
institutional investors) is sort of like a validation. Because let's not kid ourselves, in terms 
of this (governance) systems and institutions that have been put in place, the developed 
nations are way ahead of us (in Nigeria)”. 
Further, investment in shares of a local company by foreign investors is also a mark of 
confidence in the local firm’s profitability (Ferreira & Matos, 2008), and this stamp of 
confidence triggers certain reactions from investors. Interviewee LA4 puts it thus “when 
you have foreign confidence in your institution or in the bank; it means that these 
foreigners have identified profit-making opportunity in your organization or they have 
identified a value that can be obtained. It means the bank is now open to international 
scrutiny. Where you move from operating on a domestic or local level to international 
levels is always a good thing for a bank or an institution.” 
However, despite the general consensus among most of the investment analysts, there 
were still certain concerns for the effect of foreign institutional investments on the local 
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capital market especially as foreign investors can be tagged as rate shoppers (Tesar & 
Werner, 1995; Bohn & Tesar, 1996; Grinblatt & Keloharju, 2000) who are concerned 
only about short-termism. For example interviewee LF2 highlights as follows “for me, 
that (foreign institutional investors buying shares of a firm) is not a good thing because 
that they create a lot of volatility in the market. As you can imagine they are out there 
shopping for rates and so as soon as things start to move in the negative for Nigeria you 
see a quick flight to safety and there is a huge sell off. Unfortunately domestic investors 
do not have an alternative market to go to so they are stuck here.” 
Despite this reservation, the investment climate in Nigeria itself is short-term (Adegbite 
et al., 2012). Hence, it is unsurprising that investment analysts are positively persuaded 
when foreign institutional investors purchase shares of a firm. This view supports the 
literature that foreign institutional investors can act as protection for minority 
shareholders (Ferreira & Matos, 2008; Huang & Zhu, 2015).  
Nevertheless, while foreign institutional investors on a board represent positives for 
investment analysts, the statue of the person nominated to the board is still important to 
determine their capability in delivering value to the board and by extension the firm. 
Interviewee CP1 highlights it thus “It comes down to the quality of individual that is 
nominated onto that bank boards. But based on track record, and based on what I have 
experienced in the past, I have come to realize that foreign investors especially if you are 
coming from the right shop or right investment boutique are usually quite vast, you know, 
in the practices and they know the correct questions to ask”. Considering the general 
malaise of corruption prevalent in the Nigerian environment (Adegbite, 2012), foreign 
institutional investors are presumed by investment analysts to have an arms-length 
dealing (Ferreira & Matos, 2008) with the board, taking only unbiased decisions which 
the foreign institutional investors feel is best for the firm. Interviewee LA1 highlights 
this local environment distrust thus, “I do not want to keep saying it is the way Nigeria 
is, but, maybe it is because of the standards in their (foreign institutional investors') 
country that dictates how they invest. Therefore, they are very wary about going into 
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certain situations. The local investors do not have those constraints because we do not 
have those constraints in Nigeria. So, that is why am saying that the local institutional 
investors would not sway your investment decisions but the foreign investors will.  If they 
are in the company, I am more assured of things like corporate governance in those 
companies. We have so many corporate governance issues happening in Nigeria right 
now. It is very rare that you will look into such company (having governance issues) that 
you see significant foreign investment or you see foreign investors on the board because 
those things (governance) matter to them".  From the submissions presented above, 
hypothesis 4a is supported. 
 
 
 
Importance of local institutional investors on a board compared to foreign 
institutional investors 
Importance of Local Institutional Investors on a board compared to foreign institutional 
investors is positively correlated with investment decision making although not 
statistically significant (β= .08, p=.28 ). Findings from our interviews suggests that the 
investment analysts presume that local institutional investors are important, but not with 
any level of reliability. The insignificance of this feature can be explained by inconsistent 
views held by the investment analysts interviewed. Indeed, only 42.98% were of the 
opinion that local institutional investors were as important as foreign institutional 
investors. For example, while on the one hand, interviewee LF1 states that “I think the 
foreign (is more important). Because for the foreign investor, he has come from the 
region that has what to comply with (has standards he has to comply with), because he 
can be fined if he does not do the right thing. That is one. And two, he is in the country 
to protect this investment. So, definitely, I do not see him, in the long run, forming an 
alliance with other people and fail in his responsibility to protect investors generally. 
But for a local institutional investor, while for some time he could have the interest of 
shareholders at heart but... I do not want to jump to conclusion, but we have had 
instances where,….you know, people change, and once they see the other side that on 
the board you can get something even better, the interest of shareholders may leave their 
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hearts”. This conforms with the literature which suggests that foreign institutional 
investors are often believed to play more of a role in prompting changes in corporate 
governance practices than local institutional investors (Gillan & Starks, 2003).  
Similarly, arguing from the perspective that foreign institutional investors import values 
into a local firm (Huang & Zhu, 2015), interviewee MF3 posits that “yes, they (foreign 
institutional investors) are more professional in their dealings… but who they are 
matters. Not just any foreign (investor). If they are foreign from more developed 
economies, more advanced economies, of course, you think they will bring the wealth of 
the experience to bear. The assumption is that they have better corporate governance 
practices out there now. at least  in the Western world than what we have here in Nigeria, 
and that experience can only be an additional or a plus to what  the local ones (investors) 
have so like I said by and large it is preferable to have more foreign than local.” 
Corroborating further, interviewee CP2 states as follows “unfortunately yes. As much as 
I do not like to say that, unfortunately, yes. Obviously, because they are coming from 
more developed markets they are coming from markets that have way higher standards, 
and they can begin to demand for those kinds of standards to be replicated here in 
Nigeria." 
On the other hand, interviewees such as OP3 seek to maintain a balanced neutrality and 
posits as follows, “no, I would not (say foreign institutional investors on the board of a 
bank are more important than local institutional investor on the board of the bank), 
because there is always the risk of (the foreign institutional investor) trying to apply 
successful international models to the local environment. That is always a risk, and when 
you do not have strong local management, they tend to give in to the pressure. Investors 
eventually suffer for it. It is not to say that foreign investors are not good, sometimes you 
find a very good balance where the approach is to customize best practice internationally 
to local context and likewise I think the local investor community has developed quite a 
bit over the years with all the crisis that we have had and with the significant pool of 
investments that has been built-in especially in the pension space where you now have a 
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significant enough mass to attract really capable talents to the area. So, I would not say 
foreign is better; likewise, I would not say local is better, it is really about application.” 
Similarly maintaining the neutrality, interviewee LC2 states as follows “so, you might 
say maybe from the point of view of maybe trying to instill best practice given how weak 
governance is in our environment maybe, but at the same time, I would argue that 
because the domestic investors are on the ground and most of the time have access or 
follow and can track the environment and the sector, then it is easier to object the case”. 
Therefore, our findings do not support H4b. It is interesting to note that no interviewee 
argued that local institutional investor was definitely more important. Instead, some 
arguments were made for value brought to the firm by any investor whether local or 
foreign. Interviewee LC1 highlights this as follows “more important in terms of 
direction; in terms of technical expertise; in terms of what they bring on board. But again 
I do not think it's just about whether you are foreign or local. I think it’s a function of a 
stand-alone assessment of who it is and what you are bringing into the table”. Thus, H4b 
is not supported. 
 
 
Foreign listing as a proxy for well managed 
 
Foreign listing as a proxy for well managed is positively statistically significantly 
correlated with decision-making (β=.61, p<0.5). This finding is supported by Sarkissian 
& Schill’s (2016) study which reported more accountability with firms when they cross-
listed. The reasoning of our interviewees seems to corroborate the literature to a limited 
extent. Interviewee CP1 confirms this as follows “It (foreign listing) does not influence 
anything.  It just helps hold the banks to more level, higher level of accountability and 
stewardship, higher level of disclosure.  Moreover, as an investor it provides room for 
better returns because listing the different in markets provides arbitrage opportunities”.  
Further, similar to studies by Gozzi et al. (2006) and Sarkissian & Schill (2008), which 
suggests that firms that access international markets have transitory valuation gains, 
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investment analysts do not assume foreign listing of shares is a feature by itself for 
investment decision making, but it is a feature that enhances the positive visibility of the 
firm.  Interviewee LC6 highlights this as follows: “in itself does not influence the 
decision-making, however when it (a bank) does a foreign listing  it means that the entity 
in question is very sizeable, probably at the top of the strata from a banking perspective 
and it means that they are more sellable. So larger is bigger when it comes to banks, 
larger is better when it comes to banks, and that in itself is positive” 
However, the distrust of the motives for foreign listing might be responsible for the 
indifferent perceptions of investment analysts towards foreign listing, especially as firms 
have different motives for cross-listing (Dodd, 2013). Interviewee CP2 highlights as 
follows “frankly speaking I think it (foreign listing) is a charade. ,…. because the reason 
why they do that is for credibility, right? You see a lot of banks going down route now. 
The biggest culprit is the London and Johannesburg Stock Exchange. As much as listing 
would give some level of better accountability, but I still think it could be all be 
"packaged16” nicely to meet whatever requirements. … I know there are some tougher 
countries like the US you know, so  if it's beyond the usual London and Johannesburg 
then maybe I would step back  to have a bit more confidence but right now if it is just the 
two usual culprits (London and Johannesburg Stock Exchange), it does not really do 
much for me” 
Nevertheless, investment analysts pay attention to banks that list their shares outside their 
home country believing it might provide some liquidity. This is in accordance with the 
literature on foreign listing presenting more liquidity (Dodd, 2013).  Corroborating the 
literature, interviewee LF1 suggests as follows, “it (foreign listing) provides liquidity but 
because the market is not yet integrated to that extent that you can actually take arbitrage 
opportunity, it does not really influence that much. But the only thing is, from my 
perspective I can say it influences is that it scales up the reporting quality for the 
                                                          
16 “Packaged” is a Nigerian slang which means enhancing or exaggerating the quality  
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company which makes it better for us to assess the company’s reporting and financials 
better". 
Similarly, foreign listing can be an integral part of a firm's global strategy necessary 
(Dodd, 2013) for providing it foreign exchange for example and provides a form of 
reputational bonding (Coffee, 2002; Stulz, 1999). Corroborating the literature, 
interviewee LC8 argues thus, "it just makes it easy for those banks to raise money and 
that for me is positive. So, if a bank is listed abroad, I know X bank is listed in the London 
stock exchange, I do not know any other bank, but you can see that X bank does well 
especially in areas of foreign exchange lending because the listing gives them access to 
foreign capital.” 
From the results, although H5c was supported, foreign listing is viewed more as an extra 
quality check rather than a driver that directly by itself influences investment-making 
decisions. 
The next sub section presents part B, findings of shareholder groups’ activism of external 
ownership driver. 
 
7.3 Part B. External Ownership Driver 2. Effective shareholder 
groups’ activism 
This sub section presents results of shareholder groups’ effective activism from the 
perspective of investment analysts. 
7.3.1 Statistical Analysis of Study Variables  
7.3.1.1 Descriptives of Shareholder Groups’ Effective Activism in Nigeria 
 
Tables 7.9-7.11 reports percentage and frequencies of respondents that agree with 
features of shareholder groups’effective activism in Nigeria. In table 7.9, 75.63% of 
respondents agree or strongly agree that sophisticated activist shareholders influence 
their purchase of equities of the bank. This feature has a mean of 2.017 and a standard 
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deviation of 0.8828 suggests a congruence of opinions by investment analysts. However, 
Table 7.10 reveals that an even higher percentage of investment analysts (84.03%) are 
swayed by reputable shareholders. Also, the mean of this feature is 1.8908 with a 
standard deviation of 0.7224 which indicates even more congruence on this feature by 
investment analysts. In line with literature (e.g., Adegbite, 2015; Uche et al., 2016), 
while, investment analysts clearly find both sets of shareholders somewhat useful, the 
understanding is that reputable people in developing countries are more likely to be the 
ones establishing firms or with more resources to make profits. 
In table 7.11, 83.19% believe that presence of activist institutional shareholders acts as a 
check on the management of banks.  The mean value is 1.966, and the standard deviation 
of 0.8727 depicts a high level of agreement among the investment analysts. Similar to 
literature by Bechal et al. (2009) which suggests activist institutional shareholders 
generate herd followership, investment analysts feel such activism will help solve some 
agency problems. The qualitative study will help shed some light on this particular 
finding. 
Table 7. 9 Presence of Sophisticated Activist Shareholders   
 Frequency Percent Cumulative 
Strongly Agree 35 29.41 29.41 
Agree 55 46.22 75.63 
Neither Agree or Disagree 23 19.33 94.96 
Disagree 4 3.36 98.32 
Strongly Disagree 2 1.68 100 
 
Table 7. 10 Presence of Reputable Activist Shareholders    
 Frequency Percent Cumulative 
Strongly Agree 35    29.41 29.41 
Agree 65 54.52 84.03 
Neither Agree or Disagree 16 13.45 97.48 
Disagree 3 2.52 100 
Strongly Disagree 0 0 - 
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Table 7. 11 Presence of Activist Institutional Shareholders  
 Frequency Percent Cumulative 
Strongly Agree 35 29.41 29.41 
Agree 64 53.78 83.19 
Neither Agree or Disagree 10 8.40 91.60 
Disagree 9 7.56 99.16 
Strongly Disagree 1 0.84 100 
 
 
Table 7. 12 Summary of descriptives of Activist Shareholder Groups  
 Mean STD. DEV Min Max Frequency aggregate of 
strongly agree and agree (%) 
Presence of Activist 
Sophisticated 
Shareholders   
2.016807    .882823           1 5 75.63 
Presence of Activist 
Reputable 
Shareholders    
1.890756 .722401 1 4 84.03 
Presence of Activist 
Institutional 
Shareholders 
1.966387     .872681           1 5 83.19 
7.3.1.2 Test for normality of activist shareholder groups  
The Skewness and Kurtosis tests were conducted and provided evidence of fairly normal 
distribution of the variables. For Skewness, the value of the symmetrical distribution is 
zero (Gujarati, 2003; Brooks, 2008). ). For Kurtosis, the hypothesis of non-normality can 
be rejected if its value is 3 (Gujarati, 2003; Brooks, 2008). 
Table 7.13 which reports shareholder activism features shows that the Skewness values 
for most of the variables fall between 0.000 and 0.0114, which indicates mostly 
symmetrical distribution. For Kurtosis test statistics, the variables fall between 0.0306 
and 0.3352 indicating normal distribution. 
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Table 7. 13 Skewness/ Kurtosis Tests for Normality  
 OBS  
PR(SKEWNESS)   
PR(KURTOSIS) ADJ 
CHI2(2)    
PROB>CHI2 
Presence of Sophisticated 
Shareholders   
0.0003         0.0560      13.58          .0011 
 
Presence of Reputable 
Shareholders    
0.0114             0.3352       6.82 0.0331 
Presence of Activist 
Shareholders 
0.0000         0.0306        17.99         0.0001 
 
7.3.1.3 Spearman and Pearson Correlation of Shareholder Activism Features 
A correlation matrix was used to test the direction and magnitude of the linear 
relationship between the variables. This test helps to discover the potential presence of 
multicollinearity among the variables. There could be multicollinearity if a correlation 
coefficient between two variables is large. Following Ntim et al. (2012a) and Ntim & 
Soobaroyen (2013), the Pearson and Spearman correlation coefficients are reported in 
Table 5.14. The table shows the correlation matrix for the dependent, independent and 
control variables employed for the foreign institutional investors and decision-making 
models. The magnitude and direction of both the Pearson correlation coefficients 
(parametric) and Spearman correlation coefficients (non-parametric) appear to be 
relatively similar. This adds to the evidence that there is no major problem of non-
normality among the variables in the models (Ntim & Soobaroyen, 2013). In addition, 
the correlations among the variables are fairly low, indicating that there is not a serious 
multicollinearity problem (see Haniffa & Hudaib, 2006; Dam & Scholtens, 2012; Ntim 
et al., 2012a; Ramly, 2012).
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Table 7. 14  (obs=115) Correlation of Activist Shareholder Groups 
Pearson Correlation  
 gen age bg tny sub annut sa1iv sa2iv sa3iv sa5dv 
gen 1.0000          
age -0.1795 1.0000         
bg 0.0349 0.0835 1.0000        
tny -0.1422 0.5940 -0.2035 1.0000       
sub -0.0117 -0.1251 -0.0036 -0.0230 1.0000      
annut -0.0773 -0.0889 -0.0745 0.0073 0.3597 1.0000     
sa1iv 0.1904 -0.1133 -0.0433 -0.1274 -0.2347 -0.0989 1.0000    
sa2iv 0.1371 0.0751 0.0357 -0.0112 -0.0691 -0.1266 0.3911 1.0000   
sa3iv -0.0510 -0.0031 -0.1015 0.0959 -0.0122 0.1738 0.2205 0.1365 1.0000  
sa5dv -0.0658 0.0579 -0.1188 0.1021 -0.0135 -0.0506 0.2132 0.3624 0.4477 1.0000 
 
Spearman Correlation  
 gen age bg tny sub annut sa1iv sa2iv sa3iv sa5dv 
gen 1.0000           
age -0.1871 1.0000          
bg 0.0507 0.0222 1.0000         
tny -0.1315 0.5868 -0.2026 1.0000        
sub -0.0117 -0.0994 0.0005 -0.0158 1.0000       
annut -0.1172 -0.0720 -0.1147 -0.0184 0.3362 1.0000      
sa1iv 0.2017 -0.1619 -0.0272 -0.1194 -0.2389 -0.1128 1.0000     
sa2iv 0.1388 0.0431 0.0456 -0.0156 -0.0821 -0.1324 0.4688 1.0000    
sa3iv -0.0167 -0.0108 -0.1691 0.1195 -0.0373 0.1632 0.2773 0.2165 1.0000   
sa5dv -0.0491 0.0297 -0.1546 0.0877 -0.0520 -0.0940 0.2897 0.4030 0.4862 1.0000 
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7.3.1.4 Ordered Logit Regression of Activist Shareholder Groups against 
Decision Making 
The ordered logit regression (Table 7.15) was used to investigate the relationship 
between activist shareholder groups and decision-making.  The table will reveal that 
eight submodels were built each with independent variables. Sub model with Adjusted 
R2 of 0.1946 was the best fit. This model can explain 19.46% of the variables 
relationship. When seeking only a weak signal in the presence of a lot of noise, and even 
a small signal can be of interest, then R-squared of even 10% or lower can have some 
information (Nau, 2018).  Moreover, as suggested by Nau (2018), the results obtained 
from this regression were cross validated through the semi-structured interviews 
conducted. Other studies reported similar low R-squared values. For example, McCahery 
et al. (2016) reported R-squared of 10% in their study. 
 
A summary of the results from the ordered logit and hypothesis can be found in table 
7.16 below. For robustness, ordered probit regression was conducted and produced 
similar results to the ordered logit regression. See appendix 3. 
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Table 7. 15 Ordered logit regressions of activist shareholder groupsagainst investment decision making the influence of shareholder activism 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
VARIABLES sa5dv sa5dv sa5dv sa5dv sa5dv sa5dv sa5dv sa5dv 
         
gen -0.359 0.369 -0.529 0.250 -0.583 0.250 0.122 0.108 
 (0.404) (0.426) (0.404) (0.437) (0.407) (0.437) (0.432) (0.437) 
age 0.0222 0.0435 -0.165 0.0613 -0.138 0.0613 -0.0642 -0.0600 
 (0.272) (0.279) (0.272) (0.279) (0.273) (0.279) (0.285) (0.285) 
bg -0.122 -0.121 -0.156 -0.119 -0.139 -0.119 -0.143 -0.141 
 (0.175) (0.186) (0.173) (0.187) (0.175) (0.187) (0.188) (0.188) 
tny 0.128 0.175 0.212 0.175 0.220 0.175 0.228 0.229 
 (0.203) (0.208) (0.206) (0.207) (0.205) (0.207) (0.213) (0.213) 
sub 0.165 0.0527 -0.175 0.159 -0.0459 0.159 -0.00626 0.0139 
 (0.415) (0.410) (0.409) (0.419) (0.420) (0.419) (0.415) (0.425) 
annut -0.0857 -0.259* 0.000539 -0.245* -0.00340 -0.245* -0.184 -0.183 
 (0.143) (0.149) (0.145) (0.149) (0.145) (0.149) (0.151) (0.151) 
sa1iv 0.637***   0.284 0.316 0.284  0.0522 
 (0.222)   (0.230) (0.227) (0.230)  (0.244) 
/cut1 -0.553 0.667 0.342 1.197 0.849 1.197 2.080* 2.148* 
 (0.994) (0.958) (0.994) (1.051) (1.062) (1.051) (1.065) (1.111) 
/cut2 1.500 3.144*** 2.580** 3.723*** 3.124*** 3.723*** 4.733*** 4.805*** 
 (0.998) (0.986) (1.023) (1.097) (1.101) (1.097) (1.126) (1.177) 
/cut3 2.633*** 4.595*** 3.786*** 5.191*** 4.349*** 5.191*** 6.244*** 6.318*** 
 (1.020) (1.037) (1.052) (1.152) (1.136) (1.152) (1.184) (1.235) 
/cut4 4.287*** 6.808*** 5.543*** 7.344*** 6.097*** 7.344*** 8.520*** 8.583*** 
 (1.089) (1.196) (1.141) (1.275) (1.216) (1.275) (1.345) (1.377) 
sa3iv  1.350***  1.298***  1.298*** 1.228*** 1.220*** 
  (0.207)  (0.211)  (0.211) (0.212) (0.215) 
sa2iv   1.293***  1.159***  0.942*** 0.920*** 
   (0.286)  (0.301)  (0.296) (0.313) 
Pseudo R2 3.35 15.74 7.37 16.21 7.96 16.21 19.01 19.02 
Observations 115 115 115 115 115 115 115 115 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
   
265 
 
Codes  
Gender GEN 0 Male 1 Female 
AGE AGE 21-30 – 1, 31-40 -2, 41-50 – 3, 51-60 -4, Over 60 - 5 
Your Background (Which area have you gained most of your 
working investment experience) 
BG Banking and Finance – 1, Pol Science -2, Economics – 3, Accounting – 4, Others - 5 
Total number of years you have spent as an analyst TNY 0-4 – 1,5-9 – 2, 10-15 – 3, 16-20 – 4, Over 20 -5 
Is your firm a subsidiary/affiliate of an international company? SUB Yes- 1, No -0 
What is the annual investment turnover of your company? AnnuT N1M-N100M -1, N101M-N1bn – 2, N1bn-N10bn – 3, N10bn-N100bn – 4, Over N100bn - 5 
 
When a bank has active sophisticated shareholders (typically 
people working in the formal sector of the economy), I am 
inclined to invest in the bank 
 
SA1IV Presence of sophisticated activist shareholders 
When a bank has active reputable shareholders (typically 
positively influential and well known individuals), I am inclined to 
invest in the bank 
 
SA2IV Presence of reputable activist shareholders 
Institutional shareholder activism acts as a check to management SA3V Presence of activist institutional shareholders 
Shareholder activism  influences my investment decision-making SA4DV Investment Decision making 
   
266 
 
Table 7. 16 A summary of all of the hypotheses and findings for the effective shareholder 
activism groups and decision making model 
Dependent Variable Decision Making influence of effective 
shareholder activism groups  
Independent 
variable  
No. 
Hypothesis  
Expected sign  Finding sign  Finding 
significance  
Hypothesis 
status  
Presence of 
activist 
sophisticated 
shareholders  
 
1  + + Insignificant Rejected  
Presence of 
activist 
reputable 
shareholder  
2 +  +  Significant at 
the 1% level 
Accepted 
Presence of 
activist 
institutional 
shareholders 
3 +  +  Significant at 
the 1% level 
Accepted 
 
7.3.2 Discussions and Triangulation of Qualitative and Quantitative 
Findings of  Activist Shareholder groups in Nigeria 
 
Model 1 Shareholder Activism Induced Propensity to Make Favourable Investment 
Decision = β0 + .15(SA1) + 1.06(SA2) + 1.171(SA4) + .11(TNY) -.50(Gen) - .16(BG) -.07(AGE) 
+0.02(IA) -.12(FS) + εi 
7.3.2.1 Controls applied in the models 
Gender is negatively correlated with decision-making (induced by shareholder activism) 
although not statistically significant (β= .50, p=.81). One can assume that female analysts 
are less likely to believe that shareholder activism is important for investment decision 
making. The explanation might be found from the Nigerian environment where 
shareholder activism seems to be at its early infancy stage hence characterized by 
unruliness. Whereas, women have been reported to be more circumspect and exhibit 
greater care in their dealings (Barber & Odean, 2001a; Niederle & Vesterlund, 2007). 
   
267 
 
Age is negatively statistically correlated with decision-making (induced by shareholder 
activism) although not statistically significant (β= -.07, p=.83). One can assume that 
older investment analysts are, the less likely they believe shareholder activism is 
important for investment decision making. In the Nigerian environment where corruption 
beclouds many activities, the experience of the investment analysts will come to bear.  
Background is negatively statistically correlated with shareholder activism although not 
statistically significant (β= -.16, p=.45). One can assume that investment analysts that 
are not specialist in banking funds/equities are more likely to believe that shareholder 
activism is important for investment decision making. Investment analysts recognize the 
limitations of shareholder activism in the Nigerian environment. 
Total number of years is positively statistically correlated with shareholder activism 
although not statistically significant (β= .11, p=..28). One can assume that the more 
experienced investment analysts are more likely associate shareholder activism as being 
important for investment decision making. Recently in Nigeria, some experienced 
activist fund managers joined ranks in influencing certain firm management decisions 
they thought was unfavorable to shareholders of that firm. 
International subsidiary is positively statistically correlated with shareholder activism 
although not statistically significant (β= 0.02, p=.97). One can assume that investment 
analysts that work for international companies believe that shareholder activism is 
important for investment decision making. Finally, Firm size (represented by annual 
turnover) is negatively statistically correlated with decision making although not 
statistically significant (β= -.16, p=.23). One can assume that investment analysts that 
work in larger organizations are less likely to believe that shareholder activism is 
important for investment decision-makings. 
7.3.2.2 Features of effective shareholder activism 
 
Presence of activist sophisticated shareholders 
Presence of activist sophisticated shareholders is positively correlated with investment 
decision making although not statistically significant (β= .15, p=.83). Findins from our 
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interviews suggests that investment analysts assume that the presence of activist 
sophisticated shareholders can help shareholder activism but they are not important for 
investment decision making. The insignificant relationship might be for the reason that 
in Nigeria majority of investment analysts do not believe activist sophisticated 
shareholders necessarily have the wherewithal to make sound investment choices worthy 
of emulation. Interviewee LC2 suggests that activist sophisticated shareholder “could 
just be some sharp cowboy17 trying to take advantage of a situation of the market”. 
However, a few of the interviewees were of the opinion that activist sophisticated 
shareholders make informed investment decisions. Interviewee MF2 highlights this point 
thus, “sophisticated shareholders are people who actually know why they are investing 
and they usually have projections that they need to meet. That would drive that 
organization towards profitability”.  Moreover, if the activist sophisticated shareholder 
is investing on behalf of respectable organisations then in such situations their 
investments might interest analysts with the caveat that the sophisticated shareholder is 
well informed. Similarly, interviewee LC5 states that”… if I know a couple of 
sophisticated investors and let us assume it is accepted that they know what they are 
doing, it will influence my decision-making. I have seen a situation where sophisticated 
investors are not investing for their on their own good, they are investing on behalf of 
the organizations”. 
Nevertheless, due to transaction costs (Williamson, 1985), sophisticated shareholders 
who might not have large investment fund, might be unable to carry out proper analysis 
(Bebchuk & Weisbach, 2010). Interviewee LC5 highlights this as follows “…the bulk of 
(activist sophisticated) people do not really do deep analysis, and their decisions are 
normally not objective. So, I mean I do not place too much premium on their investment 
decisions”. Similarly, interviewee OP3 opines as follows “unfortunately the working-
class investor locally seems not to be the most proficient in investing and there tends to 
be a bandwagon effect, lots of herding. Many say that if they are moving in one direction, 
                                                          
17 Cowboy – slang used in Nigeria to describe someone inexperienced but very aggressive and unduly bullish in 
business dealings 
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really you should be moving in the other but they are getting better because I think one 
or two crises and a lot of people have learned that you need to do a bit more work”. 
Gleaning from the above, therefore H5a is not supported. 
 
 
Presence of activist reputable shareholders 
Presence of activist reputable shareholders is positively statistically significantly 
correlated with investment decision making (β=1.06, p<.01). This suggests that 
investment analysts assume that the presence of activist reputable shareholders is an 
important feature when considering shareholder activism and might influence investment 
decision making. In Nigeria, where many businesses are still family owned (La Porta et 
al., 1999, Adegbite, 2015) presence of activist reputable shareholders is synonymous 
with influential business owners. This is highlighted by interviewee CP1 as follows “I 
would prefer the reputable investors to the sophisticated investor. But I do not have a 
choice. I do not decide, who backs, who follows or who invests in an entity.  And 
shareholding structure to a large extent does not really influence what I do. Capital will 
always follow value, and if you find the right entity, there is a likelihood a few reputable 
investors have also spotted that entity”. 
 
Further, in developing countries, businesses are usually financed or started by influential 
people who have access to capital (Adegbite, 2015).  Interviewee CP1 highlights this 
thus “and who are the ones with the likelihood to back an entity first? Its reputable 
investors and not the sophisticated investor because reputable investors have the 
infrastructure. They have the resources to do the analysis, to do the due diligence and 
they will most likely be the first to make an entrance into the institution before the 
sophisticated investors came on board". This agrees with the literature on developing 
countries where dominant family or individual shareholding are still the order of the day 
(La Porta et al., 1999; Adegbite, 2015). 
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Also, the literature documents that investment analysts are always on the lookout for best 
value for their investments, (Ivanova, 2017) hence they follow the flow of capital. This 
is highlighted by interviewee LC7 as follows “you have to be careful. Someone who is 
well known and is a “big man18”, they have resources that help take investment decisions 
and those resources might not be available to the everyday person. Sometimes when you 
hear that this person is moving into this stock, for example Dangote19 is going to buy this 
stock, it is not Dangote in itself, it is the resources he has that enables him to access that 
company and invest in it. That of course would influence my investment decision to invest 
in that stock”. Arguments from interviewee LC7 gives credence to the fact that 
investment analysts typically follow fundamentals of investments and almost always 
disregard minority shareholders. Instead, they take cues from influential shareholders. 
Interviewee MF4 confirms this position thus "Honestly when investing co-shareholders 
or minority shareholders do not really matter. They would not even enter my factor model 
in determining investment. I look at majority shareholders.  Those are people that can 
drive (business).  But I see the other (minority) shareholders as passengers to the vehicle 
and they cannot really (influence the firm fundamentals)…, I do not see their weighing 
in on things like earnings of the company or other strong fundamentals that would make 
me make an investment decision”. 
 
Nevertheless, despite the majority of interviewees confirming the importance of 
reputable shareholders in their investment decision making, there were still some 
dissenting voices because of the distrust of the Nigerian environment (Nakpodia & 
Adegbite, 2018). For example, interviewee MF1 asserts as follows, "influential 
shareholders or known shareholders are more or less emotional shareholders. Their 
considerations are not necessarily profitability or growth. It could be as little as ‘Oh, 
yeah, he has done me a favor in the past; I want to support him now.” Corroborating the 
general lack of expertise in the Nigerian investment space, interviewee LF2 posits as 
                                                          
18 Big man -  slang used in Nigeria to describe a dominant/influential person 
19 Dangote is a Nigerian Conglomerate 
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follows, “if I can take a cue from things that have happened in the past, for this sort of 
scenario — there is no Warren Buffett in Nigeria, maybe that is the way to put it. if there 
was a Warren Buffett in Nigeria, then I might be tempted to say you know what that guy 
is seeing something that I am not seeing but in the context of Nigeria you do not have 
seasoned investors per say”. Despite these reservations, H5b is supported. 
 
Presence of Institutional activist shareholders 
Presence of activist shareholders is positively statistically significantly correlated with 
investment decision making (β=1.14, p<.01). According to literature, investment analysts 
recognise the potential of institutional activism to check the agency problem (Black, 
1992), since activist institutional investors focus on the poorly performing firms in their 
portfolio and pressure the management of such firms for improved performance, thus 
enhancing shareholder value (Gillian & Stacks, 2003; McCahery et al., 2016). The 
confirmation by investment analysts about the potential role activist institutional 
shareholders can play in a firm is in line with the literature on activism in governance 
(Sarkar & Sarkar, 2000). This level of activism though is missing from the Nigerian 
clime.  Interviewee OP3 highlights this as follows "we have seen the abuse of lots of 
corporate power. Especially by executive management and we have not seen a sufficient 
level of institutional shareholder activism. In other jurisdictions, we have funds that even 
make their core objective to pursue institutions that are not well run at a discount and to 
ensure that changes are affected, and you typically see a bounce in share price, that is 
how they make their money. So, we have shareholder associations, (but) I am not sure 
they do enough of that (institutional activism)”. Confirming the weakness of self or board 
activism in Nigerian firms, interviewee LF2 states as follows “It (institutional activism) 
is very weak in Nigeria. My preference is that it needs to be upped (improved). So we 
have some shareholders associations. The general perception in the market is that these 
banks and other companies pay them to vote in favor of every decision they want to make 
at the board meeting. I can imagine that if more institutional investors like myself (wealth 
management firm), PFAs and insurance company were more active in terms of airing 
our views, it can improve — it can bring a lot more improvement in terms of the board. 
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Again, the board may have been lackadaisical because they know that they do not get 
objections from shareholders but the minute institutional investors become really active 
in having is a say in how the business is run then you see the board members sit up". 
This agrees with literature that the market for corporate takeovers and shareholder 
activism seem corrupt in Nigeria (Adegbite et al., 2012). 
 
Furthermore, information asymmetry is prevalent in weak institutional environments (La 
Porta et al., 1999). Therefore, in Nigeria, the existence of information asymmetry 
between management/dominanat principal and other stakeholders might escalate the 
need for more institutional activism.  Interviewee LC1 highlights this thus "the biggest 
problem is probably how informed the shareholders are. So yes (institutional) activism, 
it can probably drive good corporate governance within the firm. because you know you 
talk a lot, but the point is not just enough for you to be active around; it is for you also 
to be knowledgeable, so I think  we just need a blend of the balance between, and just 
talking and being knowledgeable and know what you are really fighting for.”  
 
From the above inference and deductions, this hypothesis finding is consistent with the 
literature on institutional activism within a firm as investment analysts assume that 
presence of institutional activist shareholders on a board can help shareholder activism 
and is important for investment decision making. Investment analysts who operate in 
Nigeria will like to see more activist shareholders. Therefore, H5d is supported. 
 
7.4 Conclusion  
This chapter presented investment analysts perception of external ownership drivers. The 
chapter was divided into Part A and B. Part A was for foreign institutional investors while 
Part B covered effective shareholder activism. Part A presented the summary descriptive 
statistics of foreign institutional investors' driver features, following which test for 
normality, correlation and ordered logit regressions were discussed. Finally, the findings 
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of the quantitative and qualitative studies were triangulated for a robust discussion. 
Subsequently, Part B was reported similarly. 
 
Leading from Part A of the chapter, the psychological reasoning findings of the 
investment analysts obtained through interviews when triangulated with the regression 
analysis reveal the following; foreign institutional investors possessing shares of a bank 
and being on the board excites investment analysts. They believe these foreign 
institutional investors perform competent due diligence before investing. While foreign 
investors being on a board is good, the shareholding size of the foreign investor is 
important. Further, foreign institutional investors are less likely to be influenced by the 
corrupt Nigerian environment especially as they are likely to be monitored by their 
foreign parent company. Local institutional investors are also desirable as they 
understand the local terrain better than the foreign institutional investors and are more 
likely to stay in the Nigerian market even during times of crisis.  
 
Foreign listing of shares does not spur investment analysts to invest in banks although it 
does expose the company to higher governance requirement in the foreign countries 
where it is listed. The evidence further suggests that foreign institutional investors wield 
greater influence than local institutional investors in achieving a reform process. Overall, 
the results support the stakeholder- agency theory (Stulz, 1999; 2005) that as "outsiders", 
foreign institutional investors are less prone to political pressure than their local peers 
and are more likely to perform arm's length monitoring in an environment where the 
principal-principal agency problem exists, and weak and corrupt institutions are 
prevalent. 
 
The results demonstrate that opening up a market to foreign institutional investors can 
be an effective way to reduce the agency problem of controlling shareholders that are 
trying to expropriate from minority shareholders. As also reported by Huang & Zhu 
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(2015), to the extent that external monitoring benefits all shareholders, the presence of 
foreign institutional investors generates positive externalities. 
 
For Part B, the psychological reasoning of the investment analysts obtained through 
interviews when triangulated with the regression analysis reveals the following; 
Activism is still at its infancy in Nigeria, and shareholder associations are unreliable and 
exposed to corrupt questionable characters. In developing countries, reputable 
shareholders are likely to be the ones with the right set of information at least in the short 
run. There is a need for institutional investors to join ranks more often to influence 
management activities. A few times the institutional investors have come together; they 
have been able to achieve some impactful activism.  Activist shareholders on the board 
of a bank will help investment analysts know that reasonable decisions are being taken 
by management for principals especially minority shareholders since the activist 
investors are also after good returns. However, there is a shortage of such activist 
investors in Nigeria. 
 
In developing countries like Nigeria, the possibilities of shareholder activism addressing 
the principal-principal agency problem is still at its infancy stage. This might have to do 
with the inability of the minority shareholders to have a common protective voice leaving 
the dominant principal to dictate activities (Adegbite, 2015, Uche et al., 2016).  
According to interviewee LF1, "If you have numbers, but you do not have a large value, 
your voice cannot be heard. Because the number of shares you are holding, the 
percentage holding, determines how the votes are cast. How interests are being protected 
is subjected to vote and the higher the number of shares you have, the higher the decision 
can be skewed in your favor. So, the majority shareholders have the decision". Hence, 
despite regulation by the CBN to limit holdings by one individual, the Nigerian 
institutional environment means the laws are sidestepped. Interviewee LF1 highlights 
this “there are some individuals that have registered (shares) directly in their names, 
   
275 
 
some have their corporate entities they have used to invest where they own almost one 
hundred percent of the shareholdings of that company." 
 
Furthermore, despite the recent activities by different shareholder groups, the findings 
suggest that the potency of shareholder activism is still negligible in Nigeria. The 
shareholder associations seem to be controlled by firm management or dominant 
principal. Interviewee MF1 states as follows "it (shareholder activism) is non-existent in 
Nigeria. You have an association of shareholders, one, two, three or thereabout, but what 
do they do?  They come when the company wants to have its annual general meeting. In 
most cases, the leaders that are representing those associations have been compromised. 
So, that is not activism. When you talk about shareholder activism that means the person 
gets involved in the scheme of the business. He knows what more or less goes on in that 
organization. It is not when you call for an AGM somebody stands up and say, no last 
year you did not do well or stating that the bank has bad quality assets. When you say 
activism, it means that you are there at the beginning not at the end when you are doing 
annual general meeting”. Indeed, according to the literature, the shareholder associations 
in Nigeria are routinely manipulated by management thereby compromising the 
independence and trustworthiness of these shareholder associations (Adegbite, 2015; 
Uche et al., 2016). Interviewee MF1 highlights this further as follows “to be honest with 
you, what goes on is that a day or two days or three days to the AGM, you call the 
president of the Association and say, this is what we want… and enlist his support. So, 
when it gets to the AGM, he does not talk much. He is the one that even pacifies the other 
shareholders because he is a spoke person.” 
 
Also, the literature explains that transaction cost might be a reason why investors might 
not necessarily engage in activism (Bebchuk & Weisbach, 2010). Corroborating 
literature, interviewee LC1 states thus “we actually find (that for) those kinds of (other 
minority) organizations… it is easier to challenge when you are trying to fight or take 
on someone who has 10% stake or someone who has a 15% stake. But how do you 
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challenge someone who already has a 50% stake?  Even if you get yourself together, you 
guys are only about 50%. Away from that, it (activism) actually leads to a lot of court 
cases, and Nigerians generally would like to back off from anything that has to do with 
a long process of fighting things. People would rather let it go than pull the strings that 
are difficult to pull”.  
 
Hence, rather than engage in activism, minority shareholders or other dominated 
principals use the shares sell off mechanism when they are uncomfortable with firms 
activities (see McCahery et al., 2016) or when they have achieved short-term profit goals. 
Interviewee MF1 states thus, "you are not active because you can easily sell off your 
shares. Most investment is not about holding the shares in perpetuity, and there are 
alternative investment outlets mostly. If this company is not doing well, my decision as 
an institutional investor will be to sell it off, and I either invest in other things; either 
invest in property, invest in the money market, or just sell-off. For example; sell out my 
X bank shares if it is not making money for me, look at the results that they are declaring 
in the first quarter second quarter and third quarter, sell it off now. And then we go to 
the money market maybe buy a government bond, let me buy government Treasuries, that 
is the way we look at things as opposed to activism like oh! I am going to XX bank. I am 
going to ask them, why are they not doing well? Your cost is going high; your profit is 
going down, what product are you selling?” This finding is corroborated by literature 
such as McCahery et al. (2016) that have reported situations where investors vote with 
their feet rather than engage firms’ management. 
 
Nevertheless, the literature on activism in Nigeria has documented some marked 
improvements but recommends more participation (Uche et al., 2016, Adegbite, 2015; 
Adegbite et al., 2012).  Interviewee LC2 corroborates this as follows "for me, if I think 
about the reasonable experiences we have had, I think it (activism) is something that is 
needed more in our environment. I think it is needed more So if we use the XX bank 
experience (where minority shareholders gathered and were able to influence the change 
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of a bank's management), it clearly did make a difference. I know with XXX (an oil 
company), there has been a few tries but has not really been strong but since XX bank 
was a very good example of how shareholders can make it far stronger, positive influence 
on the institution". For activism to be more effective, minority shareholders need to go 
beyond just yearly or bi-annual engagements at annual general meetings, and instead 
participate in banks activities throughout the year. This will ensure that the activism has 
a meaningful impact that can influence the management and possibly the bank's 
performance. Interviewee LC3 highlights it thus "the only (activism) point available 
today in Nigeria is at the AGM. Do not forget at the AGM; activities have passed. So, 
they are coming to make the report of their activities, and it is at that point they vote. 
They are voting into another year. So, we cannot really feel the impact of that because 
one year has passed, transactions have been done. So, you are saying they should vote 
for what you have done.  So by and large, it (activism) is weak". 
 
Finally, in the Nigerian environment, participation in activism also needs to be more 
inclusive of knowledgeable investors who can absorb some transaction costs and also 
have some technical expertise to their activism. Interviewee CP2 highlights this 
challenge thus "the only people I see that are very active in respect to shareholders 
activism are the senior citizens. So, when you go for annual general meetings, these are 
the guys that are active. I think because of the nature (of Nigerian institutional 
environment)….., abroad you get to have more of collective investment schemes than 
people actually holding shares on a retail side and I think that there is a lot of benefits 
that come with that. Because those institutions, because of the pool they have under their 
management they can hold management to higher accountability. But the way it is today, 
it is very defragmented. And most times you know there is this feeling that if I say 
whatever, it cannot be heard or what are the pension managers saying or the big 
institutions. If the pension funds are not talking why should I? So, usually as a retail 
investor you look up to all the big institutions, the pension fund particularly to say 
something and in the event that they do not say something, everybody just goes quiet”. 
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Findings in this chapter go beyond what has traditionally been the focus of research 
inquiry—the correlation between different variables—and contributes to the literature by 
expanding the remit of the research questions and revealing the reasoning behind the 
decisions of an important stakeholder group (investment analysts). This study provides 
specific evidence of what specific features of foreign (institutional) investments and 
shareholder groups’activism influence investment decision making and reveal how the 
involvement of foreign institutional investors and shareholder groups’ activism in 
developing markets can (if at all) promote good corporate governance. 
 
The next chapter presents the findings on the accountability mechanism drivers. 
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Chapter Eight: Accountability Mechanism Drivers and 
Investment Analysts’ Perspective. 
 
8.1 Introduction  
The literature has indicated several mechanisms that help solve corporate governance 
problems (Fama, 1980; Fama & Jensen, 1983b; Turnbull, 1997). These mechanisms can 
be internal to the firm (e.g., managerial compensation, audit committee, board of 
directors) or external (e.g., the market for corporate control). However, the efficacy of 
these mechanisms depends on the corporate governance system prevalent in the country; 
that is, whether it is market-oriented or large-shareholders oriented (Franks & Mayer, 
1997; Shleifer & Vishny, 1997). In developing countries like Nigeria, the weak 
institutional environment makes accountability mechanism more pertinent to solve 
corporate governance problems (Anderson & Reeb, 2004). Consequently, this chapter 
reveals investment analysts' perspective on features of accountability mechanism of 
voluntary disclosure, independent audit committee, executive pay for performance and 
board evaluation as signaled by Nigerian banks. 
 
This chapter will be presented in four parts. Part A will cover effects of voluntary 
disclosures features on investment analysts; part B will cover effects of independent audit 
committee features on investment analysts, part C will reveal the effect of pay for 
performance features on investment analysts while part D will reveal effects of board 
evaluation on investment analysts. 
 
   
280 
 
8.2 Part A. Investment analysts' perspective on the effect of 
voluntary disclosure features.  
8.2.1 Statistical Analysis of Study Variables 
8.2.1.1. Descriptives of Voluntary Disclosure Features in Nigeria 
In table 8.1, 79.31% of respondents agree or strongly agree that mandatory information 
is more important than voluntary disclosure. The mean score of 1.9397 and a standard 
deviation of .8776 further indicates the agreeability of the respondents. The high number 
of respondents who emphasize mandatory disclosure seem to resonate with the literature 
(e.g., Barnard, 1938; Prietula & Simon, 1989) that suggests that in a weak institutional 
environment, investment analysts tend to be focused on immediate returns. The 
investment analysts' investment horizon being short-tenured in nature thereby makes the 
reliance on financial ratios more important (Owusu-Ansah, 1998). This is interesting 
especially considering table 8.2 where 96.55% of the investment analysts feel more 
voluntary information disclosure is a signal of accountability. Indeed, for this feature, 
there was no disagreement at all. The standard deviation of this feature was .554 
indicating an even closer agreement amongst respondents. In table 8.3, 62.93% of the 
investment analysts agree or strongly agree that more voluntary disclose signals better 
performance. 11.21% of the investment analysts disagreed while as high as 25.86% were 
neutral. 
 
The descriptives suggest investment analysts recognize that voluntary disclosure 
potentially mitigates some of the agency challenges, but their cognition about the 
instability of the Nigerian environment still makes them to be more focused on the short 
term. 
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Table 8. 1 Mandatory more relevant than voluntary  
 Frequency Percent Cumulative 
Strongly Agree 39 33.62 33.62 
Agree 53 45.69 79.31 
Neither Agree or Disagree 17 14.66 93.97 
Disagree 6 5.17 99.14 
Strongly Disagree 1 0.86 100 
 
Table 8. 2 More voluntary information signals accountability 
 Frequency Percent Cumulative 
Strongly Agree 76 65.52 65.52 
Agree 36 31.03 96.55 
Neither Agree or Disagree 4 3.45 100 
Disagree - - - 
Strongly Disagree - - - 
 
Table 8. 3 More voluntary information signals performance  
 Frequency Percent Cumulative 
Strongly Agree 37 31.90 31.90 
Agree 36 31.03 62.93 
Neither Agree or Disagree 30 25.86 88.79 
Disagree 9 7.76 96.55 
Strongly Disagree 4 3.45 100 
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Table 8. 4 Summary of features describing information signals disclosure  
 Mean STD. DEV Min Max Frequency 
aggregate of 
strongly agree and 
agree (%)  
Mandatory more relevant than 
voluntary 
 
1.939655 .877633 1 5 79.31 
More voluntary information signals 
accountability 
 
1.37931     .554118           1 3 96.55 
More voluntary information signals 
performance 
 
2.198276     1.081222           1 5 62.93 
8.2.1.2. Test for normality of voluntary disclosure features 
The Skewness and Kurtosis tests were conducted and provided evidence of fairly 
normal distribution of the variables. For Skewness, the value of the symmetrical 
distribution is zero (Gujarati, 2003; Brooks, 2008). ). For Kurtosis, the hypothesis of 
non-normality can be rejected if its value is 3 (Gujarati, 2003; Brooks, 2008). 
 
Table 8.5 which reports voluntary disclosure features shows that the Skewness values for 
most of the variables fall between 0.000 and 0.0059 which indicates symmetrical 
distribution. For Kurtosis test statistics, the variables fall between 0.1252 and 0.7430 
indicating normal distribution. 
              
Table 8. 5 Skewness/Kurtosis test for normality  
 OBS  
PR(SKEWNESS)   
PR(KURTOSIS) ADJ 
CHI2(2)    
PROB>CHI2 
Mandatory more relevant than 
voluntary 
0.0003         0.1252            13.02          0.0015 
More voluntary information 
signals accountability 
0.0000         0.4476        15.48          0.0004 
More voluntary information 
signals performance 
0.0059         0.7430         7.08        0.0291 
 
8.2.1.3. Spearman and Pearson Correlation of Voluntary Disclosure Features 
A correlation matrix was used to test the direction and magnitude of the linear 
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relationship between the variables. This test helps to discover the potential presence of 
multicollinearity among the variables. There could be multicollinearity if a correlation 
coefficient between two variables is large. Following Ntim et al. (2012a) and Ntim & 
Soobaroyen (2013), the Pearson and Spearman correlation coefficients are reported in 
Table 8.6. The table shows the correlation matrix for the dependent, independent and 
control variables employed for the voluntary disclosure and decision making models. 
The magnitude and direction of both the Pearson correlation coefficients (parametric) 
and Spearman correlation coefficients (non-parametric) appear to be relatively similar. 
This adds to the evidence that there is no major problem of non-normality among the 
variables in the models (Ntim & Soobaroyen, 2013). In addition, the correlations among 
the variables are fairly low, indicating that there is not a serious multicollinearity problem 
(see Haniffa & Hudaib, 2006; Dam & Scholtens, 2012; Ntim et al., 2012a; Ramly, 2012). 
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Table 8. 6 (obs=112) Correlation of Voluntary Disclosure Features  
Pearson Correlation 
 gen age bg tny sub annut vi2iv vi3iv vi4iv vi1dv 
           
gen 1.0000          
age -0.1907 1.0000         
bg 0.0691 0.0682 1.0000        
tny -0.1640 0.5901 -0.1641 1.0000       
sub 0.0195 -0.1377 -0.0563 -0.0024 1.0000      
annut -0.0698 -0.1105 -0.1167 0.0108 0.3524 1.0000     
vi2iv 0.0866 -0.0733 -0.1314 -0.1986 -0.0742 -0.0708 1.0000    
vi3iv 0.1877 -0.1437 0.0755 -0.1745 -0.0456 -0.1335 0.2322 1.0000   
vi4iv 0.1520 -0.0100 -0.0648 -0.1172 0.0781 -0.0000 0.2489 0.1789 1.0000  
vi1dv 0.1025 -0.0809 0.1014 -0.1147 0.0176 -0.0391 0.2690 0.5512 0.3104 1.0000 
 
Spearman Correlation  
gen age bg tny sub annut vi2iv vi3iv vi4iv vi1dv 
           
gen 1.0000           
age -0.1950 1.0000          
bg 0.0817 0.0007 1.0000         
tny -0.1479 0.5891 -0.1736 1.0000        
sub 0.0195 -0.1129 -0.0399 0.0033 1.0000       
annut -0.1036 -0.0936 -0.1535 -0.0144 0.3249 1.0000      
vi2iv 0.0768 -0.0756 -0.1660 -0.1669 -0.0964 -0.1046 1.0000     
vi3iv 0.1771 -0.1475 0.0285 -0.1640 -0.0405 -0.1097 0.2497 1.0000    
vi4iv 0.1773 -0.0307 -0.0468 -0.1783 0.0893 0.0030 0.2695 0.2308 1.0000   
vi1dv 0.1182 -0.0775 0.0854 -0.1150 -0.0087 -0.0242 0.2679 0.5378 0.3469 1.0000  
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8.2.1.4. Ordered Logit Regression of Voluntary Disclosure Features against 
Decision Making 
The ordered logit regression (Table 8.7) was used to investigate the relationship between 
features of voluntary disclosure and decision-making.  The table will reveal that five 
submodels were built each with varying independent variables. Sub model with Adjusted 
R2 of 0.2828 was the best fit. This model can explain 28.28% of the variables 
relationship. When seeking only a weak signal in the presence of a lot of noise, and even 
a small signal can be of interest, then R-squared of even 10% or lower can have some 
information (Nau, 2018).  Moreover, as suggested by Nau (2018), the results obtained 
from this regression were cross validated through the semi-structured interviews 
conducted. Other studies reported similar low R-squared values. For example, McCahery 
et al. (2016) reported R-squared of 10% in their study. 
 
A summary of the results from the ordered logit and hypothesis can be found in table 8.8 
below. For robustness, ordered probit regression was conducted and produced similar 
results to the ordered logit regression. See appendix 3. 
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Table 8. 7 Ordered logit regressions of features of voluntary disclosure against investment decision making influence of voluntary disclosure 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES vi1dv vi1dv vi1dv vi1dv vi1dv 
      
gen 0.351 -0.0125 0.214 -0.0604 -0.196 
 (0.480) (0.552) (0.489) (0.564) (0.570) 
age -0.285 0.0275 -0.345 -0.0538 -0.230 
 (0.331) (0.353) (0.338) (0.383) (0.415) 
bg 0.362 0.172 0.316 0.291 0.379 
 (0.226) (0.249) (0.223) (0.261) (0.269) 
tny 0.105 -0.0304 0.0669 0.0992 0.212 
 (0.252) (0.264) (0.250) (0.293) (0.319) 
sub 0.0662 0.185 -0.135 0.246 0.149 
 (0.458) (0.499) (0.463) (0.513) (0.531) 
annut -0.0415 0.0497 -0.0523 0.0581 0.0333 
 (0.167) (0.187) (0.169) (0.193) (0.196) 
vi2iv 0.689***   0.562** 0.466 
 (0.247)   (0.268) (0.285) 
vi3iv  2.363***  2.277*** 2.249*** 
  (0.456)  (0.465) (0.473) 
vi4iv   0.636***  0.559** 
   (0.202)  (0.229) 
      
/cut1 1.721 4.029*** 1.330 5.394*** 6.288*** 
 (1.190) (1.380) (1.092) (1.589) (1.636) 
/cut2 5.659*** 8.795*** 5.277*** 10.30*** 11.37*** 
 (1.438) (1.759) (1.327) (1.986) (2.070) 
Pseudo R2 .0728 .2185 .0876 .2452 .2828 
Observations 112 112 112 112 112 
 
 
                                                                                                                                       Standard errors in parentheses 
                                                                                                                                        *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Codes  
Gender GEN 0 Male 1 Female 
AGE AGE 21-30 – 1, 31-40 -2, 41-50 – 3, 51-60 -4, Over 60 - 5 
Your Background (Which area have you gained most of your 
working investment experience) 
BG Banking and Finance – 1, Pol Science -2, Economics – 3, Accounting – 4, Others - 5 
Total number of years you have spent as an analyst TNY 0-4 – 1,5-9 – 2, 10-15 – 3, 16-20 – 4, Over 20 -5 
Is your firm a subsidiary/affiliate of an international 
company? 
SUB Yes- 1, No -0 
What is the annual investment turnover of your company? AnnuT N1M-N100M -1, N101M-N1bn – 2, N1bn-N10bn – 3, N10bn-N100bn – 4, Over N100bn - 5 
Mandatory information disclosure as mandated by the 
Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) is more important when 
making investment decisions. 
VI2IV Mandatory more relevant 
Banks disclosing more information voluntarily other than 
those mandated by the regulators, signals accountability 
VI3IV More voluntary information as a signal of accountability 
More profitable banks disclose more voluntary information 
than less profitable banks 
VI4IV More voluntary information as a signal of performance 
The more voluntary information I have about a bank, the 
more I am likely to make favorable investment decisions 
about the bank 
VI1DV Investment decision making bias based on voluntary information 
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Table 8. 8 A summary of all of the hypotheses and findings for the voluntary disclosure 
and decision-making model 
 
 
Dependent Variable  Decision Making influence of voluntary disclosure  
Independent 
variable  
No. Hypothesis  Expected sign  Finding sign  Finding 
significance  
Hypothesis 
status  
Mandatory more 
relevant than 
voluntary  
1  + + Not Significant  Rejected 
More voluntary 
information 
signals 
accountability  
2 +  +  Significant at the 
1% level 
Accepted 
More voluntary 
information 
signals 
performance 
3  +  + Significant at the 
5% level 
Accepted 
8.2.2 Discussions and Triangulation of Quantitative and Qualitative 
Findings of Voluntary Disclosure Features.  
Model 1: Voluntary Disclosure Induced Propensity to Make Favourable Investment 
Decision = β0 + .547VD2) + 2.25(VD3) + .56(VD4) - .20(Gen) + .38(BG) - .23(AGE) 
+.15(IA) + .03(FS) + 21(TNY) + εi 
8.2.2.1. Features of voluntary disclosure 
Mandatory more relevant  
Mandatory more relevant is positively correlated with investment decision-making but 
not significant (β= .47, p=.10). Findings from the interviews suggest that while 
investment analysts assume mandatory disclosure is important for fundamental analysis, 
one cannot say with any degree of certainty that mandatory disclosure is more relevant 
than voluntary disclosure for investment decision making. The literature on disclosures 
describe mandatory disclosure as the presentation of the minimum amount of information 
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required by law (Owusu-Ansah, 1998; Wallace & Naser, 1995), hence in environments 
such as Nigeria, where institutions are weak,  investment analysts, rely on the statutory 
requirements to make base investment judgments. Interviewee LC1 confirms this 
positive correlation thus, "what you see is that mandatory disclosures are usually those 
things that you always need to work with and without those things probably would not 
be able to make good calls." 
 
Also, in 2012, Nigerian banks switched to the International financial reporting standards 
(IFRS). As the IFRS has more extensive disclosure requirements (Balakrishnan et al., 
2012), investment analysts might feel more confident that mandatory disclosures cover 
many important areas required for investment decision making. Interviewee MF1 
highlights this as follows “for me mandatory are key. Then when I do the fundamental 
analysis, I unravel things that are not written. IFRS is about more disclosure. Hitherto 
to now, before IFRS, financial statements of banks was like maybe ten pages. But now, 
with more disclosure, you have something like maybe a hundred pages. So, if you have 
the patience to read through you can question certain things because it is more of 
disclosure.  That is why IFRS came in into this (Nigerian) environment. Because it is 
more of disclosure.  That is why I say I look at fundamentals. Whether that is good 
enough, I do not know, but it gives you some level of sophisticated information". This 
finding also conforms to the study by Byard et al. (2011) who also finds that analyst 
estimates became more accurate following IFRS adoption. Further, interviewee LC4 
highlights the importance of mandatory disclosures thus "you know I cannot have the 
time to independently analyze everything a bank has done, but if there are regulatory 
filing, regulatory reporting that has said, okay these are the certain things you should 
report. It is a layout check for me, so I may just want to look at how the bank has 
performed vis-a-vis what regulators said it should do”.  
 
Furthermore, according to interviewee MF4 “mandatory decisions are by far more 
important because the CBN has gone through a series of different reviews on their 
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regulation for banks especially and if you look at the reporting that is required, even the 
reporting they have changed from NGAAP to IFRS which shows a lot more disclosure 
on line items. They have mandated banks. Even the quarterly snapshot earnings give us 
(investment analysts) key issues, profitability, and liquidity.  Ratios like CAR (capital 
adequacy ratio) are computed as the CBN as instructed. So, this really helped my 
investment decisions. Sometimes voluntary disclosures are only useful for me for me 
when they are more forward looking. For instance, a quoted company or a quoted bank 
gives a profit warning. So, it is not a full disclosure, they have just said a profit warning. 
They are not mandated to say that, but they have given that information. Maybe I think 
the market actually encourage you to do that and that now I have to take that to 
consideration.  Negative voluntary disclosures, I would always take that seriously. But 
on a scale of preference, I would take mandatory." The finding corresponds with 
literature (e.g., LaFond & Watts, 2008) which suggests mandatory disclosure provides 
concrete evidence that stakeholders can rely upon before even verifying the softer 
voluntary issues. 
 
Despite the importance of the mandatory reports, investment analysts still expressed 
concerns on the true heterogeneity of mandatory reports in the Nigerian investment 
clime. This made some of the analysts to consider voluntary disclosures more important 
or as crucial as mandatory disclosures in providing some idiosyncratic evidences. 
According to interviewee OP1 "mandatory no, because that (mandatory disclosure) is 
uniform I guess, everyone is making the same mandatory disclosures." Interviewee OP5 
provides more in-depth and impetus to the distrust challenge by stating thus, "I think the 
voluntary disclosures would be more important maybe just edging a bit ahead a bit of 
the mandatory disclosures. Because even in the mandatory ones, sometimes the 
information is still a bit muddled up, because a lot of times, you can follow the rule of 
law but not the spirit. So, the banks sometimes play within those grey areas just to, should 
I say paint a picture of what they think the investors would like to see”. 
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Overall, even though mandatory disclosures are essential for investment analysts who 
make investments in the Nigerian environment for time saving and transaction cost 
(Owusu-Ansah, 1998; Wallace & Naser, 1995; LaFond & Watts, 2008), the investment 
environment makes sole reliance on mandatory disclosures, doubtful. 
 
Therefore, H6a is not supported. 
 
Voluntary information as a signal of accountability 
Voluntary information as a signal of accountability is positively statistically significantly 
correlated with investment decision making (β= 2.25, p<.01). This suggests that in the 
Nigerian investment clime, investment analysts presume that the more voluntary 
information given out signals accountability and can influence decision-making. 
According to interviewee LC5 "voluntary disclosure will tell you the character if the 
bank makes a lot of voluntary disclosure, it means that the bank is trying to be very 
transparent. I mean voluntary disclosure shows the transparency of the management and 
the culture of the board." The results are contrary to the study by Stocken (2000) which 
argues that in climes such as developing countries where there is an absence of a 
mechanism to enforce verifiability, voluntary disclosures are not credible and therefore 
are ignored by the market. The weak institutional environment in Nigeria 
notwithstanding, investment analysts were unanimous in their expectations that 
voluntary disclosure signals accountability and can influence investment decision 
making. 
 
Further, associating voluntary disclosure with transparency, interviewee MF2 posits as 
follows “It will be interesting if a lot of banks do more disclosures beyond the mandatory 
disclosures and that would give more credence to their level of transparency and 
integrity.” Corroborating this price on integrity and better governance practice, 
interviewee MF3 highlights thus “you have got the impression that there is nothing to 
hide if the bank offers information as against when they are compelled to do so. And if 
the information offered gives you a better impression of the company it is only a plus. I 
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mean, if I have to beat information out of you. I would rather have you offer it to me than 
have to compel you to make it available. I think it is better corporate governance for 
companies to offer as much information as possible.” 
 
Also, the results confirm that voluntary disclosure encourages selection in capital 
markets. This is in line with literature by Bourveau & Schoenfeld (2017) which suggests 
that a consequence of voluntary disclosure is reduced adverse selection in the capital 
markets. Interviewee LF2 evidences this finding thus; “when I make investment 
decisions, my investment decision is not based on the mandatory disclosure. What do I 
mean by that? My investment decision is not made solely on the back of the financials of 
the company, i.e. the notes, etc. There is a lot more that you can take a cue from. A good 
example is, a company recently released a notification to say that they were starting their 
audit period and so directors of the company issued like a block out period they cannot 
trade for stocks. For me, it (information such as this) shows transparency in a company 
and so those sort of things will tend to attract me more to those companies but I think the 
message really is that I would rather rely on softer news that is out there as opposed to 
focusing on what is stated in the financials to make my investment decision”. 
Hence, voluntary information projects the banks in Nigeria positively ensuring more 
trustworthiness of such bank by investment analysts. Interviewee OP6 highlights this 
further “so, whoever tells you more, allows you raise or allows them to rise up on your 
believability index. So if for instance, somebody has written all sorts, has given you 
information that you do not readily find everywhere, you are more likely to believe every 
other thing that you have that has been thrown at you. Okay even for the ones I do not 
really need to know, they have gone ahead to tell me then maybe you know this is where 
I should put my money”. This is consistent with literature by Williams (1996) which 
posits that management of a firm establishes a forecasting reputation based on prior 
earnings forecasts. 
 
Therefore, H6b is supported. 
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Voluntary information as a signal of performance 
Voluntary information as a signal of performance is positively statistically significantly 
correlated with investment decision making (β= .56, p<.05). This suggests that 
investment analysts presume that voluntary disclosures signals better performance and 
can influence their investment decision making. The agency and signaling theory 
presume that managers use voluntary disclosure to bridge information asymmetry among 
stakeholders. Furthermore, the study by Balakrishnan et al. (2012) suggests that 
investment analysts often use voluntary disclosure to supplement mandatory reporting to 
communicate their superior knowledge of firms' performance to investors they represent. 
The finding, therefore, conforms to literature (e.g., Balakrishnan et al., 2012) and 
suggests that investment analysts use voluntary disclosures as recent updates about a firm 
to supplement the information they might already have about the performance of a firm. 
Interviewee LA3 highlights this thus "when the bank makes voluntary disclosure of 
information; they are telling more than just mandatory (disclosure). For the 
psychological part of it, is it needed or not? However, they are revealing it. If the 
information is strategic (sensitive) enough, they can create problems for them, but they 
are still revealing it. We are talking of integrity of a company and the corporate 
governance—All these work more for an investor who believes if I put my money 
somewhere; increases one's trust and the entire business deal is on trust. So, what will 
enhance my trust is my ability to believe that what information you are giving me; 1. 
adds value; 2. is not (necessarily) needed. It can allow me to make a decision. I can see 
your sincerity in what you are churning out in terms of information. Yes, you do not need 
to give me, but you are enhancing my decision-making power by providing this formation 
aside from mandatory information”. 
 
Similar to findings by Collett & Hrasky (2005), Nigerian banks also use voluntary 
information for capital raising purposes as it helps the banks signal transparency. 
Interviewee LC6 explains this thus “mandatory covers most of the more important… the 
hard issues, the soft issues are typically covered by voluntary.  What I found from a 
Nigeria standpoint is quite interesting, from an equities standpoint. On the NSE, they 
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(banks) do provide all the information that is very clear, some of them even go as much 
as doing pillar three and putting it up on their website. But every time a bank decides to 
raise money from foreign investors for the bond markets or even the equity markets using 
the GDR, the levels of disclosure is way more intense. So those documents actually make 
for a better read and a better understanding of the firms than their normal annual 
reports." 
 
Also, as posited by Meek et al. (1995), investment analysts operating in Nigeria ascribe 
voluntary disclosure by banks as going the extra mile and disclosing in excess of the 
regulatory requirements. For example, according to interviewee CP3 “...that is where I 
think X bank stands above the rest with respect to their voluntary disclosures. So, they 
do the normal management briefing…I think one of the very important sources of 
information is when they have their conference call. So, typically after audited results, 
there would be a conference call with all the analysts dialing in, and then they critique 
the audited reports. They talk about the economic environment. Talk about their strategic 
outlook. They give guidance as to where they are looking at and what is driving to that 
guidance. I think that is as far as how all the banks take it, but X bank could give you 
way more disclosures that you asked for. And sometimes even when you go back to them 
for information, they will give you as much as possible. So for me voluntary is more 
important because that shows how open you are and shows you do not have too much to 
hide. On the flip side, I think the bank that I fault the most when it comes to the disclosure 
is XX Bank. Those guys are something else. Even behind their numbers, you ask, please 
just some clarity around this; you would not get anything! So, for me voluntary is more 
important, regulatory you have to do it anyways. But for me voluntary disclosures are 
way more important.”  
 
From the foregoing, H6c is supported. 
 
Following our coverage of the voluntary disclosure driver, we next discuss Part B, which 
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covers independent audit committee driver. 
 
8.3. Part B. Perception of Investment Analysts on Independent 
Audit Committee Driver Features. 
The next subsection reveals perspectives of investment analysts on the features of audit 
committee. 
8.3.1 Statistical Analysis of Study Variables. 
8.3.1.1 Descriptives of Audit Committee Features in Nigeria 
From table 8.9 below, 86.09% of respondents agree or strongly agree that audit 
committee reports are important. This is interesting especially considering table 8.10 
where only 33.91% of the investment analysts the members of the audit committee are 
independent. The literature on developing countries documents the weak institutional 
environment (La Porta, 1999; Okike, 2007; Adegbite et al., 2013; Nakpodia, 2015). 
Further, most businesses in such environments are dominated by elites (Nakpodia & 
Adegbite, 2018) or family-owned (Adegbite, 2015). These dominant individuals 
typically nominate trusted/loyal persons to important roles within the firm.  Hence, 
although a vast majority of investment analysts feel audit committee reports are 
important, most of the investment analysts do not believe the members are uninfluenced 
by the management of the banks. 
 
Table 8. 9 Importance of Audit Committee Reports  
 Frequency Percent Cumulative 
Strongly Agree 52 45.22 45.22 
Agree 47 40.87 86.09 
Neither Agree or Disagree 14 12.17 98.26 
Disagree 1 0.87 99.13 
Strongly Disagree 1 0.87 100 
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Table 8. 10 Perception of Independence of Individuals on the Audit Committee  
 Frequency Percent Cumulative 
Strongly Agree 10 8.70        8.70 
Agree 29 25.22 33.91 
Neither Agree or Disagree 30 26.09 60.00 
Disagree 34 29.57 89.57 
Strongly Disagree 12 10.43 100 
 
Table 8. 11 Summary of Features Describing Independent Audit Committee  
 Mean STD. DEV Min Max  Frequency aggregate of 
strongly agree and agree 
(%) 
Importance of Audit 
Committee Reports 
1.713043 .7809713        1 5 86.09 
Perception of 
Independence of 
Individuals on the Audit 
Committee 
3.078261     1.148209                     1 5 33.91 
 
8.3.1.2. Test for normality of independent audit committee features 
The Skewness and Kurtosis tests were conducted and provided evidence of fairly normal 
distribution of the variables. For Skewness, the value of the symmetrical distribution is 
zero (Gujarati, 2003; Brooks, 2008). ). For Kurtosis, the hypothesis of non-normality can 
be rejected if its value is 3 (Gujarati, 2003; Brooks, 2008). 
 
Table 8.12 below which reports independent audit committee features shows that the 
Skewness values for most of the variables fall between 0.000 and 0.6997 which indicates 
symmetrical distribution. For Kurtosis test statistics, the variables fall between 0.0012 
and 0.0073 indicating normal distribution. 
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Table 8. 12 Skewness/Kurtosis Tests for Normality  
 OBS  
PR(SKEWNESS)   
PR(KURTOSIS) ADJ 
CHI2(2)    
PROB>CHI2 
Importance of Audit 
Committee Reports 
0.0000         0.0073              20.04          0.0000 
Perception of Independence 
of Individuals on the Audit 
Committee  
0.6997        0.0012      9.34          0.0094 
 
8.3.1.3. Spearman and Pearson Correlation of Independent Audit Committee 
Features 
A correlation matrix was used to test the direction and magnitude of the linear 
relationship between the variables. This test helps to discover the potential presence of 
multicollinearity among the variables. There could be multicollinearity if a correlation 
coefficient between two variables is large. Following Ntim et al. (2012a) and Ntim & 
Soobaroyen (2013), the Pearson and Spearman correlation coefficients are reported in 
Table 8.13. The table shows the correlation matrix for the dependent, independent and 
control variables employed for the independent audit committee and decision making 
models. The magnitude and direction of both the Pearson correlation coefficients 
(parametric) and Spearman correlation coefficients (non-parametric) appear to be 
relatively similar. This adds to the evidence that there is no major problem of non-
normality among the variables in the models (Ntim & Soobaroyen, 2013). In addition, 
the correlations among the variables are fairly low, indicating that there is not a serious 
multicollinearity problem (see Haniffa & Hudaib, 2006; Dam & Scholtens, 2012; Ntim 
et al., 2012a; Ramly, 2012). 
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Table 8. 13 (obs=111) Correlation of Independent Audit Committee Features 
Pearson Correlation  
 
Spearman Correlation 
 gen age bg tny sub annut ac1iv ac2iv ac3dv 
          
gen 1.0000          
age -0.1913 1.0000         
bg 0.1001 -0.0238 1.0000        
tny -0.1479 0.5902 -0.1843 1.0000       
sub 0.0160 -0.1081 -0.0206 0.0039 1.0000      
annut -0.1030 -0.0938 -0.1615 -0.0142 0.3262 1.0000     
ac1iv 0.1509 -0.0944 0.1219 -0.1180 -0.1595 -0.1248 1.0000    
ac2iv 0.0452 0.1721 0.1500 -0.0352 0.0884 -0.0697 -0.2731 1.0000   
ac3dv 0.0956 -0.0864 -0.0915 -0.0584 -0.1627 -0.1415 0.4742 -0.3846 1.0000  
          
 gen age bg tny sub annut ac1iv ac2iv ac3dv 
          
gen 1.0000         
age -0.1881 1.0000        
bg 0.0953 0.0470 1.0000       
tny -0.1639 0.5910 -0.1801 1.0000      
sub 0.0160 -0.1337 -0.0318 -0.0020 1.0000     
annut -0.0689 -0.1121 -0.1349 0.0106 0.3549 1.0000    
ac1iv 0.1106 0.0077 0.0591 -0.0348 -0.1807 -0.1184 1.0000   
ac2iv 0.0316 0.1477 0.1698 -0.0524 0.1009 -0.0484 -0.3086 1.0000  
ac3dv 0.0479 -0.0227 -0.0950 -0.0059 -0.1418 -0.1240 0.4866 -0.3878 1.0000 
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8.3.1.4. Ordered Logit Regression of Independent Audit Committee Features 
against Investment Decision Making 
The ordered logit regression (Table 8.14) was used to investigate the relationship 
between features of independent audit committee and investment decision-making 
induced by reliance on independent audit committee.  The table will reveal that three 
submodels were built each with varying independent variables. Sub model with Adjusted 
R2 of 0.1837 was the best fit. This model can explain 18.37% of the variables relationship. 
When seeking only a weak signal in the presence of a lot of noise, and even a small signal 
can be of interest, then R-squared of even 10% or lower can have some information (Nau, 
2018).  Moreover, as suggested by Nau (2018), the results obtained from this regression 
were cross validated through the semi-structured interviews conducted. Other studies 
reported similar low R-squared values. For example, McCahery et al. (2016) reported R-
squared of 10% in their study. 
 
 A summary of the results from the ordered logit and hypothesis can be found in table 
8.15 below. For robustness, ordered probit regression was conducted and produced 
similar results to the ordered logit regression. See appendix 3. 
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Table 8. 14 Ordered logit regressions of features of independent audit committee against investment decision making influence of audit committee 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES ac3dv ac3dv ac3dv 
    
gen 0.169 0.479 0.285 
 (0.453) (0.449) (0.465) 
age -0.212 0.105 -0.0420 
 (0.295) (0.296) (0.310) 
bg -0.282 -0.160 -0.214 
 (0.227) (0.232) (0.237) 
tny 0.0988 -0.112 -0.00840 
 (0.226) (0.219) (0.236) 
sub -0.246 -0.358 -0.0859 
 (0.430) (0.426) (0.445) 
annut -0.132 -0.178 -0.179 
 (0.154) (0.152) (0.158) 
ac1iv 1.389***  1.228*** 
 (0.277)  (0.282) 
ac2iv  -0.776*** -0.642*** 
  (0.189) (0.199) 
/cut1 0.722 -3.866*** -1.513 
 (1.057) (1.098) (1.265) 
/cut2 3.360*** -1.417 1.338 
 (1.111) (1.034) (1.259) 
/cut3 5.590*** 0.633 3.665** 
 (1.319) (1.141) (1.437) 
/cut4 6.771*** 1.766 4.918*** 
 (1.568) (1.403) (1.677) 
Pseudo R2 .1392 .0986 .1837 
Observations 111 111 111 
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Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Codes  
Gender GEN 0 Male 1 Female 
AGE AGE 21-30 – 1, 31-40 -2, 41-50 – 3, 51-60 -4, Over 60 - 5 
Your Background (Which area have you gained most of 
your working investment experience) 
BG Banking and Finance – 1, Pol Science -2, Economics – 3, Accounting – 4, Others - 5 
Total number of years you have spent as an analyst TNY 0-4 – 1,5-9 – 2, 10-15 – 3, 16-20 – 4, Over 20 -5 
Is your firm a subsidiary/affiliate of an international 
company? 
SUB Yes- 1, No -0 
What is the annual investment turnover of your 
company? 
AnnuT N1M-N100M -1, N101M-N1bn – 2, N1bn-N10bn – 3, N10bn-N100bn – 4, Over 
N100bn - 5 
 
When members of the audit committee are not 
influenced the executive management of the bank, then 
the bank is presumed accountable to all stakeholders. 
AC1IV importance of audit committee reports 
I can tell easily when members of an audit committee 
are influenced by the executive management of the bank 
AC2IV Perception of independence of individuals on the audit committee 
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Table 8. 15 A summary of all of the hypotheses and findings for the independent audit features 
and decision-making model 
Dependent Variable  Decision Making influence of independent audit 
committee  
Independent 
variable  
No. 
Hypothesis  
Expected 
sign  
Finding 
sign  
Finding 
significance  
Hypothesis status  
Importance 
of audit 
committee 
reports 
1  + + Significant 
at the 1% 
level 
Accepted 
Perception of 
Independence 
of individuals 
on the audit 
committee 
2 -  -  Significant 
at the 1% 
level 
Accepted 
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8.3.2 Discussions and Triangulation of Qualitative and Quantitative 
Findings of Audit Committee Features in Nigeria. 
 
Audit Committee Induced Propensity to Make Favourable Investment Decision = β0 + 
1.23(AC1) -.64(AC2) + .29(Gen) - 21(BG) - .04(AGE) -.09(IA) + .01(TNY) - .18(FS) 
+ εi 
8.3.2.1 Features of Audit Committee 
Importance of audit committee reports 
Importance of audit committee reports is positively statistically significantly correlated 
with investment decision making induced by audit committee (β= 1.23, p<.01). The 
majority of respondents (86.09%) provide evidence which is supported by the literature 
(e.g., Palepu & Healy, 2003) that audit committee reports represent an important internal 
governance mechanism that external stakeholders rely upon to mitigate some agentic 
issues (Preston et al., 1995). According to interviewee LF1 "when you receive the report 
from an independent committee, you want to read it in line with the report of the external 
auditor. So, if the two reports are saying different things, definitely there must be a 
problem somewhere. The audit committee (report) cannot be saying everything is fine or 
there is no any issue with the company and the external auditors say otherwise. 
Definitely, there is a problem somewhere. So, we will have to read the two together. It 
(audit report) speaks volume about the company and the perception that were to have 
about investing in such a company.” 
 
However, for the investment analysts, though the audit committee reports are an essential 
tool for analysis of Nigerian banks, they are not necessarily a deciding factor. Interviewee 
LC5 highlights this as follows "of course the (audit committee report) are important. But 
they are not part of the due diligence. It forms just like 10 or 20% of the due diligence. 
But they are important. If there is a red flag there, then there is a genuine red flag (issue). 
But if there is no (red) flag and they (the banks) are fine in terms of that report. It just 
means fine you have just ticked that box but does not mean that everything is wonderful 
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(with the bank). A red flag there (in the report) is a big problem”. The positive 
significance of this feature draws similitudes from the literature (e.g., Palepu & Healy, 
2003) where according to the agency theory, independent audit committee report acts as 
an internal monitoring mechanism for firms' activities. 
 
The audit report provides some measure of guide for investment analysts, the absence of 
this audit report or the mandatory requirement for the report to be prepared by an 
independent committee will mean investment analysts have no background information 
on inside dealings in the bank. Interviewee OP1 highlights the credence given to the audit 
committee report as follows "you will assume that little regulation is adding some value 
somewhere, right? So, today say you have 21 banks, and they all have independent audit 
committees. There will be one or two that are still playing games maybe three or four 
banks that are still playing games not really independent. If, you remove that requirement 
(mandatory independent audit committee) instead of having three or four banks you end 
up with eleven or twelve banks that are playing games. So, the rules as they are I am 
sure they are helping. Do they eliminate the problem? Probably not, but they are 
probably helping in some ways.” 
 
Hence, the value of the audit committee report is not in doubt. The audit committee 
reports provide a first layer of assurance on the activities of a firm, helping to bridge the 
information asymmetry that might exists between firms' managers and external 
stakeholder (Palepu & Healy, 2003). According to interviewee CP2, "the audit committee 
report is essentially a source of information for me. It is not going to be a decision-
making tool. It just provides further insights, but I place more emphasis on the external 
auditors". The findings confirm existing literature (e.g., Palepu & Healy, 2003) that the 
audit committee report is important for analysts who want a starting point for their own 
individual analysis. According to interviewee LA3 "the point is that—by the time you 
read those (audit report) statements, you can infer. We are analysts, so we look through 
the (fine details of the) statement. It is not reading the report in isolation. We have to 
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blend it with a number of things. Even when they (independent audit committee report) 
said everything is fine, I can see from analysis when some things are not well”. 
 
Thus, H7a is supported. 
 
Perception of independence of individuals on the audit committee 
 
Perception of independence of individuals on the audit committee is negatively 
statistically significantly correlated with decision making (β= -.65, p<.01). This suggests 
that investment analysts who operate in Nigeria, have a challenge in ascribing true 
independence to the audit committee members as they do not trust that individuals on the 
committee are independent. In fact, only 33.91% of the investment analysts agree or 
strongly agree that the members of the audit committee are independent. Instead, the 
weak institutional environment which presents itself in the Nigerian environment 
(Adegbite, 2015), means stakeholders have to rely on assumptions and faith that audit 
committee members perform their fiduciary responsibility that. Interviewee LC4 states 
this challenge thus "you cannot tell (if members of the audit committee are independent 
or not), but directors of every company have a fiducial responsibility to ensure the 
company is well run. So, it is based on that, that we have faith in them, so we tend to take 
their word for the gospel truth because he has signed an oath in that perspective. So, we 
believe it”. 
 
Furthermore, in the Nigerian environment, knowledge of independency of audit 
members is treated more reactionary feature than a predictive feature. Interviewee OP1 
highlight this as follows “I am not able to tell (when audit committee members are 
independent) or sometimes you can tell after the fact, right? So, when you have seen the 
bank “blow up20" (collapse), in hindsight, you can tell that the audit committee clearly 
was not doing something right. But in terms of being able to tell ahead of time or as 
                                                          
20 Blow up is a Nigerian slang which means fail or collapse  
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things are unfolding, I do not know how to tell. So, yes regulatory requirements say you 
have to have independent audit committee, and you (the banks) do. Check. Does that (the 
requirement of independence) always add value? No, but a lot of times when… you see 
that the independent audit committee is there. It is after the fact that you are now able to 
establish that it was truly independent." Similarly, interviewee CP1 states as follows 
"that in itself (knowledge of independence of audit committee members) is almost a 
lagging indicator right, because it is after the fact. I really pay attention to the leading 
indicators. I really do not want to get to that point where I said to myself I wish I knew 
all right. So I would look at leading indicators.” This is despite the fact that the CBN 
makes the independence of audit committee of banks sacrosanct and mandatorily ensures 
compliance with this provision. SEC demands similar compliance. The CAMA Act also 
provides that all public liability companies must have an audit committee. 
 
Inevitably, the intricacies prevalent in the Nigerian environment tends to lead to some 
level of homogeneity among banking industry actors making actions of banks and 
individuals who work in the banks less trustworthy. Interviewee LC1 confirms as follows 
“it is tough to see (the independence); it is tough to tell (if committee members are 
independent).  The biggest challenge you have is that you are limited to just what is 
provided. … What you see for most audit committee reports (is that) the committee is 
(reported as) independent, then they list the number of independent people on it. They 
just lift all those basic rules, but away from those basic rules, we know that it does not 
work that way. It is really tough to tell.” 
  
Furthermore, the weak institutional environment does not lend itself to transparency and 
trust (Adegbite, 2015). According to interviewee OP2, "this (knowledge of audit 
committee members independence or otherwise) is just community management, 
knowing who knows who and understanding the relationships. There is nothing on paper 
that says - okay, you are going to verify this person was brought in on an arm’s length 
basis to oversee the audit committee." Similarly, interviewee LC2 expressed skepticism 
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about the independence of audit committee members as follows "unfortunately, I cannot 
tell. I do not know, I do not have a clue. Again it is not like, I had access to the minutes 
of the audit committee meeting, and I saw that the action the bank took was against the 
resolution then I can say. But to the best of my knowledge, they do not publish minutes 
of those meeting. The best they just do is tell you the number of times they met. So I really 
do not know, but we are made to believe that the audit committee is independent of 
management." 
 
In Nigeria, the family ties and relationships with dominant shareholder also inhibit the 
independence presenting a principal-principal agency challenge (La Porta et al., 1999; 
Adegbite, 2015). According to interviewee OP3, "it is really in the profile of the audit 
members. Because you can have independent (audit members) that in some way still have 
a relationship with executive management. You really look at the profile and track record 
of the people and see if they have that record of being independent. You talk to people 
that know them, a bit of research on their character, that really is.; as subjective as it 
may be, it is the way to do it today". Further, in Nigeria, the interference by executive 
management, which might impede the independence of audit committee members, 
cannot be ignored. Interviewee LC8 states thus, "truth is that a lot of the board committee 
especially the audit committee are influenced. They have to be influenced anyway 
because there is usually an executive of the bank embedded in there, who helps them 
(audit committee) navigate. Not all of them are independent.”  
 
From the foregoing, investment analysts are unable to ascribe independence to audit 
committee members hence H7b is supported. 
 
The next subsection presents Part C, findings of pay for performance driver of 
accountability mechanism. 
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8.4. Part C. Pay for Performance  
The part reveals the perception of investment analysts on the features associated with 
pay for performance as a driver of good corporate governance. 
8.4.1 Statistical Analysis of Study Variables  
8.4.1.1. Descriptives of Pay for Performance Features in Nigeria 
In table 8.16, only 43.10% of respondents agree or strongly agree that compensation 
schemes of executive management are clear. This lack of clarity might not be 
unconnected with the relative newness of pay for performance in the Nigerian 
environment (Adegbite, 2015). In table 8.17, 75.86% agree or strongly agree that reward 
schemes for management are an acceptable practice. That up to 24.13% of respondents 
are either non-committal or disagree that reward schemes are beneficial in the Nigerian 
environment is also an indication of the distrust of the Nigerian system, compensation 
motives, and alignment of compensation with performance (Adegbite, 2015). In table 
8.18, 73.28% agree that general employee reward schemes are acceptable compensation 
plans, which engender good corporate governance practice. Again, that the respondents 
were not unanimous in agreeing to this variable portends a distrust of the Nigerian 
environment. 
 
Table 8. 16 Clear Compensation Schemes  
 Frequency Percent Cumulative 
Strongly Agree 11 9.48 9.48 
Agree 39 36.62 43.10 
Neither Agree or Disagree 22 18.97 62.07 
Disagree 37 31.90 93.97 
Strongly Disagree 7 6.03 100 
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Table 8. 17 Executive Rewards Schemes Acceptability  
 
 
Table 8. 18 Employee Reward Schemes  
 Frequency Percent Cumulative 
Strongly Agree 32 27.59 27.59 
Agree 53 45.69 73.28 
Neither Agree or Disagree 20 17.24 90.52 
Disagree 8 6.90 97.41 
Strongly Disagree 3 2.59 100 
 
Table 8. 19 Summary of Features of pay for performance  
 Mean STD. DEV Min Max Frequency aggregate 
of strongly agree 
and agree (%) 
Clear Compensation 
Schemes 
2.913793    1.131132 1 5 43.10 
Executive Rewards 
Schemes Acceptability 
1.965517   .903433           1 5 75.86 
Employee Reward 
Schemes 
2.112069     .975986 1 5 73.28 
 Frequency Percent Cumulative 
Strongly Agree 40      34.48        34.48 
Agree 48 41.38 75.86 
Neither Agree or 
Disagree 
21 18.10 93.97 
Disagree 6 5.17 99.14 
Strongly 
Disagree 
1 0.86 100 
   
310 
 
 
8.4.1.2. Test for normality of pay for performance features 
The Skewness and Kurtosis tests were conducted and provided evidence of fairly normal 
distribution of the variables. For Skewness, the value of the symmetrical distribution is 
zero (Gujarati, 2003; Brooks, 2008). For Kurtosis, the hypothesis of non-normality can 
be rejected if its value is 3 (Gujarati, 2003; Brooks, 2008). 
 
Table 8.20 which reports pay for performance features shows that the Skewness values 
for most of the variables fall between 0.002 and 0.9079 which indicates symmetrical 
distribution. For Kurtosis test statistics, the variables fall between 0.0000 and 0.4094 
indicating normal distribution. 
 
Table 8. 20 Skewness/Kurtosis Tests for Normality  
 OBS  
PR(SKEWNESS)   
PR(KURTOSIS) ADJ 
CHI2(2)    
PROB>CHI2 
Clear Compensation Schemes 0.9079         0.0000        18.80        0.0001 
 
Rewards Schemes 
Acceptability 
0.0011         0.4094        9.84          0.0073 
Employee Reward Schemes 0.0002         0.1532        12.96          0.0015 
8.4.1.3. Spearman and Pearson Correlation of Pay for Performance Features 
A correlation matrix was used to test the direction and magnitude of the linear 
relationship between the variables. This test helps to discover the potential presence of 
multicollinearity among the variables. There could be multicollinearity if a correlation 
coefficient between two variables is large. Following Ntim et al. (2012a) and Ntim & 
Soobaroyen (2013), the Pearson and Spearman correlation coefficients are reported in 
Table 8.21. The table shows the correlation matrix for the dependent, independent and 
control variables employed for the board independence and decision making models. The 
magnitude and direction of both the Pearson correlation coefficients (parametric) and 
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Spearman correlation coefficients (non-parametric) appear to be relatively similar. This 
adds to the evidence that there is no major problem of non-normality among the variables 
in the models (Ntim & Soobaroyen, 2013). In addition, the correlations among the 
variables are fairly low, indicating that there is not a serious multicollinearity problem 
(see Haniffa & Hudaib, 2006; Dam & Scholtens, 2012; Ntim et al., 2012a; Ramly, 2012).  
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Table 8. 21 (obs=112) Correlation of Pay of Performance Features  
Pearson Correlation  
 gen age bg tny sub annut pf1iv pf2iv pf3iv pf4dv 
           
gen 1.0000          
age -0.1907 1.0000         
bg 0.0691 0.0682 1.0000        
tny -0.1640 0.5901 -0.1641 1.0000       
sub 0.0195 -0.1377 -0.0563 -0.0024 1.0000      
annut -0.0698 -0.1105 -0.1167 0.0108 0.3524 1.0000     
pf1iv -0.0237 0.0632 -0.1316 -0.0359 -0.1562 0.0327 1.0000    
pf2iv 0.0512 -0.1691 0.0272 -0.1140 -0.1527 -0.1604 0.0129 1.0000   
pf3iv 0.0148 -0.1445 -0.1050 -0.0878 -0.1170 0.0450 0.1633 0.4134 1.0000  
pf4dv 0.1178 -0.0533 0.0657 -0.0574 -0.0476 -0.1663 0.1207 0.3209 0.4326 1.0000 
 
 
Spearman Correlation 
 
 Gen age bg Tny sub annut pf1iv pf2iv pf3iv pf4dv 
           
gen 1.0000           
age -0.1950 1.0000          
bg 0.0817 0.0007 1.0000         
tny -0.1479 0.5891 -0.1736 1.0000        
sub 0.0195 -0.1129 -0.0399 0.0033 1.0000       
annut -0.1036 -0.0936 -0.1535 -0.0144 0.3249 1.0000      
pf1iv -0.0186 0.0840 -0.1800 -0.0352 -0.1552 0.0451 1.0000     
pf2iv 0.0827 -0.1850 0.0563 -0.1646 -0.1915 -0.1534 -0.0038 1.0000    
pf3iv 0.0321 -0.1434 -0.1124 -0.0926 -0.1478 -0.0272 0.2287 0.4308 1.0000   
pf4dv 0.1654 -0.0721 0.0459 -0.0511 -0.0789 -0.2140 0.1139 0.3038 0.4449 1.0000 
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8.4.1.4. Ordered Logit Regression of Pay for Performance Features against 
Decision Making 
The ordered logit regression (Table 8.22) was used to investigate the relationship 
between features of pay for performance and decision-making.  The table will reveal that 
fivesubmodels were built each with varying independent variables. Sub model with 
Adjusted R2 of 0.1376 was the best fit. This model can explain 13.76% of the variables 
relationship. When seeking only a weak signal in the presence of a lot of noise, and even 
a small signal can be of interest, then R-squared of even 10% or lower can have some 
information (Nau, 2018).  Moreover, as suggested by Nau (2018), the results obtained 
from this regression were cross validated through the semi-structured interviews 
conducted. Other studies reported similar low R-squared values. For example, McCahery 
et al. (2016) reported R-squared of 10% in their study. 
A summary of the results from the ordered logit and hypothesis can be found in table 
8.23 below. For robustness, ordered probit regression was conducted and produced 
similar results to the ordered logit regression. See appendix 3. 
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Table 8. 22 Ordered logit regressions of features of pay for performance against investment decision making influence of pay for performance 
       
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES pf4dv pf4dv pf4dv pf4dv pf4dv 
      
gen 0.666 0.632 0.677 0.646 0.699 
 (0.433) (0.434) (0.440) (0.436) (0.445) 
age -0.184 0.0267 -0.0766 -0.0417 -0.0615 
 (0.282) (0.285) (0.285) (0.287) (0.290) 
bg 0.156 0.101 0.260 0.153 0.290 
 (0.193) (0.194) (0.198) (0.196) (0.202) 
tny 0.0684 0.00836 0.0800 0.0632 0.130 
 (0.214) (0.214) (0.216) (0.215) (0.218) 
sub 0.00131 0.177 0.308 0.266 0.502 
 (0.407) (0.412) (0.416) (0.414) (0.423) 
annut -0.284** -0.194 -0.333** -0.214 -0.305** 
 (0.142) (0.145) (0.150) (0.146) (0.154) 
pf1iv 0.266   0.277* 0.261 
 (0.165)   (0.166) (0.171) 
pf2iv  0.766***  0.774*** 0.442* 
  (0.236)  (0.236) (0.245) 
pf3iv   1.145***  1.016*** 
   (0.227)  (0.235) 
      
/cut1 -2.000** -0.695 -0.309 0.101 1.353 
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 (1.006) (1.085) (1.041) (1.188) (1.281) 
/cut2 0.208 1.631 2.235** 2.466** 4.007*** 
 (0.983) (1.090) (1.050) (1.205) (1.328) 
/cut3 2.093** 3.587*** 4.434*** 4.442*** 6.238*** 
 (1.016) (1.140) (1.128) (1.259) (1.410) 
/cut4 3.271*** 4.794*** 5.777*** 5.662*** 7.597*** 
 (1.098) (1.230) (1.240) (1.348) (1.515) 
Pseudo R2 .0349 .0623 .1204 .0718 .1376 
Observations 112 112 112 112 112 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
 
Codes  
Gender GEN 0 Male 1 Female 
AGE AGE 21-30 – 1, 31-40 -2, 41-50 – 3, 51-60 -4, Over 60 - 5 
Your Background (Which area have you gained most of 
your working investment experience) 
BG Banking and Finance – 1, Pol Science -2, Economics – 3, Accounting – 4, Others - 5 
Total number of years you have spent as an analyst TNY 0-4 – 1,5-9 – 2, 10-15 – 3, 16-20 – 4, Over 20 -5 
Is your firm a subsidiary/affiliate of an international 
company? 
SUB Yes- 1, No -0 
What is the annual investment turnover of your company? AnnuT N1M-N100M -1, N101M-N1bn – 2, N1bn-N10bn – 3, N10bn-N100bn – 4, Over N100bn - 5 
 PF1IV Clear Compensation schemes 
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Compensation schemes of directors and executive 
management of banks as stated in the bank's financial report 
are well understood. 
 
Performance pay reward schemes for executive 
management of Nigerian banks should be encouraged and 
is viewed positively by the public 
 
PF2IV Management rewards schemes acceptability 
Performance pay reward schemes (monetary and non-
monetary) including employee share option schemes 
promote accountability in Nigerian bank 
PF3IV Employee reward schemes bring accountability 
 
 
 
 
317 
 
 
Table 8. 23 A summary of all of the hypotheses and findings for the pay for performance and 
decision making model 
 
 
    
8.4.2 Discussions and Triangulation of Quantitative and Qualitative 
Findings of Pay for Performance 
Model.    Pay for Performance Induced Propensity to Make Favourable Investment 
Decision = β0 + .26(PF1) + .44(PF2) + .1.02(PF3) + .70(Gen) + .29(BG) - .06(AGE) 
+ .50(IA) -.31(FS) + .13(TNY) + εi 
8.4.2.1 Controls in the models 
Annut (annual turnover) is negatively statistically significantly correlated with 
investment decision making (β=-.31, p<.05). This suggests that in Nigerian environment, 
the larger the organization an investment analyst works for, the less likely they associate 
pay for performance with investment decision making.  
Dependent Variable  Decision Making influence of Pay for 
Performance  
Independent 
variable  
No. 
Hypothesis  
Expected sign  Finding sign  Finding 
significance  
Hypothesis 
status  
Clear 
compensation 
schemes 
 
1  + + Insignificant Rejected 
Management 
reward 
schemes 
acceptability  
2 +  +  Significant at 
the 10% level 
Accepted 
Employee 
reward 
schemes bring 
accountability 
3  +  + Significant at 
the 1% level 
Accepted 
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8.4.2.2 Features of pay for performance 
 
Clear Compensation schemes 
"Clear Compensation schemes" is positively correlated with investment decision making 
induced by pay for performance although not statistically significant (β=.26, p=.13). 
Findings from the interviews suggests that while investment analysts assume clear 
compensation schemes are relevant for pay for performance variable, we cannot report 
with any level of certainty if the compensation schemes paid to executives influences 
analysts’ investment decision making. Interviewee OP1 explains this blurriness as 
follows "I had no idea how executive directors are compensated. It is very opaque. It 
(compensation) is not broken down so, the last time I looked, they will tell you this total 
amount we paid to the board over the year.” Corroborating this, interviewee MF4 posits 
thus “these (pay for performance) are not well stated. In most financials, you just see the 
total wage bill as a component of OPEX (operating expense). Even in the notes, probably 
at best you see a range of salary scales, with different numbers for employees one to fifty 
earning a certain amount, fifty to X earning this amount. So, it is not as granular as 
expected.” 
 
As a result of this lack of clarity, investment analysts are unable to make use of this driver 
even if they wanted to. Corroborating this further, interviewee OP1 highlights thus “we 
have taken note of it. The big picture rather than granular. So for instance, I know that 
as of maybe two years ago, X bank and XX Bank were the ones spending the most on 
their boards and we are like, oh yes, these two institutions are wasteful, but we have not 
actually gone to analyze it and break it down. For instance like how many board 
members do they have per head is it the same? ….So, if you just hear that X bank spends 
N1bn ($3.13M) on the board and XXX bank spends N700M ($2.19M) but maybe X bank 
has fifteen board members, and XXX bank has only seven.  We actually do check it to 
that granular level, but we actually do not check how much goes to executives and how 
much goes to non-executives. ……. So, you take one or two or three headliners, and just 
sense check it. ….. and that is as far as we go”.  
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The lack of clarity also leads to investment analysts digging deeper usually through less 
formal means. Interviewee MF2 highlights thus “usually, it is never that clearly stated. 
So as an investor you must do a bit of fact-finding and request for more documentation 
to support the financial statement. If I am investing in a bank, for instance, I want to get 
a copy of the management pay structure; the management performance requirement; and 
management bonus structure and I must have all of that to be able to make sense of 
whatever payment that is in the financial statements. So, it is critical”. Despite the 
criticality of pay for performance, investment analysts generally do not perceive it to be 
objectively appropriated in Nigeria. This has some resonance with literature that suggests 
pay for performance does not necessarily correlate with firm performance (Pass, 2003).  
 
Nevertheless, the stakeholder-agency theory postulates that pay for performance will 
help align managers’ interests with stakeholders (Hill & Jones, 1992). Interviewee LF2 
corroborates this as follows “so there is really no reason why they should not (state the 
details of pay for performance). My preference would be for them to disclose as much 
information on board remuneration and things like that. Again, for me, it is going to 
influence my decision. If I think of all the issues that we have spoken about now, it is 
probably one of topmost in my mind because it represents transparency and also we are 
able to invest in a company that is transparent”. In line with this agentic perspective, 
some of the investment analysts were of the opinion that there is a move towards ensuring 
transparency of remuneration in the Nigerian banking sector as regulators are taking 
more interest in this governance driver (Adegbite, 2015). Interviewee OP3 opines thus, 
“it (pay for performance) is not as well stated, but I think that there is a slow move to 
have a bit more transparency. I mean many banks, for instance, have quarterly calls now 
with institutional investors especially, and these questions increasingly come up. People 
would dissect their books and ask more questions about line items. So yes, far from ideal, 
but I think things are improving, and if I hear some of the comments coming from 
regulators, SEC, the CBN, there is a stronger move to have more transparency around 
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this. So, I would say it is in the detail, it is in how it is treated where it is abused and used 
as an avenue for self-enrichment without the interest of shareholders being taken into 
consideration then absolutely we would desist from investing in those situations”. 
 
The findings on clarity of compensation schemes in Nigeria, is consistent with some 
literature on pay for performance in developed countries which found that while pay for 
performance to executives was increasing, performance was not necessarily improving 
(Conyon & Leech, 1994; Tosi et al., 2000) and can be viewed negatively by the public 
in Nigeria (Adegbite, 2015). This skepticism is more likely to be exhibited by investment 
analysts that work in larger organizations. The literature is corroborated by interviewee 
LC2” as follows “most times if you look at the compensation, it is all bucked up, and so, 
you cannot really tell how much each executive is earning per se and differentiate, and 
there is no link to performance. So, there is a stronger link to pay and inflation than pay 
for performance… So, I have to align pay to inflation instead of performance”. The 
double digits inflation rate in Nigeria (NBS, 2018) might therefore necessitate the 
increase in compensation more than performance. 
 
The lack of clarity in compensation schemes as stated in financial statements of banks 
has negated the importance of this driver according to investment analysts. In addition, 
the lack of trust of the Nigerian environment makes this driver not to be viewed with 
great importance (Adegbite, 2015) despite the recognition of it as a driver of good 
corporate governance. Interviewee LC6 highlights this thus "no, you cannot determine 
an executive compensation in Nigeria. The CBN yes, might be able to but the man on the 
street cannot determine it. It is not very clear because there is a lot of unclarity. I mean 
it is a (Nigerian) system issue. Similar to politics or any other firms, there are a lot of 
benefits and those benefits are not necessarily apparent from just looking at a document”.  
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In any case, from the literature, there is a dearth of detailed information about executives' 
pay (Gregg et al., 1993). Hence, unsurprisingly in Nigeria, from the evidence provided 
in this study, "clear compensation" is a disputed feature of pay for performance.  
 
Therefore, H8a is not supported. 
 
Rewards schemes for management acceptability 
Rewards schemes for management acceptability is positively statistically significantly 
correlated with investment decision making (β= .44, p<0.1). This suggests that with some 
certainty, we can conclude that reward schemes for executives are acceptable to 
investment analysts and represent a favorable feature of pay for performance that can 
lead to investment decision making. The statistical analysis is consistent with the theory 
which posits that rewards schemes help to align the interests of manager with 
shareholders (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Shleifer & Vishny, 1997) and indeed other 
stakeholders. According to interviewee OP2 “what we look for is an alignment of 
interests. So, if pay for performance is aligned to increasing the earnings per share of 
the company, then fair enough, something that we would look at as opposed to other tools 
that management use to increase their pay.”  
 
Similarly, interviewee MF1 captures this positive association between reward schemes 
for management and pay for performance thus, “well, I want to know that there is a merit 
based system that rewards good performance. Secondly, it (the reward scheme) comes 
with candor. It is transparent." Supporting this further, interviewee MF1 presumes 
reward schemes can help breach information asymmetry. Interviewee MF1 highlights 
this as follows "what has this guy (executive) done to merit this amount of bonus? And 
if it (reward for management) is excessive, we should be able to query it. Is there stock 
option? Those are the things part of fundamentals, and if they are not there, you have a 
shortage of information." 
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According to the literature (e.g., Fama & Jensen, 1983), reward schemes for management 
can be designed to serve as incentives for management to perform on behalf of 
shareholders (Eisenhardt, 1989). Investment analysts operating in Nigeria also believe 
reward systems will enable management to take ownership of the business. Interviewee 
LC3 highlights this finding as follows "it (reward schemes) makes them (managers) the 
owners of the business. They (managers) do well; you are going to pay them. So, basically 
it sees them as the owners of the business, and they can drive the institutions very well. 
It is a good development.” Some of the analysts even went further to suggest reward 
schemes can act as a deterrence to illicit activities, which can have negative consequences 
for investment returns. For example, according to MF2 “yes, pay for performance for 
management is a yes! Because that is what is going to drive them towards performance. 
If you do not put that (reward schemes) there, management will find a way of making 
their money through their expenses. So the only way you can drive your own returns is 
to ensure that there is pay for performance". This finding agrees with the literature on 
agency theory (e.g., Fama & Jensen, 1983). 
 
Even though 75.86% of investment analysts agree or strongly agree with this feature, 
there was a note of caution considering the Nigerian environment and trustworthiness. 
Especially when the reward scheme might not necessarily correlate with firm 
performance (Pass, 2003) or leads to short-termism by management. Interviewee LC5 
highlight this thus "I am all for it (reward scheme). My problem is that it can be abused 
too easily. Well, I am all for it, if there is real performance, I am 100% for it. My problem 
is that many times there is no real performance. Somebody gives out a loan say a billion 
naira (approx. $3.13M), it looks fantastic today, and three years down the line, (the loan) 
is bad. So, if it is appraised very well, I am a hundred percent in support of strong pay 
per performance”.   
 
Nevertheless, the "reward scheme for management" is a feature of pay for performance 
that is realistically measurable hence its desirability to investment analysts. Interviewee 
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LF2 highlights as follows "I am in full support. Again, it speaks to something we spoke 
earlier around having KPIs or measurable… it is probably going to be bonus based. So, 
outside of the sitting fee that they pay them, they are saying to them if your committee is 
able to drive through certain initiative they will pay a certain fee. You will find more 
commitment, more engagement and more involvement from the board”. 
 
Therefore, H8b is supported. 
 
Employee reward schemes bring accountability 
"Employee reward schemes bring accountability" is positively statistically significantly 
correlated with investment decision making induced by pay for performance (β= 1.02, 
p<.01). In line with stakeholder-agency theory, which expects employee reward system 
to align employee performance of their contractual objective with those of business 
principals (Hill & Jones, 1992), investment analysts presume that employee reward 
schemes promote accountability in Nigerian banks especially when well structured. The 
investment analysts are nevertheless skeptical about the implementation of employee 
reward schemes. Interviewee OP4 describes this feature thus "I think it is good but then 
it should be well structured in such a way that you do not necessarily overweight in short-
term performance, and then long-term performance suffer. So it has to be well balanced 
because if you do pay for performance a lot of performance metrics are wired towards 
the short-term, and then you see the employee cutting corners doing things just for the 
benefit of the short term, and in the long term you suffer." This challenge of short term 
and long term objectives led the majority of the investment analysts to refer to the double-
edged nature of pay for performance in ensuring accountability. Interviewee LA2 
highlights this thus "it (employee reward scheme) is a two-edged sword in the sense that 
it can actually ensure that the executives21 (employees/managers) put in their best and 
get the best for the company. But the reason why I said it is a double-edged sword is the 
fact that it may then (lead to short-termism)…. if the pay is only in cash, it means that the 
                                                          
21 Executives here refers to managers/workers in Nigerian banks 
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executives (employees/managers) will only be looking at short-term gains for the 
company. But if it is split maybe cash and maybe to some extent shareholding, then you 
know you want to ensure that long-term value for the company. The way it is structured 
is really important to ensure that the executives (employees/managers) are not just 
looking at returns right here and right now without looking at what the long-term gains 
are for the institution. It may be eroding long-term value while they are just trying to get 
present. So, it needs to be structured very well otherwise it may not be in the best interest 
of the company." This is supported by literature (Main et al., 1996; Buck et al., 2003; 
Ozkan, 2011) which posits that the inclusion of equity incentive payments increases pay-
performance sensitivities. 
 
From the literature, in Nigeria, the culture of pay for performance and employee reward 
schemes is still at its infancy and aspirational (Adegbite, 2015). Interviewee LC2 alludes 
to this thus “because it (employee reward scheme) is not happening right now, I would 
say (employee reward schemes) has not come to play per se, even though questions 
around employee schemes keep on coming up. There is always that view that it (employee 
reward scheme) helps to influence the activity or actions ,,,,, if you are seeing the links 
more, then it should influence investment decision." Notwithstanding the belief that pay 
for performance might lead to short-termism (Filatochev et al., 2007), "employee reward 
schemes" has been acknowledged as a means to ensure accountability by employees in 
Nigeria especially if the long term and short term objectives of the firm can be aligned. 
Interviewee LF1 highlights this further as follows "that is where I think the direction 
should be going into the future but again it has to be done with caution. Because it is 
good to tie the compensation to performance and at least to be sure they (employees) 
can justify why they are being paid at least.  But at the same time, excessive use of that 
compensation arrangement can actually lead to a short-term view on, on the part of the 
executive (employee). So meaning that viable opportunities that are going to materialize 
in the future might not be taken by such executive (employee) because it is not going to 
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translate into the current period gain. So, I will say the benefit scheme that rewards both 
on the short and long-term should be worked out”. 
 
Hence, in agreement with studies by Main et al. (1996), Buck et al. (2003) and Ozkan 
(2010), interviewee LC6 confirms the need to change the employee reward scheme from 
mainly cash to a mix of cash and equity tying earnings potential of the executives 
(employees/managers) to the future of the company. According to interviewee LC6 "give 
them equity! I agree. They (employees) have to get paid, or else they can use their brains 
elsewhere, I know cash is king in Nigeria but at the same time ideas do matter, and I am 
a big proponent of that. So give them equity." The evidences support the study's 
hypothesis. Therefore, hypothesis 8c is accepted. 
 
The next section presents the findings of part D, board evaluation as an accountability 
mechanism driver. 
 
8.5. Part D- Perception of Investment Analysts on Board Evaluation 
Driver Features. 
The next subsection presents the results of the features of board evaluation from the 
perspectives of investment analysts. 
8.5.1. Statistical Analysis of Study Variables.  
8.5.1.1 Descriptives of Board Evaluation Features in Nigeria 
Tables 8.24-8.27 report percentage and frequencies of respondents’ perception of 
features of board evaluation. In table 8.24, only 49.18% of respondents agree or strongly 
agree that board evaluation reports are transparent. For table 8.25, 95.08% of respondents 
agree or strongly agree that board evaluation reports are necessary this is despite the fact 
that over half (as reported in table 8.26) do not believe the transparency of the board 
evaluations. In table 8.26, again, less than half of respondents (48.36%) believe the report 
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is important as presently reported. For table 8.27, 73.77% of respondents agree or 
strongly agree that board evaluations are a representation of directors’ performance. 
 
This finding represents interesting inconsistencies in the Nigerian investment clime as 
expectations would have been that if investment analyst associate performance of 
directors with the board evaluation reports, then one should have safely assumed that the 
investment analysts would believe the contents of the report. Especially as an 
overwhelming majority of the investment analysts reckon that board evaluation is 
necessary. 
 
 
Table 8. 24. Perception of transparency of evaluation report 
 Frequency Percent Cumulative 
Strongly Agree 22 18.03 18.03 
Agree 38 31.15 49.18 
Neither Agree or Disagree 33 27.05 76.23 
Disagree 18 14.75 90.98 
Strongly Disagree 11 9.02 100 
 
Table 8. 25. Necessity of evaluation report 
 Frequency Percent Cumulative 
Strongly Agree 85 69.67 69.67 
Agree 31 25.41 95.08 
Neither Agree or Disagree 4 3.28 98.36 
Disagree 1 0.82 99.18 
Strongly Disagree 1 0.82 100 
 
Table 8. 26. Importance of report 
 Frequency Percent Cumulative 
Strongly Agree 21 17.21 17.21 
Agree 38 31.15 48.36 
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Neither Agree or Disagree 36 29.51 77.87 
Disagree 20 16.39 94.26 
Strongly Disagree 7 5.74 100 
 
Table 8. 27 Content of evaluation report as indication of director performance 
 Frequency Percent Cumulative 
Strongly Agree 29 23.77 23.77 
Agree 61 50.00 73.77 
Neither Agree or Disagree 20 16.39 90.16 
Disagree 8 6.59 96.72 
Strongly Disagree 4 3.28 100 
 
Table 8. 28 Summary of features describing board evaluation  
 
 MEAN STD. 
DEV 
MIN MAX Frequency Aggregate 
of strongly agree and 
agree (%) 
Perception of transparency of 
evaluation report 
 
2.6755738        1.19759           1 5 48.18 
Necessity of evaluation report 1.377049   .672087           1 5 95.08 
Importance of report  2.622951 1.123218         1 5 48.36 
Content of evaluation report 
as indication of director 
performance 
2.155738     .970818          1 5 73.77 
 
8.5.1.2. Test for Normality of Board Evaluation Features 
The Skewness and Kurtosis tests were conducted and provided evidence of fairly normal 
distribution of the variables. For Skewness, the value of the symmetrical distribution is 
zero (Gujarati, 2003; Brooks, 2008). ). For Kurtosis, the hypothesis of non-normality can 
be rejected if its value is 3 (Gujarati, 2003; Brooks, 2008). 
 
Table 8.29 below which reports board evaluation features shows that the Skewness 
values for most of the variables fall between 0.000 and 0.1780, which indicates mostly 
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symmetrical distribution. For Kurtosis test statistics, the variables fall between 0.0000 
and 0.0582 indicating normal distribution. 
 
 
 
 
Table 8. 29 Skewness/Kurtosis Tests for Normality 
 OBS  
PR(SKEWNESS)   
PR(KURTOSIS) ADJ 
CHI2(2)    
PROB>CHI2 
Perception of transparency of 
evaluation report 
 
0.0884         0.0240      7.33 0.0256 
Necessity of evaluation report 0.0000 0.0000         57.06          0.0000 
Importance of report  0.1780 0.0511     5.48        0.0645 
Content of evaluation report as 
indication of director performance 
0.0000         0.0582        16.17          0.0003 
8.5.1.3. Spearman and Pearson Correlation of Board Evaluation Features 
A correlation matrix was used to test the direction and magnitude of the linear 
relationship between the variables. This test helps to discover the potential presence of 
multicollinearity among the variables. There could be multicollinearity if a correlation 
coefficient between two variables is large. Following Ntim et al. (2012a) and Ntim & 
Soobaroyen (2013), the Pearson and Spearman coefficients are reported in Table 8.30. 
The table shows the correlation matrix for the dependent, independent and control 
variables employed for the board evaluation and decision making models. The magnitude 
and direction of both the Pearson correlation coefficients (parametric) and Spearman 
correlation coefficients (non-parametric) appear to be relatively similar. This adds to the 
evidence that there is no major problem of non-normality among the variables in the 
models (Ntim & Soobaroyen, 2013). In addition, the correlations among the variables 
are fairly low, indicating that there is not a serious multicollinearity problem (see Haniffa 
& Hudaib, 2006; Dam & Scholtens, 2012; Ntim et al., 2012a; Ramly, 2012). 
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Table 8. 30 Correlation for board evaluation features 
Pearson Correlation  
 gen age bg tny sub annut be1iv be2iv be3iv be4iv be5dv 
            
gen 1.0000           
age -0.1742 1.0000          
bg 0.0102 0.0953 1.0000         
tny -0.1743 0.5768 -0.1851 1.0000        
sub -0.0084 -0.1039 0.0252 -0.0352 1.0000       
annut -0.0804 -0.0991 -0.1151 0.0169 0.3197 1.0000      
be1iv -0.0684 -0.0300 -0.1144 0.0151 -0.0254 0.1217 1.0000     
be2iv 0.0980 0.1072 -0.0664 -0.0780 -0.0886 -0.0862 0.1176 1.0000    
be3iv 0.1017 -0.0379 -0.1055 -0.0535 -0.0412 0.1349 0.3047 0.2727 1.0000   
be4iv 0.2295 -0.1635 -0.1203 -0.1515 0.0128 0.0085 0.1706 0.3387 0.2858 1.0000  
be5dv 0.2500 -0.0108 -0.0878 -0.0927 -0.0678 0.0012 0.1774 0.3041 0.4223 0.4264 1.0000 
 
 
Spearman Correlation 
 gen age bg tny sub annut be1iv be2iv be3iv be4iv be5dv 
            
gen 1.0000            
age -0.1812 1.0000           
bg 0.0238 0.0399 1.0000          
tny -0.1648 0.5662 -0.1840 1.0000         
sub -0.0084 -0.0736 0.0281 -0.0257 1.0000        
annut -0.1254 -0.0838 -0.1424 -0.0026 0.3046 1.0000       
be1iv -0.0731 -0.0331 -0.1140 -0.0236 -0.0376 0.1409 1.0000      
be2iv 0.1184 0.0715 -0.0443 -0.1271 -0.0546 -0.1160 0.2112 1.0000     
be3iv 0.1139 -0.0273 -0.1814 -0.0639 -0.0479 0.0854 0.3076 0.2408 1.0000    
be4iv 0.2298 -0.1473 -0.1292 -0.1336 -0.0395 0.0092 0.2051 0.3535 0.2964 1.0000   
be5dv 0.2107 -0.0632 -0.0815 -0.1117 -0.0956 -0.0475 0.1793 0.3766 0.4106 0.4674 1.0000 
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8.5.1.4. Ordered Logit Regression of Board Evaluation Features against Decision 
Making 
The ordered logit regression (Table 8.31) was used to investigate the relationship 
between features of board evaluation and investment decision-making induced by board 
evaluation.  The table will reveal that seven submodels were built each with varying 
independent variables. Sub model with Adjusted R2 of 0.1559 was the best fit. This model 
can explain 15.59% of the variables relationship.  When seeking only a weak signal in 
the presence of a lot of noise, and even a small signal can be of interest, then R-squared 
of even 10% or lower can have some information (Nau, 2018).  Moreover, as suggested 
by Nau (2018), the results obtained from this regression were cross validated through the 
semi-structured interviews conducted. Other studies reported similar low R-squared 
values. For example, McCahery et al. (2016) reported R-squared of 10% in their study. 
 
A summary of the results from the ordered logit and hypothesis can be found in table 
8.32 below. For robustness, ordered probit regression was conducted and produced 
similar results to the ordered logit regression. See appendix 3. 
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Table 8. 31 Ordered logit regressions of features of board evaluation against investment decision making influence of board evaluation 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
VARIABLES be5dv be5dv be5dv be5dv be5dv be5dv be5dv 
        
gen 1.054** 0.919** 0.833* 0.654 1.028** 0.891** 0.658 
 (0.430) (0.429) (0.434) (0.432) (0.433) (0.440) (0.449) 
age 0.201 0.0114 0.192 0.284 -0.00599 0.0396 0.141 
 (0.276) (0.283) (0.278) (0.277) (0.287) (0.289) (0.293) 
bg -0.251 -0.214 -0.217 -0.168 -0.181 -0.157 -0.0877 
 (0.201) (0.205) (0.202) (0.205) (0.205) (0.204) (0.201) 
tny -0.269 -0.126 -0.213 -0.198 -0.144 -0.135 -0.134 
 (0.204) (0.211) (0.207) (0.204) (0.212) (0.214) (0.214) 
sub -0.288 -0.293 -0.0999 -0.435 -0.272 -0.146 -0.291 
 (0.398) (0.400) (0.409) (0.403) (0.402) (0.412) (0.417) 
annut -0.0173 0.0378 -0.131 0.0126 0.0222 -0.0765 -0.0625 
 (0.143) (0.147) (0.149) (0.144) (0.148) (0.155) (0.155) 
be1iv 0.345**    0.311* 0.190 0.191 
 (0.159)    (0.162) (0.169) (0.170) 
be2iv  0.894***   0.843*** 0.626** 0.353 
  (0.286)   (0.279) (0.295) (0.303) 
be3iv   0.804***   0.643*** 0.566*** 
   (0.188)   (0.198) (0.199) 
be4iv    0.884***   0.665*** 
    (0.203)   (0.216) 
        
/cut1 -0.151 0.328 0.739 1.301 0.993 1.800* 2.949** 
 (0.933) (0.985) (0.956) (1.011) (1.032) (1.082) (1.160) 
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/cut2 1.786* 2.375** 2.871*** 3.460*** 3.089*** 4.035*** 5.321*** 
 (0.946) (1.014) (0.995) (1.059) (1.073) (1.140) (1.240) 
/cut3 2.930*** 3.561*** 4.103*** 4.693*** 4.283*** 5.291*** 6.639*** 
 (0.987) (1.059) (1.047) (1.111) (1.118) (1.195) (1.306) 
/cut4 4.668*** 5.303*** 5.910*** 6.459*** 6.045*** 7.128*** 8.507*** 
 (1.186) (1.248) (1.247) (1.295) (1.308) (1.393) (1.492) 
Pseudo R2 .0489 .0712 .1005 .1037 .0839 .1220 .1559 
Observations 118 118 118 118 118 118 118 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
 
Codes  
Gender GEN 0 Male 1 Female 
AGE AGE 21-30 – 1, 31-40 -2, 41-50 – 3, 51-60 -4, Over 60 - 5 
Your Background (Which area have you gained most of your working 
investment experience) 
BG Banking and Finance – 1, Pol Science -2, Economics – 3, Accounting – 4, Others - 5 
Total number of years you have spent as an analyst TNY 0-4 – 1,5-9 – 2, 10-15 – 3, 16-20 – 4, Over 20 -5 
Is your firm a subsidiary/affiliate of an international company? SUB Yes- 1, No -0 
What is the annual investment turnover of your company? AnnuT N1M-N100M -1, N101M-N1bn – 2, N1bn-N10bn – 3, N10bn-N100bn – 4, Over N100bn - 5 
 
Evaluating board directors in banks is done effectively and transparently.  
 
**Please Note that this function is done by external consultants induced by 
regulation. However, only a summary is produced in the financial statements 
BE1IV Perception of transparency of evaluation report 
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of banks for public consumption. The main report is restricted for internal 
management/board consumption only. 
 
Board evaluation is necessary for accountability and helps prevent 
organizational failure 
BE2IV Necessity of evaluation report 
I read the board of directors performance evaluations in banks' annual reports 
(or other bank reports) before making investment decisions on a bank 
 
BE3IV Information in report 
If a bank has performed well in specific performance criteria (e.g., risk 
management, auditing, credit quality, customer service, technology, etc.), I 
assume the individual director supervising that function has performed well 
 
BE4IV Content of evaluation report as indication of director performance 
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Table 8. 32 A Summary of all the hypotheses and findings for the board evaluation and 
decision making model  
Dependent Variable  Decision Making influence of Board Evaluation  
  
Independent 
variable  
No. 
Hypothesis  
Expected 
sign  
Finding sign  Finding 
significance  
Hypothesis 
status  
Perception 
of 
transparency 
of 
evaluation 
report 
1  - + Insignificant  Rejected 
Necessity of 
evaluation 
report 
2 +  +  Insignificant Rejected 
Importance 
of 
information 
in report 
3  +  + Significant at the 
1% level 
Accepted 
Content of 
evaluation 
report as an 
indication of 
director 
performance 
4 +  +  Significant at the 
1% level 
Accepted 
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8.5.2 Discussions and Triangulation of Qualitative and Quantitative 
Findings of Board Evaluation 
 
Model 1: Board Evaluation Induced Propensity to Make Favourable Investment Decision 
= β0 + .19(BE1) + .35(BE2) + .57((BE3) + .67(BE4) +65(Gen) - .09(BG) + .14(AGE) -
.29(IA) - .06(FS) - .13(TNY) + εi 
8.5.2.1. Preamble 
 Board evaluations are a way to assess board performance (Ingley & van der Walt, 2002; 
2005; Leblanc, 2005; Leblanc & Schwartz, 2007; Long, 2006; Minichilli et al., 2007; 
Gabrielsson & Huse, 2004; Kiel & Nicholson, 2005). However, interviewee OP6 posits 
that “board evaluation report as presented now (for Nigerian banks), will speak to 
composition, the committees, the attendance of meetings. However, it is actually very 
sketchy. It is not like it allows you to do a deep dive into what it each person contributed 
to it”. So how will evaluations features be perceived or represented? 
 
8.5.2.2. The features of board evaluation driver findings 
 
Perception of transparency of evaluation report 
Perception of transparency of evaluation report is positively correlated with investment 
decision making although not statistically significant (β=.19, p=.26). This represents 
interesting results and is contrary to the hypothesis (H9a) for this study as it would have 
been expected that the abridged evaluation report would have represented negativity to 
the investment analysts. However, the sheer volume of pages of annual reports or 
financial statement and other reports emanating from banks means most analysts are 
unable to go through all details in the report but instead might be satisfied reading the 
abridged version. From the interviews, the reason for the insignificance of this feature 
might not be unconnected to the lack of believability in the transparency of evaluation 
reports by investment analysts. For example, interviewee CP1 posits that "I would also 
imagine that even if the banks were obligated to share the evolution reports on their 
managers or their directors, the investor or the fund manager will still also need to carry 
out so an independent evaluation. So, that in itself does not in any way influence or decide 
   
336 
 
what I do with that financial institution. I always will carry up my own independent 
evaluation” Similarly, interviewee LA3 posits that “we are going to an era of 
transparency and it (board evaluation report) is not too good. It needs to be improved. I 
mean, you know that when you are elected onto the board of a bank and a public service 
like that, then you must be prepared for it (evaluation). It should not be a summary thing. 
It should be a full-blown report, because being a director is a huge responsibility that 
must be taken up with all sense of seriousness and so by the time you bring an abridged 
version you are trivializing it kind of”. 
 
From the evidence provided above, H9a is not supported. 
 
Necessity of evaluation report 
Necessity of evaluation report is positively correlated with investment decision making 
although not statistically significant (β=.35, p=.24). The literature suggests that 
evaluations are necessary as they help prevent potential governance failures (Kiel & 
Nicholson, 2005). However, in Nigeria, there is widespread apathy towards reports 
generated on directors despite the CBN mandating that evaluation reports be generated 
by external auditors.  Interviewee MF1 describes the necessity of evaluation reports as 
follows "In this environment, you do not go looking for who are the board members? 
What value are they adding? Even though the financial now says, Oh have they attended 
board meeting, what do they say in their meeting? You do not know. So, why should I 
bother myself?....... what we just see is that his past experience has been this, is being 
that; that they attend board meeting; they just tick box, tick off. It is like checkbox". 
 
Furthermore, the distrust prevalent in the Nigerian environment (Nakpodia & Adegbite, 
2018) means investment analysts attach homogeneity (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983) to 
transparency to evaluation report.  Interviewee LF2 highlights this as such, "in my own 
opinion, I might be wrong, but I think a lot of those board meetings are probably just 
held to fulfill all righteousness because the CBN demands  that you should have I  believe 
one meeting every quarter I am not sure, but there is a statutory number of meetings you 
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must  have and they, I think, they just have it. Seeing through a lot of the decisions they 
make for me is what is key and important, and I would like to see". The stakeholder 
distrust as evidenced by the submissions of the investment analysts provides ample 
support to the non-significance of this feature. Therefore, H9b is not supported. 
 
Information in report 
Information in report is positively statistically significantly correlated with investment 
decision making (β=.57, p<.01). This corroborates the literature (e.g., Kiel & Nicholson, 
2005) and suggests that investment analysts presume that information in evaluation is 
important. Digging further however, while it seems investment analysts feel the 
evaluation reports are important, they attach little influence to it. Interviewee LC6 
highlights this as follows "we review them but it does not really influence, because to be 
truthful it is not the easiest thing to digest.  It feels very tick boxy. so you have attended 
this number of meetings, not even sure if it shows you vote in a certain way, so it is 
information, but it is not really relevant." 
 
Furthermore, the abridged version of the evaluation report seems adequate in meeting 
the requirement of the investment analysts. Interviewee LA4 highlights this as follows 
“I think it is fine. You do not have time to roam around like a hundred page financial 
statement, so abridged is all right. Google is your friend if you need to find out more 
information about any of these people you can Google them, you can ask about them, 
you can research them, information is available”. Interviewee LC8 corroborates this 
further as follows “you do not have to read the life history of a director before you know 
enough about the person but in any case, you do not have to limit yourself if you really 
want to know. All you need to do is google the person and then ask around…several ways 
you can make discreet enquiries.” 
 
From the above, H9c is supported. 
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Content of evaluation report as an indication of director performance 
Content of evaluation report as an indication of director performance is positively 
statistically significantly correlated with decision making (β=.67, p<.01). This suggests 
that investment analysts associate contents of the evaluation report with director 
performance. For example, according to interviewee LC3 "If they (directors) are rated 
high, you invest, if not, you run away. So, the evaluation report is very critical because 
at least it sheds light on the personality and the people on the board. It helps a great 
deal." 
 
Investment analysts also linked the content of evaluation reports to information divulged 
about director related loans. Interviewee OP2 opines that “this evaluation report to be 
disclosed fully. Also, transactions with related parties should also be fully disclosed” 
Similarly, interviewee MF1 states as follows “are the committees doing their job, 
advising correctly. If you see, a bank with non-performing assets, well above the 
recommended limit, if the recommended limit for a bank is five percent and if you start 
seeing 30 percent 40 percent, you wonder what the board is doing. Why are they creating 
bad quality assets?  That comes with questions such as; are these board members there 
on merit? Or they are just rubber stamp? “ 
 
From the foregoing, H9d is supported. 
 
8.6 Conclusion 
This chapter presented the quantitative and qualitative findings of accountability driver 
mechanisms and provided impetus to the literature on accountability mechanism drivers. 
Of the four drivers reviewed in the study, voluntary disclosure was most important 
according to survey results. Further, the relationships between decision-making and 
features that describe voluntary disclosure, independent audit committee, pay for 
performance and board evaluation were revealed. 
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For voluntary disclosure as a driver of good corporate governance, findings from both 
the quantitative and qualitative studies establish that investment analysts presume that 
mandatory financial reporting and voluntary disclosure can be complements. Wherein 
the former produces verifiable information that improves the credibility of the latter and 
therefore encourages managers to issue more forecasts, i.e., the confirmatory role of 
mandatory reporting (Balakrishnan et al., 2012).  The psychological reasoning findings 
of the investment analysts obtained through interviews when triangulated with the 
regression analysis reveal the following; investment in Nigeria is mostly short-term 
hence the majority of investment analysts rely on fundamental ratios of the bank to make 
short-term investment decisions. Hence, for investment analysts, mandatory reports of 
banks as detailed by the Central Bank of Nigeria serves as the primary disclosure required 
for investment purposes. Moreover, the Nigerian banks report their financial statements 
and annual reports according to international financial reporting standards (IFRS). 
However, relevant voluntary disclosure by a bank projects the bank as transparent and 
accountable. 
 
Furthermore, voluntary disclosure improves the believability of the mandatory reports 
especially as the homogeneity of the mandatory reports makes it difficult to differentiate 
the Nigeria banks. 96.55% of survey respondents for this study agree or strongly agree 
that voluntary disclosures represent accountability. Voluntary disclosure also signals 
performance to investment analysts. Voluntary disclosures cognitively signal more 
accountability (than performance) to investment analysts. The findings from this section 
enhance the literature on voluntary disclosure as well as deepens our understanding of 
the signaling theory. 
 
For independent audit committee, the results revealed that audit reports are important for 
providing preliminary background information on internal happenings in the bank. 
However, the independence or otherwise of the audit committee members cannot be 
proved. The psychological reasoning findings of the investment analysts obtained 
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through interviews when triangulated with the regression analysis reveal the following; 
in Nigeria, most individuals are appointed into critical positions such as audit committee 
based on family ties or loyalty to the dominant shareholder. This makes it difficult to 
trust that individuals on the audit committee are truly independent. Indeed, independence 
in the Nigerian environment can only be regarded as a post event. The only way 
investment analysts know an audit committee member is independent is if he resigns 
from his position due to a difference of opinion or by behind the scenes interactions 
(McCahery et al., 2016). 
 
Nevertheless, audit reports provide a first glimpse into the activities of the firm hence are 
an important material for investment analysts. However, the audit committee reports are 
read with a bit of reservation especially as mandatory regulatory requirements imprints 
homogeneity on the Nigerian banking sector. Most analysts will rather read the external 
audit committee reports; hence the independent audit committee reports are not decisive 
for investment decision making. 
 
For Pay for performance, triangulated findings from both the quantitative and qualitative 
studies establish that compensation schemes are not clear in Nigeria. Despite the lack of 
clarity, reward schemes are encouraged by investment analysts believing it aligns agents 
and principals interests. The psychological reasoning findings of the investment analysts 
obtained through interviews when triangulated with the regression analysis reveal the 
following; the issue of pay for performance is still relatively unclear in the Nigerian 
business environment. The findings of this research confirm that while pay for 
performance is viewed positively, one cannot confidently predict its effect on decision-
making. For example, interviewee LA1 argues as follows “it (pay for performance) is not 
stated in financials.  I have been through a good amount of financials I do not think I 
have seen exact details of bonus and things like that". Investment analysts are unable to 
decipher the micro-details of pay for performance therefore, this necessitates more 
intervention by regulators.  
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Furthermore, the distrust of performance as presented in the financials is prevalent in the 
Nigerian family/dominant shareholder business clime, especially where remuneration 
committees can be viewed as compromised. Interviewee OP2 highlights this as follows 
"pay for performance most times is not objective. If the compensation committee is a 
related party, then your compensation is an arrangement. It is a conversation with 
friends as opposed to conversations held at arm’s length”. However, reward schemes are 
acceptable incentives and can be confidently predicted to influence decision-making. 
This is in line with the stakeholder-agentic position that presumes pay for performance 
potentially aligns executives’ interests with shareholders and investors (Hill & Jones, 
1992). According to interviewee LC8, “the truth is if at the end of the day, after they 
(management) have rewarded themselves but the bank is able to make good profits, we 
just have to be satisfied with that. So, pay for performance I think it is a very opaque 
area, no matter how deep you dig, you cannot really know how much those guys pay 
themselves.” Interviewee LA3 corroborates the importance of this feature thus: “the era 
of having an executive (employee/manager) that just sits down and do not do anything, 
you know, there is nothing better than pay for performance. It aligns the interests of the 
shareholders and the executive and the management. I really believe in more because 
otherwise, we will be creating room for inefficiencies”. 
 
In Nigeria, Pay for performance is described as double-edged as it might be viewed as 
promoting short-termism to the detriment of the going concern realities of a firm 
(Filatotchev et al., 2007). According to interviewee OP5, "remuneration is a very dicey 
aspect (of corporate governance) especially because it brings up an issue of how the 
individuals being put in charge of the business (are conducting their affairs) …. So, again 
I refer to the agency relationship which I mentioned originally. So, pay for performance. 
I think is again a double edge sword. I think it is down to how it is going to be 
implemented or how it is being implemented that would determine if it is positive or it is 
being used for other personal benefits". Nevertheless, Investment analysts support 
reward schemes as they see it as a measure of accountability and the implementation can 
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determine investment outlook. Interviewee LA2 posits as follows "so in the case where 
I can ascertain that the pay for performance is skewed more in terms of things that would 
ensure the long-term value of the company is not eroded, then it does influence 
investment decisions. But in a case where it is skewed more towards monetary 
performance bonuses, it does not enhance our long-term investment. Maybe short-term 
decisions, so just one year when you know there would not be likely change in 
management. However, once there is a change in management, we will start looking, ….; 
okay I need to get out before this managing director gets out so., you know, those kinds 
of decisions. So in the case where we are able to verify the pay for performance details, 
then it sways investment decisions.” 
 
Finally, while board evaluations provide some information, there is a belief among 
investment analysts that it is mainly a window dressing activity. The psychological 
reasoning findings of the investment analysts obtained through interviews when 
triangulated with the regression analysis reveal the following; investment analysts treat 
evaluation reports as a box-ticking exercise, as they do not believe negative or essential 
information is divulged in the reports. They believe management manages the reports. 
They do think the report is necessary. There was no agreement on whether the abridged 
report is satisfactory. While some investment analysts recommend more information be 
divulged, others were of the opinion that even the abridged version is rarely read in depth. 
 
Overall, however, there is some importance attached to evaluation report regardless of 
the trust level in such reports. Interviewee CP2 states as follows "I think the more 
information you have, regardless of whether it is window dressed or not, you should be 
able to now see through those window dressings if you like and make some decisions." 
This importance is however minimal as according to interviewee OP3 "It plays a role 
but not a significant role. Our approach is to do our evaluations ourselves. Maybe some 
of the key takeaways from those areas of coverage but in truth it is easy to have board 
evaluation documents. I mean there is not a significant difference from the evaluation 
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documents for what we may feel at the worst run banks and the best-run banks. So really 
how do you make that a big consideration in your investment decisions?”  
 
The findings in this chapter have advanced the stakeholder-agency, signalling and social 
cognition theories, and confirmed that important stakeholders such as investment 
analysts operating in the Nigerian investment clime, place a premium on accountability 
mechanism drivers especially voluntary disclosures.   
 
The next chapter provides a conclusion to the thesis. 
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Chapter Nine: Discussion and Conclusions  
 
9.1 Introduction  
Using an explanatory sequential mixed method design, this study investigates the 
perspectives of investment analysts on drivers of good corporate governance in Nigerian 
Banks and the influence of the features of the drivers on investment decision making. 
The drivers of good corporate governance and the features of each driver were followed 
or developed from previous studies (e.g., Adegbite, 2015; Filatotchev et al., 2007). 
 
More precisely, the study used quantitative data to reveal; A. Which features of board 
structure and composition mechanism governance drivers matter to investment analysts 
for investment making decision? B. Which features of external ownership mechanism 
governance drivers matter to investment analysts for investment decision making? C. 
Which features of accountability mechanism governance drivers matter to investment 
analysts for investment decision making? Additionally, the study used qualitative data 
(semi-structured interviews) to explore psychological reasoning of investment analysts 
on of why drivers and features revealed from the quantitative study matter or otherwise. 
 
This chapter proceeds thus. First, this chapter summarises triangulated the findings from 
the quantitative and qualitative data. Subsequently, this chapter highlights the 
implications of the findings for corporate governance literature of developing countries, 
actors in the banking sector and policymakers. Finally, this chapter addresses the 
contributions and limitations of the study and offers suggestions for future research. 
  
9.2 Summary of triangulated findings  
This section summaries the findings obtained from the triangulated data obtained from 
the quantitative and qualitative studies. Recently, the mixed-methods approach has been 
widely welcomed in the corporate governance literature and is considered very effective 
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for developing a deep understanding of corporate governance behavior (McNulty et al., 
2013; Zattoni et al., 2013).  
 
The quantitative study followed methodology as employed by previous studies such as 
Filatotchev et al. (2007) and MaCahery et al. (2016). While the qualitative study 
employed  semi-structured interviews following Nakpodia & Adegbite (2018), Adegbite 
(2015), Haniffa & Hudaib (2007), Liew (2007), Johl et al. (2012), Piesse et al. (2012), 
Soobaroyen & Mahadeo (2012) and Bailey & Peck (2013). This study aimed to reveal 
features of corporate governance drivers that have the most significant relationship with 
investment decision making using the Nigerian banking sector for context.  
 
Chapter Six presented board structure and composition drivers’ findings. This chapter 
represented the study one results of this thesis. The chapter was divided into Part A-C. 
Part A was for board independence, B, for board heterogeneity and C, for board 
reputation. From Part A of the chapter, it was revealed that diverse share ownership is 
the preferred indication of board independence. This feature is also preferred because it 
provides an easy exit either for profit taking or dissatisfaction with the firm 
practice/performance. Also, despite the weak institutional environment, presence of more 
non-executive directors on a board projects some level of independence. The Part B of 
the chapter, revealed that investment analysts that operate in the Nigerian investment 
space, pay little attention to board diversity even though majority of female investment 
analysts interviewed expressed sentiments for having more women representations on 
boards. Despite the seemingly irrelevance of board diversity, age diversity is positively 
received and is linked with innovation and business experience. Tribe is only relevant 
for business expediencies for the firm but not as an investment decision-making factor. 
Investment analysts ascribe multiple directorship to the nature of firm ownership in 
Nigeria as firms are still dominated by family or influential beneficial owners. These 
findings are consistent with prior literature such as Adegbite (2015). 
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For Part C, while the importance of reputation of firm/directors to investment decision 
cannot be overstated, majority of investment analysts interviewed interpret reputation 
differently from the legal connotation of Central bank of Nigeria (CBN). They do 
understand and agree that CBN conducts a “fit and proper” test before directors are 
appointed onto boards of Nigerian banks; however, they feel that the weak institutional 
environment might still allow people of disrepute onto boards of banks. Credibility of 
directors is extremely important and can determine success or otherwise of the bank. The 
name precedes the person, hence a director’s name is a brand that can enhance or 
diminish the reputation of a board. In Nigeria, it is believed that most persons of repute 
are connected politically, and hence the degree to which the director is involved in 
politics is what is most critical in determining how being politically exposed affects the 
director’s reputation. 
 
Chapter Seven presented investment analysts perception of external ownership drivers. 
The chapter was divided into Part A and B. Part A was for foreign institutional investors 
while Part B covered effective shareholder activism. Part A of the chapter revealed that 
foreign institutional investors possessing shares of a bank and being on the board excites 
investment analysts. This is because investment analysts believe these foreign 
institutional investors perform competent due diligence before investing. Further, foreign 
institutional investors are less likely to be influenced by the corrupt Nigerian 
environment especially as they are likely to be monitored by their foreign parent 
company. Local institutional investors are also desirable as they understand the local 
terrain better than the foreign institutional investors and are more likely to stay in the 
Nigerian market even during times of crisis. The results demonstrate that opening up a 
market to foreign institutional investors can be an effective way to reduce the agency 
problem of controlling shareholders that are trying to expropriate from minority 
shareholders. As also reported by Huang & Zhu (2015), to the extent that external 
monitoring benefits all shareholders, the presence of foreign institutional investors 
generates positive externalities. 
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For Part B of the chapter, it was revealed that activism is still at its infancy in Nigeria, 
and shareholder associations are unreliable and exposed to corrupt questionable 
characters. The wealth concentration in a few hands in developing countries, means 
shareholders who Adegbite (2015) conceived as “reputable shareholders” are likely to 
influence investment decisions as in they might be in possession of the right set of 
information. The limited shareholder activism in Nigeria, especially by institutional 
investors means the possibilities of shareholder activism addressing the principal-
principal agency problem is still not effective at the moment. This might have to do with 
the inability of the minority shareholders to have a common protective voice leaving the 
dominant principal to dictate activities (Adegbite, 2015, Uche et al., 2016).   
 
Chapter Eight presented the quantitative and qualitative findings of accountability driver 
mechanisms and provided impetus to the literature on accountability mechanism drivers. 
Divided in Part A-D, the four drivers reviewed in the study were voluntary disclosure, 
independent audit committee, pay for performance and board evaluation. For voluntary 
disclosure as a driver of good corporate governance, findings from both the quantitative 
and qualitative studies establish that investment analysts presume that mandatory 
financial reporting and voluntary disclosure can be complements. Wherein the former 
produces verifiable information that improves the credibility of the latter and therefore 
encourages managers to issue more forecasts, i.e., the confirmatory role of mandatory 
reporting (Balakrishnan et al., 2012).  Indeed, investments in Nigeria is mostly with 
short-term horizon hence the majority of investment analysts rely on fundamental ratios 
of the bank to make short-term investment decisions. Hence, for investment analysts, 
mandatory reports of banks as detailed by the Central Bank of Nigeria serves as the 
primary disclosure required for investment purposes. Moreover, the Nigerian banks 
report their financial statements and annual reports according to international financial 
reporting standards (IFRS). However, relevant voluntary disclosure by a bank projects 
the bank as transparent and accountable. The findings from this section enhance the 
literature on voluntary disclosure as well as deepens our understanding of the signaling 
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theory. 
 
For Part B, of the chapter, it was revealed that audit reports are important for providing 
preliminary background information on internal happenings in the bank. However, the 
independence or otherwise of the audit committee members cannot be proved. The 
reason adduced by investment analysts was that most individuals are appointed into 
critical positions such as audit committee based on family ties or loyalty to the dominant 
shareholder. This makes it difficult to trust that individuals on the audit committee are 
truly independent. Nevertheless, audit reports provide a first glimpse into the activities 
of the firm hence are an important material for investment analysts. However, the audit 
committee reports are read with a bit of reservation especially as mandatory regulatory 
requirements imprints homogeneity on the Nigerian banking sector. Most analysts will 
rather read the external audit committee reports; hence the independent audit committee 
reports are not decisive for investment decision making. 
 
The Part C of the chapter established that despite the lack of clarity of pay for 
performance in the Nigerian banking sector, reward schemes are still encouraged by 
investment analysts as they believe it aligns agents and principals interests.  This is in 
line with the stakeholder-agentic position that presumes pay for performance potentially 
aligns executives’ interests with shareholders and investors (Hill & Jones, 1992). 
However, in Nigeria, pay for performance is described as double-edged as it might be 
viewed as promoting short-termism to the detriment of the going concern realities of a 
firm (Filatotchev et al., 2007).  
 
Finally for Part D of the chapter, it was revealed that while board evaluations provide 
some information, investment analysts assume this exercise to be a box-ticking and 
mainly window dressing activity. They believe management manages the information 
divulged in such evaluation reports. However, although investment analysts agreed the 
evaluation reports are necessary, there was no consensus on the how much information 
   
349 
 
should be revealed in the reports. While some investment analysts recommend more 
information be divulged, others were of the opinion that even the abridged version is 
rarely read in depth. 
 
9.3 Contributions of this Study 
As discussed in Chapter One, the current study contributes to the literature on corporate 
governance in several ways. First, business studies in general and corporate governance 
studies, in particular, are dominated by quantitative studies (Molina-Azorin, 2012). Boyd 
et al. (2012) suggest that the literature on corporate governance could greatly benefit 
from the use of additional qualitative methods or mixed-methods research approaches in 
order to enhance the understanding of corporate governance practices. It can be argued 
that quantitative data alone does not present an explanation of the findings from statistical 
tests. More precisely, quantitative findings do not provide sufficient interpretation of the 
findings, and are less likely to shed light on the insights of ‘why’ a social phenomenon 
happens (Morgan & Smircich, 1980; Cohen et al., 2002; Creswell & Clark, 2011).  
 
In this regard, Zattoni et al. (2013) indicate that the lack of agreement in corporate 
governance findings refers to the inability of quantitative data to provide explanations of 
the results. Therefore, researchers use interviews along with quantitative data (mixed-
methods research) to explore interactions among key stakeholders (Molina-Azorin, 2012; 
Boyd et al., 2012; Zattoni et al., 2013). Boyd et al. (2012), Albassam, (2014) and Molina-
Azorin (2012) argue that mixed-methods research generates more reliable and credible 
findings than any single method used. Hence, responding to prodding for more mixed-
methods research, this study uses mixed-methods as an approach to studying corporate 
governance (Boyd et al., 2012; Zattoni et al., 2013; McNulty et al., 2013). Therefore, this 
study contributes to the corporate governance literature by showing how the findings 
from quantitative and qualitative data can be integrated to examine corporate governance 
behavior in Nigeria, an important developing country. This study encourages future 
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research to use mixed methods for corporate governance research in developing 
countries.  
 
Second, the study contributes to the literature by adopting a multi-theoretical framework 
to interpret the empirical findings and to understand corporate governance behavior in 
depth. More precisely, it is argued that most existing studies on corporate governance 
concentrate on agency theory, though they mention other corporate governance theories 
(Filatotchev & Boyd, 2009; Chalevas, 2011; Zattoni et al., 2013). Hence the mixed 
findings obtained from corporate governance research might be a consequence of the 
dominance of an agency-based perspective (Zattoni et al., 2013). Specifically, this study 
responds to the recent calls by scholars (e.g, Connelly et al., 2011) to use complementary 
theories in empirical governance studies to enhance understanding of corporate 
governance behavior. Moreover, the corporate governance phenomenon is related to a 
variety of disciplines, such as sociology, economics, law, and business (Rwegasira, 2000; 
Bebchuk & Weisbach, 2010), which are inherently multi-theoretically oriented..  
 
Third, this thesis also makes a contribution to the empirical literature on corporate 
governance in developing countries. In these countries, it has been severally noted that 
literature regarding corporate governance is scarce (Berglöf & Claessens, 2006; 
Mangena & Tauringana, 2007; Adegbite, 2015). Even more scarce is evidence-based 
empirical literature (Adegbite et al., 2013). In fact, the majority of studies on corporate 
governance in developing African countries such as Nigeria are substantially undertaken 
as non-empirical (conceptual) studies (for example, see Okike, 2007). A few others have 
employed a large-scale survey-based quantitative approach (for instance, see Okpara, 
2011). Recently though, some intrepretivist and qualitative empirical studies have started 
emerging (e.g., Nakpodia, 2015, Adegbite, 2015; Nakpodia & Adegbite, 2018; Uche et 
al., 2016). Nevertheless, evidence-based qualitative research is still sparse in many 
developing economies. To the best of this researcher's knowledge, no study has used the 
mixed methodology approach of quantitative and qualitative method to obtain 
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triangulated empirical evidence from less studied but increasingly important developing 
country of Nigeria.   
 
The aforementioned has implications for the understanding of corporate governance 
drivers globally and, in particular, Nigeria, as the lack of empirical outputs hinders 
governance scholarship in countries like Nigeria. In view of increasing globalization, the 
continued lack of evidence-based corporate governance literature means that it may be 
difficult for multinational organizations, for instance, to appropriately comprehend the 
challenges of corporate governance in developing countries. This could have 
implications for their (multinational companies) investments in developing countries 
and, subsequently might affect their operations globally. Following the preceding 
observation, a key motivation of this thesis is to contribute knowledge in order to address 
concerns regarding the scarcity of empirical literature on corporate governance amongst 
developing countries.  
 
Fourth, this study contributes by extending the scope of behavioral theory under agentic 
conditions. The social cognition theory “accords a central role to cognitive, vicarious, 
self-regulatory and self-reflective processes" (Wood & Bandura, 1989 p. 362). This 
theory is especially relevant to this present study as it looks at interactive human 
psychosocial functioning in terms of behavior, cognition, trust, other personal factors and 
environmental events (Wood & Bandura, 1989).  Decisions of individuals are influenced 
by internal cognitive processes and external social situations (Cooper & Lu, 2016). This 
is because the environment of people predicts their behavior (Bandura, 1989). This 
environment includes social norms, access within the community, peer influence and 
values (Bandura, 1991).  Further, in complex, uncertain environments (such as Nigeria), 
stakeholders’ social cognition can be traced to research on individual perception (Asch, 
1946; Cantor & Mischel, 1979a; Schneider et al., 1979), cognitive schemata (Alba & 
Hasher, 1983; Anderson, 1982; Reder & Anderson, 1980), categorization (Rosch et al., 
1976) and decision making which enables individuals achieve their set objectives 
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(Kotter, 1982; Mintzberg, 1973; Stewart, 1967). Investment analysts create their decision 
support systems and selectively process the information generated by their environment 
(George, 1980). This research extends the social cognition theory by advancing the 
understanding and predictability of investment analysts' decision-making based on their 
perception of features of good corporate governance drivers signaled by Nigerian banks. 
 
Moreover, the social cognition theory has been criticized as broad reaching, and difficult 
to operationalize in entirety (Flamand, 2017).). This study has attempted to string the 
loosely organized social cognition theory by focusing on the agentic behavior of a 
particular set of audience in a particular sector of a developing country. The theoretical 
framework for this study is that banks will signal governance drivers which investment 
analysts will understand and interpret based on their experience operating in the weak 
institutional environment of Nigeria. In an environment such as Nigeria, the reliance on 
institutions is treated at best with skepticism and usually with distrust (Nakpodia & 
Adegbite, 2018). Conversely, this study assumes that the absence of trust will distort 
normal agency theory predictions on governance drivers. The fact that the institutional 
environment in Nigeria does not lend itself to trust enables this study to extend the social 
cognition theory. Thus, based solely on the dynamic interplay between person, behavior, 
and environment, the study revealed in a clear methodological manner the extent to 
which each feature of the governance mechanism drivers affect actual investment 
behavior. Furthermore, the study revealed which features in a family of governance 
drivers is more influential. 
 
Fifth, this study offers a stakeholder-agentic approach to understanding corporate 
governance drivers. The rise of institutional (Davis, 2009a; Davis, 2011) and, the advent 
of agency theory, (Dobbin & Jung, 2010; Shapiro, 2005) has perhaps made the 
shareholder-value oriented corporate governance more popular. Dobbin & Jung (2010) 
however criticized this approach as they argued it leads to short-termism in corporate 
policy. Also, when investigating developing countries, most existing studies (e.g 
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Adegbite, 2015; Acemoglu et al., 2005; Adegbite & Nakajima, 2012; Nakpodia & 
Adegbite 2018) posit that the establishment of a good corporate governance system is 
dependent on the degree of robustness possessed by institutional elements in a particular 
institutional environment (Judge et al., 2008; Filatotchev et al., 2013). They suggest that 
corporate governance enhances the capacity of institutions to act as a check on the 
behavior of agents (North, 1990) which, in turn, allows a good corporate governance 
system to manifest (Fiss, 2008). The generality of corporate governance literature which 
integrated institutional theory in its analysis has embraced this view (Scott, 1999; 
Aguilera & Jackson, 2010). This understanding is identified as the top-down approach 
(Nakpodia, 2015). However, the context of this study offered in-depth but different 
insights when compared with the foregoing position. This study obtained the perspective 
of important economic agents by using a stakeholder-agentic approach to understand if 
features of governance drivers’ signals projected by actors of a sector were similarly 
received by the audience, especially investment analysts.   
 
9.4 Contribution to Practice and Policy 
This research by focusing on investors' perception of features of corporate governance 
drivers as signaled by actors in the banking sector has expanded the scholarship on 
governance in the banking sector for all stakeholders but especially the following three. 
A. Investors are increasingly important in the finance world. This study can have 
implications for investors who want to be assured about the safety of their investment 
before making investment decision. B. Managers of banks need to position their banks 
for investment opportunities. Considering the weak institutional environment in Nigeria 
and indeed most developing countries (La Porta et al., 1999), this research reveals what 
managers should be signaling to enable them to attract the required finance from 
investors.  C. Regulators in Nigeria (such as CBN, SEC, and CAC) are authorized to 
supervise banks. One way these regulators function is by the use of codes of corporate 
governance. However, it has been documented that codes of corporate governance as 
introduced in most developing countries are similar to those obtainable in Anglo/Saxon 
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codes (Nakpodia & Adegbite, 2018). In most developed countries, the institutions are 
developed unlike developing countries, which are replete with weak institutions (La 
Porta et al., 1999). For example, our findings support regulators' concern about financial-
reporting quality and the recent calls for more independent audit committees (Carcello 
& Neal, 2000). This is because firms should gear towards safeguarding investors’ value 
(Groves, 1999; Blackburn, 1999) and independent audit committee mechanism 
represents a way for investment analysts to recognise and manage risks. We recommend 
a more open verification and documentary process that assures external stakeholders that 
audit committee members will uphold their accountability and fiduciary responsibility 
more independently. This can be achieved in a number of ways. One of such 
improvements is the recent emphasis of independent directors by the CBN onto the 
boards of banks and the insistence by the Federal Reporting Council of Nigeria (FRCN) 
in their combined corporate governance code of 2018 that an independent director acts 
as the chairman of the independent audit committee to guarantee more accountability and 
enhanced independence (Bhasin, 2015).  Similarly, our findings suggests that the advent 
of technology and more open information sourcing outlets (e.g. social media), means the 
CBN and other regulators can encourage anonymous suggestions from members of the 
public in a manner that will encourage banks to be increasingly more responsible for the 
quality of reports that emanate from banks (Beasley et al., 2009). Therefore, this research 
presents a springboard for policymakers who are desirous to tackling corruption and 
governance issues in their country. The opinions and reasoning of a cross-section of top 
investment executives who are critical economic agents provided for in this research 
present policymakers a glimpse into amendments to make to existing regulations and 
codes of corporate governance. In essence, copying codes of governance obtainable in 
developed countries might not necessarily be the panacea to agency issues in developing 
countries where trust of institutions is lacking or at best waning. 
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9.5 Research Implications and Recommendations 
The agency theory suffers from several limitations in international business governance 
research. The theory assumes an efficient and competitive market environment, where 
firm ownership is dispersed, information asymmetry is minimal and competitive 
pressures are maximized (Udayasankar et al., 2005). However, in many developing 
countries, these presumptions are predominantly invalid (Adegbite, 2015; La Porta 
1999). Furthermore, there is empirical evidence that drivers of good corporate 
governance are different across countries (Hove, 1986; Chang, 1992; Adegbite & 
Nakajima, 2011a; Adegbite, 2015; Demirag et al., 2000).  Nevertheless, the findings in 
this study are consistent with stakeholder agency theory and with a number of studies 
conducted in both developed and developing countries. Furthermore, this research 
supported the stakeholder agency theory with the social cognition theory. The social 
cognition theory was used as a theoretical lens to understand the investment environment 
debate regarding the effectiveness of corporate governance mechanisms (Wijewardena 
& Yapa, 1998) in Nigeria. This research revealed the perceptions of investment analysts 
who hold a critical role in the Nigerian investment space. Prior to now, many 
management studies have been slow to recognize the importance of external investors 
(Aguilera et al., 2015). 
 
Consequently, this study contends that rather than creating codes of corporate 
governance or supposedly building institutions in order to enhance corporate governance 
practices (see Acemoglu et al., 2005; Adegbite & Nakajima, 2012), the concerns created 
by overly powerful/influential audience (investment analysts) must first be addressed. 
These concerns must be sufficiently addressed prior to the creation of additional 
institutional framework especially in developing countries where corruption and weak 
legal systems erode the confidence and trust of market players (La Porta, 1999; Adegbite, 
2015).  
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Contextually, the numerous corporate governance scandals in the past decade and the 
limited success of regulatory reforms and prosecution of offenders further help to 
underscore the usefulness of a Nigerian case study for this research inquiry (Okike, 2007; 
Adegbite et al., 2012; Adegbite et al., 2013; Amao & Amaeshi, 2008; Yakasai, 2001). 
This is because despite the introduction of governance codes in Nigeria since 2003, and 
sterner monitoring by the CBN occasioned by regular updating of the governance codes, 
there have still been many bank infractions and crisis most of which were blamed on 
governance failure (Adegbite, 2012). Just recently in October 2018, the CBN withdrew 
the banking licence of Skye bank Plc and attributed the failure of the bank to poor 
corporate governance (Bloomberg, 2018). The findings in this research reveal that 
investment analysts are extremely skeptical about corporate governance claims of 
Nigerian banks. This is despite the nearness of the banking sector in Nigeria to the 
institutional framework in developed countries and the proactivieness of CBN (Nakpodia 
& Adegbite, 2018). The findings in this study lead the researcher to suggest that a 
combination (or bundle) of governance mechanisms is required to reduce principal-
agent/principal costs and align the interests of principals and agents. 
Complementarities/substitution of features of governance drivers implies that reforms 
made in one element of corporate governance are mediated by the wider configuration 
of governance channels and national institutions. Thus, best practice should be 
understood in terms different combinations of practices, rather than as individual good 
corporate governance ‘drivers' that are universally applicable. 
 
Nevertheless, despite the numerous challenges confronting the investment climate in 
Nigeria and indeed developing countries, there is a growing belief in the principles 
embedding corporate governance. This belief has propelled constant improvements 
towards achieving acceptable standards in corporate governance (Nakpodia & Adegbite, 
2018). On the evidence presented in this research, what is necessary is perhaps not more 
regulations but a rebuilding of the core fabric of the society. The differing perspectives 
of investment analysts on drivers of good corporate governance projected by banks 
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become even more evident when a comparison is drawn between strong and weak 
institutional contexts. The lack of trust existing in the Nigerian society negates whatever 
gains regulations proffer. 
 
9.6 Limitations of the Study and Future Directions 
Research undertakings are typically subject to limitations. As this study is not different 
in this regard, it is important that such limitations are acknowledged. While it is essential 
to state that precaution was taken to limit the effect of identified limitations on the 
outcome and integrity of this thesis, it is equally imperative to emphasize that not all 
limitations are completely addressed. The limitations are discussed from three main 
aspects: (i) the general framework of the research; (ii) the quantitative research design; 
and (iii) the qualitative research design.  
 
Regarding the general framework of the research, the study has the following limitations. 
First, although the banking sector is important, there are other sectors that significantly 
contribute to the Nigerian economy and are worthy of being studied, such as the oil and 
gas sector or agricultural sector. The current study focuses on banking sector due to the 
importance of the sector to any economy and particularly because of its comparability 
with governance in developed countries since the sector is highly regulated (Lewane, 
2012). In addition, the sector has established industry-specific mandatory code of 
corporate governance which creates homogeneity of governance practices by the banks 
which might not necessarily be present in other sectors. It is also more difficult to obtain 
data for the non-banking sector due to the limited number of sizeable player.  Second, 
given the diverse nature of corporate governance, the theoretical framework of the study 
relied on multiple theoretical perspectives to explain corporate governance mechanisms 
(Rwegasira, 2000; Solomon, 2010). Analysis of the quantitative and qualitative data is 
limited to main theories, such as agency, institutional, stewardship, managerial, and 
resource dependence theories. This is because the governance system (Anglo-American 
model) in Nigeria mainly focuses on shareholders' interests (ROSC, 2004; Oyejide & 
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Soyibo 2001; Okeahalam & Akinboade, 2003) or institutional environment (Adegbite, 
2012; Adegbite, 2015; Nakpodia, 2015; Nakpodia & Adegbite, 2018). Thus, adopting 
additional theories could extend the multiple theoretical perspectives and provide a richer 
basis for understanding corporate governance drivers in developing countries. 
 
Using mixed-methods research involves a number of challenges in terms of the time and 
cost needed to design and conduct the research (Creswell & Clark, 2011). Regarding the 
quantitative research design, there are some limitations that need to be addressed. First, 
the quantitative sample size of 161 respondents is relatively small. However, the total 
population of investment analysts in Nigeria is 1400. Moreover, these investment 
analysts are the ones with required knowledge of signaled corporate governance drivers 
by Nigerian banks. Although the sample used in this study is comparable to other 
finance/governance related studies (e.g., MaCahery et al., 2016), the generalisability of 
the findings could be improved if the sample size was even larger. Second, the study 
relies on the opinions of investment analysts obtained via a survey instrument. Hence 
data that are produced are likely to lack details or depth on the topic being investigated. 
It is also possible to have omitted some important control variables (e.g. past performance 
of banks). The survey instrument covered only non - financial variables. 
 
Furthermore, results from questionnaires should be interpreted with caution for two 
reasons. First, participants may read the same questions, however, respond based on their 
interpretations which involve a level of subjectivity. Second, questionnaires could be 
useful to know what the participants mean when they think about corporate governance 
drivers however they are incapable of capturing what the participants do not mean, which 
is important for understanding phenomenon in a certain context. To overcome this 
challenge, the study used interviews to explore top executives perspective of governance 
drivers and their features. This could help to minimize the limitations of using 
quantitative study. A third limitation is that this is a cross-sectional study where all 
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constructs were measured at the same time, and therefore the found significant 
correlations among variables do not imply causation. 
 
Finally, there are also some limitations of the qualitative research design. First, the 
interviews focus only on senior management investment analysts of pension funds and 
asset managers; especially those who can understand good corporate governance 
practices, such as chief investment officers or managing directors (see Haniffa & Hudaib, 
2007; Solomon, 2010). However, other important stakeholders involved in investing 
activities who might potentially have varied opinions on governance mechanisms and 
governance drivers, such as retail investors were ignored. This was largely due to the 
requirement of the research to target a particular audience- institutional investment 
analysts. Second, some potential interviewees refused to participate in the research. Thus, 
it is noted that they may have potentially provided different insights although the 
qualitative research achieved saturation by interviewing 27 top management of pension 
funds and asset companies. Third, unlike quantitative research, the researcher in a 
qualitative study faces the problem of subjectivity while analyzing the research problem 
(Collis & Hussey, 2009). Therefore, the collection and analysis of the interview data may 
be influenced by the researcher's subjectivity (Creswell & Clark, 2011). However, and 
arguably, the use of mixed-methods research design has helped in minimizing such 
subjectivity problems. 
 
The study limitations themselves open up new avenues for further corporate governance 
research. First, attention has been recently paid to the use of mixed-methods in exploring 
corporate governance behavior, and researchers are encouraged to employ this approach 
in their analyses (McNulty et al., 2013; Zattoni et al., 2013; Albassam, 2014). According 
to Creswell & Clark (2011, p.15) "One way to help convince others of the utility of 
mixed-methods is to locate exemplary mixed-methods studies in the literature on a topic 
or in a content area and share studies to educate others." This may help to overcome the 
limitations of using mixed-methods, such as the need to develop a clear theoretical 
   
360 
 
framework (Smith & Heshusius, 1986; Morgan, 1998). Moreover, mixed-methods 
research helps achieve integration between the findings from quantitative and qualitative 
data. Greene et al. (1989) examine integration by reviewing 57 mixed-methods studies. 
Their findings indicate that 44% of the studies did not show any integration between the 
quantitative and qualitative methods used. Therefore, wider use of this promising field 
in management research can improve findings, understanding of reasoning and 
conclusions.  
 
Second, future studies can examine drivers of good corporate governance in non-listed 
firms and potentially SMEs. Especially investigating the level of compliance with 
corporate governance regulatory standards. While most existing empirical studies are 
conducted on listed firms, a study examining non-listed especially SMEs firms may be 
an innovative opportunity to reveal drivers of good corporate governance which might 
impact investment in developing countries. Additionally, one can investigate whether 
corporate governance mechanisms have similar impacts on all companies (listed, non-
listed, SMEs). The negligence of corporate governance in SMEs could be a factor in 
explaining existing corporate governance practice. It is necessary to gain knowledge as 
to how good governance structures can be improved in SMEs as a way to drive 
consciousness of the concept, promote the adoption of sound governance mechanisms in 
their operations and enhance their contribution to a developing country’s economy.  
 
Third, future studies can examine both banking and non-banking sector in Nigeria. This 
can help determine whether the findings are different especially considering the 
corporate governance practices in the banking sector is based on coercive isomorphism 
by the bank regulatory authorities in Nigeria. 
 
Fourth, corporate governance is related to different disciplines and is explained by many 
theories (Rwegasira, 2000). Existing studies have focused on a number of governance 
theories, such as agency, stakeholders, shareholders, resource dependence, managerial 
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signaling and stewardship theories, in investigating the relationship between corporate 
governance and firm performance (see Ntim et al., 2013). Therefore, future studies could 
take a cue from this study to integrate psychological and governance theories to develop 
multiple theoretical frameworks in examining the relationship between corporate 
governance and performance. This can assist in achieving integration between theoretical 
and practical frameworks, thereby providing a deeper understanding of corporate 
governance practices.  
 
Fifth, new research may possibly improve the number of respondents who participate in 
surveys testing corporate governance drivers and investment decision making. New 
research may conduct surveys of retail investors and other much smaller investment 
groups (e.g., cooperatives, clubs) that could help in examining the weighting of 
governance drivers and their relative importance to investment decision making. 
 
Sixth, future research could explore more in-depth the different corporate governance 
mechanisms and how they relate to performance, investment decision making or even 
other aspects of corporate governance, such as social responsibility. Topics like social 
responsibility have been addressed in existing studies in developed countries; however, 
this topic has not been researched widely in developing countries (Ntim & Soobaroyen, 
2013). Also, it would be interesting to conduct a study in Nigeria investigating the 
influence of religion on governance mechanisms and compliance with codes of corporate 
governance.  
 
Lastly, whereas it must be noted that corporate governance literature in Nigeria is 
somewhat scant, it is worth mentioning that corporate governance scholarship in Nigeria 
has generally neglected perspectives of regulators on how policies are developed. This is 
particularly worrisome as there are indications that many policies are developed by 
adopting the ubiquitous Anglo-Saxon governance models (Nakpodia et al., 2016).  
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Consequently, future studies may evaluate the perspectives of corporate governance 
regulators to understand policy development influencers.  
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Appendix 1 Research Survey 
 
 
Start of Block: Introduction 
 
Q74    
Dear Executive  
I am a PhD management student in Durham University Business School, UK. The 
purpose of this study is to learn more about investors’ perception towards good 
corporate governance in Nigerian Banks and how this perception affects investment 
decisions. 
This confidential anonymous questionnaire is prepared only for the purpose of 
gathering information to ascertain corporate governance practices in the Nigerian 
banking sector and how these perceived practices influence investment analysts’ 
decisions.    
It is expected that the results of this research when analysed can have major impacts on 
corporate governance practices not only in Nigeria but the developing world at large. 
The value of your time is recognised and sincerely appreciated. Individual responses 
are anonymous and all company level data will be held in confidence.    
Please take 15 minutes to complete this survey and submit it in online at your earliest 
convenience. 
Thank you   
 
 
End of Block: Introduction 
 
Start of Block: Personal Questions 
 
Q1 what is your gender 
o Male  (1)  
o Female  (2)  
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Q2 Age 
o 21-30  (1)  
o 31-40  (2)  
o 41-50  (3)  
o 50-60  (4)  
o Above 60  (5)  
 
 
 
Q3 Your Background (Which area have you gained most of your working investment 
experience) 
o Banking and Finance  (1)  
o Political Science or Legal  (2)  
o Economics  (3)  
o Accounting  (4)  
o Others  (5)  
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Q4 Total number of years you have spent as an analyst 
o 0-4years  (1)  
o 5-9years  (2)  
o 10-15years  (3)  
o 16-20years  (4)  
o Over 20years  (5)  
 
 
 
Q5 Would you like to receive a copy of research findings sent to you 
o Yes. Please provide email 
address ........................................................................................................................  (1)  
o No  (2)  
 
 
 
Q72 Is your firm a subsidiary/affiliate of an international company? 
o Yes  (1)  
o No  (2)  
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Q73 What is the annual investment turnover of your company? 
o N1M-N100M  (1)  
o N100M-N1BN  (2)  
o N1BN-N10BN  (3)  
o N10BN -N100BN  (4)  
o N100BN and above  (5)  
 
End of Block: Personal Questions 
 
Start of Block: Section 1 
 
 Board Independence – A board is independent when it has  more outside (non-
executive) directors than (inside) executive directors such  that conflict of interest is 
minimised.  THE QUESTIONS BELOW ARE IN RELATION TO  BANKS 
OPERATING IN NIGERIA    
 
 
 
Q6 When the CEO of the bank is NOT the same as the chairman, I am inclined to think 
there is minimal conflict of interest on the board 
o Strongly agree  (1)  
o Somewhat agree  (2)  
o Neither agree nor disagree  (3)  
o Somewhat disagree  (4)  
o Strongly disagree  (5)  
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Q7 To reduce the conflict of interest on a bank’s board, the number of non-executive 
directors must be more than executive directors on the board of a bank  
o Strongly agree  (1)  
o Somewhat agree  (2)  
o Neither agree nor disagree  (3)  
o Somewhat disagree  (4)  
o Strongly disagree  (5)  
 
 
 
Q8 When I perceive the board of a bank to have minimal or no conflict of interest, I am 
inclined to make investment recommendations. 
o Strongly agree  (1)  
o Somewhat agree  (2)  
o Neither agree nor disagree  (3)  
o Somewhat disagree  (4)  
o Strongly disagree  (5)  
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Q9 To guarantee board independence, the number of non-executive directors must be 
more than executive directors on the board of a bank 
o Strongly agree  (1)  
o Somewhat agree  (2)  
o Neither agree nor disagree  (3)  
o Somewhat disagree  (4)  
o Strongly disagree  (5)  
 
 
 
Q10 Shares   of a bank owned by different individuals/organisations rather than   
concentrated in the hands of a few individuals/organisations, helps to achieve   less 
conflict of interest in a bank’s board 
o Strongly agree  (1)  
o Somewhat agree  (2)  
o Neither agree nor disagree  (3)  
o Somewhat disagree  (4)  
o Strongly disagree  (5)  
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Q11 Presence of at least 2 independent directors helps to minimise conflict of interest 
on a bank’s board 
o Strongly agree  (1)  
o Somewhat agree  (2)  
o Neither agree nor disagree  (3)  
o Somewhat disagree  (4)  
o Strongly disagree  (5)  
 
End of Block: Section 1 
 
Start of Block: Section 2 
 
Q75 Board diversity/Heterogeneity – board diversity aims to cultivate a broad 
spectrum of demographic attributes and characteristics in the boardroom. These 
attributes include age, gender, tenure, tribe, network, etc 
 THE QUESTIONS BELOW ARE IN RELATION TO  BANKS OPERATING IN 
NIGERIA 
 
 
 
Q76 For accountability to all stakeholders and continued success of the bank, it is 
important for the board to consist of both male and female  
o Strongly agree  (1)  
o Somewhat agree  (2)  
o Neither agree nor disagree  (3)  
o Somewhat disagree  (4)  
o Strongly disagree  (5)  
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Q77 For accountability to all stakeholders and continued success of the bank, it is 
important for the board to consist of people in different age brackets 
o Strongly agree  (1)  
o Somewhat agree  (2)  
o Neither agree nor disagree  (3)  
o Somewhat disagree  (4)  
o Strongly disagree  (5)  
 
 
 
Q78 For accountability to all stakeholders and continued success of the bank, it is 
important for the board to consist of people of different tribes  
o Strongly agree  (1)  
o Somewhat agree  (2)  
o Neither agree nor disagree  (3)  
o Somewhat disagree  (4)  
o Strongly disagree  (5)  
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Q79 For accountability to all stakeholders and continued success of the bank, it is 
important for the board to consist of people that have spent different lengths of time on 
the board. 
o Strongly agree  (1)  
o Somewhat agree  (2)  
o Neither agree nor disagree  (3)  
o Somewhat disagree  (4)  
o Strongly disagree  (5)  
 
 
 
Q80 It is important that members of a bank board are on boards of many other 
companies 
o Strongly agree  (1)  
o Somewhat agree  (2)  
o Neither agree nor disagree  (3)  
o Somewhat disagree  (4)  
o Strongly disagree  (5)  
 
 
 
Q81 Having a board that consists of both male and female, and/or people in different 
age brackets, and/or people of different tribes and/or people that have spent different 
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lengths of time on the board is important and influences my investment decision-
making 
o Strongly agree  (1)  
o Somewhat agree  (2)  
o Neither agree nor disagree  (3)  
o Somewhat disagree  (4)  
o Strongly disagree  (5)  
 
End of Block: Section 2 
 
Start of Block: Section 3 
 
Q29 Board Directors’ Reputation - Prestige or positive reputation of a board is the 
perception the society has of the board and is typically based on perceived positive 
character of individual members of the board  
 
 
 
Q30 Positive character of board members increases visibility of the bank 
o Strongly agree  (1)  
o Agree  (2)  
o Somewhat agree  (3)  
o Neither agree nor disagree  (4)  
o Somewhat disagree  (5)  
o Disagree  (6)  
o Strongly disagree  (7)  
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Q31 Positive character of board members is essential for credibility of the bank 
o Strongly agree  (1)  
o Somewhat agree  (2)  
o Neither agree nor disagree  (3)  
o Somewhat disagree  (4)  
o Strongly disagree  (5)  
 
 
 
Q32 Positive character of board members increase the goodwill of the bank 
o Strongly agree  (1)  
o Somewhat agree  (2)  
o Neither agree nor disagree  (3)  
o Somewhat disagree  (4)  
o Strongly disagree  (5)  
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Q33 Positive character of board members influences investment decision making  
o Strongly agree  (1)  
o Somewhat agree  (2)  
o Neither agree nor disagree  (3)  
o Somewhat disagree  (4)  
o Strongly disagree  (5)  
 
 
 
Q34  Presence of directors with prestigious names influences investment decision 
making 
o Strongly agree  (1)  
o Somewhat agree  (2)  
o Neither agree nor disagree  (3)  
o Somewhat disagree  (4)  
o Strongly disagree  (5)  
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Q35 Presence of directors that are politically connected influences (positively or 
negatively) investment decision making 
o Strongly agree  (1)  
o Somewhat agree  (2)  
o Neither agree nor disagree  (3)  
o Somewhat disagree  (4)  
o Strongly disagree  (5)  
 
 
 
Q36 Presence of directors who are on boards of other firms influences investment 
decision making 
o Strongly agree  (1)  
o Somewhat agree  (2)  
o Neither agree nor disagree  (3)  
o Somewhat disagree  (4)  
o Strongly disagree  (5)  
 
End of Block: Section 3 
 
Start of Block: Section 4 
 
Q37  
Board Evaluation - Board evaluations examines board members’ performance. 
Individual board members can be evaluated on the fulfilment of their specific board 
functions. 
 
 
 
 THE QUESTIONS BELOW ARE IN RELATION TO  BANKS OPERATING IN 
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NIGERIA 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Q38 Evaluating board directors in banks is done effectively and 
transparently      **Please note that this function is done by external consultants 
induced by regulation. However, only a summary is produced in the financial 
statements of banks for public consumption. The main report is restricted for internal 
management/board consumption only. 
o Strongly agree  (1)  
o Somewhat agree  (2)  
o Neither agree nor disagree  (3)  
o Somewhat disagree  (4)  
o Strongly disagree  (5)  
 
 
 
Q39 Board evaluation is necessary for accountability and helps prevent organisational 
failure 
o Strongly agree  (1)  
o Somewhat agree  (2)  
o Neither agree nor disagree  (3)  
o Somewhat disagree  (4)  
o Strongly disagree  (5)  
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Q40 I read board of directors performance evaluations in banks’ annual reports (or 
other bank reports) before making investment decisions on a bank 
o Strongly agree  (1)  
o Somewhat agree  (2)  
o Neither agree nor disagree  (3)  
o Somewhat disagree  (4)  
o Strongly disagree  (5)  
 
 
 
Q41 If a bank has performed well in specific performance criteria (e.g risk 
management, auditing, credit quality, customer service, technology, etc), I assume the 
individual director supervising that function has performed well 
o Strongly agree  (1)  
o Somewhat agree  (2)  
o Neither agree nor disagree  (3)  
o Somewhat disagree  (4)  
o Strongly disagree  (5)  
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Q42 Board evaluation is an important driver of good corporate governance I consider 
before making investment decision about a bank 
o Strongly agree  (1)  
o Somewhat agree  (2)  
o Neither agree nor disagree  (3)  
o Somewhat disagree  (4)  
o Strongly disagree  (5)  
 
End of Block: Section 4 
 
Start of Block: Section 5 
 
Q43  
Foreign or Large institutional shareholders – institutional shareholders are 
businesses that own shares in a quoted company.  
 
 
 
 
THE QUESTIONS BELOW ARE IN RELATION TO  BANKS OPERATING IN 
NIGERIA 
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Q44 When foreign institutional shareholders hold shares of a bank, I perceive the bank 
as being accountable and well managed 
o Strongly agree  (1)  
o Somewhat agree  (2)  
o Neither agree nor disagree  (3)  
o Somewhat disagree  (4)  
o Strongly disagree  (5)  
 
 
 
Q45 When foreign institutional shareholders hold the shares of a bank, it influences my 
investment decisions 
o Strongly agree  (1)  
o Somewhat agree  (2)  
o Neither agree nor disagree  (3)  
o Somewhat disagree  (4)  
o Strongly disagree  (5)  
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Q46 Presence of local institutional shareholders influence my investment decision 
making exactly the same way as presence of foreign institutional shareholders 
o Strongly agree  (1)  
o Somewhat agree  (2)  
o Neither agree nor disagree  (3)  
o Somewhat disagree  (4)  
o Strongly disagree  (5)  
 
 
 
Q47 Presence of representative of foreign institutional shareholders on board of a bank 
leads to the bank being well managed and accountable 
o Strongly agree  (1)  
o Somewhat agree  (2)  
o Neither agree nor disagree  (3)  
o Somewhat disagree  (4)  
o Strongly disagree  (5)  
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Q48 If a bank’s shares are listed on a foreign stock exchange, I perceive the bank to be 
accountable and well managed 
o Strongly agree  (1)  
o Somewhat agree  (2)  
o Neither agree nor disagree  (3)  
o Somewhat disagree  (4)  
o Strongly disagree  (5)  
 
 
 
Q49 Listing of shares of a bank on a foreign stock exchange influences investment 
decision making 
o Strongly agree  (1)  
o Somewhat agree  (2)  
o Neither agree nor disagree  (3)  
o Somewhat disagree  (4)  
o Strongly disagree  (5)  
 
End of Block: Section 5 
 
Start of Block: Section 6 
 
Q50  
Effective shareholder activism -  Shareholder activism occurs when shareholders 
(anyone or group of persons) use of ownership position to actively influence company 
policy and practice   
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THE QUESTIONS BELOW ARE IN RELATION TO BANKS OPERATING IN 
NIGERIA 
 
 
 
Q51 When a bank has active sophisticated shareholders (typically people working in 
the formal sector of the economy), I am inclined to invest in the bank 
o Strongly agree  (1)  
o Somewhat agree  (2)  
o Neither agree nor disagree  (3)  
o Somewhat disagree  (4)  
o Strongly disagree  (5)  
 
 
 
Q52 When a bank has active reputable shareholders (typically positively influential and 
well known individuals), I am inclined to invest in the bank 
o Extremely positive  (1)  
o Somewhat positive  (2)  
o Neither positive nor negative  (3)  
o Somewhat negative  (4)  
o Extremely negative  (5)  
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Q53 The more activism by shareholders, the more accountable and successful the bank 
is 
o Strongly agree  (1)  
o Somewhat agree  (2)  
o Neither agree nor disagree  (3)  
o Somewhat disagree  (4)  
o Strongly disagree  (5)  
 
 
 
Q54 Institutional shareholder activism acts as a check to management 
o Strongly agree  (1)  
o Somewhat agree  (2)  
o Neither agree nor disagree  (3)  
o Somewhat disagree  (4)  
o Strongly disagree  (5)  
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Q55 Shareholder activism influences my investment decision-making 
o Strongly agree  (1)  
o Somewhat agree  (2)  
o Neither agree nor disagree  (3)  
o Somewhat disagree  (4)  
o Strongly disagree  (5)  
 
End of Block: Section 6 
 
Start of Block: Section 7 
 
Q56  
Performance related executive compensation  : The act of linking executive 
management/directors’ remuneration to firm performance 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
THE QUESTIONS BELOW ARE IN RELATION TO  BANKS OPERATING IN 
NIGERIA 
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Q57 Compensation   schemes of directors and executive management of banks as stated 
in the   bank’s financial report are well understood 
o Strongly agree  (1)  
o Somewhat agree  (2)  
o Neither agree nor disagree  (3)  
o Somewhat disagree  (4)  
o Strongly disagree  (5)  
 
 
 
Q58 Performance pay reward schemes for executive management of Nigerian banks 
should be encouraged and is viewed positively by the public   
o Strongly agree  (1)  
o Somewhat agree  (2)  
o Neither agree nor disagree  (3)  
o Somewhat disagree  (4)  
o Strongly disagree  (5)  
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Q59 Performance pay reward schemes (monetary and non-monetary) including 
employee share option schemes promote accountability in Nigerian banks 
o Strongly agree  (1)  
o Somewhat agree  (2)  
o Neither agree nor disagree  (3)  
o Somewhat disagree  (4)  
o Strongly disagree  (5)  
 
 
 
Q60 Performance pay reward schemes for executive and directors influence investment 
decision making 
o Strongly agree  (1)  
o Somewhat agree  (2)  
o Neither agree nor disagree  (3)  
o Somewhat disagree  (4)  
o Strongly disagree  (5)  
 
End of Block: Section 7 
 
Start of Block: Section 8 
 
Q62  
Full and transparent information disclosure - Information transparency can be 
defined as the level of availability and accessibility of market information to its 
stakeholder.  
 
 
This research is primarily concerned about voluntary information bank’s release to the 
public of their own free will that is not mandated by regulators. This voluntary 
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information can be on the following: financial/operating results; ownership structure; 
members of board of directors and management; quantitative and qualitative matters 
relating to employees and other stakeholders in the bank; governance structures and 
policies; corporate targets and prospects.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
THE QUESTIONS BELOW ARE IN RELATION TO  BANKS OPERATING IN 
NIGERIA 
 
 
 
Q63 The more voluntary information I have about a bank, the more I am likely to make 
favourable investment decisions about the bank  
o Strongly agree  (1)  
o Somewhat agree  (2)  
o Neither agree nor disagree  (3)  
o Somewhat disagree  (4)  
o Strongly disagree  (5)  
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Q64 Mandatory information disclosure as mandated by Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) 
is more important when making investment decisions 
o Strongly agree  (1)  
o Somewhat agree  (2)  
o Neither agree nor disagree  (3)  
o Somewhat disagree  (4)  
o Strongly disagree  (5)  
 
 
 
Q65 Banks disclosing more information voluntarily other than those mandated by the 
regulators, signals accountability   
o Strongly agree  (1)  
o Somewhat agree  (2)  
o Neither agree nor disagree  (3)  
o Somewhat disagree  (4)  
o Strongly disagree  (5)  
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Q66 More profitable banks disclose more voluntary information than less profitable 
banks 
o Strongly agree  (1)  
o Somewhat agree  (2)  
o Neither agree nor disagree  (3)  
o Somewhat disagree  (4)  
o Strongly disagree  (5)  
 
End of Block: Section 8 
 
Start of Block: Section 9 
 
Q68  
Independent audit committees- Audit committee is independent when the majority of 
the members are independent and are not influenced by the bank’s management 
 
 
 
 
 
THE QUESTIONS BELOW ARE IN RELATION TO  BANKS OPERATING IN 
NIGERIA 
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Q69 When members of the audit committee are not influenced the executive 
management of the bank, then the bank is presumed accountable to all stakeholders   
o Strongly agree  (1)  
o Somewhat agree  (2)  
o Neither agree nor disagree  (3)  
o Somewhat disagree  (4)  
o Strongly disagree  (5)  
 
 
 
Q70 I can tell easily when members of an audit committee are influenced by the 
executive management of the bank 
o Strongly agree  (1)  
o Somewhat agree  (2)  
o Neither agree nor disagree  (3)  
o Somewhat disagree  (4)  
o Strongly disagree  (5)  
 
 
 
   
452 
 
Q71 The reports produced by the audit committee which consists of members not 
influenced by the bank’s management are important for investment decision making    
o Strongly agree  (1)  
o Somewhat agree  (2)  
o Neither agree nor disagree  (3)  
o Somewhat disagree  (4)  
o Strongly disagree  (5)  
 
End of Block: Section 9 
 
Start of Block: Section 9 
 
Q82 Thank you 
 
End of Block: Section 9 
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Appendix 2 Interview Questionnaire Guide 
What is your name? 
What organisation do you work for? 
How long have you worked for them? 
What do you do with your organisation? 
1. When the board of a bank is said to be independent, what do you expect to see? 
2. What is your opinion on CEO duality, presence of 2 independent directors, presence 
of more NED and dispersed share ownership? Do they influence investment decision? 
3. Do the following board heterogeneous characteristics a. having a board that consists of both 
male and female, b. and/or people in different age brackets, c. and/or people of different tribes 
d. and/or people that have spent different lengths of time on the board influence your 
investment decision making? How and why? 
4. Considering the corruption prevalent in the country, what is your opinion on reputation 
requirement of board directors of banks? How does board reputation influence your decision to 
invest or not in a bank? 
5. What if the director is politically connected, will this affect your decision to invest in the bank 
shares? 
6. Presently, banks do not share the full evaluation report on their directors. They only present 
an abridged version in their financial statements. What is your view on this? Does board 
evaluation report as it is presented now by banks influence your investment decision? 
7. How do you suppose board directors should be evaluated? 
8. What is your opinion on presence of foreign investors on a board? What is your opinion on 
presence of local institutional investors on a board? Does their presence influence investment 
decision making? 
8b. Will you consider foreign institutional investors more important than presence of local 
institutional investors? Does the foreign listing of shares of a bank influence your decision 
making? Why? 
9. What is your opinion on shareholders activism? Which sets of activist shareholders will be 
more likely to influence your investment decision making, Reputable (well known individuals) or 
sophisticated (working class people) or activist institutional? Why? 
10. What is your opinion on Pay for performance for executives/directors and employees? Is it 
well stated in financials or are you are able to verify the exact details? How does pay for 
performance influence your investment decision making? 
11. Banks make mandatory and voluntary disclosure. Mandatory is enforced by regulators 
while voluntary is at discretion of the banks. Which of these disclosures are more important 
when you are making investment decisions and why?  
12. How are you able to tell when audit members are not influenced by the bank’s 
management? Are reports from independent audit committee members important for 
investment decision making? Why? 
13. Do you consider only financial statements when making investments in banks? How 
important is corporate governance when you want to make investment decisions? Why? 
Please do you have any other drivers that influence your investment decisions? 
Thank you for your time. 
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Appendix 3 Robustness Test using Ordered Probit Regressions 
Ordered probit regressions of features of voluntary disclosure against investment decision making influence of voluntary disclosure 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES vi1dv vi1dv vi1dv vi1dv vi1dv 
      
gen 0.172 -0.0284 0.0911 -0.0727 -0.144 
 (0.288) (0.320) (0.290) (0.328) (0.332) 
age -0.102 0.0370 -0.129 -0.0197 -0.0905 
 (0.192) (0.203) (0.195) (0.211) (0.224) 
bg 0.193 0.0976 0.165 0.169 0.206 
 (0.133) (0.145) (0.132) (0.150) (0.154) 
tny 0.0199 -0.0332 -0.00725 0.0441 0.0953 
 (0.146) (0.149) (0.144) (0.159) (0.169) 
sub 0.148 0.124 0.0216 0.153 0.102 
 (0.269) (0.289) (0.270) (0.294) (0.301) 
annut -0.0290 0.0361 -0.0352 0.0393 0.0376 
 (0.0996) (0.107) (0.100) (0.109) (0.113) 
vi2iv 0.410***   0.303** 0.242 
 (0.144)   (0.153) (0.158) 
/cut1 1.052 2.433*** 0.847 3.135*** 3.696*** 
 (0.710) (0.790) (0.654) (0.876) (0.923) 
/cut2 3.097*** 5.113*** 2.903*** 5.852*** 6.504*** 
 (0.789) (0.995) (0.726) (1.073) (1.134) 
vi3iv  1.411***  1.346*** 1.324*** 
  (0.262)  (0.266) (0.270) 
vi4iv   0.385***  0.322** 
   (0.118)  (0.130) 
      
Observations 112 112 112 112 112 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Ordered probit regressions of features of pay for performance against investment decision making influence of pay for performance 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES pf4dv pf4dv pf4dv pf4dv pf4dv 
      
gen 0.311 0.319 0.352 0.323 0.355 
 (0.252) (0.253) (0.256) (0.253) (0.257) 
age -0.116 0.00676 0.00613 -0.0284 0.0164 
 (0.160) (0.161) (0.162) (0.162) (0.166) 
bg 0.0913 0.0540 0.132 0.0872 0.143 
 (0.115) (0.113) (0.116) (0.115) (0.117) 
tny 0.0259 -0.00546 0.0125 0.0202 0.0241 
 (0.120) (0.120) (0.122) (0.121) (0.123) 
sub 0.0286 0.0596 0.167 0.129 0.239 
 (0.231) (0.231) (0.235) (0.236) (0.240) 
annut -0.164* -0.120 -0.208** -0.136 -0.196** 
 (0.0858) (0.0860) (0.0877) (0.0868) (0.0894) 
pf1iv 0.155   0.164* 0.118 
 (0.0945)   (0.0954) (0.0971) 
/cut1 -1.261** -0.641 -0.369 -0.174 0.329 
 (0.594) (0.627) (0.601) (0.685) (0.703) 
/cut2 0.0569 0.735 1.117* 1.225* 1.847*** 
 (0.583) (0.625) (0.603) (0.689) (0.714) 
/cut3 1.133* 1.831*** 2.350*** 2.338*** 3.089*** 
 (0.593) (0.636) (0.629) (0.704) (0.739) 
/cut4 1.678*** 2.404*** 2.969*** 2.914*** 3.714*** 
 (0.613) (0.661) (0.656) (0.726) (0.764) 
pf2iv  0.398***  0.404*** 0.213 
  (0.123)  (0.124) (0.133) 
pf3iv   0.610***  0.525*** 
   (0.120)  (0.129) 
      
Observations 112 112 112 112 112 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Ordered probit regressions of features of board evaluation against investment decision making influence of board evaluation 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
VARIABLES be5dv be5dv be5dv be5dv be5dv be5dv be5dv 
        
gen 0.624** 0.529** 0.495** 0.381 0.570** 0.495** 0.357 
 (0.246) (0.245) (0.250) (0.253) (0.248) (0.252) (0.259) 
age 0.133 0.0197 0.110 0.175 0.0332 0.0432 0.114 
 (0.155) (0.159) (0.156) (0.158) (0.160) (0.160) (0.164) 
bg -0.156 -0.123 -0.126 -0.111 -0.118 -0.0998 -0.0716 
 (0.116) (0.116) (0.115) (0.118) (0.117) (0.117) (0.119) 
tny -0.133 -0.0624 -0.114 -0.0933 -0.0694 -0.0718 -0.0666 
 (0.114) (0.117) (0.116) (0.116) (0.117) (0.118) (0.119) 
sub -0.179 -0.179 -0.114 -0.253 -0.159 -0.0980 -0.155 
 (0.228) (0.228) (0.232) (0.231) (0.229) (0.234) (0.237) 
annut -0.00388 0.0345 -0.0527 0.0166 0.0133 -0.0405 -0.0393 
 (0.0856) (0.0854) (0.0880) (0.0857) (0.0866) (0.0893) (0.0900) 
be1iv 0.196**    0.170* 0.0903 0.0595 
 (0.0890)    (0.0901) (0.0939) (0.0956) 
/cut1 0.0102 0.239 0.497 0.836 0.602 1.046* 1.685** 
 (0.555) (0.560) (0.562) (0.596) (0.595) (0.616) (0.658) 
/cut2 1.176** 1.447** 1.754*** 2.108*** 1.832*** 2.353*** 3.065*** 
 (0.561) (0.571) (0.575) (0.614) (0.610) (0.637) (0.688) 
/cut3 1.799*** 2.074*** 2.441*** 2.771*** 2.463*** 3.037*** 3.778*** 
 (0.580) (0.590) (0.602) (0.637) (0.628) (0.661) (0.714) 
/cut4 2.633*** 2.884*** 3.373*** 3.642*** 3.304*** 3.975*** 4.769*** 
 (0.652) (0.652) (0.690) (0.710) (0.698) (0.747) (0.811) 
be2iv  0.482***   0.453*** 0.339** 0.191 
  (0.155)   (0.156) (0.160) (0.167) 
be3iv   0.450***   0.377*** 0.351*** 
   (0.101)   (0.107) (0.110) 
be4iv    0.509***   0.386*** 
    (0.114)   (0.123) 
        
Observations 118 118 118 118 118 118 118 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 457 
 
 
Ordered probit regressions of features of board reputation against investment decision making influence of board reputation 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
VARIABLES br4dv br4dv br4dv br4dv br4dv br4dv br4dv br4dv br4dv br4dv br4dv 
            
gen -0.144 -0.0489 -0.0110 -0.420 -0.175 -0.179 -0.153 -0.116 -0.429 -0.436 -0.455 
 (0.260) (0.261) (0.262) (0.274) (0.260) (0.264) (0.268) (0.270) (0.289) (0.290) (0.296) 
age 0.167 0.0984 0.148 -0.264 0.0205 0.0524 0.139 0.155 -0.197 -0.202 -0.171 
 (0.164) (0.166) (0.166) (0.183) (0.168) (0.171) (0.169) (0.169) (0.193) (0.193) (0.200) 
bg 0.0192 0.0188 0.0902 0.128 0.0450 0.0991 0.0164 0.0565 0.166 0.167 0.197* 
 (0.102) (0.102) (0.103) (0.108) (0.102) (0.105) (0.103) (0.105) (0.113) (0.113) (0.116) 
tny -0.196 -0.236* -0.261** -0.135 -0.182 -0.173 -0.196 -0.217* -0.148 -0.142 -0.139 
 (0.121) (0.123) (0.123) (0.127) (0.122) (0.125) (0.125) (0.126) (0.133) (0.134) (0.138) 
sub -0.455* -0.527** -0.502** -0.776*** -0.604** -0.687*** -0.408 -0.405 -0.609** -0.607** -0.672** 
 (0.246) (0.246) (0.247) (0.256) (0.240) (0.250) (0.253) (0.254) (0.272) (0.272) (0.279) 
annut 0.0188 0.0719 0.0181 0.0596 0.0628 0.109 0.0653 0.0446 0.0652 0.0696 0.111 
 (0.0863) (0.0887) (0.0875) (0.0914) (0.0871) (0.0901) (0.0897) (0.0902) (0.0964) (0.0970) (0.0999) 
br1iv 0.528***      0.487*** 0.398** 0.231 0.219 0.183 
 (0.175)      (0.179) (0.185) (0.195) (0.197) (0.201) 
/cut1 0.604 1.100* 1.009* 0.582 0.368 1.528** 1.970*** 2.004*** 2.462*** 2.525*** 3.396*** 
 (0.626) (0.617) (0.600) (0.578) (0.590) (0.654) (0.704) (0.706) (0.743) (0.761) (0.829) 
/cut2 1.854*** 2.493*** 2.465*** 1.981*** 1.612*** 2.951*** 3.425*** 3.522*** 4.189*** 4.252*** 5.250*** 
 (0.641) (0.647) (0.637) (0.595) (0.599) (0.682) (0.744) (0.753) (0.805) (0.822) (0.901) 
/cut3 2.715*** 3.635*** 3.574*** 3.001*** 2.513*** 3.968*** 4.569*** 4.706*** 5.572*** 5.639*** 6.804*** 
 (0.669) (0.732) (0.704) (0.647) (0.640) (0.736) (0.819) (0.830) (0.914) (0.931) (1.053) 
/cut4 3.166*** 4.176*** 4.089*** 3.733*** 3.032*** 4.624*** 5.085*** 5.224*** 6.316*** 6.383*** 7.644*** 
 (0.717) (0.792) (0.759) (0.798) (0.716) (0.859) (0.865) (0.874) (0.991) (1.008) (1.141) 
br2iv  1.153***     1.118*** 0.679** 0.489 0.494 0.513 
  (0.236)     (0.237) (0.315) (0.329) (0.329) (0.332) 
br3iv   1.088***     0.600** 0.722** 0.718** 0.670** 
   (0.209)     (0.284) (0.294) (0.295) (0.300) 
br5iv    0.676***     0.615*** 0.594*** 0.519*** 
    (0.124)     (0.131) (0.142) (0.147) 
br6iv     0.338***     0.0508 -0.0656 
     (0.111)     (0.130) (0.138) 
br7iv      0.681***     0.489*** 
      (0.127)     (0.147) 
            
Observations 124 124 124 124 124 124 124 124 124 124 124 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Ordered probit regressions of features of board heterogeneity against investment decision making influence of board heterogeneity 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
VARIABLES bh6dv bh6dv bh6dv bh6dv bh6dv bh6dv bh6dv bh6dv bh6dv 
          
gen 0.534** 0.518** 0.563** 0.689*** 0.564** 0.531** 0.552** 0.697*** 0.728*** 
 (0.233) (0.235) (0.234) (0.239) (0.235) (0.236) (0.236) (0.243) (0.245) 
age -0.152 -0.125 -0.157 -0.194 -0.291* -0.114 -0.114 -0.124 -0.204 
 (0.152) (0.154) (0.153) (0.152) (0.154) (0.154) (0.155) (0.156) (0.160) 
bg -0.0454 -0.101 -0.0317 -0.0887 -0.0346 -0.0914 -0.0756 -0.105 -0.0786 
 (0.0977) (0.0991) (0.0984) (0.0987) (0.0987) (0.0993) (0.1000) (0.101) (0.101) 
tny 0.0989 0.0781 0.0721 0.141 0.167 0.0837 0.0765 0.123 0.173 
 (0.112) (0.113) (0.113) (0.113) (0.114) (0.113) (0.114) (0.116) (0.119) 
sub -0.285 -0.174 -0.204 -0.264 -0.140 -0.198 -0.184 -0.197 -0.128 
 (0.213) (0.215) (0.214) (0.213) (0.215) (0.216) (0.217) (0.218) (0.221) 
annut -0.0710 -0.108 -0.0895 -0.0414 -0.0966 -0.0975 -0.0972 -0.0605 -0.0666 
 (0.0791) (0.0798) (0.0792) (0.0802) (0.0791) (0.0803) (0.0804) (0.0820) (0.0823) 
bh1iv 0.282***     0.135 0.0983 0.0877 0.0664 
 (0.0894)     (0.0976) (0.101) (0.101) (0.102) 
/cut1 -0.593 -0.404 -0.378 -0.316 -2.624*** -0.169 0.0229 0.719 -0.387 
 (0.540) (0.528) (0.545) (0.571) (0.583) (0.555) (0.570) (0.627) (0.757) 
/cut2 0.600 0.855 0.836 0.878 -1.382** 1.106** 1.312** 2.055*** 0.998 
 (0.538) (0.527) (0.544) (0.569) (0.556) (0.558) (0.576) (0.641) (0.757) 
/cut3 1.463*** 1.772*** 1.712*** 1.755*** -0.490 2.034*** 2.245*** 3.036*** 2.015*** 
 (0.558) (0.551) (0.565) (0.593) (0.561) (0.584) (0.602) (0.675) (0.781) 
/cut4 2.311*** 2.736*** 2.632*** 2.640*** 0.393 2.991*** 3.226*** 4.054*** 3.045*** 
 (0.599) (0.615) (0.621) (0.641) (0.594) (0.642) (0.665) (0.739) (0.834) 
bh2iv  0.445***    0.393*** 0.328*** 0.330*** 0.265** 
  (0.0923)    (0.0998) (0.109) (0.109) (0.113) 
bh3iv   0.335***    0.151 0.117 0.113 
   (0.0848)    (0.101) (0.102) (0.102) 
bh4iv    0.389***    0.321*** 0.305*** 
    (0.114)    (0.117) (0.118) 
bh5iv     -0.423***    -0.280*** 
     (0.0986)    (0.105) 
          
Observations 124 124 124 124 124 124 124 124 124 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Ordered probit regressions of features of board independence against investment decision making influence of board independence 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
VARIABLES bi3dv bi3dv bi3dv bi3dv bi3dv bi3dv bi3dv bi3dv bi3dv 
          
gen 0.289 0.148 0.157 0.204 0.217 0.148 0.143 0.0893 0.0767 
 (0.234) (0.242) (0.240) (0.237) (0.238) (0.243) (0.245) (0.247) (0.249) 
age -0.226 -0.180 -0.163 -0.253 -0.258 -0.180 -0.160 -0.185 -0.196 
 (0.157) (0.159) (0.160) (0.159) (0.158) (0.159) (0.161) (0.162) (0.164) 
bg 0.0215 0.0318 0.0446 0.0101 0.0121 0.0318 0.0444 0.0335 0.0302 
 (0.0971) (0.0981) (0.0989) (0.0979) (0.0976) (0.0981) (0.0990) (0.0996) (0.0998) 
tny -0.0123 -0.0455 -0.0235 0.0144 -0.0118 -0.0454 -0.0278 -0.00744 -0.00697 
 (0.120) (0.121) (0.122) (0.121) (0.120) (0.121) (0.123) (0.124) (0.124) 
sub -0.131 -0.0606 -0.139 -0.0794 -0.134 -0.0606 -0.131 -0.0825 -0.0796 
 (0.225) (0.229) (0.228) (0.228) (0.226) (0.229) (0.233) (0.235) (0.236) 
annut -0.101 -0.0848 -0.0930 -0.127 -0.106 -0.0848 -0.0906 -0.111 -0.113 
 (0.0839) (0.0847) (0.0850) (0.0854) (0.0843) (0.0850) (0.0855) (0.0868) (0.0870) 
bi1iv 0.0766     0.000221 -0.0162 -0.0415 -0.0433 
 (0.0914)     (0.0975) (0.0988) (0.0998) (0.100) 
/cut1 -0.601 -0.130 0.166 -0.388 -0.530 -0.130 0.168 0.316 0.340 
 (0.542) (0.571) (0.584) (0.535) (0.526) (0.580) (0.598) (0.604) (0.606) 
/cut2 0.397 0.898 1.224** 0.644 0.473 0.898 1.225** 1.396** 1.419** 
 (0.539) (0.573) (0.590) (0.535) (0.523) (0.583) (0.604) (0.613) (0.614) 
/cut3 1.106** 1.628*** 1.984*** 1.364** 1.186** 1.628*** 1.984*** 2.164*** 2.188*** 
 (0.558) (0.593) (0.614) (0.554) (0.541) (0.604) (0.629) (0.639) (0.641) 
/cut4 1.762*** 2.312*** 2.702*** 2.008*** 1.865*** 2.312*** 2.700*** 2.873*** 2.909*** 
 (0.643) (0.679) (0.709) (0.630) (0.632) (0.693) (0.725) (0.731) (0.738) 
bi2iv  0.246**    0.246** 0.0333 0.0383 0.0411 
  (0.0968)    (0.102) (0.139) (0.139) (0.140) 
bi4iv   0.356***    0.336** 0.302** 0.287* 
   (0.105)    (0.146) (0.149) (0.152) 
bi5iv    0.259**    0.197* 0.186 
    (0.109)    (0.114) (0.115) 
bi6iv     0.185*    0.0606 
     (0.107)    (0.116) 
          
Observations 131 131 131 131 131 131 131 131 131 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Ordered probit regressions of features of audit committee against investment decision making influence of audit committee 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES ac3dv ac3dv ac3dv 
    
gen 0.0426 0.240 0.102 
 (0.269) (0.267) (0.274) 
age -0.0943 0.0864 0.0220 
 (0.173) (0.176) (0.180) 
bg -0.200 -0.120 -0.164 
 (0.138) (0.141) (0.143) 
tny 0.000184 -0.0910 -0.0659 
 (0.130) (0.130) (0.134) 
sub -0.140 -0.199 -0.0772 
 (0.253) (0.250) (0.257) 
annut -0.0845 -0.109 -0.104 
 (0.0920) (0.0909) (0.0935) 
ac1iv 0.756***  0.644*** 
 (0.150)  (0.155) 
/cut1 0.135 -2.287*** -0.982 
 (0.610) (0.641) (0.725) 
/cut2 1.636*** -0.855 0.597 
 (0.621) (0.617) (0.718) 
/cut3 2.708*** 0.153 1.696** 
 (0.674) (0.639) (0.759) 
/cut4 3.269*** 0.646 2.292*** 
 (0.778) (0.711) (0.865) 
ac2iv  -0.438*** -0.326*** 
  (0.106) (0.111) 
    
Observations 111 111 111 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Ordered probit regressions of features of foreign institutional against investment decision making influence of foreign institutional investors 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES ii2dv ii2dv ii2dv ii2dv ii2dv 
      
gen 0.264 0.167 0.256 0.180 0.202 
 (0.240) (0.246) (0.243) (0.247) (0.248) 
age -0.0343 0.0588 -0.0902 0.0721 0.0257 
 (0.156) (0.159) (0.157) (0.160) (0.163) 
bg -0.0545 -0.106 -0.0297 -0.0955 -0.0651 
 (0.111) (0.112) (0.111) (0.113) (0.113) 
tny -0.125 -0.141 -0.0411 -0.174 -0.132 
 (0.118) (0.118) (0.118) (0.121) (0.124) 
sub 0.506** 0.475** 0.702*** 0.477** 0.618*** 
 (0.227) (0.231) (0.234) (0.232) (0.238) 
annut -0.121 -0.0449 -0.157* -0.0560 -0.0988 
 (0.0856) (0.0879) (0.0876) (0.0885) (0.0907) 
ii3iv 0.269***   0.184* 0.150 
 (0.102)   (0.106) (0.108) 
/cut1 -0.532 0.492 -0.213 0.836 1.068 
 (0.571) (0.613) (0.561) (0.646) (0.657) 
/cut2 0.759 1.968*** 1.173** 2.338*** 2.619*** 
 (0.570) (0.629) (0.560) (0.668) (0.680) 
/cut3 1.468** 2.760*** 1.974*** 3.139*** 3.481*** 
 (0.585) (0.653) (0.586) (0.692) (0.710) 
/cut4 2.294*** 3.593*** 2.913*** 3.981*** 4.400*** 
 (0.644) (0.704) (0.663) (0.743) (0.772) 
ii4iv  0.712***  0.675*** 0.539*** 
  (0.134)  (0.137) (0.145) 
ii5iv   0.521***  0.344*** 
   (0.109)  (0.117) 
      
Observations 117 117 117 117 117 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Ordered probit regressions of features of shareholder activism against investment decision making influence of shareholder activism 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES sa5dv sa5dv sa5dv sa5dv sa5dv 
      
gen -0.239 0.205 -0.299 -0.341 0.0398 
 (0.244) (0.250) (0.246) (0.248) (0.261) 
age 0.00773 0.0134 -0.0870 -0.0721 -0.0590 
 (0.155) (0.160) (0.158) (0.159) (0.165) 
bg -0.0727 -0.0608 -0.0958 -0.0859 -0.0680 
 (0.108) (0.110) (0.108) (0.109) (0.111) 
tny 0.0929 0.0993 0.108 0.118 0.135 
 (0.116) (0.120) (0.117) (0.118) (0.123) 
sub 0.134 0.0770 -0.00485 0.0686 0.0710 
 (0.230) (0.230) (0.226) (0.233) (0.239) 
annut -0.0588 -0.182** -0.0261 -0.0299 -0.149* 
 (0.0834) (0.0875) (0.0845) (0.0846) (0.0892) 
sa1iv 0.334***   0.172 -0.0128 
 (0.120)   (0.128) (0.134) 
/cut1 -0.415 0.0971 -0.0823 0.199 0.928 
 (0.580) (0.555) (0.572) (0.610) (0.640) 
/cut2 0.804 1.461*** 1.207** 1.507** 2.394*** 
 (0.580) (0.552) (0.574) (0.617) (0.651) 
/cut3 1.478** 2.284*** 1.913*** 2.217*** 3.261*** 
 (0.586) (0.567) (0.582) (0.626) (0.671) 
/cut4 2.342*** 3.492*** 2.831*** 3.130*** 4.509*** 
 (0.610) (0.637) (0.614) (0.655) (0.732) 
sa3iv  0.680***   0.641*** 
  (0.103)   (0.108) 
sa2iv   0.650*** 0.577*** 0.543*** 
   (0.148) (0.158) (0.163) 
      
Observations 115 115 115 115 115 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Appendix 4  
Appendix 4a. Agency theory 
The agency theory assumes that the ability of a firm to maximize its wealth is advanced by 
minimizing possible conflicts between its main actors (Fama & Jensen, 1983). This possible 
conflict is usually referred to as the agency problem (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). The history 
of agency problem is well dated and is one of the age-old issues that have persisted since the 
evolution of the quoted companies. Agency problem cannot be ignored since every 
organization possibly suffers from this problem in different forms. The presence of agency 
problems has been widely witnessed in different academic fields. Evidences have been found 
in different fields including accounting (Watts & Zimmerman, 1983; Ronen & Balachandran, 
1995), economics (Spence & Zeckhauser, 1971; Ross, 1973; Jensen & Meckling, 1976), 
finance (Fama, 1980; Fama & Jensen, 1983; Jensen, 1986), political science (Weingast & 
Moran, 1983; Hammond & Knott, 1996), sociology (Adams, 1996; Kiser & Tong, 1992), 
organisational behaviour (Kosnik & Bittenhausen, 1992) and marketing (Bergen et al., 1992; 
Logan, 2000; Tate et al., 2010).  
In a bid to encapsulate the agency problem, Alchian & Demsetz (1972) and Jensen & Meckling 
(1976) described firms as legal fictions, where some contractual relationships exist among the 
persons involved in the firm. The principal(s) is (are) the individual(s) who own(s) the firm, 
while the agent(s) manage(s) the business of the firm on behalf of the principal(s). According 
to the theory, the principal(s) and agent(s) reside in the same firm. However, both parties have 
different interests and opposite goals, posing a conflict, which is termed as the agency problem. 
An agency relationship is a kind of contract between the principal and the agent, where both 
parties work for their self-interest that leads to the agency conflict. In this context, principals 
exercise various monitoring activities to curb the actions of the agents to control the agency 
cost. In the principal-agent contract, the incentive structure, labor market, and information 
asymmetry play a crucial role, and these elements help in building the theory of ownership 
structure. 
Similarly, Jensen & Meckling (1976) portray the firm as a black box, which operates to 
maximize its value and profitability. The maximization of the wealth can be achieved through 
proper coordination and teamwork among the parties involved in the firm. However, the 
interest of the parties differs, the conflict of interest arises, and it can only be relegated through 
managerial ownership and control. In the same line of argument, Fama (1980) advocated that 
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the firms can be disciplined by the external players who monitor the performance of the entire 
firm and the individual persons. Thus, the agency problem is not only limited to the principal 
and agent, rather it has gone beyond and covered other parties like creditors, majority 
shareholders, and minority shareholders. The economic and finance researchers have 
categorized the agency problem into three types, which are depicted in figure 2.1.  
Appendix 4a Table 1. 1 Types of Agency Problem 
 
Source: Panda & Leepsa (2017) 
Type 1: Principal-Agent Problem: The problem of agency between owners and managers in 
the organizations due to the need to separate ownership from control, was found since the 
establishment of large firms (Berle & Means, 1932). The principals engage managers to 
manage the company with a hope that managers as agents will operate the company for the 
benefit of the principals. However, managers are interested in the maximization of their 
compensation. The argument on the agent's self-satisfying behavior is based on the rationality 
of human behavior (Williamson, 1985; Sen, 1987), which states that human actions are rational 
and motivated to maximize their ends. The misalignment of interest between the principal(s) 
and agent(s) and the improper monitoring due to diffused ownership structure leads to the 
conflict, which is known as principal-agent conflict. 
Type 2: Principal–Principal Problem: The underlying assumption of this type of agency 
problem is the conflict of interest between the majority and minority owners. Majority owners 
are termed as a person or group of person holding the majority of the shares of a firm, while 
minority owners are those persons holding a very less portion of the firm’s share. The majority 
owners or blockholders have higher voting power and can take any decision in favor of their 
benefit, which hampers the interests of the minority shareholders (Fama & Jensen, 1983). This 
kind of agency problem prevails in a country or company, where the ownership is concentrated 
in the hands of few persons or with the family owners, then the minority shareholders find it 
difficult to protect their interests or wealth (Demsetz & Lehn, 1985).  
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Type 3: Principal–Creditor Problem: The conflict between the owners and creditors arise due 
to the projects undertaken and the financing decision taken by the shareholders (Damodaran, 
1997). The shareholders try to invest in risky projects, where they expect a higher return. The 
risk involved in the projects raise the cost of the finance and decreases the value of the 
outstanding debt, which affects the creditors. If the project is successful, then the owners will 
enjoy the huge profits, while the interest of the creditors is limited as they get only a fixed rate 
of interest. On the other hand, in the event the project fails, then the creditors will be enforced 
to share some of the losses and generally, this problem persists in these kinds of circumstances 
(Panda & Leepsa, 2017). 
To mitigate these agency issues, the agency theory relies on firms abiding by regulations as 
enforced by the authorities (Coffee, 1999; 2002). However, this fits more with the dominant 
shareholder – centered approach to corporate governance, which relies on the fact that firms 
have a collective identity and are distinguishable from their owners (Hall, 1989). In addition, 
firm business activities take place within the borders of legal and moral obligations. Hence, in 
these developed countries, the agency theory supposes that the primary purpose of corporate 
governance systems (board, ownership and accountability mechanisms) is to provide 
shareholders with some level of assurance that their interests will be protected by managers 
who are trying to achieve outcomes that are consistent with the shareholders' objectives 
(Shliefer & Vishny, 1997). Accordingly, agency theory assumes that the institutionalization of 
corporate governance mitigates the problems resulting from the separation of ownership and 
control in the most efficient manner by means of the market efficiency/mechanism. 
For developing countries, on the other hand, the principal – principal conflicts are rather more 
relevant. These developing countries are characterized by poor institutional protection of 
minority shareholders, and concentrated ownership and control. In these environments, 
indicators of weak governance such as lower levels of dividends payout (La Porta et al., 2000), 
less publicly traded firms (La Porta et al., 1997), firms with low valuations (La Porta et al., 
2002; Claessens et al., 2002; Lins, 2003), less investment in innovation (Morck et al., 2005), 
inefficient strategy (Filatotchev et al., 2003; Wurgler, 2000), less information contained in 
stock prices (Morck et al., 2000), and in many cases, expropriation of minority shareholders 
(Claessens et al., 2000; Faccio et al., 2001; Mitton, 2002) are prevalent. In short, the corporate 
governance structures in developing countries often resemble those of developed countries in 
form but not in substance (Peng, 2004). As a result, concentrated ownership and other informal 
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mechanisms emerge to fill the corporate governance vacuum. While these ad hoc mechanisms 
may solve some problems, they create other problems in the process. 
Therefore, while agency theory has provided scholars with the dominant theoretical inspiration 
for understanding corporate governance, it has also been criticized in favor of more 
accommodating theoretical views (Eisenhardt, 1989; Hillman & Dalziel, 2003; Judge Jr. & 
Zeithaml, 1992). Researchers increasingly realize that there is not a single agency model that 
adequately depicts corporate governance in all national contexts (La Porta et al., 1997, 1998; 
Lubatkin et al., 2005a). The agency theory satisfactorily explains situations where 
executives/managers (agents) can have economic self-interest, which will naturally affect firm 
performance and the subsequent payoff to the shareholders, it misses essential bases of human 
behavior, upon which cooperation and collective action are possible. Sullivan & Conlon (1997) 
for example argue that firms are recognized by regulation not only for generating wealth for its 
owners but also for contributions to its environment in general.  
Another limitation of the agency theory is that it is too general to account for the diversity of 
institutional contexts in which empirical studies are based (Bruce et al., 2005). For example, 
the agency theory presupposes the operation of an efficient and competitive market 
environment, where corporate ownership is dispersed, information asymmetries are minimal 
and competitive pressures are maximal (Udayasankar et al., 2005). However, in many 
developing market economies, these agency theory presumptions are predominantly invalid 
(Adegbite, 2015). In these developing countries, the principal – principal conflicts are more 
pertinent (Young et al., 2008; Chang, 2006; Jiang, 2006; Adegbite, 2015).  The prevalence of 
family dominated ownership of firms makes the agency problem less important in developing 
countries environments. Therefore, a more pluralistic theoretical view of corporate governance 
is essential for understanding the complexities of relationships, mechanisms, and structures 
surrounding corporate governance.   
Other scholars such as Perrow (1986) claimed that agency theory addresses no clear problems, 
and Hirsch & Friedman (1986) called it excessively narrow, focusing only on stock price. Also, 
according to researchers such as Kaczmarek et al. (2014), the agency theory may have become 
a self-fulfilling prophecy which assumes managers are selfish and will always act according to 
type. The resulting agency cost from the selfish managers is then borne entirely by the 
shareholders (Baulkaran, 2014; Kay & Vojtech, 2016; Rashid & Islam, 2013). However, Hiebl 
(2013) found the presence of owner-manager in management lowers the perceived control by 
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top management and in turn ensures mutual trust and respect between the managers and 
shareholders, thereby reducing agency problems. 
Further, the agency theory by itself provides weak empirical evidence regarding the efficacy 
of policing mechanisms that seek to mitigate agency costs (Tosi et al., 2000; Dalton et al., 
2007). For instance, empirical studies highlight the lack of efficient executive contracting 
(Bertrand & Mullainathan, 2001), the scarcity of relative performance evaluation of CEOs 
(Abowd & Kaplan, 1999), and the weak power of shareholders in selecting directors (Bebchuk 
& Fried, 2004). Furthermore, other factors apart from corporate governance failures can 
determine market swing of share prices; therefore, the market is seemingly punishing managers 
for prejudices beyond their control (Keynes, 1936; Shiller, 1989). Consequently, Daily et al. 
(2003) have argued that “(w)hereas agency theory is appropriate for conceptualizing the 
control/monitoring role of directors, additional theoretical perspectives are needed to explain 
directors’ resource, service and strategy roles” (Daily et al., 2003, p. 372). 
Finally, the weak institutional environment prevalent in developing countries weakens agency 
theory as a theory to use in isolation for research focused on investment analysts' perspective 
on governance drivers. Hence, although agency theory lends itself to information processing 
contingency theories (see Chandler, 1962; Galbraith, 1973; Lawrence & Lorsch, 1967), and is 
still acknowledged as a major theory for firm practices, it is not relied upon by itself for this 
study especially as it positions managers as people concerned only about their self-interests 
despite the responsibilities placed on them as stewards. 
Appendix 4b.  Stewardship theory 
Stewardship theory, rooted in sociology and psychology, is usually presented as the alternative 
theory to agency theory (Davis et al., 1997).  This is because stewardship theory rather than 
assume a divergence of principal and agent interests defines human relationships around a more 
robust behavioral model. Stewardship theory postulates instances in which a convergence of 
interests can occur, resulting in a more collaborative approach to governance. The theory also 
defines situations where managers are not necessarily motivated by individual goals, but 
instead are stewards whose motives are in tune with the objectives of their principal(s). The 
premises of stewardship theory follows from the underlying assumption that "pro-
organizational, collectivist behaviors have higher utility than individualistic, self-serving 
behaviors" (Davis et al., 1997, p. 24). Consequently, the satisfaction of stewards (executives) 
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is linked to the success of the organization, thereby creating organizationally centered 
behaviors. 
Stewardship theory further argues that managers have many motives to perform other than just 
self. These motives include recognition, intrinsic satisfaction and feeling of success (Marris, 
1964; Etzioni, 1975). As a result of this more trusting perception of management, stewardship 
theory does not advocate for some corporate governance mechanisms of agency theory. For 
example instead of board independence, the theory favors a majority of inside directors who 
bring company and industry knowledge and skills (Davis et al., 1997). Additionally, the need 
to separate the Chairman and the CEO as in agency theory is not viewed as central to effective 
board functioning. Stewardship theory presents managers as trustees of firms (Kay & 
Silberston, 1995) who should not serve the interest of residual owners alone but the wider 
environment as a whole. Donaldson & Davis (1991) argue that stewardship theory suggests 
that corporate governance practices should allow CEOs have high authority and discretion and 
where possible permit CEO duality (Davis et al., 1997). This argument, for instance, fits the 
case in developing countries, where firms are dominated by family ownership. This duality 
structure, however, is not permitted in the Nigerian banking sector as the Central Bank of 
Nigeria (CBN) mandates separation of CEO and board chairman positions very much in line 
with the agency theory model. 
Under the stewardship model, executives seek to maximize their utility as they achieve 
organizational rather than self-serving objectives. The contingency nature of this theory is 
based upon the idea that stewardship is about choice. Managers choose to behave as stewards 
or agents based upon their motivations and reading of the particular situation (Clarke, 2004). 
Similarly, principals also choose whether to create an agency or stewardship relationships 
based upon their reading of the situation (Clarke, 2004). Hence, rather than self-serving 
behavior, a steward's behavior will not depart from the interests of his or her organization. The 
steward will substitute behaviors that can be considered self-serving for cooperative behaviors. 
Thus, even in situations where the interests of the steward(s) and the principal(s) seem not 
aligned, the steward(s) place(s) a higher value on cooperation. This is because if the steward 
perceives greater utility in cooperative behavior and behaves accordingly, his or her behavior 
can be considered rational. 
Implied in this theory is the fact that the power of directors over the enterprise is derived from 
their democratic appointment by shareholders at the Annual General Meetings (AGMs). In 
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most developing countries, this largely remains a theory that has not and might not ever be 
practiced especially in those nations with dictatorial regimes (Adegbite, 2010). In Nigeria, until 
recently, the AGMs of many of the large corporations were fait accompli to rubber stamp 
government appointments and directives (Adegbite, 2010)  
Therefore, in spite of suggestions that executives/stewards in “loosely coupled, heterogeneous 
organizations with competing stakeholders and competing shareholder objectives are 
motivated to make decisions that they perceive are in the best interests of the group”, (Davis et 
al., 1997, p. 25),  this study is not concerned with the motives of managers to perform or serve. 
This present study concerns itself with the perspective of investment analysts on which features 
of good corporate governance drivers are important for investment decision-making purposes 
and why. As a result, the stewardship theory is not appropriate for this study especially as it 
accounts mainly for managers as stakeholders and not investors or investment analysts.  
Appendix 4c. Stakeholder Theory 
Stakeholder perspective can be traced to 1930's depression era when used by General Electric 
Company to engineer its survival (Preston & Sapienza, 1990). The theoretical concept here is 
that the general society expects firms to behave properly in a manner that guarantees their going 
concern and in manners that befits their social and economic roles. Freeman, (1984) defines a 
stakeholder of a firm as those who can affect or are affected directly or indirectly by the firm's 
success or otherwise. They can also exercise some form of power or discretion over the firm 
or its activities (Donaldson & Preston, 1995). Stakeholders are classified into two groups: 
primary stakeholders (e.g employees, management, investors, regulators, etc.), whose 
participation is essential for the survival of the firm, and secondary stakeholders (e.g analysts, 
NGOs, regulators, etc), who are not essential to the survival of the corporation although their 
actions and response can significantly damage or benefit the corporation (Freeman, 1984; 
Clarkson, 1995). However, the rights of all stakeholders should be considered to be equal 
(Freeman, 1994). 
Consequent upon this equal right, the stakeholder theory can be applied when investigating 
phenomena which generate mutual interests between different stakeholders, not focusing on 
trade-offs (Moriarty, 2014). These interests can even involve regulators who are interested in 
making effective policies for specialized sectors such as the banking industry. Moriarty (2014) 
advocated that stakeholders should be given opportunities to participate in the running of firms, 
recommending that managers do so by taking inputs and interests of other stakeholders during 
 470 
 
decision-making as it is believed that involving other stakeholders leads to better accountability 
(Gray et al., 1997). Lee (1998) believes that weak/failing management affects everyone not 
just shareholders and managers thus making the monitoring of firms the business and 
responsibility of everyone involved internally and externally with the firm. Furthermore, the 
involvement of more stakeholders might help contain crisis (Alpaslan et al., 2009) making the 
stakeholder model beneficial to the corporate governance practices of firms. 
Typically, the agency model predominately concerns itself with contractual relationships, 
(Giudice et al., 2013; Miletkov et al., 2014). However, the stakeholder theory's underlying 
philosophy is much broader and accommodates external and internal perspectives of anyone 
with connections to the firm (Conyon & He, 2016; Haβ et al., 2016). Therefore, this theory is 
more interested in a larger group than just the shareholders and their managers/agents (Mallin, 
2004; Nasi, 1995; Conyon & He, 2016; Haβ et al., 2016). Moreover, nowadays, firms' best 
assets are their personnel, knowledge, information, and relationships (Zingales, 2000). Indeed, 
when firms signal their corporate governance practices, different stakeholders will perceive the 
drivers of corporate governance differently. Therefore, the stakeholder perspective stresses the 
long-term economic relationships and going concern nature of firms, which are beneficial to 
managers, shareholders and other stakeholders. Stakeholder theory arises due to the rejection 
of the concern about maximizing the benefits of just a single stakeholder (shareholders) 
(Wijnberg, 2000). The stakeholder theory's main advantage is providing a means for dealing 
with multiple stakeholders with multiple conflicting interests as a firm does not focus on 
interests of just one individual stakeholder. Hence, the interests of the firm's different 
stakeholders are satisfied using system centered theory (Freeman, 1984). 
The stakeholder theory is categorized into three main aspects of normative, instrumental and 
descriptive. Normative stakeholder theory originates from the social entity concept of the 
independent firm. It presumes that in modern times, everyone has a stake in the firm. The theory 
supposes that in any society, shareholders own only shares as investors, while other 
stakeholders have other different types of claims to the firm (Mayson et al., 1994). Instrumental 
stakeholder theory posits that to improve the overall success of a firm, all stakeholders have a 
value (Slinger, 1998; Freeman, 1984). This does not suggest that shareholders right should be 
ignored, but instead, that other stakeholders can also lay claim to the firm (Gamble & Kelly, 
2001; Turnbull, 1994; 1997a). The descriptive accuracy of the stakeholder theory presumes the 
truth of the core normative conception. The normative approach is considered to be the central 
core of the stakeholder theory. The instrumental approach is the second level of the theory, 
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which predicts that performing certain practices, should mean certain results are obtained. The 
external shell of the theory is its descriptive aspects explaining the observed relationships in 
the external world. Therefore, stakeholder theory has been advanced and justified based on “its 
descriptive accuracy, instrumental power, and normative validity” (Donaldson & Preston, 
1995, p.69). Turnbull (1997a) postulates that stakeholder participation in corporate governance 
can engender firms to produce more accurate information of operation and management, 
thereby improving effectiveness.  
Especially in situations where stakeholders invest in firms, then the stakeholders should be able 
to lay claim to the firm and make specific demands of managers (Blair, 1995; Kelly & 
Parkinson, 1998). Therefore, corporate governance of firms should assign "control rights, 
rewards, and responsibilities to the appropriate stakeholders" (Blair, 1995, p 274). According 
to stakeholder theory proponents, if firms do not take into consideration the concerns of 
stakeholders, then the firm might cease to exist (Donaldson & Preston, 1995) or face rebuttal 
actions from the stakeholders (Reverte, 2009). As a result, to manage information needs of 
important stakeholders, firms have corporate disclosures (Reverte, 2009) as "the stakeholder 
theory explicitly considers the expectation impact of the different stakeholder groups within 
society upon corporate disclosure policies" (Reverte, 2009, p.353). However, although, 
proponents of the stakeholder theory focus on stakeholder relationships, they do not suggest 
equal treatment of all stakeholders (Moriarty, 2014) or that these treatments should 
compromise the objectives of the firm (Klettner et al., 2014). Instead, the stakeholder theory 
seeks to define specific stakeholders of a firm and satisfy the legitimate needs of these 
stakeholders as the success of a firm depends on the inputs of its stakeholders. 
Critics of the stakeholder theory posit that in the real world, trade-offs exist, and it is impossible 
to make decisions without trade-offs (Klettner et al., 2014). In addition, in reality, it is difficult 
for a firm to meet the demands of all stakeholders at all times (Klettner et al., 2014; Zeitoun et 
al., 2014). Some researchers such as Sternberg (1997) go further to suggest that stakeholders 
other than shareholders and agents are not able to provide either better corporate governance 
monitoring or better financial performance for firms. Further, some researchers have stated that 
the notion of considering the interests of all stakeholders may have been extended to an 
impracticable extent, and it is important for corporate managers and practitioners to know 
where to draw the line (Arenas & Rodrigo, 2016; Perrault & HcHugh, 2015). These criticism 
have failed to recognize an important element of the stakeholder theory which supposes that 
the more important the stakeholder to a firm, the more effort the firm puts into managing and 
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manipulate this relationship. Moreover, stakeholder theory posits the “all persons or groups 
with legitimate interests participating in an enterprise do so to obtain benefits and that there is 
no prima facie priority of one set of interests and benefits over another” (Donaldson & Preston, 
1995, p. 68). 
The corporate governance drivers signaled by firms can be used by the firm to influence their 
stakeholders in order "to gain their support and approval, or distract their opposition or 
disapproval' (Gray et al., 1996, p. 46). As stakeholder's priorities might be heterogeneous, the 
stakeholder theory focuses on the relationships and interactions between the firm or industry 
and the various stakeholders who compose the organizational/sectoral environment. Hence, the 
stakeholder theory can be applied such that rather than considering the social environment 
completely and assuming the homogeneity of stakeholders' perception and expectations it 
permits heterogeneity in thoughts and decision-making. 
However, the broad nature of the stakeholder theory makes it only partially suited for this 
present study. Although the stakeholder theory supports a concept where non-financial 
measures are designed to investigate firm activities (Logsdon & Lewellyn, 1998), it fails to 
recognize the agency challenges that exists between managers and investment analysts who 
make investment decisions. Moreover, even though environmentalists and consumerists 
particularly find a perfect ally in the stakeholder theory, the weak institutional environments 
prevalent in developing countries makes many stakeholders of a firm disadvantaged compared 
to certain principals and agents. Hence, some scholars apply the institutional theory to the study 
of corporate governance.  
Appendix 4d.  Institutional theory 
Institutional theory is a well-developed theory in management studies that presupposes that 
firms are not just concerned or affected by internal environment but also by its external 
regulatory, normative and cognitive institutional environment (Scott, 1995). Institutionalism 
assumes that organizations conform to accepted standards of behavior in an effort to enhance 
their survivability by gaining legitimacy with other external organizations. Leading from this, 
the institutional theory is based upon the idea that much of what shapes organizational 
structures and behaviors are a reflection of patterns that have evolved from doing things over 
a period. As a result, the prediction of organizational practices and their explanations can be 
arrived at by examining industry traditions and patterns (Eisenhardt, 1988; Judge & Zeithaml, 
1992). Thus, from an institutional theory perspective, in order to gain competitive advantage, 
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firms in particular concentrated industries adopt similar strategies (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; 
Meyer & Rowan, 1977; Scott, 1995) which leads to some form of homogeneity (D’Aveni, 
1994). This action makes some firm activities fashionable (Sharma & Vredenburg, 1998).  
Going further, institutional theory concerns itself with how firms seek to project themselves 
cognitively in order to be perceived as legitimate in society (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983) using 
what Di Maggio & Powell (1983) describe as one or a combination of "coercive, mimetic or 
normative" isomorphism. Isomorphism, according to DiMaggio & Powell (1983), explains 
how and why organizations conform to accepted norms. Perhaps it is not coincidental that 
Hoskissou et al. (2000) see institutional theory as one of the top three most insightful theories 
when delving into developing countries. Adegbite & Nakajima (2011b) showed two classes of 
institutional effects on corporate governance: those external (macro) and those internal (micro) 
to the firm. They provided empirical evidence to suggest that the external institutional 
environments, which profile a firm's corporate governance, consist of the country's social, 
economic, political, and legal environments, whereas those internal to the firm consist of the 
firm's/industry's values, culture, history, and ethics. They noted that this model represents an 
encompassing framework that provides illumination on certain institutional effects and 
relationships, thereby encapsulating the complex dynamics and realities of governance in 
modern-day corporations. This resonates with practices in Nigeria where corporate governance 
of financial institutions is dictated by regulation and mandated by the Central Bank of Nigeria 
(CBN).  Further, Useem & Zelleke (2006) argue that because of the need for isomorphism, 
firms that have to make public disclosures seem to align their behavior. Hence, banks boards 
operating in Nigeria, readily look to one another for guidance in aligning visible structural 
elements such as composition, size, committee structure, and policies involving compensation 
practices and ethics. 
Besides the external pressures to conform driven by publicly disclosed information, 
institutional pressures on boards to conform to industry norms can lead to passive acquiescence 
that does not contribute to the organizations’ interest and efficiency (Tolbert, 1985; Zucker, 
1997). In other words, firms’ corporate governance practices may be determined by conformity 
to environmental constraints. While centrally mandated governance reforms may invoke 
institutional changes, the impact may not occur uniformly across all firms due to variations in 
institutional inertia.  Institutional logics affect the flow of information and resources through 
relationships as well as network formation and evolution (Fligstein & Shin, 2007; Shin, 2013).  
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However, when it comes to actual behavioral processes in Nigeria, we should expect to see 
evidence of substantial variance from boardroom to boardroom. These differences present 
themselves in the Nigerian environment despite the enforced governance regulations. Also, 
while centrally mandated governance reforms may invoke institutional changes, the impact 
may not occur uniformly across all firms due to variations in institutional inertia. Furthermore, 
this current study concerns itself not with the conformity or otherwise of banks with mandatory 
regulations which produces the isomorphism. Instead, the study focuses on perspectives of 
investment analysts and how features of drivers of good corporate governance can influence 
their decision-making. The study is not primarily concerned with Nigerian banks' legitimacy 
or compliance with codes of corporate governance. Therefore, while the institutional theory 
has some relevance to this current research, it does not provide enough impetus to answer the 
research questions, which are concerned about perspectives of investment analysts on features 
of good corporate governance drivers that leads to decision making. Theories that explain the 
agentic relationship between external stakeholders and firm and psychological reasoning for 
actions these external stakeholders engage in are more relevant to this research.  
 
